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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

THE POLITICAL BEHAVIOR QE
CALIFORNIA COMMUNITY COLLEGE NURSING FACULTIES
IN RESPONSE TO BUDGET CUTBACKS. 1982-198?
This study explored the political behavior of community college nursing faculties
during a unique period of California history, 1982-87, when the community colleges
were struggling to adapt to the economic and political consequences of Proposition 13.
Using a two-phase qualitative design, it examined the effects of budget cutbacks
on the nursing programs at 38 community colleges statewide, including twelve targeted
for faculty layoffs, and identified the political behavior of their nursing faculties in
response. It then focused on six districts, varying in size, structure, and location, for a
series of in-depth case studies.

In four districts, nursing programs were targeted for

closure or downsizing; in two, they were not.

Surveys, telephone interviews, and

document review were the primary research tools.
The results showed that most faculties accommodated to across-the-board
cutbacks, but opposed and resisted selective termination, generally regarded as a crisis
situation.

One political benefit of accommodating was that little new behavior was

required and faculties could remain focused on their primary value, clinical teachings.
Efforts to alter college budget policy, on the other hand, required a level of governance
participation to which few faculties were willing to commit, absent a crisis. The faculties
targeted for layoffs orchestrated anti-termination campaigns to prevent the enactment or
reduce the scope o f the policy proposed.
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CHAPTER I

THE PROBLEM

Introduction

To those charged with responsibility for public welfare, political action to
influence public policy is a subject of considerable theoretical and practical importance.
Although the development of public policy normally takes a slow, plodding, incremental
course (Lindblom, 1980), occasionally environmental variables converge to produce a
public crisis necessitating rapid policy change. Such a crisis occurred in 1982-84, as
California struggled with economic recession. Actions taken by state officials to deal with
a substantial shortfall in state revenue resulted in the drastic reduction of funds for
community colleges. This, in turn, initiated a political battle over community college
finance and, in some districts, a spiral of institutional fiscal decline. The impact of this
chain of events was felt in all aspects of the community college system, including the
many areas of vocational instruction. The focus of this study is the political behavior of
community college faculty in one vocational area, nursing, in response to statewide events
and the local consequences of financial turbulence.

Statement of the Problem

Because of a combination of circumstances created by state economic conditions

I
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and the revision of California tax laws, California faced a genuine fiscal crisis in early
1982, which in turn led to an unprecedented political situation for the California
community colleges (Director's Report, 1982, September; Commission Report 1983,
June). Having depleted a huge budget surplus in the bail-out of public agencies after
Proposition-13, the California state government under the administration of Governor
Jerry Brown was forced to take drastic measures in order to avoid a budget deficit. These
included massive cuts to public programs.
One such reduction was a $30 million cut in the state's allocation to the
community colleges which came as the result of a political compromise.

In order to

forestall the imposition of student fees on a system traditionally tuition-free, the
community colleges agreed to eliminate hundreds of avocational and recreational courses
from their state-funded curriculum (San Diego Union. July 17, 1982). With the passage
of Proposition 13, the community college system had become the fifth largest item in the
state budget.

State officials, concerned about the escalating expense of the system,

sought ways to reduce that expense. One avenue was to impose student tuition as way of
raising revenue. The compromise worked out by the legislature under recommendations
from the California Post-Secondary Education Commission (CPEC) forestalled tuition-a
policy unpopular with educators and many legislators (Director's Report, 1982, JuneJuly).
Unfortunately, the situation worsened the following year, 1983.

The recession

failed to lift, and the state was forced to carry over a $ 1.5 billion dollar budget deficit
from the previous fiscal year. In order to balance the budget without a general tax
increase, the newly elected governor, George Deukmejian, among other actions, reduced
community college funds budgeted for 1982-83, and then reopened the issue of tuition by
vetoing $231,968,000, or 10.8%, of community college revenue, from the 1983-84
California Budget Act (Callan, 1983; Hayward, 1983).
That action led to a prolonged political struggle at the state level, one lasting the
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better part of a year. The central focus of the debate was the governor's proposal to
generate new revenue by levying a $100 per semester tuition fee policy (Director’s
Report, March-April, 1983).

Considered extremely controversial by its opponents,

Deukmejian's proposal cut to the philosophic heart of state education policy which for
years had maximized citizen access to post-secondary education. The proposal initiated a
very emotional debate over the merits of tuition and resulted in a long and bitter political
stalemate between the governor, and the Democrats in the state assembly who were
backed by several professional organizations and other interest groups (Los Angeles
Times. October 11, 1983).
By early 1984, a turnaround in the state economy made it possible to expand the
state budget for 1984-85.

Based on predictions of $3 billion in extra revenue,

Deukmejian increased state spending by 10.8%, and raised allocations for education (San
Diego Union. January 10, 1984).

Projected increases for higher education were

sufficient to restore community college base funds and fund other priorities such as the
important inflation, equalization, and growth funding provisions of SB 851, unfunded
since their enactment (Director's Report, July, 1984).
Reflecting the optimism accompanying improved conditions, state officials finally
reached a political compromise on the issue of tuition. That compromise, formalized in
AB 470 (Campbell), Chapter 3 (1984), and AB 1XX (Katz), Chapter 1 Second
Extraordinary Session (1984), called for an immediate restoration of $96 million in base
funds in return for the enactment of a $50 per semester student fee (Klass, 1984). With
the restoration of funds, the economic crisis in the community college system abated.
The resolution was not without an aftermath, however. Actions taken to deal with
the economic turbulence caused by the acute crisis brought additional economic
difficulties after the compromise was reached.

Many schools, for instance, limited

enrollment as a way of cutting expenditures, which in turn resulted in a reduction of
average daily attendance (ADA), the units for calculating district revenue allotments
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(Hayward, 1983). Official reports, in fact, documented a systemwide decline in ADA of
over 100,000 students (Los Angeles Times. January 4, 1984). Tuition opponents argued
that ADA decline was a predictable effect of the student fees levied under the compromise,
and predicted that student enrollment would continue to shrink. Indeed, in the context of
an uncertain future, the actual ADA losses initiated a spiral of fiscal decline in many
districts. Real and projected budget deficits, in turn, caused a serious economic challenge
to instructional programs and jobs (Los Angeles Times. September 22, 1984).
Given such conditions, it is understandable that administrators in many districts
would undertake program evaluations and efficiency and productivity assessments with
the aim of reducing expenditures. Indeed, verbal reports indicated that expensive allied
health programs such as registered nursing came under scrutiny for their peculiarly low
student-faculty ratios, ratios which made them particularly expensive to run (personal
communication, numerous Southern California Community College nursing program
directors, October-November, 1983). As colleges and districts set their priorities, some
nursing programs were targeted for cutbacks not always shared by other instructional
units. Many were forced to reduce operating expenses, while others made curriculum
changes or cut faculty and enrollment.
The focus of this study is the response of nursing faculty members to those
circumstances.

Aware of the administrative peculiarities of their programs, nursing

faculties could easily have anticipated cutbacks and taken action to secure their interests.
Nurses have a reputation for political apathy, however, a fact confirmed by the
professional literature in nursing which exhorts nurses to overcome their political inertia
and take an active role in public policy. Reputations often lag behind reality, however,
and subgroups may diverge from population norms. Whether or not apathy characterized
the faculty teaching in community college nursing programs between 1982 and 1987, the
years of severe community college economic crisis and aftermath, is a key issue that bears
investigation.
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Objectives of the Study

Archer and Goehner (1982) suggested that political action involves participating in
the democratic process for goal-oriented, cooperative problem solving by which the
action-taker stands up for his or her values and attempts to influence those with power to
vote for desired policy outcomes.
Archer and Goehner’s views mirror the perspective of Wirt and FCirst (1982) on
politics in educational systems. Wirt and Kirst emphasized that the essence of a political
act is the struggle of a group to secure authoritative support for its values.
Goehner’s views are also faithful to Mazzoni's definition of politics.

Archer and

Mazzoni (1980)

defined politics as an allocation process under which competing individuals and groups
seek decision benefits through the exercise of influence.
Activities aimed at influencing public officials, referred to as lobbying, are an
important form of political behavior. This study examined the lobbying and other political
behavior of community college nursing faculties in response to funding policy changes
stemming from resource decline. Its purpose was to aid a better understanding of the
political behavior of nurses.
The primary objectives of this study were to determine:
1. How and to what extent nursing faculty members on behalf of their own
interests acted to influence policies proposed in campus and state legislative arenas as a
response to the community college fiscal decline, 1982-87.
2. What factors influenced the patterns of political behavior exhibited by nursing
faculty members.
3. The impact of nursing faculty political behavior on policy decisions pertaining
to nursing programs.
The secondary objectives of this study were to determine:
4. How and to what extent the patterns of political behavior of nursing faculty
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compared to those of nonnursing faculty in the same community colleges subject to the
same budget cuts.
5.

How and to what extent the patterns of political behavior varied among

community college nursing faculties.

Conceptual Framework

The conceptual framework for this study is derived from three sets of abstract
ideas. The first set relates to resource change, its impact on organizational decision
making, and the resultant adaptations that occur through administrative action.

The

second set relates to factors that shape the interpretation of organizational changes by
constituency groups and the development of social crisis. The third set elucidates factors
that shape the political responses of constituency groups.

Resource Change. Organization J>ecision Structure and Administrative Strategy

The first part of the framework deals with the responses of institutions to resource
change. It consists of a model of cutback management developed by Levine, Rubin, and
Wolohojian (1981) in the early 1970s for the study of municipal fiscal crises. Modified
for academic organizations, this model was subsequently used by Sibolski (1984) in a
study of higher education.
As presented in Figure 1, the model suggests that resource change has an impact
on an institution's organizational decision structure that, in turn, determines the choices of
administrative strategies appropriate for dealing with resource change.

Levine et al.

emphasized that severe revenue decline often forces the employment of fiscal control
strategies which then alter institutional climate by fostering a realignment of formal and
informal authority.

By changing power relationships within and outside of an
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organization, such a realignment often acts as a constraint on administrative discretion in
selecting approaches to retrenchment

Resource Decline

Organization Decision
Structure

Administrative Strategy

Factors in resource decline;
revenue losses, inflation,
asset devaluation

Politicization of decision
making under conditions of
resource decline; Severity of
decline stimulates
constituency group activity

Options for cutback
management weighed;
Uncertainty fosters conflict;
original tactics altered

Figure 1. Model of the impact of resource decline. Adapted from Levine, Rubin, and
Wolohojian, 1981, pp. 26-32.
Retrenchment and Crisis in Organizations

The second part of the framework amplifies these ideas by looking at resource
decline from an organizational crisis perspective. In particular, it deals with variables in
the perception of crisis. Billings, Milbum, and Schaalman (1980) elaborated a model of
organizational crisis that included the factors displayed in Figure 2.

Discrepancy between
Belief that time is
Lack of a contingency
expected and available
+
insufficient to research + plan for dealing with the
resources result in threat
alternative
situation
to important values______________________________________________________
Figure 2.

Organizational crisis perspective.

Adapted from Billings, Milbum, and

Schaalman, 1980, p. 306.
Threat to important values which results from perceived resource discrepancy is
the salient and most fundamental aspect of the model (Milbum, 1972; Paige, 1972;
Robinson, 1972; Simon, 1977).
Billings et al. (1980) emphasized that once a discrepancy is perceived, the
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seriousness of the problem is judged according to the factors identified in Figure 3.

Perceived value of loss
Probability the loss will
Time pressure imposed
_______________________ +_________ occur_________ +_____ for the reaction
Figure 3. Factors in degree of crisis. Adapted from Billings, Milbum, and Schaalman,
1980, pp. 307-308.
Although crisis does not accompany all retrenchment, targeted cuts, for example,
tenured faculty layoffs and the termination of programs, lead to a particularly volatile
cutback climate that is associated with crisis (Deutsch, 1983; Kerlin and Dunlap, 1993;
Levine, Rubin, and Wolohojian, 1981; Powers, 1982).
Crisis, perceived or real, often results in conflict among the individuals and
groups in organizations (Hermann, 1963).

Cyert (1978) noted that organizational

cutbacks create an emphasis on survival that fosters conflict over and above the level
usually experienced under stable budget circumstances.

Hall and Mansfield (1971)

reported that financial decline in organizations increases personal stress and self-serving
behavior and reduces concern by individuals and groups for the organization as a whole.

Retrenchment and Political Behavior

The third part of the conceptual framework deals with additional social and
symbolic factors that shape a constituency group's response to institutional decline.
Authorities agree that resource allocation in schools and other public institutions is a
political process, particularly under conditions of scarcity (Cyert and March, 1963; Dahl
and Lindblom, 1976; Gumport, 1993, May-June; Krantz, 1988; Levine, Rubin, and
Wolohojian, 1981; March and Simon, 1958; Slaughter, 1993; Wanat, 1978; Wildavsky,
1984; Wiles, Wiles, and Bondi, 1981; Wirt, 1975; Wirt and Kirst, 1982).
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Budgeting, often described as a technical function, can therefore also be viewed as
a process of institutional priority setting, a political process, the outcome of which is
determined by the power relationships within and outside of an organization. Thus, the
relative power of an organization's constituency groups is often reflected in the allocations
made to subunits (Gumport, 1993, May-June; Wanat, 1978; Wildavsky, 1984). This
view represents the movement away from the rational model toward a political model of
organizational decision making.
Although budgeting is a constant feature of organizational life, interest in
organizational politics is not (Cohen and March, 1974). At any given time, participation
in politics is determined by important factors. Interest may be activated by dramatic
institutional conditions (Levine, Rubin, and Wolohojian, 1981), and particularly by
issues with important symbolic meaning (Edelman, 1967).

Interest is frequently a

consequence of scarcity since scarcity creates struggles for the allocation of resources
within an organization (Easton, 1971; Gumport, 1993, May-June).
Interest in politics is also a consequence of factors that shape political behavior.
Bamer-Barry and Rosenwein (1985) identified two broad categories affecting individual
behavior, personal factors and environmental factors. These factors converge to shape a
perception of justice that is the driving force of political behavior.
Personal factors lie within the individual and include the individual motives,
values, attitudes, and perceptions of others and of the organization and its structures and
functions that distinguish one individual from another.
Environmental factors are the factors beyond the individual that are shared with
others. One important environmental factor is the social context in which an individual
functions on a daily basis. According to Verba (1961), the primary group (small, face-toface group), by fostering group consciousness (shared opinions, attitudes, values), has a
powerful influence on the individual.

The primary group is instrumental in the

mobilization of political behavior because such groups are the locus of political decision
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making in an organization as well as the transmission points for political communications.
Thus, they exercise a major influence on the political beliefs and attitudes of group
members. In school settings, a primary group may be a faculty, a group of students,
clerical personnel, or a group of trustees or administrators-any small constituency bound
together by issues or interests.

Summary of Conceptual Framework

It is clear that the ideas of this conceptual framework overlap. To summarize and
integrate the three major aspects, it can be said that the first part of the framework outlines
the essential organizational aspects of resource decline, while the second and third
develop the psychosocial aspects more specifically related to political behavior. Taken as
a whole, the framework stipulates that institutions (including educational institutions)
function as political systems. In any context, resource decline creates a need for fiscal
control; however, control is difficult to achieve within a political system.

Control

strategies such as plans for expenditure cutbacks tend to activate the political
constituencies they affect The degree to which these constituencies mobilize depends on
the psychosocial variables-crisis perception and group consciousness as they reflect the
interaction of individual and environmental factors—all of which influence a collective
perception of justice. Subsequent efforts by constituency groups to influence those in
authority or to alter the balance of power on behalf of their own interests, often bring
them into conflict with institutional officials, and, in turn, the actions of these groups
make retrenchment plans more difficult or impossible to achieve, thus determining
politically the outcome of resource decline.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

11
Scope, Limits, and Limitations

This study explores the factors described above using a combination of survey,
case study, and document review research methods. First, it looks at the dimensions of
resource decline experienced by the California community colleges, the impact statewide
on nursing programs, and the patterns of political behavior employed by nursing
faculties. Then, using a case study approach, it describes the specific situations in six
districts selected for size, location, and approach to retrenchment. The examination of
institutional cases puts a focus on the perceptions of resource decline held by nursing
faculty members and the perceived effects that resource decline has on individual and
group values and goals.
The study also looks at the symbolic issues raised by retrenchment, and the ideas
and causal theories shared by members about their situation, and the effect those had on
group behavior; it looks at the faculty group in each case, and its structure and history as
those bore on the behavior of members; it considers the institutional supports for and
barriers to lobbying activities; and, finally, it looks at the role of group leaders in
mobilizing, organizing, and directing members' actions. All of these aspects are relevant
to the research objectives of this study.
A wide-angle perspective such as this demands an eclectic model of political
behavior. The one employed in this study blends the following political theories:
1. G am e T heory asserts that politics is a game, but one that vitally affects
groups and individuals with serious players, rules, goals, and scores (Brams, 1975;
Kuhn and Tuckers, 1953; Rapoport, 1966).
2. Exchange Theory explains political behavior as a series of exchanges in
which a player trades support for influence (Blau, 1964; Harsanyi, 1962).
3.

P lu ralist Theory emphasizes that interest groups are a basic feature of

organization life and conflict is a key element of interaction (Dahl, 1961).
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4. Political Elitist Theory postulates that power rests in the hands of a few
who occupy top positions in institutional hierarchies (Wright, 1956) and finally,
5. Conflict Theory contends that the exertion of control in institutional affairs
is a source of political conflict subgroups' divergent preferences for the allocation of
scarce resources (Kalisch and Kalisch 1982).
While its scope is broad, this study does have limits. It makes no attempt, for
example, to assess the political behavior of nursing faculty unrelated to economic crisis in
the community college system. Aspects such as personal political philosophy, party
affiliations, voting patterns, electoral campaign activities unrelated to the institution,
general political preferences, or any political behavior outside of the interests of the
faculty group or its program as affected by resource decline are beyond the scope of this
research.
It should be noted that this study is both exploratory and descriptive. It is an
initial attempt to investigate the complex factors in the political behavior of a subgroup of
nurses.

It employs a qualitative methodology that is well-suited to identifying broad

relationships, but not to the computation of exact tallies needed for quantifying subjects'
responses. A particularly important limitation characteristic of qualitative studies is that of
subjects' variable use of language and the difficulties this sometimes creates in
interpreting responses; another is the difficulty in controlling the array of factors that
affect survey and interview responses. (Miles and Huberman, 1984, May) The findings,
therefore, should help point a direction for further research, but are limited in their
generalizability and their applicability to particular settings until validated by future
studies.

Assumptions

This study makes the following assumptions:
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1. A representative democracy by its nature requires an exchange of values and
influence by its participants.
2. Community colleges as public agencies are political systems with many of the
features of a representative democracy and a structure and process akin to that of the
larger political system.
3.

Faculty and other groups in a community college comprise political

constituencies and participate formally and informally in the exchange of values and
influence that is part of setting institutional policy.
4.

Community

college resources are linked to the interests of college

constituencies.
5.

Community college faculty understand their role as participants in a

representative democracy.
6. Nursing educators comprise a faculty subunit which holds interests in common
with the college organization and the general faculty constituency.
While this study concentrates on the patterns of behavior exhibited by nursing
faculties in response to resource decline, the researcher makes no assumptions about the
character of those patterns. This study thus provides a test of theory in educational policy
making.

Definition of Terms

Political behavior/political action/lobbying. These terms as used in this
study refer to any behavior of individuals or groups that is aimed at influencing
authoritative decisions in public institutions.
Econom ic decline/fiscal

dow nturn.

These terms refer to deteriorating

economic conditions, whatever the cause, as they affect public agencies, including
community colleges.
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Revenue reduction/income decline.

These terms refer to reductions in

revenue from public sources available for the support of public programs such as higher
education.
Financial cutbacks/expenditure reductions/cost-cutting.

These terms

refer to official reduction in operating budgets necessitated by the loss of institutional
revenue that sometimes leads to retrenchment of public programs or services.
This term refers to cutbacks in instructional

Educational retrenchment.
programs,

services,

workforce,

or

enrollment

by

an

educational

institution.

Retrenchment can be achieved by managing the same programs, student number, or
services with fewer personnel, supplies or both-or by narrowing the scope of the
curriculum and services while making accompanying reductions in enrollment and
personnel.
Suggested

retrenchment

/

proposed

retrenchment

/

enacted

retrenchment. Suggested retrenchment is the condition that exists when officials have
made informal statements about the need to retrench but no official announcement of
intention to retrench. Proposed retrenchment is the condition that exists after officials
have made an official announcement of their intention to retrench but have not approved a
definitive action plan.

Enacted retrenchment refers to the state that exists after a

retrenchment plan is officially approved and implemented.

Significance of the Problem

Given that educational institutions operate as small political systems within the
community and the larger sphere of state government, an understanding of the actions of
college constituencies to achieve favorable educational policy decisions is important to
those who manage educational institutions (Wiles, Wiles, and Bondi, 1981; Wirt and
Kirst, 1982), particularly in today’s climate of public sector retrenchment. This study
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bears on the factors that promote political behavior in an institutional context.
Further, the nursing professionals who serve as the faculty for community college
nursing programs comprise a particularly important group.

Approximately 55% of the

labor force in nursing is educated in community college nursing programs (Waters,
1986).

Thus, these

teaching professionals are the initial role models and political

socializes for the majority of nurses educated in the United States. They are, therefore,
in a position to influence the oudook of most of those who enter the profession.
Nurses generally, however, are noted for their enduring ambivalence toward
politics and political engagement (Archer and Goehner, 1982; Bagwell, 1980; Berger and
Hunter, 1984; Cowart, 1977; Hayes and Fritsch, 1988; Hughes and Proulx, 1979;
McDermott, 1987; Schultz, 1983; Wakefield, 1990).

Ambivalence is a characteristic

which several authorities have described as an outcome of political socialization (Archer
and Goehner, 1982; Kalisch and Kalisch, 1982). As potential political socializes, the
political behavior of community college nusing educates is important to undestand—
especially now as the nation faces the highly political task of health care reform. This
study contributes to the goal of undestanding nuses' political behavior by examining, in
this historical instance, whether California community college nusing educates, under
conditions that significantly challenged nursing programs, were moved to lobby district
and state officials for policies serving their interests.
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CHAPTER n

LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction

This chapter reviews selected literature corresponding to the ideas introduced in
Chapter I. After an introductory section on the California community colleges, there are
sections on the Levine et al. (1981) model of cutback management, on retrenchment and
crisis in organizations, and on retrenchment as it affects political behavior.

The California Community College System

Understanding the effects of resource change on the community college system
requires a general understanding of how the system developed, and how it is structured
and financed.

Development of the California Community Colleges

The California community colleges began as an extension of secondary education
and much about their organization reflects those beginnings. Post-high school courses—
the courses for grades 13 and 14—were first authorized by the California state legislature
in 1907, and, in 1910, the Fresno, CA Board of Education established the state's first

16
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two-year college program. In 1921, the state legislature approved the creation of separate
local community college districts but continued its authorization of junior college
departments within K-12 districts. The number of campuses increased rapidly in the
1950s, and in the 1960s, colleges began to cut their ties to secondary systems; separation
was largely complete in the early 1970s (Weiler, Izu, Nelson, Pratt, Schoenhair, and
Stem, 1985).
Because of their origins in the secondary system, the community colleges from the
beginning were unlike the other institutions of public higher education in the state.
Indeed, the very ideas driving their development set the community colleges apart Those
ideas included (1) a belief that higher education should be available close to home (hence,
the construction of local district colleges), and (2) that classes should be open to all high
school graduates at no cost to students (hence, a no-tuition policy) (Commission for the
Review of the Master Plan for Higher Education, March, 1986).
Popular with the public, the community colleges expanded rapidly, particularly as
the baby boom generation arrived in the 1960s. They continued to grow in size and
number through most of the 1970s by offering educational opportunities to segments of
the population not previously included in the scheme of higher education. By the focal
period of this study, in fact, the California community college system had become a huge
enterprise, encompassing 106 campuses in 70 local districts, and serving more than 1.2
million students with an annual budget of $1.5 billion (Savage, 1986), out of an overall
state budget of $21.3 billion (Driscoll, 1984).
The original mission of the community colleges was to prepare students for
transfer to four-year institutions or for entry level positions in a variety of occupations.
The system gradually took on a far broader mission, however, as it expanded in the
1960s. Referred to as the “comprehensive community college,” this new vision expanded
the scope of college offerings to include not only traditional college courses, but also
remedial education courses, civic, cultural, and general education courses, community
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services, and basic adult education courses on a wide array of subjects (Director’s Report,
October- November, 1983).

Eundin£-Qf California-Community Colleges

Because of their origin in secondary education, the community colleges have
distinct similarities to the public high schools in their funding mechanism. Indeed, during
the years of this study, community college districts used the average daily attendance
(ADA) as a workload measure for the computation of local district allocations, the same
measure used for public high schools. Although that system was subsequently changed,
ADA being augmented by additional workload measures (AB 1725, Vasconcellos, 1988),
it contrasted at the time with the funding approaches used for the state universities and the
University of California. Those approaches were (and are) the line item budget and block
grant mechanisms. Although the UC and CSU systems also use workload formulas in
constructing their budgets, unlike the community colleges, they did not then and do not
now rely on any singular measure of input or output to establish their revenue. More
importantly, the community colleges, similar to the K-12 districts, received and still
receive a part of their revenue from local property taxes, although the proportion for most
districts was decreased from over 50% to under 30% by Proposition 13.

The state

universities and the University of California do not share directly in this latter source of
funding (League of Women Voters, 1986).

California Community College Governance

Prior to Proposition 13, the governance of community colleges showed striking
similarities to that of the K-12 districts in that policy control was substantially in the hands
of locally elected boards of education. That pattern, which evolved from the system of
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property tax financing (League of Women Voters, 1986), gave local community college
boards the authority to set property tax rates for generating college revenues, as well as to
adopt local budgets and set local education policy (Weiler et al., 1985).
However, in 1978 the passage of the tax-limitation initiative substantially altered
that system by limiting the incremental rise in property tax rates, permanently
withdrawing the prerogative of local trustees to adjust district property taxes as college
needs required. The chief funding source for local districts thus shifted from property
taxes to the state general fund.
Not surprisingly, doubtful forecasts about the future of local control followed,
and, indeed, important changes in state-local power relationships occurred. As Gooder
(1984) noted, local trustees lost their control over revenue, but retained control over
expenditures.
Authorities agree that power shifted from local boards to the state government
with the change in funding (Gooder, 1984; Savage, 1986). The system of strong local
boards with weak state coordination gave way to a new system that valued accountability
over access and diversification (Gooder, 1984). Before Proposition 13, state legislators
showed little interest in local budgets or local spending priorities, but as the state assumed
greater responsibility for meeting local obligations, state policy makers paid increasing
attention to the scope of college operations. Moreover, under the new system, power
accrued to the California Community College Board of Governors and to the state
chancellor who became responsible for central planning in the system. The community
colleges thus became an increasingly important aspect of California state government
(Weiler etal., 1985).
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Resource Change, Organizational Decision Structure, and Administrative Strategy

Resource Change

As a concept, resource change deals with the various factors that diminish revenue
and lead ultimately to organizational retrenchment.

Levine, Rubin, and Wolohojian

(1981) developed a model that emphasizes the commonalties of formal organizations in
adapting to financial stress. Resource change is the independent variable and determines
the character of the organizational adaptation.

Theoretical Views on Resource Change

Theories of resource change focus on cycles of revenue expansion and contraction
and their causes and effects, and assume a direct relationship between economic
conditions and government spending (Biller, 1980; Bozeman and Slusher, 1979;
Gumport, 1993, May-June; Levine, 1980; Levine, Rubin, and Wolohojian, 1981; Lewis
and Logalbo, 1980; McTighe, 1979; Whetten, 1980).
At an abstract level, they postulate that economic downturn creates a necessity to
align government spending with dwindling financial resources, and thus encourages
competition for appropriations among the various agencies of government as debates on
government priorities ensue (Bozeman and Slusher, 1979; Lewis and Logalbo, 1980).
Eventually economic downturn, reflected in spending adjustments, results in
reduced allocations to public programs.

According to Levine, Rubin, and Wolohojian

(1981), the impact of resource change on public agencies depends on the degree of
revenue change, and, more importantly, the level of decline reached. These authorities
hypothesized that fiscal stress begins at the point of no revenue growth, when institutional
stress may not yet be evident At this stage, the signs of stress are often masked by an

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

21
agency's use of excess resources or reserves, referred to by Levine and associates as
“slack”--unutilized revenue accumulated during periods of growth before economic
downturn occurs. Severe decline, however, unlike mild or even moderate decline, cannot
be masked. Typically, the slack is gone and this leads to deep cutbacks in services and
dramatic changes in organizational decision making. By all authoritative descriptions, the
financial conditions in many, if not most, California community colleges between 198287 constituted a state of severe decline.
Whetten (1980) offered a theory of resource change as it relates to organizational
decline in public institutions. He identified four factors as the sources of decline: (1)
organization atrophy—successful organizations frequently grow overly confident and less
responsive to new challenges as they mature; (2) environmental entropy—the capacity of
the environment to support an organization, as Whetten observed, is crucial to its
survival, but sometimes changes; the options open under a reduced capacity for support,
according to Whetten, are to “find another ecological niche,” or to “scale down
operations,” which is a more common approach in public organizations which have more
difficulty redirecting themselves than private institutions; (3) political vulnerability—the
base of political support for public institutions is fragile, even for established
organizations; excessive demands for public resources may, according to Whetten,
ultimately outstrip the capacity of government to deliver on its promises and this
frequently results in a change in government; (4) loss of legitimacy-changes in the match
between an institution's mission and public priorities affect public willingness to support
an institution; overemphasis by an organization on expanding allocations and lack of
emphasis on cultivating political acceptance of programs, according to Whetten, erode
support.
Whetten suggested that under conditions of environmental entropy, organization
atrophy and loss of legitimacy lead to political vulnerability. Authorities have argued that
in California the expanded scope of the comprehensive mission rendered the community
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colleges politically vulnerable (Gooder, 1984; Hayward, 1986).

The Changing Environment of Higher Education

Changes in the financial conditions of higher education institutions were first
noted by Cheit (1971; 1973) in the late 1960s and early 1970s. His studies examined 41
American colleges and universities and found evidence of financial stress, despite the
enormous growth of higher education in the same period.
Cheit's work subsequendy led to the development of a large literature on higher
education financial trends and fiscal forecasting. This literature established that higher
education was affected by powerful factors fostering a continuous decline of revenue.
Reduced enrollment from demographic fluctuation (Carnegie Council, 1980; Crossland,
1980; Hodgkinson, 1983), declining revenues related to enrollment falloff, reductions in
public and private funding (Kaysen and Sloan Commission, 1980; Mortimer and Tierney,
1979), and inflation and rising costs (Mortimer and Tierney, 1979) all contributed to
revenue loss and a need to retrench.

Factors in California Community College Resource Change: The Tax-Limitation Initiative

Although the California community colleges were subject to the conditions
described above, the literature clearly points to the 1978 tax-limitation measure as the
unique and most profoundly disruptive factor in their financial situation.

Authorities

agree that resource changes resulting from the passage of Proposition 13 created a
wrenching fiscal crisis in the system (Jackson, 1981; Kintzer, 1980; Koltai, 1979;
Lombardi, 1979; McCartan, 1979; McCuen and Hoffland, 1978; McKinley, 1984;
Meardy, 1979; Permaul, 1985; Pickens, 1981). These changes were not isolated from
other events before or after the initiative, however.

McKinley (1984), for instance,
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described a context of fiscal stress that existed prior to 1978. The taxation equalization
formula imposed by the Serrano-Priest decision in 1969 initiated the resource decline that
tax imitation ultimately deepened. After 1978, another change-tax indexing-augmented
the drop in public revenue that resulted in the state budget crises of 1982-83 and 1983-84,
setting the stage for the fiscal situation in community colleges between 1982-87.
To understand the situation, a review of the tax-limitation initiative is helpful.
Proposition 13 cut property taxes to a base o f 1% of 1975-76 appraised property value,
restricted tax assessment increases to 2% annually, and mandated a two-thirds vote of the
legislature or the local electorate as necessary to change property taxes. Revenue loss
from these factors was estimated at $7 billion annually (McCuen and Hoffland, 1978).
City and county programs felt the loss of funds most acutely, since the property
tax was their prime revenue source.

Community colleges, which were funded by

property taxes, experienced the most direct impact, with only an indirect effect on the
other segments of the postsecondary system (Hayward, 1986; McCuen and Hoffland,
1978; Permaul, 1985; Pickens, 1981; Savage, 1986).
At the time of Proposition 13, the community colleges were essentially tuition-free
and relied on property taxes for over 50% of their operating revenue. After Proposition
13, they lost an estimated two-thirds of their local revenue (McCuen and Hoffland, 1978;
Lombardi, 1979). They also lost their ability to raise local revenue through tax increases
(McCarten, 1979). Not only was the amount o f available local revenue reduced, but also
the authority o f districts to adjust tax rates was nearly eliminated.
Despite the partial relief brought by emergency funding legislation, revenue
reduction took an immediate toll on community college finance. (Koltai, 1978).
out measure authorized the use of state treasury surpluses to replace revenues.

A bail
That

action restored funds to about 87% of their prior level (Kintzer, 1980; McCuen and
Hoffland, 1978; Pickens, 1981).
Nevertheless, cost cutting became necessary throughout the system.

Individual
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districts took various budget-reducing measures (Jackson, 1981).

Their strategies

included spending reserves, reducing program offerings, increasing class size, cutting
course sections, reducing faculty through attrition, retirement incentives, or layoffs,
consolidating administradve positions, imposing self- supporting policies for student and
community services, and reducing purchases of institutional equipment and supplies
(Jackson, 1981; Koltai, 1979; Lombardi, 1979; McKinley, 1984; Meardy, 1979;
Permaul, 1985).
Loss of revenue was accompanied by a 10% decline in enrollment systemwide
(Lombardi, 1979; McCuen and Hoffland, 1978). Given that allocations were based on
enrollment, it is not surprising that diminished enrollment would contribute to fiscal stress
in the system. Many observers believed that increased student fees played a part in the
loss of students (Permaul, 1985).

Nevertheless, widespread climate of uncertainty

resulted in a heavy toll on morale in many districts, and particularly on the campuses that
sustained the most drastic losses (Bowen and Glenny, 1980).

Factors in California Community College Resource Change: The Politics of Tuition

Environmental entropy and community college politics. The reduced capacity of
the environment to support the community colleges changed the political climate of higher
education in California.

In particular, revenue reduction forced a reconsideration of

funding policy for the community college system.

The issues centered mainly on

community college curriculum and tuition policy (Jackson, 1981; Lombardi, 1979;
Koltai, 1979; McCarten, 1979; Permaul, 1985; Savage, 1986).

Loss of legitimacy and curriculum politics. Under the new conditions of scarcity
in California following Proposition 13, the financial commitment required of the state by
the comprehensive mission of the community colleges emerged as a volatile political

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

25
issue. Officials asked: What programs and services should the community colleges
offer, and what should they charge the students for those offerings?

Ultimately, the

rising costs of the community college system in the context of a precipitous loss of
revenue caused by state tax law changes hastened a challenge to the comprehensive
mission which politicized the community college curriculum.
The politics of curriculum officially began with a 1979 classification study
mandated by Assembly Bill 8 which required the state community college chancellor to
examine the status of all credit and noncredit courses. Intended to help correct the severe
state budget crisis, that action reflected “long-held legislative concerns about the proper
role, mission,

function, and funding of the California Community Colleges”

(Commission Report, 1982, p. 3).
The classification study's findings indicated that 19% of the credit student contact
hours were generated by courses in physical education, fine and applied arts, and other
nonacademic, nonvocational courses (Commission Report, 1982). In an official report to
the state legislature, analysts commented that “some observers perceived this
concentration as an imbalance in the community college curriculum” (Commission
Report, 1982, p. 3). Thus, the comprehensive community college mission, viewed by
public officials as incorporating controversial elements, suffered a substantial loss of
legitimacy (Pickens, 1981).
The politics of curriculum accelerated in March of 1982, when Assembly
Concurrent Resolution 81 directed the California Postsecondary Education Commission
(CPEC) to conduct a study of the impact of student charges on access to the community
colleges.

Recognizing the resolution as a clear step toward tuition, the California

Postsecondary Education Commission made an effort to protect the no-charge policy for
academic courses and occupational programs.

It recommended that the $30 million

reduction in state apportionment be reflected in decreased support for noncredit,
recreational, avocational, and personal development, adult and community education
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courses (Commission Report, 1982). Some analysts referred to this as a “trim-the-fat”
strategy.

The legislature, as a result, passed AB 21, which directed the California

Community College Board of Governors to discontinue all state support for such courses.
Districts approached “defunding” in various ways.

Most dropped courses in

accord with a highly publicized course list adopted by the state board of governors in
July, 1982 (Commission Report, 1983).

Many districts, however, undertook more

severe retrenchment than required by the defunding legislation. In 60% of the districts,
entire degree or certification programs were eliminated (Director's Report, June, 1983).
In all, more than 5,200 credit courses and 386 noncredit courses were deleted from
college catalogues (Commission Report, 1983).

Political vulnerability and appropriation politics.
political strategy were short-lived.

The effects of defunding as a

Within months, analysts and the politicians who

supported student fees were again challenging California's tuition-free policy--the symbol
of equal access to postsecondary education (Jackson, 1981). The prospect of user fees,
however, was again met by strenuous opposition from community college officials,
faculty and students (Jackson, 1981; McCartan, 1979; Permaul, 1985; Savage, 1986).
Ultimately, an intense, rancorous controversy developed between the proponents and
opponents of tuition (Savage, 1986).
The politics of tuition became even more partisan when in early 1983 the new
Republican governor of California, George Deukmejian, proposed a tuition fee of $ 100
per semester. Democratic party leaders, backed by community college officials, wanted
no part of a tuition policy (Savage, 1986). To surmount the political barriers before him,
the governor forced the issue by withholding state funds budgeted to the community
colleges for 1983-84, vetoing $231,968,000 which included $108.5 million in base
funding (Hayward, 1983). In signing the budget act (which took place on July 22, 1983-well into fiscal year) the governor indicated that he would support legislation to reinstate
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$105,766,000 in base funding provided that it included authorization for a $100 per
semester student fee (Director’s Report, March-April, 1983; July, 1983). For the next six
months, the governor and state legislators engaged in a political dance in which proposals
from each side were toyed with and ultimately rejected by the other (Los Angeles Times.
August 2, 20, 1983; September 14, 16, 21, 23, 24, 28, 30, 1983; January 5, 11, 14, 18,
1983).
Responsibility for the prolonged impasse seemed to rest primarily with Democrats
in the state assembly, with the Office of the Chancellor, and with the leaders of the large
urban districts. According to Patrick Callan, the director of CPEC, and several unnamed
political insiders interviewed by William Trombley, Los Angeles Times staff writer, those
officials assumed the coalition of community college interest groups allied with the
Democrats would prevail. Consequently, they never treated the new governor's proposal
seriously (Los Angeles Times. October 11, 1983).

Dominated by the large, urban

community college districts-Los Angeles, Oakland, San Diego, and San Francisco-with
their strong ties to the teachers' unions, the coalition refused to compromise. However,
the state chancellor, Gerald Hayward, a one-time Democratic legislative aid, also came
under criticism for assuming the Democrats would ultimately defeat the tuition proposal at
a time when the community colleges had lost their credibility with the general public (Los
Angeles Times. October 11, 1983).

Organizational atrophy and the politics of decline. The $232 million lost to the
governor's 1983 veto represented a 11% decline in community college buying power
(Hayward, 1983).

It deleted $86,700,000 in cost-of-living salary adjustments,

$27,250,000 for enrollment growth, and $10,690,000 in aid for equalization (Director's
Report, July, 1983) which put the financially weaker districts in considerable jeopardy
(Los Angeles Times. July 15, 1983). Discouraging predictions from state-level planners
warned of the inability of many districts to adjust. A CPEC Director's Report (July,
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1983, p. 1) referred to the funding picture as “worse than the worst case contemplated in
advance.” CPEC indicated that deferred maintenance necessitated by the reductions would
result in deteriorating facilities, and obsolete educational equipment which would take a
toll on program quality (Director's Report, July, 1983). Further, Chancellor Hayward
indicated that 15,000 course sections would have to be canceled, thus reducing enrollment
by 163,000 students, and causing corresponding reductions in system revenue (Los
Angeles Times. July 22, 1983.) CPEC subsequently studied the cumulative impact of
defunding and the revenue veto, and concluded that the community colleges were scaling
down operations to an extent that changed “the character and scope of these institutions”
(Commission Report, 1983, p. 16). Overall, the politics of decline caused a climate of
crisis and uncertainty in which no coherent debate over the future direction of community
colleges was possible (Director’s Report, June, July, 1983).

Institutional reassessment and political compromise. By 1984-85, however, the
picture had substantially changed.

A turnaround in the state economy significantly

increased state revenues, and the 1984 Budget Act showed a projected 18% growth over
the previous year's expenditures. For the community colleges there was an increase of
10% in overall funding over the previous year. Funding for the inflation, equalization,
and growth provisions of SB 851 was finally possible, and there was a 100% increase for
deferred maintenance needs (Director's Report, July, 1984).
In light of these changes, the stalemate between the governor and the legislature
came to an end on January 20, 1984. A compromise agreement restored $96 million to
the community college budget in return for a $50-per-semester tuition fee. It did not
correct the fiscal problems in the system, however, at least not immediately. For several
reasons enrollment continued to decline. Instructional retrenchment, student fees, and,
improved postrecession job availability, perpetuated the vicious cycle set in motion by the
veto, and resulted in some districts in further funding reduction and retrenchment.
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Thus, the problems—fiscal and political—persisted even after the compromise.
The $50 tuition fee became a symbol of fundamental change in community college
governance (Permaul, 1985; Savage, 1986). However, Savage (1986) reported that the
political disagreements were finally relegated to an independent body, the Commission on
the Review of the Master Plan for Higher Education. That body sponsored a full-scale
policy debate over the mission of the community colleges. Ultimately, its actions led to
omnibus legislation for the reform of the mission, governance and finance of the
community colleges formalized in AB 1725, 1988 (California Community Colleges,
October, 1988).

Organizational Decision Structure

The Levine model hypothesizes a complex linkage between changes in
institutional resources, institutional authority, and community power relationships.
Organizational decision structure is the intervening variable in the model which connects
resource change to administrative strategy. Levine et al. defined organizational decision
structure as the relationship between formal authority and interest group structure, both of
which help to shape organizational decisions (Levine et al., 1981). Sibolski (1984), who
adapted the Levine model for higher education, modified that definition to focus on the
internal decision making patterns or governance system of higher education institutions.
However, Zoglin (1976), criticized definitions that emphasize internal organization
mechanisms to the exclusion of the external superstructure affecting policy. He called for
a broader view-one that encompasses both.

Based on Zoglin's ideas, this study will

expand the concept of organization decision structure to include the influence of outside
groups and structures that play a role in the community college governance.
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Definition of Governance

Random House Unabridged Dictionary defines governance as the exercise of
authority or control, and as the method or system of government or management.
However, governance is assigned various connotations in the education literature where
the themes of direction, authority, and control are recurring ones (Corson, 1960; Monroe,
1972; Thornton, 1972), as is the relationship of authority to decision making.

Wiles,

Wiles, and Bondi (1981) focused on decision control as central to school governance.
Deegan (1985) viewed governance as the social framework in which decision making
occurs. Alfred and Smydra (1985) stressed that community college governance is a
process of locating authority for academic decisions.
Another theme in the education literature is scope of participation. Zoglin (1976)
referred to governance as a process of making decisions about the purpose, procedures,
and performance of an institution, and emphasized that community college governance is
the means by which gU interested parties-individuals, groups,
governmental units-participate in making college policy.

agencies, and

The Western Interstate

Commission for Higher Education defined governance as “all aspects of the control and
direction of community colleges” (WICHE, 1985, p.3). These views share assumptions
with the Levine et al. model and the public administration approach on which it rests
(Peterson, 1976). In this study, organization decision structure is taken to mean the
control exercised by all parties for identifying college policy.

Resource Change and California Community College Governance

Consistent with the Levine etal. (1981) model, resource change caused profound
changes in California community college governance. The paragraphs below describe
those changes.
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Resource change and the state role in governance. One of the key questions after
Proposition 13 was the extent to which decision making authority had shifted from local
districts to the state. Alfred and Smydra (1985) noted the expanded influence of “state
systems”—the executive, the legislative, and administrative aspects of state government
Operationally, state systems include the governor, legislative committees on education and
finance, the legislative staff, the state budget office, the state higher education planning
commission (CPEC), the community college governing board, and the state chancellor.
The economic and political events occurring between 1982-87 focused attention
on the role of the governor and legislature in community college governance. Pressure
from a longstanding economic recession necessitated state fiscal adaptations at about the
same time that tax-limitation created a constitutional mandate for an executive and
legislative review of public priorities. The roles-regulatory and advisory-of the state
planning commission and the community college governing board also became stronger.
(Hayward, 1986).
The shift in control occurred as a direct result of changes in community college
funding

(Hayward, 1986; Jackson, 1981; Lombardi, 1979; McCuen and Hoffland,

1978; McKinley, 1984; Palmer, 1985; Permaul, 1985; Savage, 1986; Tillery and
Wattenbarger, 1985).

With the passage of Proposition 13, the community colleges

became dependent on state funds to an unprecedented extent Influence over community
colleges accrued to the executive, legislative, and administrative authorities with power to
determine the volume and distribution of allocations to the system (Alfred and Smydra,
1985).
Issues of state control extended to the relationship between funding formulas and
academic programs.

Thus, the actions of state administrative bodies reflected a

substantial coalescence of power (Mingle, 1981).

Resource change and the local role in governance. Theoretically, local authority
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diminishes as central control over financial and curricular decisions accrues (Alfred and
Smydra, 1985). Although authorities disagree about the extent to which the control of
funding policy actually shifted in California (Hayward, 1986; Pickens, 1981; Schmidt,
1986), they agree that gains in control by the state limited the discretion of local bodies
(Alfred and Smydra, 1985; Weiler et al., 1985; Hayward, 1986; Jackson, 1981;
McKinley, 1984; Permaul, 1985; Savage, 1986; Tillery and Wattenbarger, 1985).
Authorities questioned how much power the local board retained to effect policy.
Weiler etal. (1985) conducted a comprehensive study and found a considerable change.
Neither local trustees nor the state board of governors controlled how much money a
district received. Tillery and Wattenbarger (1985) noted, however, that local governance
endured as a value, which created a dichotomy between ideals and reality. In their view,
that dichotomy fostered a crisis of governance: neither the state nor local bodies held all of
the elements needed to govern effectively.
Thus, state and local power relationships took on a certain ambiguity. The budget
approach used by state bodies allowed local districts to maintain much of their traditional
discretion (Pickens, 1981). However, local boards, showing the conservatism that often
accompanies fiscal stress, tended to behave as if control had shifted to the state
(Henderson, 1978; Jackson,

1981).

Authorities referred to this situation as

“organizational dualism” (Alfred, 1985; Cohen and Brawer, 1982), or “bifurcated
governance” (Hayward, 1986), both of which connote authority split between funding
and operational control.
Dualism had interesting effects on state-local relationships, one of which was that
local constituencies began to take their issues directly into the state political arena
(Hayward, 1986; Tillery and Wattenbarger, 1985).

Figure 4 depicts the new

relationships in California as conceived by Tillery and Wattenbarger (1985).

Groups

interested in influencing policy-associations of trustees, administrators, faculty, and
community interest groups—directed their issues to state legislators, and thereby gained
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public attention and created political pressure for local policy outcomes. Lobbying by
organized interest groups thus became an important factor in local governance. Tillery
and Wattenbarger (1985) referred to such groups and their activities as the “shadow
governance network” (p. 14), a phrase describing lines of authority not usually
represented on official organizational charts.

Coordination

Coordination

Figure 4. Governance of California community colleges: structure and context
Note. From “State Power in a New Era: Threats to Local Authority” by D. Tillery, J.L.
Wattenbarger, 1985, New Directions for Community Colleges. 49, p. 15. Reprinted by
permission.
Resource Change and Local Governance Relationships and Roles

According to the Levine model, power and influence relationships change as
resources erode.

Several authorities studied the influence patterns surrounding

community college policy and found changed relationships under conditions of declining
revenue.
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Trustee/administrator relationships. Hayward (1986) studied decline and found
that the dominance of administrators over local policy decreased as resources became
scarce and local political groups intensified their activities.
Gleazer (1985) observed that the trustees, whose electoral fate rested on
maintaining a level of community approval, took increased responsibility for defining
policy and resolving conflicts. Recognizing the potential for litigation that exists when
conflicts emerge over local compliance with state regulations, trustees began to monitor
the actions of administrators more closely (Cohen and Brawer, 1982; Gleazer, 1985;
Hayward, 1986).

Tensions between the local board and president were frequently

resolved by a turnover in the chief executive position (Gleazer, 1985).

Top and middle administration relationships. Several authorities found that fiscal
crisis substantially changed administrative decision making routines, shifting budget
decisions centrally and weakening department influence over program planning and
staffing decisions, particularly as these tended to expand operations (Bozeman and
Slusher, 1979; Hayward, 1986; Rubin, 1978).

President's role. Hayward (1986) found that local presidents took on expanded
duties in the area of state accountability; these stressed a new role in developing data
systems for rational planning. Revenue decline created the need to consider the interests
of campus constituencies and community groups in decision making, which in turn
defined the president's role as political strategist (Alfred and Smydra, 1985; Hayward,
1986).

Faculty and student roles.

Other authorities observed that as fiscal stress

increased, faculty interest in governance issues related to planning, budget, and
retrenchment priorities grew, despite the limits on shared governance typical of
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community colleges (Alfred, 1985; Alfred and Smydra, 1985; Cohen and Brawer, 1982).
Alfred (1985) linked this new concern to faculty anxiety over cutbacks. With changing
market conditions, some disciplines became more valuable than others in the competition
for students.

That divided faculty along rank and department lines, and served to

fragment faculty interests (Alfred and Smydra, 1985). To some extent, the effect was
offset by collective bargaining associations which rallied to protect faculty contracts in
situations where job security was threatened. Increasingly, governance items appeared in
union contracts. Although faculties gained small increments of authority by this means,
their ability to influence retrenchment by collective negotiations remained limited because
of the inter-unit competition inherent in retrenchment (Alfred, 1985).

Role of community interest groups.

Fiscal stress fostered conditions that

amplified the role of community interest groups in community college governance (Alfred
and Smydra, 1985). Pasqua (1979) noted that local groups seeking to preserve their
special interests expressed their concerns by increasing their engagement with the
trustees, the administrators, and the media in an effort to influence policy (Pasqua, 1979).
Moreover, as resources declined, community college officials increasingly solicited
private funding from business and industry which, in turn, empowered community
groups as governance advisories (Alfred and Smydra, 1985; Allen and Hughes, 1982;
Baily, 1986).

Models of Governance

Models of community college governance describe the character of the
relationships among those who influence policy decisions. Three models are repeatedly
mentioned: the bureaucratic, the collegial, and the political model (Baldridge, Curtis,
Ecker, and Riley, 1978; Bensiman, 1984; Deegan, 1985; Gollattscheck, 1985; Palmer,
1985).
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The bureaucratic model.

The bureaucratic model, which rests on a view of

decision making as rational and devoid of conflict, conceives of organizations as
hierarchical in structure with authority flowing along formal communication lines from the
top to the bottom of the hierarchy (Weber, 1969; Merton, 1957). Control is centralized in
top administrative positions; information for decision making flows upward to decision
makers, and decisions flow downward to decision implementers (Bensiman, 1984;
Deegan, 1985; Gollattscheck, 1985). In academic settings, such a model results in a
minimum of decision sharing (O'Hara, 1990).

The collegial model. The collegial model looks at academic organizations as a
community of scholars (Millett, 1962). Decisions are a product of exchange in which
those bearing responsibility for decisions and those affected by them cooperate in a
process of consensus formation. Conflict is suppressed by the reasoned sharing of
specialized knowledge. The faculty as professional experts, and the administrators as
operational experts, are both empowered to control organizational goals and policy
(Bensiman, 1984; Deegan, 1985; Gollattscheck, 1985).

The political model.

The political model looks at organizations as miniature

political systems comprised of interest groups with diverse needs, values and goals
(Baldridge, 1971). Diversity makes consensus unrealistic. Therefore, competition for
control of resources prevails, and organizational conflict results. Decisions are achieved
through a bargaining process. Pressure is brought to bear on the decision makers by the
formation of coalitions among interest groups comprised of trustees, administrators,
faculty, students,

clerical workers,

citizens (Bensiman,

1984; Deegan,

1985;

Gollattscheck, 1985). In academic settings both internal and external constituencies exert
control over policies and enjoy strategic options not defined in the institution’s
organizational charts.
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An Integrated Model

In a classic meritocracy, the system of authority is relatively weak, and subunits
enjoy a high degree of functional autonomy (Mintzberg, 1979; Mintzberg, 1983). The
community college differs from the classical meritocracy, however, in that it is subject to
administrative dominance, central control, and a high degree of influence from the
environment (Baldridge, 1982; Baldridge, Curtis, Eckert, and Riley, 1978; Bensiman,
1984).
Baldridge (1982) observed that the presence of academic senates in community
colleges gives the impression of a meritocratic structure, yet the collegial model fails to
explain decision making in community colleges. Nor does the bureaucratic model suffice,
although Bensiman (1984) concluded that it better explains community colleges because it
highlights their similarities to the secondary system’s pattern of governance.
Mintzberg (1983) recognized the need for a more complex model, especially under
conditions such as resource scarcity that breed conflict. He recommended a political
model with bureaucratic and collegial elements--one that recognized the unstable
configuration of organizational power that occurs when there is conflict
Mintzberg (1979; 1983) therefore blended those elements in the design of an
integrated model. His integrated model incorporated five internal structural elements: (1)
the “strategic apex” designating the trustees, president and vice presidents who ensure that
the organization's mission is served; (2) the “operating core” which refers the faculty and
unit supervisors who perform the basic work of the organization; (3) the “middle line”
representing the division deans and associate deans who extend formal authority from the
strategic apex to the organization's functional units; (4) the “technostructure,” the analysts
(accountants, planners) who design and run the formal control systems, and (5) “support
staff,” the clerical, cafeteria, and mailroom employees, and the payroll and public
relations officers who support the primary function of instruction.
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Mintzberg (1983) referred to these elements as the “internal coalition”~the
elements of the organization concerned with decision making on a permanent, regular
basis. A diagram of the internal coalition appears in Figure 5.
Mintzberg contended that under ordinary circumstances coordination is achieved
by a bureaucratic process with a parallel democratic system for the operating core, when
such a system is supported by organizational philosophy. According to Mintzberg, to the
extent a bottom-up influence exists, there will be tension between the strategic apex and
the operating core, a relationship also noted by Hannan and Freeman, (1988). Mintzberg
emphasized that a fluid distribution of power is enhanced by collective organization of the
operating core, which in turn serves to politicize decision making under unstable
environmental conditions (Mintzberg, 1983).
Mintzberg (1983) also identified the powerful elements in the environment that
influence institutional decisions. These elements comprise the “external coalition,” the
alliance that exerts influence from outside of the organization, but which has a less than
full-time commitment to the decisions of the organization. They include (1) the “public”
consisting of government at all levels, governmental agencies, and detached groups such
as special interest groups sufficiently affected by the actions of an institution to attempt to
influence it; (2) “associates” referring to students and graduates; and (3) “employee
associations” referring to unions and professional groups. A fourth element, “owners,”
as conceived by Mintzberg, refers to the voters and tax payers. A diagram of the external
coalition appears in Figure 6.
According to Mintzberg (1983), conflict typifies the relationship between the
internal and external coalition. The external coalition, in the face of resistance from the
internal coalition, tries to control the organization's actions by imposing formal
constraints (laws, regulations), mounting pressure campaigns (demonstrating, lobbying,
attracting media attention), invoking direct controls (mandating authorization, limiting
budgets), and by influencing the election of members of the governing board.
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Technostructure
Middle
Line

Operating Core

Figure 5. Mintzberg's diagram of the professional bureaucracy
Note. From The Structuring of Organizations (p. 20) by H. Mintzberg, 1979, Englewood Cliffs, NJ:
Prentice-Hall. Reprinted by permission.
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Figure 6. Mintzberg’s internal and external coalitions
Note. From Power In and Around Organizations (p. 29) by H. Mintzberg, 1983, Englewood Cliffs, NJ:
Prentice-Hall. Reprinted by permission.
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Activation of the external coalition, a difficult process, usually corresponds to
mounting frustration from some fundamental change in the organization, such as a
marked shift in an institution’s fiscal position or the established order of power.
Mintzberg (1983) contended that the external coalition, which is characteristically divided,
derives power from the dependency of the internal coalition on its environment. It is this
dependency, according to Mintzberg, that makes it necessary for insiders to respond to
external influence. Mintzberg also emphasized that the flow of power between coalitions
is extremely complex, and often features alliances that make it difficult to distinguish the
insiders from the outsiders.

Administrative Strategy

Administrative strategy refers to the approach chosen to reconcile organizational
output with a change in resources. In the Levine model, administrative strategy is the
dependent variable and is related to the degree of revenue decline that occurs, and
corresponding changes in the organization decision structure.

Theoretical Views on Cutback Management

Retrenchment causes organizational stress, authorities agree (Bowen, 1983;
Dallam and Hoyt, 1983; Deutsch, 1983; Halvorson, Levine, Marks, and Strohm, 1985;
Kerlin and Dunlap, 1993; Mingle, 1981; Powers, 1982; Rubin, 1978; Volkwein, 1984).
Administrators, however, are frequently unprepared to deal with scarcity, just as an
institution's constituencies are often reluctant to accept the need to retrench (Rubin, 1978;
Volkwein, 1984). Under conditions such as these, the context of management is one of
enormous and sometimes conflicting pressures to avoid the risks of choice-making that
accompany almost every course of action.
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Administrative options. Mingle and Norris (1981) distinguished two basic types
of retrenchment strategies, (1) strategies that stave off organizational change, and (2)
strategies that adapt the organization to its new circumstances.
Strategies to prevent change, called resistance strategies, are based on the belief or
hope that retrenchment is temporary.

Costs are frozen, reserves are spent, new

obligations are postponed (Deutsch, 1983).

Seeking new students is a common

resistance strategy in academic institutions (Mingle and Norris, 1981).

Attracting new

sources of revenue is another resistance strategy, as is actions to remove the causes of
revenue decline.
Adaptation strategies are based on the assumption that decline will persist and
require institutional change. Adaptation involves cutbacks of two types: (a) across-theboard cutbacks, and (b) selective or programmatic cutbacks (Dougherty, 1981). Acrossthe-board measures involve a uniform reduction in the budget for all units and are usually
aimed at reducing services that are peripheral to the institution's mission. Such measures
include administrative consolidation, reduction of part-time and clerical personnel,
reductions in capital purchases, supplies and maintenance, and student services. Acrossthe-board cuts, because they preserve all the units of the institution, are useful when the
fiscal situation is short-termed.

Their use in long-term decline is limited, however,

because at some point such cuts compromise the effectiveness of the institution (Bowen,
1983; Dougherty, 1981-B).
Selective cuts, on the other hand, are appropriate for severe economic decline
(Doughtery, 1981). They include departmental consolidation and size reduction, and the
elimination of departments or programs which often involves forced layoffs (Mingle and
Norris, 1981). Such measures allow for an internal reallocation of funds, but require a
reassessment of priorities and a political evaluation of institutional constituencies (Mingle
and Norris, 1981).
A third type of adaptation strategy-one not often mentioned in the literature-is the
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manipulation of the environment to increase an organization's competitive advantage
(Whetten, 1980; Cameron and Zammuto, 1988). This type of adaptation aims to shape
economic and social policy and to change public opinion by various means, all in support
of the needs of the organization. Such measures require time, and thus are not helpful in
the case of an acute crisis.

Evaluation o f options. Cutback management involves evaluation to find the right
mix of strategies. Volkwein (1984) identified two important types of evaluation; (a) the
rational/analytical and (b) the political/legal.
Rational/analytic evaluations are directed at assessing the likely impact of
resource decline on the institution. Such evaluations involve forecasts of economic and
institutional variables. From these, planners construct scenarios of best, worst, and
probable cases and prepare strategies for each possibility (Bozeman and Slusher, 1979;
Dougherty, 1981; Powers, 1982).
The difficulty with rational evaluations is that economic variables are difficult to
predict and forecasts are thus unreliable (Powers,

1982).

Rubin (1978) studied

universities adapting to reduced appropriations and found budgets often in doubt until
after the fiscal year had begun.

Internal allocations had to be adjusted to last minute

changes in revenue. Costs and enrollment patterns did not always follow the expected
course, making it necessary to reframe decisions, sometimes over and over again. The
budget information necessary for assigning unit allotments was difficult to obtain, and
departments frequently used information distortion as a survival strategy.
Political/legal evaluations are directed at assessing factors related to internal
and external politics and the legal characteristics of the situation (Volkwein, 1984). The
objective is to predict the conflict likely to accompany various administrative options.
The difficulty with political evaluations is that it is hard to predict conflict in
advance without knowing whether the best, worst, or probable case will prevail. This
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leads to differences between official pronouncements on the need for cuts and the size of
the actual cuts made. Such discrepancies foster skepticism, cynicism and noncompliance
among constituents, and may take a political toll in that they often turn retrenchment into
an adversarial process (Cameron, Kim, and Whetten, 1988; Levine, 1980).

The treatment of constituencies. Powers (1982) emphasized that the treatment of
constituencies is a primary consideration when programs are discontinued.

Gumport

(1993) described the enormous human cost of eliminating academic positions. Because
the consequences of mismanaging termination are severe, termination is usually avoided
by managers until no other option is open (Mingle and Norris, 1981).
Major questions confront administrators faced with program termination.
Dougherty (1981) emphasized that to protect against arbitrary decisions, there is a need
for meticulous program review and criteria to safeguard faculty and students. Tactics to
assure fairness, according to Deutsch (1983), do not eliminate conflict, but make it more
manageable.
Volkwein (1984) stressed the importance of having faculty task forces look at
priorities and resources. He called for openness by administration, broad participation by
constituencies, and mechanisms for the consideration of appeals. Powers (1982) stressed
the need to involve faculty members in establishing cutback criteria and procedures, and
to publish the results for all groups to review.

Leadership. Leadership is critical to the success of any retrenchment strategy.
Some authorities analyzed style of leadership as related to retrenchment situations.
Powers (1982), for example, emphasized that style is important, noting that how one acts
often determines whether one can act. Others stressed the importance of encouraging all
of the constituencies to express their opinions. Deutsch (1983), for example, pointed to
the paternalistic style as particularly unsuitable for organizations being downsized.
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Hayward (1986) also noted the ineffectiveness of the bureaucratic, top-down approach in
troubled times. Krantz emphasized the importance of responding to the personal concerns
of staff members threatened by retrenchment
Rost (1991), on the other hand, addressed the nature of leadership, which he
defined as an influence relationship among leaders and followers who intend real changes
that reflect their mutual purposes. In Rost’s view leaders are those individuals who seek
to engage others with an interest in the institution to act as joint architects of a change
required by new institutional conditions. Thus, to Rost, leadership is not a matter of
style, but part of the process of change.

Resource Decline and Institutional Politics; The Levine Model

Derived from a study of the severe fiscal crisis in New York City in the mid
1970s, the Levine Model depicts the relationship between resource change (growth and
decline) and the changes in organization decision structure and administrative strategy that
derive from it.
Levine et al. (1981) defined three levels of resource decline: (1) no growth, (2)
moderate decline, (3) and severe decline. According to the model, each has a unique
effect on formal and informal authority in policy making.

Resource decline and slack. A key concept in the relationship between resource
decline and authority realignment is the idea of “slack” resources. As stated on page 21,
slack is the revenue not needed for current operations. Slack increases under conditions
of revenue growth but diminishes as income declines (Levine et al., 1981).
In a political system, slack is used by those with formal authority to build
coalitions in order to overcome resistance to change. According to Levine et al. (1981),
slack is an essential tool of conflict management
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When revenue growth ceases as it does when inflation equals revenue gains, slack
resources usually diminish but remain sufficient to keep organization service levels
temporarily constant. No authority realignment occurs (Levine et al. 1981).
In moderate decline, resource growth fails to cover the inflationary rises in costs.
Slack depletes, and officials as a result may be unable to consolidate power sufficiently to
make the organizational changes needed. Under these conditions, resources are usually
rationed, but without the attraction of the rewards made possible by slack, interest group
activity remains low.
In severe decline--an actual decline with respect to the previous year's revenue
adjusted for inflation--the slack is gone, and administrators are forced to reconstitute their
control by reorganizing the institution. These conditions favor vigorous interest group
activity. Such activity can no longer be mitigated through rewards.

At the same time,

drastic administrative actions foster conflict with constituencies vying to protect their
interests (Levine et al., 1981). Under these conditions, administrative decisions are made
as much for political expediency as for fiscal solvency.
Slack as a concept applies to academic systems to the extent that academic officials
allocate excess funds to (1) increase salaries, lighten faculty workloads, provide faculty
with opportunities (sabbatical leaves, release time), or (2) meet public needs by paying for
programs or services (Manns and March, 1978; Rubin, 1978)).

In educational

institutions, as in other institutions, the strength of formal authority is often related to the
availability of slack resources for achieving institutional or subunit goals. For example,
the use of slack for a faculty salary increase may quell faculty frustrations and quiet
activity by that constituency.

Resource decline and administrative strategies. Levine et al. (1981) argued that
the politics of retrenchment are more or less determined by the severity of decline as are
the administrative strategies appropriate to the situation.
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The Levine model links the three stages of resource decline to appropriate
administrative strategies. No growth, according to the model, demands denial and
delay strategies.

These include the use of one-time revenues, contingency fund,

depletion, asset liquidation, maintenance deferral, and borrowing on future growth.
Moderate decline demands stretching and resisting strategies.

This refers to

across-the-board tactics such as rationing services or cutting the workforce by attrition
(Levine et al., 1981). Robbed of reward power, the political position of administrators
may be weakened in states of moderate decline. But according to the model, without the
incentive of rewards, interest group activity often remains low.
Severe decline demands cutting and smoothing strategies which include
personnel layoffs, service termination, and facility closure (Levine et al. (1981). Severe
decline tends to strengthen the political position of administrators to consolidate their
authority for making changes in the institution. However, it also generates interest group
activity and political coalitions which attempt to protect their shared interests.

Retrenchment and Organizational Crisis

Uncertainty, conflict, and stress, the hallmarks of crisis, typify the climate created
in organizations by severe financial downturn. The term crisis denotes a drastic social
condition initiated by factors that threaten to overwhelm an organization.

Retrenchment as a Context for Organizational Crisis

A rapid decline in economic resources places all groups in an organization at risk
for stress. Stress, an aspect of crisis, emanates from a perceived need to protect one’s
interests.
The social conditions accompanying retrenchment, when they reach a state of
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crisis, complicate the application of adaptive solutions for addressing resource decline.
Cyert (1978) noted that in retrenching organizations there is an emphasis on survival that
intensifies conflict between individuals and groups. Hall and Mansfield (1971) described
the self-serving behavior and diminished concern for the organization as a whole that is
often characteristic of threatened groups. Hayward (1986), moreover, characterized the
role of administrators in dealing with severe decline as “mitigating chaos.”

Further,

Rubin (1978) observed that crisis prompts administrators to adopt risky strategies to
minimize the social effects of dwindling budgets.

A Concept of Organizational Crisis

Crisis Perception

Billings, Milbum, and Schaalman (1980) suggested that a determinant of whether
an individual is influenced by or attempts to influence others in relation to a situation is the
extent to which he or she perceives that situation as a crisis.
Hermann (1963), who elaborated one of the best known models of organizational
crisis perception, described crisis as a situation that (1) threatens high priority values of
the organization, (2) presents a restricted amount of time in which to respond, and (3) is
unexpected or unanticipated by the organization (Hermann, 1963, p. 64).
Billings, Milbum, and Schaalman (1980) analyzed Hermann’s model and the
empirical tests that followed, and concluded that threat and time were indeed important
factors, but that surprise did not receive empirical support. They modified Hermann's
model by incorporating two additional factors, (1) sensing a problem, and (2) defining a
problem as a crisis.

Sensing a problem. The Billings model stipulates that the first step in defining a
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situation as a crisis involves perceiving the event or problem that triggers the crisis.
Citing the decision making literature, Billings et al. (1980) contended that a problem is
experienced when a discrepancy or gap is perceived between the existing state and a
desired state.
Their review of the literature pointed to complexities in the information, rigidities
in belief, the perceptions of outsiders, and historic standards as important factors in how
indicators are chosen. They found that the degree of a discrepancy determines whether it
is noticeable, and the significance o f a discrepancy is judged according to the
consequences that result, which in turn is followed by an adjustment in the threshold for
identifying subsequent problems.

Defining a problem as a crisis.

According to Billings et al. (1980), once a

discrepancy is sensed, the seriousness of the problem is evaluated by those it affects. The
perception of crisis is then a function of (1) the perceived value of the possible loss, (2)
the probability of the loss, and (3) time pressures for responding. Thus, the greater the
value of the loss, the worse the imminent consequences, the more likely its perceived
occurrence or insufficient the time to deliberate, the more likely it is that a situation will be
judged a crisis.
Billings et al. (1980) diverged from Hermann's model in rejecting surprise as a
factor, but allowed that an absence of contingency plans, more likely if an event is
unanticipated, increases the probability that the situation will be judged a crisis.

The

Billings model is important because it is more explicitly perceptual than Hermann's. As
Billings and associates noted, “Crisis is defined by a set of variables as perceived by
the decision maker” (p. 306). Crisis, under the Billings model resides in the person as
well as in the situation. Kuklan's (1988) findings also supported such a view.
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Coping with -Organisational Crisis

The effects of crisis on an organization are diverse. Hermann (1963) suggested
that on the positive side, crisis may lead to tighter organizational integration, innovations
for meeting problems, or a clarification of values.
On the negative side, crisis may lead to behavior that limits organization viability.
Hermann (1963) identified poor precrisis organizational integration, the kind that results
in a tendency toward factionalism and withdrawal behavior by subgroups and individuals,
as an important factor.

He contended that crisis tends to cause a reduction in

communication channels and a shifting of authority to higher levels in the hierarchical
structure, both of which increase stress on the subunits and raise the probability of
conflict between authority and subunits.
Staw, Sandelands, and Dutton (1981) elaborated a “threat-rigidity” thesis to
explain behavior in organizational crisis. Their thesis relates individual psychology and
group social patterns to organization-level phenomena. According to the thesis, threat
conditions cause a restriction in information processing and a constriction of social control
at all levels, individual, group, and organization.
At the individual level, the evidence for a threat-rigidity thesis, according to Staw
et al., is in the tendency o f threatened individuals to fail to heed warnings, to “freeze-up,”
or fixate their behavior. Threatened people tend to adhere to previously learned solutions,
whether or not these are appropriate to the crisis situation.
At the group level, evidence is observed, according to Staw et al., in the effect of
threat on group cohesiveness which varies as a function of the success of the group's
efforts to cope. There is also confirmation in the effects on group leadership and social
control. Members often blame the leader for causing or failing to correct the conditions
that threaten the group.

Threat in turn increases pressure for a uniformity of attitude,

opinion, and action within the group.

Members perceive that such uniformity is
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necessary to achieve a collective goal.
At the organizational level, evidence for the thesis can be found, according to
Staw et al., in a restriction of the alternatives considered by policy makers who may
approach problems in a stereotyped way, often with a predominant concern for efficiency.
It is also observed in the centralization of authority and the formalization and
standardization of procedures.
Staw et al.(1981) contended that the effects at the individual level shape group
patterns, and, likewise, that group processes shape organizational processes and policy.
The interest of members in the welfare of the organization may be central or peripheral.
Top administrators may defend the interests of the whole organization while middle-level
administrators frequently express more loyalty to their subunits. The interests of subunit
members, according to Staw et al. (1981), are often peripheral to the organization and
heterogeneous in character.

Retrenchment and Political Behavior

Retrenchment and political behavior deals with the relationship between
institutional cutbacks and additional factors that help to mobilize political behavior.
The literature indicates that resource change brings changes in organization
decision making and administrative strategies which, in turn, influence the character of the
responses of institutional constituency groups. Political behavior is an important category
of constituency response. The factors that activate it are described below.

Theoretical Views on the Activation of Political Behavior

Bamer-Barry and Rosenwein (1985) developed a model of political behavior
based on the ideas of Easton (1971), Nimmo (1978), and Smith (1968). They looked at
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politics as the authoritative allocation of values for a society, political behavior as the
activity of people for regulating their conduct under conditions of social conflict, and the
political process as the activation of issues by authorities, with decisions on involvement
made by partisans who have an interest in the issues.

According to Bamer-Barry and

Rosenwein, personal and environmental factors act jointly to influence political behavior.
Bamer-Barry and Rosenwein (1985) identified three themes that characterize
political behavior: (1) its conflictual nature, (2) winning and losing, and (3) the perception
of justice. They contended that the nature of politics creates a dynamic under which some
individuals or groups obtain a larger share of the allocations than others. The disparity in
allocations causes persons to perceive themselves as winners and losers in the process,
and judge the outcome in normative terms regarding the fairness of treatment and justice
of the decision.

The Development of Political Interest

It is also important to understand how political interest develops.

Cohen and

March (1974) contended that in academic organizations, it is the symbolic significance of
issues that determines the number of participants and the intensity of their political
enthusiasm.

Ordinarily, the involvement level is low and people are passive, but

periodically an issue with symbolic meaning excites arousal.
The symbolic meaning of program closure in educational settings is important It
represents the termination of a policy, and termination, which suggests endings, has a
potent symbolic meaning. DeLeon (1978) likened policy termination to other kinds of
termination: coup d’etat, revolution, surrender, bankruptcy, retirement, divorce, and
death. All of these are crisis events that connote unpleasantness and failure which people
naturally want to avoid. Gumport (1993) likened the individual experience of termination
to the reality of grieving for one's “silenced life.”

Thus, it is clear that program
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termination, through the images inherent in its symbolic meaning, has the potential to
engender strong social resistance to an organization's strategic plans.
The organizational impact of policy termination can be wrenching.
termination galvanizes anti-termination coalitions (DeLeon, 1978).

Policy

Moreover, it

frequently causes participants to question the legitimacy of the exercise of authority
(Bamer-Barry and Rosenwein, 1985; Behn, 1977; Levine, 1980). Behn (1978) noted
that the conflict generated by “big-bang” termination (large scale cuts on a compressed
time schedule) is particularly public and intense, but alternatives to termination frequently
involve dme (cutbacks as a gradual, decremental process) and money (cutbacks achieved
by positive incentives) which may or may not be available.
Finally, political arousal changes the decision culture of an institution.
Schattschneider (1960) conceptualized the change as a transformation from a closed
system of central control with consensual decision making supporting the status quo, to
an open system of decentralized decision making, with factious issue oriented debate,
ideological disagreement, and conflict resolution by majority rule.

Involvement in the Political Process

Bamer-Barry and Rosenwein (1985) classified the factors mobilizing political
behavior as personal and environmental. They emphasized that these categories interact to
influence any given individual's response to events.

Personal factors in political behavior. Personal factors are factors in a person’s
subjective experience that are connected or related to his or her will to act in a political
way. Personal factors include motives (needs, drives, impulses), emotions (feelings),
faculties (skills, abilities), and habits. They become related to political behavior by the
process of political socialization which is the process through which individuals learn
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what it means to be a member of society.
Personal factors also include cognition—a person's mechanisms of knowing about
the world. “Social cognition” is particularly important It refers to the means by which
individuals come to know other people, their identity and motives. A related paradigm is
the “information processing” perspective (Neisser, 1976). It focuses on the inferences
one individual makes about the nature of other individuals or the situation which then
become related to his or her own behavior. The attributions thus assigned and categories
used to describe people and events, the implicit theories an individual generates to explain
behavior and represent the social world, are relevant to political behavior, according to
Bamer-Barry and Rosenwein (1985). All of these factors enable persons to interpret and
make predictions about the environment and the people in it, and thus provide a basis for
individual decisions about becoming involved in a conflict situation.

Environmental factors in political behavior. Bamer -Barry and Rosenwein (1985)
distinguished two categories of environmental factors: (a) macroenvironmental factors
and (b) microenvironmental.
M acroenvironm ental factors are factors not present in the individual’s faceto-face interactions but which surround the individual in a larger, more impersonal social
framework. Specifically, Bamer-Barry and Rosenwein (1985) identified the impact of
organizational context, social class, history and culture.

Of particular interest is the

organizational context which is, conceptually, the whole of the structure of an
organization that has an impact on the lives of individuals in it, even though they interact
with only a part of the organization.
Organizational context has an impact through the communication of role
expectations.

According to Bamer- Barry and Rosenwein (1985), the positions of

people in political organizations vary greatly in the demands and expectations they place
on behavior.

They stressed that vertical position in a hierarchy of authority is an
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important factor. Generally, the higher a person’s position in an organization, the easier it
will be for him or her to exercise influence over others. However, they also pointed out
that high positions may constrain the political options of the people occupying them by the
contractual responsibilities they impose. Such positions, which require an orientation to
the organization as a whole, limit as well as expand the options for problem solving.
Organizational crisis as a context for decision making also enhances the motivation
to behave politically. It is generally true that when people perceive a crisis, they also
perceive a threat to their values and recognize that unusual action is necessary (Billings et
al., 1980)
Microenvironmental factors refer to the face-to-face, personal interactions
between individuals in their immediate, up-close surroundings.

Bamer-Barry and

Rosenwein identified two important features of the microenvironment that relate to the
decision to become involved in the political process: the normative structure and the
interpersonal structure.
The normative structure is made up of the rules and ideas people hold about how
they should behave in specific situations. The interpersonal structure is comprised of the
size and arrangement of groups.
One of the most effective social structures for transmitting social norms is the socalled primary or face-to-face group, comprised generally of no more than 20 people
(Verba, 1961).

Such groups influence member opinions by the affective person-to-

person ties they support, and the social needs they fulfill for their members. The degree
of influence of a group exerts depends on its members’ needs for group acceptance and/or
avoidance of the sanctions that the group places on nonconforming members (Verba,
1961).
According to Verba (1961), small groups play a decisive role in establishing
political attitudes and opinions, in training political skills, and in activating and shaping
political behavior. Of particular importance is the role of the small group in validating
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political behavior as relevant to members' goals and as an effective means to achieve those
goals.
Small groups also act as a screen for messages from the external environment.
Through the influence of small group opinion leaders, the interpretation of events by
group members is modified which in turn may result in “groupthink” or group
consciousness (shared attitudes, opinions, values). Moreover, small group interactions
affect not only the content of a member's political attitudes but the intensity of these
attitudes as well.
Bamer-Barry and Rosenwein (1985) emphasized that the perception of justice,
also shaped by small groups, is the driving force of political behavior. Within small
groups, the results of policy decisions are evaluated in terms of the fairness of the process
and justice of the outcome. The perception of justice, in turn, is linked to decisions on
actions to rectify perceived injustice.

The Political Behavior of Nurses

In educational settings, as in other settings, the ideals of cutback management are
not always applied to retrenchment planning. Parker (1984) noted that neglect of rigorous
guidelines occurs during periods of scarcity just as in periods of abundance.

The

personnel often affected first are those whose voices are least audible; vocal interest
groups, on the other hand, prompt administrators to acquiesce to their recommendations.
Much rides, then, on the ability of those who must deal with the consequences of
retrenchment to activate their own political behavior.
Clearly, nursing programs, which sometimes cost twice the average expenditure
per ADA, were and are a potential target for selective retrenchment In the context of the
uncertain funding environment, 1982-87, nursing programs became part of a high-risk
category, a fact apparent to nursing program administrators from the outset At least two
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state reports, one from the California Postsecondary Education Commission (Director's
Report, June, 1983), and another from the Chancellor of the California Community
Colleges (Hayward, 1983), focused on nursing and other allied health programs as
appropriate units for review and as objects for retrenchment consideration. By inviting
scrutiny, those reports created an opportunity for local administrators to satisfice
decisions on program termination, and established a need for political will among those
reviewed.
The literature on the political behavior of nurses describes nurses as generally
reluctant to engage in the risk-taking behavior that political activism requires (Archer and
Goehner, 1982; Kalisch and Kalisch, 1982). Experts identify many factors to explain
that pattern.

They include the following: patterns of female political socialization,

common personality predispositions among those attracted to nursing, patterns of political
education in nursing, occupational sex segregation, the demands placed on women by
contemporary society, the disparity between the education and social class levels of men
and women, and the depoliticized culture of the nursing workplace (Archer and Goehner,
1982; Kalisch and Kalish, 1982; Taylor, 1995; Wright, 1989).
Within this literature, a collateral tract exists which is best described as a “how to”
literature.

Apparendy meant to counteract nurses' natural tendencies, this literature

stresses the importance of political activism by nurses, and describes the concepts and
processes that support political behavior.

In these articles, nurses are credited with

understanding of the importance of political involvement, but are presumed to be
politically naive, wary of power, and reluctant to engage in conflict (Beck, 1982; Berger
and Hunter, 1986; Cowart, 1977; Garant, 1982; Girot, 1990; Hughes and Proulx, 1979;
Larsen, 1982; Maraldo, 1982; Perry and Jolley, 1991; Winter, 1991).
Empirical studies present a mixed picture. Schultz (1983) studied the political
values of nurses as measured by the Allport-Vemon-Lindzey Study of Values and found
scores “skewed toward low.” Although nurses felt “personally powerful,” they also felt
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“politically powerless.” Schultz's data showed that subjects were not political
participants.
Hanley (1983) studied nurses' political orientation and activities and compared
their responses with women in two other professional groups—teachers and engineers.
While controlling for higher education, she found that there were no significant
differences in political participation among the three professional groups.

Her data did

not confirm the expected lower nurse participation rates related to occupational gender
segregation.
Small (1989) studied several variables to the political participation of nurses and
found that although nurses in the study (N = 247) revealed a desire to have influence on
others (social power motive), they tended to be political spectators and apathetics.
Daffin (1988) studied the political expectations and participation of nurses and
found that although 91% of her sample (N = 190) reported holding expectations that
nurses should involve themselves in political roles, only 26% reported doing so. Daffin
concluded that although nurses have high political expectations, they are active primarily
as voters.
Three studies dealt with work-related variables that bear on the involvement in
institutional politics. Coudret (1980) studied community college nursing faculty and
found that as a result of collective bargaining and the success of bargaining units in
equalizing faculty workloads, nurses were no longer dissatisfied with workload policies.
Her conclusions suggested that longer hours--a peculiar function of the structure of
nursing faculty positions-would not limit political behavior.
Smith (1979) and Hutcherson (1980) studied job satisfaction among nursing
faculty in community colleges. Smith found management policy to be a job dissatisfier
and security to be a job satisfier. Hutcherson found that unsuitable salary, benefits,
facilities and environment bring dissatisfaction.

All of these factors are potentially

amplified as stressors under the deteriorating conditions that frequently accompany fiscal
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crisis in institutions.

Summary on Retrenchment and Political Behavior

This review of the literature builds an understanding of those factors facilitating
and inhibiting the political behavior of community college constituency groups, and
particularly the behavior of nursing faculty, in reacting to retrenchment.
In summary, there are strong reasons to expect political behavior from
constituencies inside and outside the organization when a college undergoes financial
downturn. Revenue reduction fosters unit competition and survival behavior. Crisis,
loss, and feelings of aggrievement also promote political behavior. Variables to the local
impact of resource decline and factors in local governance, however, modify the necessity
for and intensity of the politics that result. Program termination and faculty layoffs give a
particularly powerful impetus to political behavior often sufficient to countervail the
individual apathy and group political inertia in organizations.
Whether or not political behavior results is a function of the interpretations made
by individuals and social units of the degree of threat and the likelihood of significant
loss, as well as the fairness of retrenchment policy. It is also a function of the unique
features of small group interaction and its effect on members’ perceptions of the validity
and efficacy of their own role as political participants in the organization power structure.
The question in this study is whether, and under what conditions, a group reputedly and
self-consciously politically apathetic will rise above its collective image to protect its own
policy interests when retrenchment threatens those interests.
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CHAPTER HI

METHODOLOGY

This study examined the pattern of political behavior displayed by community
college nursing faculties in response to proposed or enacted changes in nursing programs
stemming from financial downturn and fiscal stress in the California community colleges,
1982-87. This chapter presents the research plan and discusses (1) research approach,
(2) research design, (3) research samples, (4) data collection, and (5) data analysis.

Research Approach

To accomplish the objectives of this research, a research design was needed with
the flexibility to accommodate the economic, organizational, and social variables at play.
The approach taken was a qualitative one incorporating four distinct methodologies:
surveys, interviews, document and news paper review, and participant observation.
Qualitative research methods share a philosophical foundation appropriate to the
study of human behavior. They are particularly helpful in a social and organizational
context that places value on understanding relationships and patterns. A critical challenge
in this study was to identify the beliefs, values, and perceptions that influenced subjects’
political behavior. Qualitative methods are well-suited for that purpose.
Qualitative methodologies have particular benefits for organizational research.
Authoritative discussions have documented the role of qualitative methods in dealing with
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the complexity of social factors typical of organizations. Schwartzman (1993) discussed
the benefits of ethnography for studying organizations.

Hall (1980) emphasized that

qualitative methods are especially useful for yielding descriptions of the research context
that are necessary for understanding behavior in educational institutions. Van Maanan
(1979) depicted the usefulness of qualitative methods to describe unfolding social
processes, contextual understanding and empathic objectives. Englebert (1981) talked
about the importance of the holistic perspective of qualitative research which preserves the
context of the problem under study. Spradley (1979) affirmed the appropriateness of
qualitative methods for studying systems of meaning. Miles (1979) extolled the face
validity of qualitative data.

Englebert (1981) described qualitative methods as

collaborative in nature and as incorporating the point of view of both researcher and
participants for an understanding the phenomenon under study.
Precedent exists for using qualitative methods to study circumstances such as
those in this study.

Hood (1980) used participant observation to study the impact of

declining financial resources on four state colleges. Askew (1982) applied a constant
comparative method to assess faculty responses to state university budget retrenchment
Sibolski (1984) relied on case studies to establish how financially weakened colleges and
universities turned themselves around. Baltes (1985) used the survey method to uncover
institutional responses to fiscal stress.

Rose (1987) used interviews and document

analysis to study the impact of budget reduction on academic subunits.

Research Design

Design Overview

The design of this study incorporated a statewide study and a selected site study.
The statewide study involved two surveys, one directed to the nursing program directors
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of all community college districts offering an associate degree in nursing (see Appendix
A).

The information obtained from that survey was augmented with additional

information gained through telephone interviews with participating directors. A second
survey was directed to instructional deans of the colleges from which program directors
returned surveys (see Appendix B).

The purpose of both surveys was to establish

statewide trends and to advance the task of site selection by screening for college
conditions, nursing program status, and the acdons of faculties in relation to suggested,
proposed, or enacted program changes.
In order to establish the fiscal conditions of participating districts, the researcher
also reviewed summaries of public community college financial information published
annually by the state of California. The purpose of that review was to illuminate financial
factors such as revenue loss, expenditure cutbacks, and reserve position.
Based on the survey data, follow-up interviews, and financial review, the
researcher selected six sites to serve as the case studies for a multiple case-study design.
Districts were selected for size, location, and more importantly, for their potential to shed
light on the research objectives. In four of the districts selected, nursing programs and/or
faculty jobs were pinpointed for elimination. In two, there was no threat of selective
retrenchment. The researcher conducted interviews with numerous administrators and
faculty in all six districts, and made participant observations in one particularly large
district in which an ad hoc faculty political organization formed in response to district
retrenchment. The researcher also gathered information from newspaper accounts of
district retrenchment actions.
A multiple case-study design such as the one used in the selected site study
follows the multi-site qualitative approach suggested by Herriott and Firestone (1983).
Classical case studies focus on one site or setting only. The multi-site design, in contrast,
looks at several settings asking the same research questions at each. This allows the
findings to be compared for commonalties site-to-site, thereby addressing an important
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criticism of the classical case study--that it provides a weak basis for generalizing findings
(Herriott and Firestone, 1983).

Statewide Study

The statewide surveys were a preliminary step to establish how, generally
speaking, community colleges and their nursing programs fared during the years of
revenue decline, 1982-1985. The surveys also provided an efficient way of acquiring the
information needed for site selection. Kerlinger (1973) affirmed the use of the survey
method for that purpose.

Follow-up Interviews

Surveys generally do not produce information that penetrates beyond surface
opinions.

Sometimes, moreover, they produce unclear or insufficient information

(Kerlinger, 1973). To surmount those problems, the researcher conducted follow-up
telephone interviews with the nursing directors. These interviews focused on the survey
questions, but aimed to clarify and augment survey answers.
The researcher chose the telephone interview method because telephone interviews
offer a quick and flexible way of focusing on specific issues, and because they eliminate
the need for fixed appointments, and make travel expenses unnecessary (Borg and Gall,
1979).

Document Review

The researcher reviewed the California community college fiscal data from 1973 to
1988 to highlight district financial conditions. Data were extracted from the Fiscal Data
Abstracts published annually by the California Community College Board of Governors.
Those documents contain detailed accounts of revenues and expenditures for each and
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every community college district which are filed in accordance with the requirements of
state law and the regulations outlined in the California Community Colleges Budget and
Accounting Manual. (1985, October).
Document analysis is a recognized method of descriptive study. It deals with the
systematic examination of records or documents as sources of data. Best (1977) stated
that documentary data, subject to its accuracy, serves a useful purpose in adding
important information to a field of study.

Site Selection

Based on the survey and follow-up interview data and a faculty's willingness to
participate, invitations to join the study were extended to the faculties of 10 community
college nursing programs. All of the invitations were accepted; the data from six proved
sufficient for the development of case studies.
Factors considered in the selection process were the size and location of
institution, the impact of resource change on the institution, the impact of retrenchment on
the institution's nursing program, and the administrators’ general descriptions of nursing
faculty responses to retrenchment decisions.

In the final decision two factors were

critical--the impact (or lack of impact) of resource decline on a nursing program, and the
willingness of a faculty to participate in the research study.

Selected Site Study

Respondent Interviews

Following the receipt of invitation acceptances, interview schedules were
established at each of the participating sites. The researcher conducted all interviews by
telephone which enabled a substantial number of faculty to be interviewed at each site-see
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Table 1.
Practical limitations made face-to-face interviews with nursing instructors difficult
to arrange. Typically, faculty members have varied schedules which include off-campus
laboratories at odd hours of the day and evening. Those often result in a complicated
pattern o f on-campus appearances.

Furthermore, classroom and student counseling

demands often render members reluctant to make commitments that place additional
pressure on their campus hours. Telephone interviews, which provided for flexibility and
convenience in interview scheduling, alleviated those problems.

Table I

Case Study interviews
Program3
1
2b
10
22b
28b
35
38b
39

Nursing Faculty
Interview
Size________ Volunteers0

Interviews
Completed*1

28
15
10
21
8
7
10
6
6
19
14
11
12
12
8
6
4
4
14
12
12
3
3
3
T = 113___________ T = 74___________ T = 6l______

Others
Interviewed6
4
5
6
3
4
5
4
4
T = 35

Note. The totals do noi include numerous informal interviews with nursing faculty and program directors
at the meetings of the District 2/22/28/38 coordinating group. Nor do they include those with numerous
politicians, lobbyists, and district officials who were players in that situation, or the interviews conducted
with faculties of other districts that were not developed into completed case studies.
aProgram identification numbers used to preserve respondent confidentiality; numbers assigned
sequentially in order of survey returns..
bcolleges representing a single district.
cnumber of nursing faculty who volunteered.
^number of nursing faculty interviews completed.
interviews completed with campus administrators and/or general faculty leaders.
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PaQigipaoiObseDffltion

The first faculty interviews, begun in the spring of 1985, were conducted at sites
where retrenchment had already had an impact Those interviews focused on past events,
the outcomes of which were known. Another set of interviews, begun in the winter and
spring of 1986, focused on the events unfolding in two districts, as they occurred. The
outcome of decisions was unknown at the point interviews were initiated.
In one of those districts, the nursing faculty established an ad hoc coordinating
group, where, for two semesters, the researcher attended meetings as a participant
observer. Participant observation is a particularly useful method for obtaining data on
unfolding social processes (Borg and Gall, 1979). According to research experts, the
level of participation can be varied. For example, participation can be limited to the level
necessary to build rapport and develop a better understanding of group functions and
relationships.

That is the level of participation employed in this study, where the

researcher's role was to interact informally with study participants as they planned a
variety of political strategies.

Research Samples

Four research samples were assembled for this study. They included: (1) nursing
program directors in community colleges with registered nursing programs, (2)
instructional deans in the colleges from which nursing program directors returned
surveys, (3) nursing faculty members in the nursing programs of the districts serving as
selected research sites, and (4) nonnursing instructional and administrative personnel
familiar with retrenchment conditions at the selected research sites.

All subjects

participated voluntarily.
The researcher used various procedures to obtain the samples. Written surveys
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were mailed to sixty nursing program directors at colleges listed in the 1984-85 edition of
Occupational Programs in California Public Community Colleges (Meyer, 1984). One
question queried directors as to their faculty’s interest in participating in a case study.
Upon the completion and return of the surveys by nursing program directors, the
researcher mailed administrator surveys to the occupational instructional deans in the same
colleges. Their names were obtained from the Meyer (1984) publication.
The sampling procedure used for the selected site studies was somewhat different
Invitations in the form of a transmittal letter were first sent to faculty groups (see
Appendix C). Those letters were addressed to the program directors who had indicated
an interest in participating and whose programs met the selection criteria listed above.
Upon receiving notification of their acceptance, the researcher sent an interview sign-up
form (see Appendix D) which, when completed and returned, constituted an agreement to
participate. At all of the study sites, nursing program directors and faculty interviewees
were asked to nominate nonnursing faculty and administrators to participate in the study.

Data Collection

Anticipating a low survey response rate, the researcher used a large survey
mailing to maximize returns. As stated above, 60 program director forms were mailed.
Two mailings of the director surveys produced a total of 40 responses for a 67% response
rate. However, two forms, returned with no identifying data, had to be dropped from the
sample, resulting in a total of 38 usable surveys. Two mailings of the instructional deans
survey produced a return of 24 out of 38 surveys, for a 63% response rate.
The researcher then placed follow-up telephone calls to each of the nursing
program directors who returned a usable survey. Those calls were preceded by a letter
describing the purpose of the call (see Appendix E). The interviews focused on topics
suggested by the objectives, and by the conceptual framework.

The researcher’s
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questions also requested verification, correction, and expansion of survey answers. An
interview protocol listing general survey topics served to guide the semi-structured
discussions. A summary of topics appears in Table 2.
Table 2
Interview Topics
Topics Related to Budget
* College financial condition
* Mechanism for establishing budget
* Impact of financial condition on instructional
program
• Impact of financial condition on nursing program

Topics Related to Retrenchment
* Structure for establishing priorities
• Participation of nursing director in retrenchment
decision making
• Perceptions of nursing faculty related to
retrenchment decisions
• Strategies used by nursing faculty to cope with
retrenchment
• Leadership strategy
* Campus climate
• Role of union
• Role of professional associations

The procedure for case-study interviews differed from that of the follow-up
interviews described above. The researcher first provided a general verbal introduction to
the study and its goals. Following that introduction, volunteers were assured of the
study's confidentiality, and the interviews began. The case study interviews focused on
interviewers’ perceptions of the status of their program and the impact of retrenchment on
it, college and district retrenchment priorities, and nursing faculty and personal actions
taken. As the interview data accumulated, themes emerged that were then used by the
researcher to shape subsequent interviews.

Thus, interviews became increasingly

specific, allowing for a comparison of faculty members' perceptions on particular issues.
The researcher used an interview topic sheet to keep the interview on course, but
attempted to maintain a spontaneous flow of information through her use of broad, openended queries. Faculty interviews generally lasted from 10 to 60 minutes.
Two or more calls were usually necessary to make a contact Approximately 50%
of the researcher’s calls were placed to home telephone numbers provided by
respondents. After obtaining the consent of the interviewee, data were tape-recorded, or.
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alternatively, documented in hand-written process notes summarizing important points
and pertinent verbatim exchanges.
As a participant observer, the researcher attended numerous meetings of an ad hoc
nursing faculty coordination group which formed at one site selected for a case study.
During the course of meetings held between February, 1986 and November, 1986, the
researcher established close communication with the planning committee leaders, spoke
with scores of faculty members, and directly observed coordinating committee activities.
Typically, the meetings lasted two hours, and produced many opportunities for
unscheduled, informal interviews with speakers, organizers and faculty members.

Data Analysis

The first step of data analysis was to organize the survey data. To protect the
confidentiality of respondents, each program was assigned an identification number for
data reporting. Programs were numbered in series, according to the order in which their
directors surveys were received. In cases where two or more programs resided in a
single district, the identification numbers were consolidated, for example, #3/13, or
#12/14. The survey data was then summarized, and programs reporting suggested,
proposed, or enacted program termination, personnel and/or nonpersonnel cutbacks,
identified and tallied.
Data on the factors pertinent to site selection were condensed by assigning
arbitrary graded numerical values on each factor for each college. Three graded values
were used: 1 indicated a low value, 3 an intermediate value, and 5 a high value on a
factor. The purpose of that exercise was to condense the data for an easy comparison of
institutions. The researcher considered district size and location, institution size, nursing
program size, number and size of nursing retrenchment cuts, faculty involvement and
types of faculty responses as indicated by the program director survey.

From this
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information the researcher constructed a number of display matrices—master charts for
summarizing descriptive data from several research sites (Miles and Huberman, 1984).
Those appear in Tables 3,4, 5, and 6.
Table 3
Display Matrix; Size
P ro g ram

D is tric t

C ollege

P ro g ram

1
10
13
22
35
39

3
3
3
5
1
1

Sample of programs selected
5
3
5
5
1
1

5
3
3
5
1
1

7
8
12
18
21
33

3
3
3
1
3
3

Sample of programs rejected
3
5
1
3
5
5

3
3
3
I
3
3

Note: 5 = large; 3 = medium sized; 1 = small.

Table 4
Display Matrix: Location
P ro g ra m

Area*

1
10
13
22
35
39

5
1
I
5
5
5

7
8
12
18
21
33

5
5
I
5
1
5

U rb a n 6

S u b u rb a n 6

R u ral6

Sample of programs selected
5
3
5
5
1
1
Sample of programs rejected
3
3
3
1
3
5

a5 = Southern California; 1 = Northern California
&5 = large population; 3 = medium; 1 = small.
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Table 5
Display Matrix: Retrenchment in Nursing Programs
Program

FT Faculty

Enrollment

C ourse
S ection s

Sup plies

1
10
13
22
35
39

5
3»
0
5
0
5b

Sample of programs selected
5
5
3a
3a
0
0
3
3
0
0
0
0

0
5
5
5
0
0

7
8
12
18
21
33

0
0
0
0
0
0

Sample of programs rejected
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0

3
0
1
0
3
I

Notes. Values assigned on the basis of survey data only. Values refer to enacted retrenchment unless
noted; 0 = no cuts, 5 = severe cuts.
aProposed cuts
^Proposed program termination

Table 6
Display Matrix: Nursing Faculty Responses
Program

# Faculty Involved

Actions Taken

1
10
13
22
35
39

Sample of programs selected
3
3
1
3
1
3

5
5
1
5
I
5

7
8
12
18
21
33

Sample of programs rejected
1
I
3
1
1
1

1
1
1
I
1
1

Values assigned on basis of program directors’ survey indications of number and intensity of activities.
5 = high; 3 = medium; 1 = low.
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Following the completion of interviews, the researcher synthesized interview data
by making research notes in four categories: observation, theoretical, methodological, and
personal, as suggested by Schatzman and Strauss (1973).

Verbal exchanges were

recorded in the observation notes. From those, entries were made in the other categories;
for example, notes on interpretations or tasks to accomplish.
The final step in analysis was the assignment of data codes—the abbreviations
applied to segments of similar data in a body of observations (Miles and Huberman,
1984). Coding expedited data retrieval and assisted data clustering, an important aspect
of the analytic process. The researcher compiled a start-list of codes derived from the
research objectives and conceptual framework presented in Chapter 1. The list appears in
Table 7.
Much of the data consisted of statements by the respondents about the occurrence
of some event Those statements were not taken at face value. Indeed the researcher
applied three criteria of verification. First, no item of data was incorporated into a case
study that was not supported by two and preferably more respondents, or by a newspaper
account or official public document (Askew, 1982; Guba, 1981). Exceptions were made
only when an item would be known only to an individual respondent.

Second, the

credibility of respondents was judged according to the extent personal motives appeared
to distort their responses. Data found defective by that criterion were evaluated for what
they might reveal about group process or the role the individual played in the group.
Finally, the researcher assigned more value to the statements made voluntarily by
respondents than to those elicited by questions, as recommended by Becker (1985).
Important statements were checked by presenting them to other respondents for their
comment. The value placed on a statement was ultimately determined by the amount of
agreement among respondents. Site summaries were likewise shared with respondents as
a way of checking their validity. The researcher consulted the most informed, reliable
respondents at each site and a technique Guba (1981) called “member checks” (p. 86).
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Table 7
Start List of Codes
Pattern of Faculty Actions by Campus

Pattern of Faculty Actions by Campus
PFA: Environmental Factors

PFA: Actions Taken
PFA:
PFA:
PFA:
PFA:
PFA:
PFA:
PFA:
PFA:
PFA:
PFA:
PFA:
PFA:
PFA:
PFA:
PFA:
PFA:
PFA:
PFA:
PFA:
PFA:
PFA:
PFA:
PFA:
PFA:
PFA:
PFA:
PFA:
PFA:
PFA:
PFA:
PFA:
PFA:
PFA:
PFA:

Factors in Actions Taken
Personal Factors
Self-Perception
Actions/Style
Attitudes
Motives
Skills
Priorities
Opportunities
Theories
Perception of Group
Others Actions
Others Attitudes
Others Motives
Influence Maps
Information Sources
Perception of Organization
Organization History
Organization Governance
Budget Condition
Program Condition
Retrenchment Decision Process
Retrenchment Strategy
Retrenchment Impact on Nursing
Political Climate
Organization Factors
Governance System
Participation in Governance
Retrenchment Decision Process
Contingency Planning
Leadership
Peer Support
Physical Plant
Schedule

PFA: Community Support
PFA: Community Need
PFA: Symbolic Factors
Pattern Variation among Campuses
PVC: Campus Budget Conditions
PVC: Governance
PVC: Administrative Strategies
PVC: Impact on Nursing Program
PVC: General Faculty Actions
Pattern Impact on Nursing Program
PINP Program
PINP Faculty Positions
PINP Enrollment
PINP Course Sections/Sessions
PINP
PINP
PINP
PINP

Equipment
Supplies
Department Communication
Collegial Relations

The researcher organized the fiscal data with the aid of a computer spread sheet
program. Again, the data had to be condensed. To expedite year-to-year comparisons,
the current dollar amounts of reported revenues and expenditures were first converted to
constant dollars. For that purpose the researcher used the California Consumer Price
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Index (CCPI) supplied by the California Commission on State Finance and computed
annual inflation factors (see Appendix F). Although experts on fiscal analysis debate
which index is most appropriate for that purpose—the Higher Education Price Index
(HEPI), (a national index specific to higher education consumption factors), or the CCPI,
(an index sensitive to the regional differences that characterize California), the CCPI is the
one

used by the California

Postsecondary

Education

Commission

(personal

communication, Kevin G. Woolfork, Fiscal Analyst, CPEC, September 8, 1993), and
was therefore employed in this study. From the constant dollar data, the researcher
constructed trendlines. The procedure employed for that is discussed in Chapter IV.
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CHAPTER IV

THE STATEWIDE STUDY OF NURSING PROGRAMS IN CALIFORNIA

Introduction

This chapter presents the findings of a statewide study of the political behavior of
nursing faculties in response to funding policy changes and their effects on nursing
programs stemming from resource decline in the California community college system.
The findings are based on data from the reports of nursing department heads,
faculty, and college administrators, and from a review of state financial records. All data
were analyzed in light of the conceptual framework and research objectives, both of
which are detailed in Chapter I.
To restate, the conceptual framework centers on models of cutback management
and crisis perception in organizations, and authoritative ideas on the activation of political
behavior.

This framework stipulates that under conditions of resource decline,

administrative strategy and organization governance change dramatically.

Economic

decline contributes to conditions of competition, crisis, and social conflict in institutions,
all of which commonly have the effect of activating political behavior.

The question

posed in this study is whether nursing faculty members responded by acting on their own
policy interests, or whether they followed the reputed pattern of nurses which is to be
politically apathetic.

74
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The primary research objectives were to determine:
1. How and to what extent nursing faculty members on behalf of their own
interests acted to influence policies proposed in campus and state legislative arenas as a
response to community college fiscal decline, 1982-87.
2. What factors influenced the pattern of political behavior exhibited by nursing
faculty members.
3. What impact nursing faculty response patterns had on policy decisions
pertaining to nursing programs.
The secondary objectives were to determine:
4. How and to what extent the patterns of political behavior of nursing faculty
compared to those of nonnursing faculty in the same community colleges subject to the
same budget cuts.
5. How and to what extent the patterns of political behavior varied among
community college nursing faculties.
The presentation of the statewide findings is organized in two sections.
Following a recapitulation of the financial challenge to California community colleges in
the early 1980s is a discussion of the statewide findings divided into subsections on the
fiscal position of participating districts, the impact of resource decline on nursing
programs, the actions taken by nurses in response to resource decline and the factors
instrumental in shaping those responses.

Recapitulation of the Political Story

After decades of expansion, growth halted for the California community colleges
in 1978, the year of Proposition 13 and landmark property tax limitation. As a result of
falling revenues and the subsequent changes in governance this measure brought, a period
of decline resulted in the community college system that persisted into the mid-1980s and
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beyond.

Although national higher education trends undoubtedly contributed to this

decline, state factors-the economic, social and political factors set in motion by
Proposition 13—were primarily responsible. In particular, the financing system for the
community colleges underwent drastic modifications as a direct result of Proposition 13.
Local revenues were severely diminished and required substantial augmentation from state
revenue sources. This situation placed new financial responsibilities on the state. As a
consequence, the state general fund became the most important source o f community
college revenue, replacing the property tax as the financial base of the system.
Governance changes accompanied the transfer of funding. The state legislature and state
governing board of the community colleges emerged with much greater power over the
system than either of these bodies had previously held. Not surprisingly, those who
gained fiscal control began to scrutinize the expense of the system and especially aspects
such as curriculum which were driving up to the overall outlay.
Thus, the comprehensive community college curriculum became a focal point for
political controversy. Its broad-scoped programs evoked among state policy makers a
new attitude toward the costs and benefits of an expanded mission (Los Angeles Times.
May 2, 1982). As a consequence, the mission of the community colleges also came into
question.

A political debate ensued that focused not only on the proper scope of

curricula, but also on the no-tuition policy—the policy of providing community college
education at no cost to the student.
Pressure for change mounted slowly until an acute state economic crisis
intensified preexisting public concerns over state spending. By November, 1982, the
political climate in California was sufficiently turbulent to support a transition in
leadership which culminated in the election of George Deukmejian as governor.
Deukmejian's critical postelection challenge was to deal with a $1.5 billion deficit
carried over from the previous fiscal year. Rather than calling for a general tax increase
which was sure to be unpopular, the governor reduced funds for all state operations,
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including a substantial share of those funds budgeted to the community colleges (Los
Angeles Times. July 22, 1983).
In addition to exerting control over the state budget, Deukmejian's objective was
to achieve a fundamental change in community college finance that would permanently
reduce the cost of the community colleges to the state. As part of his strategy to do that,
the governor went on to veto $231,968,000 in monies allocated to the community
colleges through the 1983-94 budget act, and proposed a community college tuition fee as
a source of revenue to offset the vetoed funds (Los Angeles Times. July 30, 1983).
This highly controversial proposal embodied the governor's belief that students
should bear a greater responsibility for the cost of their education.

It conflicted

dramatically, however, with the philosophy of community college officials, faculty, and
students who had been trying for some time to avoid tuition.

Indeed, the California

Postsecondary Commission (CPEC) only a year earlier had managed to stave off tuition
by recommending that the legislature “defund” nonpriority courses in the comprehensive
curriculum (San Diego Union. July 17, 1982).
Not surprisingly, Deukmejian's proposal was immediately unpopular, not only
with community college interest groups, but also the Democratic politicians in the state
legislature with whom those groups were aligned (Los Angeles Times. July 30, 1983).
Perhaps because of the symbolism of tuition, the issue created an emotional and bitterly
partisan political atmosphere which in turn fostered an unprecedented level of distrust
between the governor and many state legislators.

Each side repeatedly rejected the

proposals and counter proposals of the other (Los Angeles Times. October 11, 1983). A
political stalemate ensued that lasted six months. Vetoed funds were ultimately reinstated,
but not until a compromise was reached under which the governor agreed to allocate
$96.5 million in return for a $50 per student per semester fee (Los Angeles Times.
January 27, 1984).
The political struggle within the state government had a devastating local impact
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Its cumulative effect was to force the community colleges to operate for over two years
under politically volatile and economically unpredictable conditions. Indeed, the financial
impact of the prolonged play of power was evident until 1987, by which time most, if not
all, districts finally regained financial stability (Commission Report, 1986; Commission
Report, 1987).
Before the crisis ended, however, many colleges were forced to make tough
decisions on internal budget allocations (Commission Report, 1983).

State documents

suggested that administrators scrutinize the costs and benefits of expensive, low
enrollment vocational programs such as those in the health care fields (Director's Report,
June, 1983; Hayward, 1983). Thus, it seemed that nursing programs which are wellknown for their low student-to-teacher ratio would be vulnerable to selective
administrative cutback strategies. The behavior of nursing faculty in response to this
situation is the focus of this study.

Findings from the Statewide Study

The statewide findings indicate that in most of the community colleges in the
sample, the nursing faculty members exhibited some form of political behavior taken on
behalf of their own interests; however, the pattern and complexity of their behavior
varied. With few exceptions, those variations related to the impact of decline on job
security and program status.

Threats to job security and program status generally

involved crisis of varying degrees, and led to more complex and organized patterns of
political behavior than found in situations where there were no such threats. However,
they did not always correspond to a finding of institutional financial exigency as might
have been anticipated on the basis of the conceptual framework. That is to say, nursing
faculty jobs were jeopardized and programs threatened in districts where the level of
reserve revenue, or “slack,” failed to drop below the criterion of severe decline set in this
study, suggesting a complex relationship between district finances and challenges to
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programs and job security.
The following sections report on the organizational characteristics of participating
institutions, their finances, the impact of resource decline on nursing programs, and the
political behavior patterns of nursing faculties.

Characteristics of Colleges and Districts in the Statewide Study

Table 8 summarizes the organizational characteristics of institutions participating
in this study.

A total of 38 colleges representing 33 community college districts

comprised the sample. The administrative organization of these institutions represented
the four models found in California community colleges as described by Jensen (1984).
Eighteen

single-college

districts,

eleven

multicollege

districts,

three

single

college/multicampus systems, and one single-college/multicenter district responded.
According to The College Handbook. 1985-86. 23rd Edition, the colleges
participating in this study were located in three distinctly different environments, 13 in
densely populated urban areas, 23 in less densely populated suburban areas, and two in
Iow-population rural areas; 15 districts were located in Northern California, and 23 in
Southern California.
Institutional size as reflected by student enrollments declined during the period of
the study, however, single-year figures provide for a comparison. Enrollments varied
from more than 30,000 students (N = 2) to less than 4,500 students (N = 1). The median
total enrollment figure was 13,500 students. As a group, participating colleges were
somewhat larger than the system median (11,000) reflecting the fact that registered
nursing programs are more frequently found in larger public community colleges (Meyer,
1982).
Table 8 shows the variation in nursing program enrollments in the sample. In
1982-83, the totals ranged from 363 students to 31 students, encompassing the largest
and smallest programs in the community college system at the time (National League for

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

80
Table 8
Characteristics of Colleges Participating in the Study
Characteristics
Nursing
Program

District
Type*

Location**
sc
sc

Environment?
u

College
Enroll**

Nursing
Enrolle

21.8
22.6
16.0
30.5
24.8
9.8
13.3
25.2
20.1
9.5

248
363
148
310
214
168
148
68
124
172

s

7.5
6.8
14.6
9.9
7.4
15.3
12.9
10.0
10.6
6.0

102
61
98
117
103
95
75
104
64
92

NC
SC
SC
SC
SC
SC
NC
SC
NC

s
u
s
s
s
s
u
u
s

26.6
12.7
14.2
21.5
13.5
20.0
27.2
7.3
6.5

132
159
163
157
286
146
184
135
105

SC
SC
NC
SC
NC
NC
SC
SC
SC

u
u
s

14.8
31.1
7.5
5.1
23.9
9.0
23.0
4.2
17.5

124
221
118
180
114
77
179
31
181

l
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

SColD
MColD
MColD
MColD
MColD
MColD
MColD
SColD
SColD
MColD

11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

SColD
MColD
MColD
MColD
MColD
MColD
SColD
SColD
MColD
SColD

NC
NC
NC
NC
SC
SC
SC
NC
SC

s
s
u
s
u
s
s

21
22
23
24
27
28
29
30
31

MColD
MColD
SColD
SColD
MColD
MColD
MColD
SColD
SColD

32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40

MColD
SColD
SColD
SColD
SColD
SColD
MColD
SColD
SColD

NC

sc
sc
NC

S

u
u
S

u

sc
sc
sc

S

NC

S

sc

S

u
u

R

R

s
s
s
s
s

Administrative Organization: SColD = Single-College District MColD = MultiCollege District,
MCamD = Single-College /Multicampus District, MCtrD = Single-College /MultiCenter District.
^Location: NC = Northern California, SC = Southern California.
cEnvironment: U = Urban, S = Suburban, R = Rural.
dCollege Enrollment: Expressed in thousands of full and part-time students. Data from 1982-83
Occupational Programs in California Community Colleges by Leo A. Mayer, 1982.
eNursing Enrollment: Data from State Approved Schools of Nursing R.N.. 1983. 41st Edition, National
League for Nursing, 1983.
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Nursing, 1983).
Figure 7 plots program enrollment in relation to college enrollment, and shows a
substantial variation in the correspondence of those factors. The larger programs, it is
clear, were generally located in larger institutions, no doubt because of the greater ability
of larger institutions to provide the financial support that larger programs require.
Nevertheless, there were exceptions. For example, #10 and 35 were instances of large
programs located in small institutions. Given those exceptions and the differences in
institutional structure, environment, and location described above, it is clear that the
organizations in this study comprised a varied sample, one reflecting the diversity that
characterizes the community college system in California.
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Figure 7. The relationship between nursing program enrollment and college enrollment.
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Resource Change

Resource change is a central factor in the Levine model of cutback management
and organization constituency politics.

Chapter II described the decline in revenue

flowing to the California community colleges after the 1978 tax-limitation initiative. A
key point about that event and the events that followed was that their fiscal impact varied
from institution to institution.
To establish the variation in the financial circumstances of the districts in this
study, the researcher summarized the fiscal data for a 15 year period beginning with
1973-74, the first year of state reporting.

The data were taken from the California

Community College Fiscal Data Abstracts (1973-1988). the annual accounting reports
published by the California Community College Board of Governors which collate
financial information by district, the lowest unit of official recording.
To facilitate year-to-year financial comparisons, the researcher converted current
dollar revenue and expenditures to constant dollars, with 1973-74 serving as the base
year.

Deflators were derived from the California Consumer Price Index (CCPI) (see

Appendix F). To track real gains and losses, each year’s revenue and expenditure figures
were indexed. Indexes compare a given district's annual figures to a base year (in this
case 1973-74) which always has an index value of 1.0 derived by dividing the base year
dollar figure by itself. The indexes for subsequent years were created by dividing their
figures by the base-year figure. Indexing is useful because it produces quotients that
illustrate a district's real revenue and expenditure changes in percentage increments or
decrements. For example, an index of 1.06 represents a 6% gain over the base year,
whereas an index of 0.94 represents a 6% drop.
Finally, to summarize the data and display the fluctuations in the sample as a
whole, the researcher constructed trend line graphs, the procedure for which involved (1)
ranking the annual sets of district indexes from high to low (see Appendices G, H, I), and
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(2) plotting the indexes of the high and low districts, median district, and interquartile
districts for each year to construct trendlines revealing the direction of change. High,
low, median and interquartile indexes served as the benchmarks of year-to-year change in
the sample, and can be viewed as horizontal “cuts” through the data that reveal the
dynamic fluctuations in revenues and expenditures systemwide.
In this study, resource change is operationalized as: (1) a change in total revenue,
(2) a change in the relationship between total revenue and total expenditures, and (3) a
change in adjusted reserve position—an index of fiscal stability (Dickmeyer, 1980, 1983).
Measuring the resource change of postsecondary institutions is fraught with problems and
complexities which have been extensively reported (Dickmeyer, 1980, 1983; Lupton,
Augenblick, & Heyison, 1976; Millett, 1976; Minter, 1979). The indicators selected for
this study are supported by current authorities for the purpose of assessing the financial
health of colleges and universities.

Revenues

Table 9 presents fifteen years of data on district revenues. The current dollar
revenue figures were drawn from general fund revenue reports. The general fund is the
account used by districts to track the fiscal transactions related to ordinary operations and
services (California Community Colleges, October, 1985).
Table 9 shows the revenue changes reported by the 33 districts in the sample, and
clearly illustrates the district-to-district variations mentioned above.

All districts

experienced a decline in their real dollar revenues after Proposition 13, but reductions
ranged from 6% to 31% of prior-year revenues, with an average drop of 17.45%.

A

majority of districts again experienced decline after defunding and the revenue veto, 19821984, but two districts showed no further losses, and three reported growth. The amount
o f change ranged from 8% growth to 23% decline, with a two-year average drop
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Table 9
Total Revenue of Participating Districts. 1973-74 through 1987-88
Revenue in Thousands of Dollars
mVWl\ 8f-R ll-Wmi 84-B15-K
7 ^ ------73:74 7E75"75-74' 7£77
District
1

27,960 26037 28,750 33,012 34,648 34.116 34373

36,638 42,024 43545

47,200

17,007 17,070

17,758

20,964 22,025

25331

27368

20564

19,771

20,973

21,789 20305

17,445

16,618

17,114

16221

15,614

15,189

15,427

1.00

0.94

LOO

097

0.®

0.79

082

0.77

0.74

072

074

1.04

081

081

085

2,22

109538 135521 156,442 16(2324 181*844 171*152 189,650 202,496 189525 191520 191501 193376 206,455 205^28 215296

2 # ,J«

100738 122,012 1 3000 JZ7306 131532 113,133 109624 104575 88*916 87,652 84299 81,421 8Bfl51 83,450 80062
120
077
0.73
074
LOO 096
081
080
074
076
LOO
1.16
LQ3
M l.
U9

3,13

30,779 36551

40,656 42,735 46,057 44,637 49,431

30,779 33,170 33,796 33,413 33,447
1.00

4

1.08

1.10

M3

U6

097

9534

9363

14361

18587

3850

3,607

26,112 32542 33505

9534

8315

11355

14532

17320

15,696

15,094

1.00

0.87

1.24

1.52

1.82

1.65

1-58

097

090

086

088

44564

16,429 16.057

16,766

1.68

1.76

15397

14,755

15,142

1.61

1.55

L59

080

074

m

075

14,730

16554

20,609

19,016 20391

22331

3580

11387

12344

13,256

14967

12,644

11,787

11576

10,705

10,481

10,420

10505

LOO

1.04

1.07

1.15

130

1.10

1.03

1.01

0.93

091

0.91

094

s
I

13342
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1757X4 16*113 16263 17525
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1.15

10,782

10551

11521

11505

13,488
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116
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200

207
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5,419
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8389

10329
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1.00

1-23
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155

189

1-59

2.05

t5 t
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067
063
06)

m

093
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5895

6,650

7,419

7,405

3311

3,762

4,047

3,454

3,465

3,447

3,473

3389

1.11

177

1.36

1.16

1.17

1.16

1.17

1.14

27324 28,466 25541 23^42 2 2 ^

1

!:

«•

1
1

39,197

vrm

11,725

10,730

105

17896 16292: 15584 15492 17(462 17,688

40343

9302

29.863 32355 32314

13.197

1.07

1.05

28,038 33329 35,471

7,445

1.06

12,023 12338

3392

5,419

1.00

3,708

3.709

159

3,154

06e

19212 22,618 3,(00

L53

2570

03

31,475 35,078

155

t5 2

3514

078

L40

MO

2970

51562
21,295 19395

L48

109

L09

1.72

28,135 33805 36516 35379 35266 37368 43,149 452® 42566

1.00

M0

102

40597 40561

1.66

093

m

35563

17,077 15873
1.79

m

33,642 33391

11,478

11568 12556

096

15859 15507 17881 16059 TS24!

m

11,478

U 568 13387

30,293

0.95

095

24*867 2 6 2 5 20605 30.996 20773 21,229 225©

s
§

U

116

3,662

29553 28554 26061

15

0.91

22366 22501

LOO

12.14

m

t l2

mm

0.87

29209 35386 35213 3*212 25890 36555 42001 42551 45525

104

19,492 21355

11

0.87

!

10

089

to o

28320 32202 34,075

80518

29,135

Os

9

0.93

72506 74324

Z7.410 26,752 26,646 28,129 29343

1

8

3,742

19.613 16,450 16884 l% fi» 16,485 36573

19531

28520 265>? 28325 26585 27544
LOt
LOO
102
LOO
097
7

0.93

55,444 58548 58,453 60299 66506

1
1
1

6

096

16575 19568 22510 24597 27,00? 2 4 3 1
16575 17,655 19,044

5

1.09

1.09

29,679 2853

7,972

9,462

10,446 11,066

12531

353

3984

4,227

4338

4,714

1.19

1-34

1.42

1.46

1-59

43,1(8 4%025 55*7® 58907 65,743

20672 15*888 193)46 30*221 2 2 5 6

W»

100

097

090

091

095

039

080

076

869

067

064

12399

14,619

16,069

17562

17,619

17,409

17207

18,604

18953

19,216

18589

12399

13.123

13357

14,059

12,795

11575

9946

9,644

8873

8.795

8391

8,176

8,440

8319

8,696

1.00

1.06

1.06

113

1.03

093

0.80

078

072

071

0.68

066

0.68

067

0.70

30361 38^79 48013

53,166 56532 52338 62,470 7 8 5 0 7 '8 1 # ? 79513

068

075

077

OS

19,417 20556 21523 23,113

80024 81,129 ©,409 95544 TOfcSK

30361 34362 40077 41368 40857 J4J99 36510 40,096 3857? 36390 35562 34560 36,183 37,454 38,4*
100

113

L32

137

155

115

U9

134

156

120

146

113

119

1®

136

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

85

Table 9

(con'd)

Total Revenue o f Participating Di§trigts^l973-7-4.tb£Q»gli 1987-8&
Revenue in Thousands of Dollars
Y ears

f7
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9/12

11,669 12/68 11/99 13,717

15/34

16,691

7564

17.631

8,156

9,124

9,432

7/12

7/29

8260

7/14

1.00

221

1.®

1.15

1.18

0 /9

1.®

1.04

0®

1.(8

1.15

1.12

125

7p<e

au»
106

8725

9#9

U»

113

149

5504

6,696

7,1®

853

5504
1.00

6,011

5973

6/76

6346

5,714

1.24

134

122

1.10

5,633
1.®

5,416

1-51

7331
1.41

6,437

1.15

6,665
128

7/40

1.16

1.04

4306:

6394

5,440

6,056

6/30

6515

7274

8,430

$7®

8,676

$238

9/07 11/16 12,126 13541

4522

435

4 /#

4332

42®

4 /7 0

45®

3/71

m

422?

145

m

098

101

095

098-

3542 28/13
3,842 3326
1.00

1.®

9m
123

m
t»

14,116 16587 17,O S 17/04 17,411 2$2W 22/85 34534 27325
tU 6t
105

8391
U»

7/64

7 /a 4

7/94

8513

?® t

ua

to t

09?

110

m

10,796 11/26 11,136 13.456 13554

12,485 12,748 12/64

$4St 10262
t2 2

IS

14,440 14,636

15545

5/44

5,737

5/48

1.12

1.10

1.12

4 /5 5

5/5X

32482 36,429 43251 40201 43/38 51536 52,660 52255 53,653 61581 70,193 75,061
27,001 28,482 31,410 26,729 25398 26,716 24,654 3 /1 5 3,709 25/29 28,407 29,424

87569

105

1.13

110

1.19

132

1.12

1.07

95»

9/50 U /6 ? 13/59 13,430 129® 15/35

y®

8/51
096

too
if

099

9,121 10,494 1 1 5 # 13/7? W *

t»

w

08?

7541

4306
21

15,413 17/69 19515 22543 22,678 26506
7/54 7/96 8217 9,123 8 /»
9/72

9 /6 6 10/79
t®

147

9253
107

1.12

1.®

095

1.09

453?

$18

105 '

32/45

123

138

17,405 17/90 1 735 17/96 19/61 22,177 3 /0 6

36/13

1®

0.®

0®

8/36

8/64

$023

0422

V 17

7/76

8,110

094

09?

,0 /9 '

OR

08?

0®

08?

1.19

8 /7 5
0®

S*3»

t»

9/95
It*

14,752 17,021 18/78 20,758 3311 21382 25,4® 29565 30,418 30520 31,431 33,440 37,799 40/34 44,644
14,752 15279 15,692 16230 16/29 14217 14,720 15327 14241 13/68 13/89 14/60 15297 16,007 16,7®
097
1.00
1.04
1.10
0®
1.04
1.14
1®
0.94
1.04
1.®
1.15
095
095
1.09

27

17,494 19,641 3 5 7 6 25575 31539 29504 31/84

35.189 37233 36386 37/33 40562 44/61 46/96 5138

17,494 1 7 /Jl 19596 20,465 22/14 19/1? 18,430 18/42 17/84 16,492 16,718 16/52 18,135 182® 19571
104
tu
too 101 U 2 117 129 112 US 1® 099 094 096 09? t/4
28552 39536 36.622 37348 415® 37,481 43/76

54281 61,405 59.071 58248 66,039 75,795 78227 81,148

28552 35,490 30,442 29201 30,144 24/21

28,139 28,748 27,(85 3,739 27/06 30,674 30,665

1.00
" '

ii

32

1/4

1.07

5/45

4& 2

7.627

5,845

5/26

63#

to o

to t

t®

6/39
U4

5,1®

6190

6,650

5,1®

5557

1.00

1.07

1®
9/57
6577

087

9M

087

0.95

0®

11444 11/14 10774 10219
6,442 6,176 5® 4 4,677

4,414

113

6251
t0 7

7,052

7506

6/46

8,731

5528

5514

5,452

4552

5,017

1.07

1®

1®

O®

097

no

099

29,041
U6

100

18319 20,716 3,469
18319 18596 19509
1.02
1.®
1.00

1.01

? /#

1.07

10330 10/96 112® 12215
035

11,000 11/89 11/68
4,411 4,632 4/11 4,699

12/44

9/35

9/82

087

30530

078

9567 10,040
4/60 4,700

4501

1.07

4586

076

091

1.07

076

080

0.®

097

4,450

0®

t®

H /S2 31,454 34/36 4138 45/32 «U44 47397 8 /5 4
24/62 28#5

U"

1.®

24/99

085

434?
074

0.89

0.93

0.91

439t

4/70
0.®

5W95 56/07 55686 58/69 65/99 66/23

71287
32292 33,139 26/21 2597 27/70 ??245 25® t 24??2 3£?8? 26/69 96295 x ity
to ?
tl.0 ,1 1 2
112
1«
t0 7
1X0
09?
12?.
098
1®
*»
33,128
27552
31,054
30/67
32376
40,497
28/95
41/44
25,793
35543
44321
25,439
30,672 20,009 17,150 16,760 17,654 15509 14,182 14507 14/65 16389 16,442 16,675
1.13

1.09

094

091

0®

085

077

4 /1 9

5 /5 6

6/92

$2®

9935

m

11/29 11/2? 11/®

11/05

4 /1 9

5,077

$32?

6,474

7/15

6,1®

6/38

6,132

$575

5m

1®

t0 5

119

t34

150

128

127

116

2612

3,119

3,942

4/28

5/46

5233

6,073

6236

2642

2/00

3277

3,775

4318

3,479

3510

1.®

1.®

1.24

1.43

1.63

1.32

1.33

0®

0.91

12/36 12,434 14,425 16/58

17/13

078

0.82

0 /9

5319

5235

$68

6295

U2

110

to ?

121

I3 t

134

6/13

6,747

6,798

8,179

9220

9/84

3233

3,1®

3.088

3,004

7215
3,038

3310

3,614

3,7®

122

121

1.17

1.14

1.15

1.25

1.37

1.42

m

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

86

Table 9

(con'd)

Total Revenue of Participating Districts. 1973-74 through 1987-88
Revenue in Thousands of Dollars
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Note. 1st line = current dollar revenue (data from California Community College Fiscal Data Abstracts,
1973-1988); 2nd line = constant dollar revenue; 3rd line = indexes.

o f 6.24%. Table 10 summarizes the figures for both periods.
Figure 8 shows the general trends in revenue over the years before and after tax
limitation.

These trends confirm that the era of expansion~as reflected by revenue

increases-ended with Proposition 13.

After the dramatic decline of Proposition 13,

however, revenue fluctuation leveled off. Table 10 shows that eight districts recovered to
some degree, as indicated by the fact that their 1978-82 decline was less than their 197879 decline; two showed no further deterioration, and one, District 9, showed revenue
increases.

Most, however, began declining again in 1981-82, and in some cases

experienced an even steeper drop.

That reflected interim changes in the state funding

formula made by the state legislature. AB 8, passed in 1979, introduced the concept of
marginal growth (and decline) as a substitute for full-cost funding, and limited growth
funding beyond budgeted amounts. AB1369, passed in 1981, established growth caps
by district (Weiler et al., 1985; Wellman, 1987).

Both measures further depressed

revenues, particularly in some rapidly growing districts.
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Table 10

PaaigjpatingJ2 istrigi.E£Yenue Changes

District

1977-78/

1977-78/

1982-83/

1977-78/

1977-78/

1978-79

1981-82

1983-84

1983-84

1986-87

1
2/22/28/38
3/13
4
5
6
7
8
9

(14%)
(17%)
(13%)
(19%)
(17%)
(9%)
(20%)
(14%)
(30%)

(20%)
(39%)
(20%)
(19%)
(16%)
(17%)
(37%)
(5%)
10%

(5%)
(4%)
(2%)
(4%)
(11%)
(7%)
(2%)
(13%)
8%

(25%)
(43%)
(22%)
(23%)
(27%)
(24%)
(39%)
(18%)
18%

(16%)
(47%)
(14%)
(17%)
(14%)
(22%)
(23%)
0
68%

10
11
12/14
15
16
17
18
19

(19%)
(20%)
(16%)
(10%)
(20%)
(19%)
(14%)
(10%)

(36%)
(19%)
(26%)
(31%)
(9%)
(20%)
(20%)
(29%)

(13%)
2%
(5%)
(4%)
(10%)
1%
(4%)
(14%)

(49%)
(17%)
(31%)
(35%)
(19%)
(19%)
(24%)
(43%)

(46%)
10%
(18%)
(36%)
(12%)
(6%)
(1%)
(41%)

20
21
23
24
27
29
30
31

(14%)
(20%)
(13%)
(19%)
(17%)
(19%)
(6%)
(17%)

(20%)
(29%)
(15%)
(18%)
(30%)
(5%)
(27%)
(14%)

0
(4%)
(7%)
(3%)
(3%)
(11%)
(10%)
(6%)

(20%)
(33%)
(22%)
(21%)
(33%)
(16%)
(37%)
(20%)

(5%)
(9%)
(5%)
(6%)
(25%)
1%
(35%)
(14%)

32
33
34
35
36
37
39
40

(21%)
(15%)
(22%)
(31%)
(21%)
(22%)
(24%)
(14%)
X = (17.45%)

(24%)
(24%)
(34%)
(42%)
(13%)
(22%)
(23%)
(18%)
X = (21.54%)

(11%)
(7%)
(6%)
(7%)
(16%)
0
(5%)
(23%)
X = (6.24%)

(35%)
(31%)
(40%)
(49%)
(29%)
(22%)
(28%)
(41%)
X = (27.78%)

(28%)
(19%)
(19%)
(26%)
1%
(15%)
(5%)
(23%)
X = (14.15%)

Note. Revenue changes (in percentages) ate derived by subtracting later indexes from earlier indexes for
the time periods stipulated. Parentheses indicate negative change.

Driven by these policy changes, decline resumed to end the respite that many
districts enjoyed between 1979 and 1981. Shortly thereafter, further policy changes,
defunding and the revenue veto, compounded previous losses and extended the
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Figure 8. Revenue trends of participating districts.
Note. Upper range represents rapidly growing districts.

progression of decline that began with tax limitation. District revenues descended to their
lowest levels in the history of state reporting, as six-year (1977-78/1983-84) mean losses
exceeded the four-year (1977-78/1981-82) drop.

Over half of the districts reported

cumulative losses of 27% or more before conditions began to improve (see Table 10).
Slow decline finally ended with the influx of lottery money in 1985 (Rodda, 1986). That
improvement is reflected by the upturn in revenue trends (see Figure 8), and the fact that
ten-year (1977-78/1986-87) cumulative losses were less than the one-year losses of tax
limitation (see Table 10).
It is important to ask how severe a decline 27% over six years represents.
Although the literature fails to provide a practical definition of “severe decline” for the
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community colleges, Levine, Rubin, and Wolohojian (1981) established a definition for
public institutions. They defined severe decline as any constant dollar reduction from the
previous fiscal period. In contrast, Sibolski (1984), who studied four-year colleges by
analyzing the Higher Education General Information Survey (United States Department of
Education) data, determined that a 12% drop in inflation-adjusted dollars over a three year
period is the equivalent of severe decline. By that criterion (the validity of which can be
challenged for community colleges), 17 districts in this study reached a state of severe
decline by as early as 1980-81, and 19 reached a state of very severe decline (4% annual
rate of loss) before revenues improved.

Financial Position

Dickmeyer (1980), a leading authority on the financial stability of postsecondary
institutions, concluded from years of study that revenue alone is an inadequate indicator
of financial position. According to Dickmeyer, the fiscal health of a college depends on
the relationship of the inflow to the outflow of resources, or, in other words, the balance
between revenues and expenditures. The following discussion assesses the financial
position of participating districts by examining expenditures in relation to revenue and
assessing trends in two financial indicators.

The relationship of expenditures to revenues. Table 11 presents 15 years of data
on community college expenditures. Expenditure figures were drawn from Objects 10006000, the accounting classifications for general fund expenditures as defined by the
California Community Colleges Budget and Accounting Manual. (1985).

Table 11

shows the year-to-year changes reported by districts and the variation among districts in
any given year. Almost very district made cutbacks immediately after Proposition 13.
The cutbacks varied from 1% and 29% of prior-year expenditures. Many districts also
cut spending following defunding, but fewer made the double-digit reductions common
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after tax limitation, and a some actually increased spending.

Figure 9 displays the

systemwide spending fluctuations following Proposition 13.
Table 12 summarizes the expenditure changes of individual districts for easy
comparison. Although one district (#5) made no cuts immediately following Proposition
13, all other districts retrenched, some with cuts of 10% or less, but many with cuts
exceeding 15% or more. Retrenchment slowed after 1979, as indicated by the 1978-1982
cumulative cutbacks which averaged only half a percentage point higher than the cuts
associated with tax limitation. It accelerated again in 1982, but never to the degree of
previous reduction trends. Nevertheless, the cumulative reductions were impressive. By
1984, in fact, 25% of the districts in the sample had cut spending to levels at or below
their 1973-74 level of spending. Revenues improved in 1985, and spending picked up in
a majority of districts. Thus, the ten-year cumulative reductions were substantially less
than immediate post-Proposition 13 cutbacks (see Table 12).
Table 12 also reveals patterns in retrenchment management. As indicated above,
many districts made large cutbacks at the time of tax limitation. Although some (#1, 3/13,
20, 37, 39) continued to manage conservatively, others (#29, 34, 36) gradually eased
their spending constraints as time went on.

Some districts (#2/38, 17, 19, 40),

minimized their initial reductions, and were forced to play catch-up later.

While the

cutbacks made prior to 1982 often failed to balance losses (as indicated by average
revenue and spending changes for the period), after 1982 a wave of fiscal conservatism
overtook the system. Twenty-two (22) districts balanced their budgets or cut spending
more than their revenue losses demanded (see Table 13). A few districts managed decline
in an extremely conservative fashion. Districts #3/13 and 39, for example, consistently
over-cut during the ten-year period, 1977-1987.

Revenue-to-expenditure ratios. Financial indicators are helpful for assessing the
financial position of organizations. One such indicator is the ratio of revenues to
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Table 11
Total Expenditures (objects 1000-6000) of Participating Districts. 1973-74 through
1987-88_____________________________________________________________
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Table 11 (con'd)
1000-6000) of Participating Districts. 1973-74 through
1 9 8 7 -8 8

Expenditures in Thousands of Dollars
Y ears
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Table 11 (con'd)
Total Expenditures (objects 1000-6000) of Participating Districts. 1973-74 through
1987-88_____________________________________________________________
Expenditures in Thousands of Dollars
Years
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Note. 1st line = current dollar expenditures revenue (data from California Community College Fiscal
Data Abstracts, 1973-1988); 2nd line = constant dollar expenditures; 3rd line = indexes.

expenditures which is a way of showing the balance between district income and
spending. Millett (1976) defined this ratio as the dividend of “current” fund revenue over
“current” fund expenditures. A ratio of 1.0 indicates fiscal balance, over 1.0 indicates a
revenue surplus, and less than 1.0, an operating deficit. According to Millett, several
years of deficit ratios may signify financial stress.
Table 14 reports the revenue to expenditure ratios for participating districts. A
simple count shows that, between 1978 and 1984, 18 districts had two or more years of
deficit ratios. Only five districts showed such a pattern in the years prior to tax limitation.
This suggests a substantial increase of financial stress in the community college system.
A count of districts showing deficit ratios in any given year shows 1982-83 as the
most unstable year for the sample as a whole; 21 districts had operating deficits in 198283, as compared with 9 in 1978-79, the year after Proposition 13. That suggests an
accumulation of financial stress in the system.
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Table 12
Participating District Expenditure Changes
1^77-7$/
1978-79

1^77-7$/
1981-82

1982-&/
1983-84

1$77-7S/
1983-84

1977-78/
1986-87

l
2/22/28/38
3/13
4
5
6
7
8
9

(17%)*
(14%)
(21%)*
(10%)
l%b
(10%)*
(17%)
(3%)
(22%)

(19%)
(14%)b
(29%)*
(14%)
2%b
(22%)*
(33%)
16%b
(16%)*

(9%)*
(23%)*
(4%)*
(8%)*
(17%)*
(4%)
(6%)*
(7%)
1%

(28%)*
(37%)
(33%)*
(22%)
(16%)b
(26%)*
(39%)
9%b
(15%)

(16%)
(42%)
(27%)*
(14%)
(3%)
(30%)
(23%)
32%
17%

10
11
12/14
15
16
17
18
19

(15%)
(16%)
(9%)
(13%)*
(9%)
(10%)
(12%)
(11%)*

(34%)
(19%)
(20%)
(16%)b
(6%)
3%b
(14%)
( 9%)b

(15%)*
8%
(7%)*
(13%)*
(3%)
(19%)*
(4%)
(14%)

(49%)
(11%)
(27%)
(29%)
( 9%)b
(16%)
(18%)
(23%)b

(49%)
14%
(14%)
(30%)
(2%)
5%
0
(31%) •

20
21
23
24
27
29
30
31

(16%)*
(28%)*
(15%)*
(18%)
(16%)
(21%)*
(10%)*
(15%)

(14%)
(41%)*
(3%)
(16%)
(24%)
(11%)*
l%b
(17%)*

(7%)a
1%
(12%)*
(3%)
(9%)*
5%
(32%)*
(5%)

(21%)*
(40%)*
(15%)
(19%)
(33%)
( 6%)b
(31%)
(22%)*

(2%)
(6%)
(1%)
(4%)
(19%)
9%
(19%)
(19%)

32
33
34
35
36
37
39
40

(12%)
(15%)
(11%)
(23%)
(11%)
(23%)*
(29%)*
( 1%)b
X = (14.33%)

(14%)
(15%)
(6%)
(17%)b
0
(21%)
(33%)*
(13%)
X = (14.79%)

(13%)*
0
5%
(5%)
(5%)
(11%)*
(7%)*
(25%)*
X = (8.39%)

(27%)
(15%)
( l%)b
(22%)b
( 5%)b
(32%)*
(40%)*
(38%)
X = (23.45%)

(12%)
(8%)
5%
9%
22%
(16%)
(14%)*
(33%)*
X = (9.72%)

District

Note. Expenditure changes (in percentages) are derived by subtracting later indexes from earlier indexes for
the time periods stipulated. Parentheses indicate negative change.
'Expenditure reduction exceeds revenue loss for the period.
"Revenue loss exceeds expenditure reduction by 10% or more.
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Figure 9. Expenditure trends of participating districts.

Table 13
Comparison of Revenue and Expenditure Changes 1982-84
District
t
2/38
3/13
4
5
6
7
8
9
to
11
12/14
15
16
17
18
19

Revenue
Change
(0.05)
(0.04)
(0.02)
(0.04)
(0.11)
(0.07)
(0.02)
(0.13)
0.08
(0.13)
(0.02)
0.05
(0.04)
(0.10)
0.01
(0.04)
(0.14)

Expenditure
Change

District

(0.09) *
(0.23) *
(0.04) *
(0.08) *
(0.17) *
(0.04)
(0.06) *
(0.07)
0.01 *
(0.15) *
0.08
(0.07) *
(0.13) *
(0.03)
(0.09) *
(0.04) *
(0.14) *

20
21
23
24
27
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
39
40

Revenue
Change
0.00
(0.04)
(0.07)
(0.03)
(0.03)
(0 .1 1)
(0.10)
(0.06)
(0.11)
(0.07)
(0.06)
(0.07)
(0.16)
0.0 0
(0.05)
(0.22)

Expenditure
Change
(0.07)*

0.01
(0.12)*
(0.03)*
(0.09)*
(0.05)
(0.32)*
(0.05)
(0.13)*
0.00
0.05
(0.05)
(0.05)
(0.11)*
(0.07)*
(0.25)*

Note. Revenue and expenditure changes are derived by subtracting the 1983-84 indexes from 1982-83
indexes (Tables 9 and 10), which yields percentage increments or decrements.

Parentheses indicate

negative change. * Districts showing fiscal conservatism.
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Adjusted reserve position. The revenue-to-expenditure ratio suffices as a crude
measure of general fiscal stress in the community college system, but is regarded as a
weak indicator of fiscal trouble in specific organizations.

For that purpose, a more

powerful and sensitive index is needed. Dickmeyer (1980) recommended the “adjusted
reserve position” (ARP), which factors an institution's revenue reserves into an appraisal
of its financial position and outlook for financial health.
Reserves-or “slack” in the terminology of Levine et al. (1981)-are, once again,
the monies left over from a previous fiscal period that are available for future
expenditures, or to cover current losses. To survive deficits, institutions commonly rely
on reserves. According to Dickmeyer (1980), growth in reserves is a sign of financial
health, while a decline in reserves, especially in public institutions, restricts the options
for effective use of resources, and may signify a deteriorating financial position.
The adjusted reserve position, which takes account of reserves, was computed by
dividing the general fund balance by the general fund expenditures (Dickmeyer, 1980).
The general fund balance is the California community college accounting system
classification for reporting reserves. It is defined as the difference between the assets and
liabilities of the general fund, designated in this study as the net-ending balance.
(Although the general fund balance combines monies from restricted and unrestricted
accounts, a combined accounting according to Dickmeyer (1980), serves to promote the
clearest picture of an institution's financial resources.)
The adjusted reserve position depicts the fund balance as a proportion of a year's
expenditures. For instance, a figure of 0.5 (50%) indicates reserves equivalent to one
half of an institution’s annual budget, or funds sufficient for six months operation after a
total cessation of revenue. The value of this indicator is that it expresses revenues and
expenditures in cumulative relationship to one another, and is therefore sensitive to
growing prosperity or fiscal trouble (Dickmeyer, 1980).
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Table 14
Ratios of Revenues to Expenditures for Participating Districts. 1973-74 through 1987-88
Revenues and Expenditures in Thousands of Dollars
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Table L4 (con'd)
Ratios of Revenues to Expenditures for Participating Districts. 1973-74 through 1987-88
Years
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Table 14 (con'd)
Ratios of Revenues to Expenditures for Participating Districts. 1973-74 through 1987-88
Revenues and Expenditures in Thousands of Dollars
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Mote. 1st line = current dollar revenues revenue (data from California Community College Fiscal Data
Abstracts, 1973-1988); 2nd line = current dollar expenditures; 3rd line = ratios.

Table 15 reports the indicator values for the districts in the sample, while Figure
10 shows the trends in ARPs over a 15 year period. The consumption of reserves in the
community college system clearly began long before tax limitation, and continued
downward through tax limitation and the years of events that followed.

The median

reserve level for the institutions in the sample declined from 25% in 1974, to 7% in 1985,
after which the trend in median reserves took an upturn.

The lowest reserve level,

reported by a particularly stressed institution (#30) at the peak of the tuition policy crisis,
was -11%. Only three institutions (#34, 35, 39) maintained reserves of 10% or more
throughout the ten-year period, 1978-79 to 1987-88.
It is important to ask at what point the erosion of reserves places an institution in
financial jeopardy. Dickmeyer (1983, p. 39) analyzed the ARP for independent two-year
institutions, and concluded that negative reserves of -20% or less indicated the “lowest
survival probability.” Clearly, none of the districts in the sample reached that degree of
decline. Growing concern for district solvency, however, did prompt the legislature to
create the California Community College Fiscal Monitoring System
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Figure 10. The trends in adjusted reserve position of participating districts.

(AB2910) in 1986, the original mission of which was to help prevent financial
emergencies in the community college system. After examining the fiscal data, agency
analysts adopted the criteria used by the K-12 system: 5% reserves defined as the level
triggering state scrutiny; 3% (accompanied by a pattern of deficit spending) defined as the
threshold of risk for fiscal emergency (personal communication, S. Nakamura and V.
Warner, Fiscal Analysts, CCC Fiscal Monitoring System, November, 1988).
Mindful of the importance of reserves, and cognizant of the standards in place for
K-12 schools, it can be argued that college administrators and trustees would seek to
preserve at least the minimum reserve level required by the state of other public
institutions, despite the lack of an official standard for the community colleges prior to
1987. Thus, for the purposes of this study, it is reasonable to accept the public institution
guidelines as a cornerstone for an operational definition of severe decline.

The five

percent (5%) reserve level taken as a pattern (two or more consecutive years at
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Table 15
Adjusted Reserve Positions (ARP) of Participating Districts. 1973-74 through 1987-88
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Table 15 (con’d)
Adjusted Reserve Positions (ARP) of Participating Districts. 1973-74 through 1987-88
Fund Balance and Expenditures in Thousands of Dollars
73-74 74-75 "75^-75"75-77 77-75 78-7*1 79-800-81 KI-8Z S2-83 83-H4 W-TT 83-80 85-87'87-8F

Years
rr —

it

■

2372

2,768

«51

7,807

036

035

89
7,473
tt«

13

a»

m

a ia

m
711

n m

2« B f
- 009
658

2071

3,173

22024 25.4S1
a«

an
872

1309

1,459

4,195
0.22

5324

6351

8,023

9,146

0.24

017

0.12

016

9286 11249 13,629 13368 12,697 12,779 13081 14904 13,618 15,096
006
006
0.07
001
004
004
008
004
016
005

#7

<44
4,068

275

795
5320

6397

<m

005

015

013

822
6,184
OS

812

■f*.M* ‘" a
19396

976

ten

606

*086
t tm

1,155

5352

76

1,472
V fr

1389

953

1237

m

6997

ym
a tf

<906

a#

aw

474

1073

1062 1381
8401 -» 9 & a s

015

983

1028 1020 1387
\m
9065 10035 n,66i 133*
a ia
aw
009
a«

5561 5,725 3910 3965 7341 8519 7,140
21374 26,661 32,495 37,6(4 42,681 37910 45577 49960 47,740 48508 50391 59,738 68712 75,796 869(8
007
017
012
0.11
008
020
O il
008
010
012
012
009
013
0:25
0.25
5399

6,789

2^63

2500

7,650

9 0

037

24

1330
:'m v - : W
AH -M-Si
8376 10294 11,751 12214 n m
B356
an
016 017 o s 005 m
OK

934

3387
m
S i—

2357 2591 3,687 3301 3,410 3216 1296 1,466 2573 1954 4057 3,764 6327
9,467 10,660 11.733 11309 13267 16,010 18582 16,105 18949 20,118 20,698 22,643 23994
026
OlO
017
027
024
026
020
007
020
028
009
031
015

<w

6,639

4362

4,757

6567

4533

8187

4058 $059 3598 3,104 2,15^ 10& 1049 2004 3,191
2335 2594
t2
?8
l
0
5
5?
nm
11986 8296 15035 t9,02t>
10019 19311 21090 22082 2$W
019
021
019012 aio 009 012 an
021
022
031 w
a i7
2/35^

3,719 4,035 4334 4,097 2350 3,661 3317 2,469 2290 2,691 3,126 3089 3322
13379 16395 18^84 20357 22393 21,425 24,067 27,058 30,757 31374 31,671 33376 37,400 40089 44371
008
0.08
020
020
012
014
O il
008
006
008
024
0.07
019
019
0.23
3,138

3344

3375 3,779 1,676 2 8 9 2345 3355 3327 3076 1015 2,120 1,0® 1575 1,0® 102)
m
1430a 1*542 22056 25684 28366 28953 303«J 3 50 » 375® 37006 36099 40017 42371 48441 490K
U02
027
020 047 007 007 m
m
004
O il , m
008
ao s
ao6
a®
i$

So

4,639 2207 3399 2388 4,073 4275 7,761 5924 15,171 4355 5509 3,044 7922 4,453 5311
24,853 28,755 32,794 36317 39,725 35,6(0 43,058 52929 55,709 67970 61,702 68752 72,452 79334 81,080
0.10
004
008
0.08
018
0.27
007
O il
006
0.07
012
012
an
0.09
019
1*225
5015

31

1,405
5382

10

955
7206

7091

&
7,447

1334

!,<&

7354 10059 11256 11,748
02! ttK OK) -006

-WOT

-747

9042

6628

-O il

■009

1,006

714

02}

024

01}

m

006

1599

2,003

1,643

1,435

897

1315

1,409

3,744

4511

5,648

7247

0.43

0.44

029

6395
0.21

1352
7,448
018

012

8109
016

9,405 10,125 10,178 10361
0.10
013
007
015

1331

79S
m
m

1018
44!
857
W160 11332 123#
a s

008

aoi

910
499
453
11380 11071 11945 12373
0.04
007
0.03
004
369

32

7379 <1,797 6,488 0158 12438 13&> ^980 a m i S,7K» 7.123 5091 2307 5,129 4527 502!
67941 70#S
2109? 20160 32056 36355 40,458 40(987 44052 4904} 56313 52338 52,796 59008 a m
034
020 022 •031' 034 O il 017 010 a s a io m
aw m
S24
008

33

2,432 2355 2363 3330 4,503 5986 6334 10,675 9,791 6323 3,668 2232 3967 3,762 3087
15516 17363 19310 22,054 243(8 22317 25,769 28477 32,455 33352 34315 37,058 38769 41,492 44,128
006
012
016
026
037
030
O il
0.10
016
019
0.25
015
019
0.09
0.09

If'".....

3s

1,430

1564

4,485

5^04

m

030

m

1355

13U

2,769 *062

sm
0as

7315

225!

<315

026

022

033
1,120

3270

2,785

1011

9207 t0997 12235 12,M

022

030

m

an

1077 1364 1090 1045 m
13,457 12052 14297 15927 17071
au

an

m

012

an

747

83

716

6(8

1,606

990

1372

1327

1,068

1064

968

977

1,462

1985

2318

2319

3,406

4526

4,137

5,027

5,182

6187

8247

6083

8997

7911

8957

9306

0.32

0.29

0.21

3325
0.17

0.36

027

020

0.26

0.21

0.17

0.20

0.14

012

0.16

0.21
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Table 15 (con’d)
Adjusted Reserve Positions (ARP) of Participating Districts._1973-74 through. 1987-8&
Fund Balance and Expenditures in Thousands of Dollars
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Note. 1st line = current dollar fund balance; 2nd line = current dollar expenditures revenue (data from
California Community College Fiscal Data Abstracts, 1973-1988); 3rd line = ratio.

that level or Iower)--a more conservative standard than the one eventually adopted by the
state-is useful as a benchmark of unacceptable risk.

In this study it will serve as the

point at which financial exigency becomes a distinct likelihood. This approach differs
from the one used by Levine et al. (1981) and Sibolski (1984), both of whom looked at
revenue losses rather than reserve levels. Unlike revenue losses, reserve levels define
precisely, from the standpoint of cash on hand and institutional obligations, the point at
which there is an urgent need to reorder institutional priorities and finances (Gray, 1981).
Table 16 shows that by that definition, two or more years of reserve levels at 5%
or less, ten districts in the sample reached a state of severe decline between 1982 and
1986; in contrast, only two institutions reached such a state between 1978 and 1982, far
fewer, in either case, than a criterion of revenue decline would have predicted.
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Table 16
Districts with Low Adjusted Reserve Positions (ARP)
Post-Proposition 13
(1977-78 / 1981-82)
District

Lowest
ARP

2, 38“
5
6a
7
15
16a
19
27
30
31

Post-Defunding
(1982-83 / 1986-87)

Years at or
Below 5%

0%

2

1%

2

Lowest
ARP
(1%)
4%
(3%)
4%
0%
4%
4%
2%
(11%)
3%

Years at or
Below 5%
4
2
5
2
4
3
2
2
3
3

Note. Parentheses indicate negative percentages.
aLarge urban districts.

Resource Change: Summary

The revenue, expenditure and financial position data show that the community
college system as a whole experienced extreme financial stress during the period of this
study. The data clearly show that tax limitation, the initial economic event, was the single
most important factor in resource change. All districts sustained sizable losses from
Proposition 13, most were able to minimize decline by making large expenditure
reductions and spending down their reserves.
Following Proposition 13 and the bail-out, a brief recovery ensued during which
many districts stabilized financially or made marginal fiscal gains. That respite ended
abruptly in 1981 when the state legislature moved to curtail system costs by initiating caps
on growth funding. Thereafter, defunding in 1982, and the revenue veto in 1983, added
to the cumulative fiscal stress in the community college system. By that time, however,
districts had dissipated much of their slack, and thus were pressed to step up
retrenchment
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It is noteworthy that the revenue losses accompanying defunding and the revenue
veto--the focal events of this study-never matched the steep decline that followed
Proposition 13, or even the slower decline associated with growth funding changes.
However, the data show that fiscal stress increased and peaked systemwide between 1982
and 1984. Greater numbers of districts reported operational deficits, and many responded
with a pronounced fiscal conservatism that could be said to typify the period. Thus, it
seems that the importance of these events was not the magnitude of the losses they
brought, but rather the heightened uncertainty that accompanied them at a time when
districts were already financially compromised, with no end of austerity in sight and slack
revenue largely depleted. Remarkably, between 1982-1987, only ten districts met or
exceeded the criterion of severe decline employed in this study, which, to reiterate, was
two or more years of reserve levels at 5% or less.

Ailministraiiy£.Strategies.and.Nursins Programs

According to authorities, the operational measures available to administrators for
dealing with decline fall into, and thus will be discussed in, three categories:
nonpersonnel, personnel, and program strategies (Bowen, 1983; Deutsch, 1983). The
data on administrative strategies were drawn from the interviews conducted with nursing
program directors. Due to minor interview inconsistencies, the number of queries on any
given strategy varies. In each case, however, the total number of queries is specified in
the response tallies.

Nonpersonnel Strategies

During the period of this study, community college administrators often made
nonpersonnel spending reductions a part of their overall retrenchment strategy.
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Implemented through collegewide spending freezes, static unit budgets, department lineitem reductions, or allotment increases insufficient to cover cost inflation, these reductions
resulted in less money for instructional materials, supplies, and equipment

Thus

nonpersonnel spending reductions were frequently an early strategy in a progression of
institutional strategies for dealing with dwindling state subsidies.

Instructional supplies and materials (Object 4000).

Instructional supplies and

materials have been defined by the CCC Budget and Accounting Manual for accounting
purposes as those items quickly consumed, easily broken, damaged, or lost, that cost less
than $200 per unit (California Community Colleges, October, 1985). In nursing, such
items encompass the printed instructional materials given to students, laboratory and
classroom supplies of various sorts, and inexpensive audiovisual teaching aids.
Nursing programs use copious printed materials—syllabi, journal reprints,
instructor-authored materials-which are costly to reproduce, and tend to run up the
overall expense of instruction.

Hence, reduced funding for printed materials was a

common cost-containment strategy. Twenty-six of 32 directors (81%) queried reported
such reductions. Sixteen (50%) directors judged their printed materials cutbacks severe
enough to require an alternative means of funding to preserve teaching routines.
Laboratory supplies encompassed the medical items needed to outfit a nursing
skills laboratory—the setting where new students are prepared through simulation practice
for clinical routines. Those items included sterile gloves, bandages, syringes, needles,
intravenous solutions and tubing, and procedure kits of various sorts, the cost of which
escalated rapidly—frequently by double-digit increments—during the period of this study.
Budget reduction for laboratory supplies was another common strategy. Of the 36
directors queried, 32 (88%) claimed that their supply budgets were cut back or frozen, or
that their increases were insufficient to cover cost-inflation. Nineteen (52%) judged their
reduction totals severe enough to require alternative sources of funding for supplies.
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Table 17 presents the findings on instructional materials and supplies.

Instructional equipment (Object 6400). Instructional equipment has been defined
by the Budget and Accounting Manual as tangible property of a more or less permanent
nature that has a market value on acquisition in excess of $200 per unit (California
Community Colleges, October, 1985).
In nursing programs, instructional equipment refers to the medical paraphernalia
necessary to outfit a nursing skills laboratory. That equipment generally approximated the
items found in a hospital nursing unit: electronically adjustable beds, stretchers and
wheelchairs, oxygen tanks, oxygen delivery devices, intravenous solution pumps,
suction devices of various kinds, mechanical lifts, patient monitoring devices, and
medical procedure mannequins, all of which are expensive purchases and require a sizable
capital outlay for their procurement or replacement
Equipment funding reductions constituted an almost universal cutback strategy in
the sample. Of the 37 directors queried, 34 (91%) reported cutbacks of various degrees;
14 (38%) stated that their budget line items for equipment purchases were eliminated for
one or more years, in which time purchases were postponed or funded through a central
college account, and subject to stringent justification and administrative approval
procedures.
Whether or not those cutbacks interfered with instructional routines depended on
the pre-cutback state of a program's equipment Numerous nursing departments tapped
the federal capitation grants and other resources available to nursing education in the
1970s, to fully outfit their were affected little by capital spending cutbacks. Others were
less well equipped at the outset of decline.
equipment became outdated.

During the years of tight money, their

A few directors (# 5, 7, 32, 33) reported that funds

available for equipment repairs (Object 5000) were also severely reduced. That resulted
in chronic equipment dilapidation, which had a serious impact on teaching routines in
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Table 17
Instructional Material and Supplies (Object 4000). and Instructional
Equipment (Object 64001 Funding Reductions
Program

Printed
Materials

Laboratory
Supplies

Laboratory
Equipment

Media
Programs

i
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

N
Y
Y®
Y®
Y®
Y®
N
Y
N

N
Y
Y®
Y
Y®
Y
Y
Y
Y®

N
Y
Y
Y
Y
Yb
yah

N
Y
Y
Y
Y
Yb
yb

Y
Yb

Y
Yb

to

_

LI
12
13
L4
15
16
17
18

Y®
Y®
N
Y®
Y®

Y®
N
N
Y®
N
Y®

Y
N
N
Yb

Y
N
Y
Yb
Y
yb

19
20
21
22
23
24
27
28
29
30

Y®
Y®
Y®
Y
Y®
N
Y
Y
N
-

31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40

.

-

Y®

Y
Yb

-

-

-

Y®
Y

Y
Y

Y
Y

Y®
Y
Y®
Y®

yab

Yb

Y
yab

Y
N
Y
Yb
yb

Y
Y
Y
Y®
Y

Y
yab
yb
Y
yab
Y
Y

Y
Yb
Y
Y

Y
yab
yab

Y
Yb
yb

Y
Y
Y
yab
yab

Y
Y
Y®

Y®
Y®
Y®
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y®
Y
Y®

Y
yab

Y
N
Y
Yb
Yb
Y
yb

xy=26

xy=32

xy=34

xy=33

Y®
Y®
Y
Y
Y
-

Note. Y = yes, funds were reduced. No, funding not reduced. Hyphen = not queried.
a augmentation required,
b allocation eliminated.
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some instances. “When our electric beds broke down, we had to tell the students to ‘just
pretend’ when procedures required they raise or lower them,” lamented Director #7. “We
had to hold some things together with bailing wire!” recalled Director #33
Audiovisual (AV) media programs, which are typically expensive, were subject to
the same capital spending reductions as laboratory equipment Thirty-four of 37 directors
(91%) reported that monies for audiovisual teaching aids were substantially reduced or
eliminated, resulting, in a few cases, in seriously outdated collections. “Some of our
films were left over from the 1960s!” complained Director #19.

In 1985, an influx of

state money allocated for instructional equipment alleviated the problems faced by many
vocational programs, including nursing (Commission Report, December, 1985). Table
17 also summarizes the findings on laboratory equipment and audiovisual media
programs.

Personnel Strategies

Personnel outlays often comprise up 85% or more of a total institutional budget
with as much as 50% going to support faculty salaries. Because fixed costs are a concern
to retrenching organizations (Vandement, 1989), administrative strategies to reduce them
were predictably common. Hiring freezes, reductions in support personnel and faculty,
the substitution of part-time for full-time teachers, workload increases and salary freezes
were some of the tactics reported in this study that became increasingly common after
1982.

Support personnel. Of the 32 directors queried, 10 (31%) reported that they had
no assigned positions for laboratory personnel-the technicians who manage nursing
skills laboratories--and for financial reasons, were unable to obtain them; eight (25%)
reported reductions of one or more positions, or the downgrading of positions to part-
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time status; eight (25%) reported no change in their laboratory staffing levels. These
findings are presented in Table 18.
Of the 29 directors queried, nine (31%) reported a reduction of one or more
secretarial positions which are needed to assist with the bureaucratic responsibilities
accompanying state regulation, and the myriad duties related to program admissions.
Three (#5, 13, 35) reported that their secretarial staffing levels, although unchanged, were
inadequate to meet department needs; one (#9) reported having no department secretarial
position. Sixteen directors (55%) reported secretarial staffing levels that were not reduced
and were adequate to meet unit needs (see Table 18).

Faculty positions. Faculty hiring freezes were a common administrative tacticone that led to department faculty attrition in numerous cases. Of 38 directors queried, 21
(55%) reported one or more full-time position vacancies. Such vacancies frequently went
unfilled for several semesters, and were accommodated either by reducing program
enrollment (15 programs) or by staffing clinical courses with part-time faculty (9
programs).
Faculty reduction by layoff was a far less common strategy. Fourteen directors
(37%) reported reduction-in-force (RIF) proceedings in their institutions; ten of these
involved nursing faculty.

Personnel policy. Reductions in funding for faculty continuing education and
travel (Object 5000) were common personnel policy retrenchment tactics. Of 24 directors
queried, 18 (75%) reported reduced or eliminated funding for these purposes.

Salary

freezes or reductions were far less common, but flat salaries and meager raises were
mentioned by nine directors as a cause of faculty morale problems, as was the loss of
overtime pay, which 11 directors reported (see Table 18).
Nursing workload was an issue that carried over from previous years into the
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Table 18
Personnel Reductions and Personnel Issues
Program
l*
2a
3
4
5
6a
7
8
9

Support Positions
Lab Asst.
Secretary
i
0
0
i
I
.
od
0
0
ob
0
0
0
ob
ob
0

FT Faculty Positions
Layoff
Attrition
2
4
3e
2e
0
0
3e
0
0
0
0
2
0
0
0
0
ice
0

vi
Y»
N
YU
Yb
Yi
Y1

0
0
0
7ef

Yb
Yb
Yb
Yb
Y*

ob
ob
I
0
ob
I
-

1
0
I
od
0
0
-

2e
0
0
jce

19
20
21
22a
23
24
27a
28a
29
30

0
ob
lc
2
0
ob
lc
0
lc
lc

0
1
2
0
I
0
0
0

Ic
lc
3C
3e
2e
lce
0
3e
[Ce
3e

0
0
Se 8
if
0
0

31
32
33
34a
35
36
37
38a
39a
40a

0
oc

0
0
1
0
oc
0
0
I

0
0
2e
0
0
0
0
2
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2f
0
2

-

ob
0
1
ob
ob
ob

lc

Yn
Yb
YU
N
Ybi
YU
Yi
YU
Yb

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

10a
11
12
13
14
I5a
16a
L7a
18

4e
2e
0
2ce

Personnel Issues

N
YU
N
yhij
N
N
Yh
N
YU

Note. Y = ves. N = no. Hyphen = not queried, dColleeewide RIF. ^No position. cPosition downgraded"
to PT. ^Staffing inadequate. eEnrollment reduced. ^Replaced with transfers. SFaculty transferred, no layoff
resulted. ^Workload fairness. ‘Salary. ^Compensation equity.
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period of this study. Many faculties held historic grievances in regard to workload that
persisted even as declining college revenue made workload adjustments increasingly
unlikely. At issue was the formula used to compute full-time equivalency (FI E), which,
under the provisions of Section 84520 of the Education Code, varied from district to
district according to the type, schedule, and length of course. Twelve directors (32%)
reported that workload equity was a matter of great concern to their faculties. In most
districts, the FTE for laboratory courses, including nursing, was set at 18 to 21 hours, as
compared with 15 hours for nonlaboratory courses; in a few (# 9, 35, 40), however, the
equivalency was set higher at 22 to 24 hours.

High FTEs, constituted an issue of

workload fairness for those groups. Many faculties were also concerned about the statemandated nursing faculty meetings not required of other faculty groups, and not factored
into institutional FTE calculations.

Program Strategies

Program strategies pertained to administrative actions which have consequences
for a program's status, organization, or continuation. One strategy with the potential to
affect program status was the reduction of funding for voluntary accreditation. Voluntary
accreditation in nursing is a prestigious but expensive standing which departments can
achieve by meeting the standards and paying the fees of the National League for Nursing
(NLN). Thirteen programs (34%) retained their voluntary accreditation during the years
of this study, however, three (#3, 10, 11) reported dropping it as part of an institutional
economy strategy. Twenty-four directors (63%) claimed that during the period of this
study their faculties were deterred from seeking NLN accreditation due to lack of funding.
Another common strategy used by administrators was to push productivity
enhancement-maximizing ADA per unit of program cost. Productivity is and was at the
time of this study measured in weekly student contact hours (WSCH). A contact hour is
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defined as the number of students under the supervision of a certificated instructor for 1
hour. One ADA is defined as the equivalent of 525 contact hours (Silverman, 1982).
Prior to 1988, WSCH was the single most important workload measure used to compute
ADA. Economic productivity, defined as WSCH per FTE, was used by community
college administrators to evaluate the comparative contributions of college subunits and
programs to a district's financial welfare.
With WSCH per FTE levels almost universally in the 150 to 250 range, the
nursing programs in this study fell far short of institutional targets, commonly set at 500
or above, and even fell short of the state average, which in 1982 hovered at 420
(Silverman, 1982). Thus, it was not unusual for administrators to urge increases in ADA
productivity for nursing and other “low-WSCH” programs. Thirty of 37 directors (81%)
reported they came under substantial administrative pressure to increase their program’s
WSCH totals. Two directors (#10, 40) reported they were given new WSCH targets
significandy above previous guidelines. Six reported no increase in WSCH pressure,
however, two directors in that group (#3, 13) reported their programs were protected by
an exclusionary clause in the faculty collective bargaining contract which exempted allied
health programs from district WSCH requirements. Table 19 summarizes these findings.
Productivity evaluations were part of a growing preoccupation with costefficiency on many campuses. According to numerous program directors, productivity
evaluations set the conditions for a heightened WSCH awareness within the general
faculty. That in turn fostered a widespread perception that low-WSCH programs such as
nursing were “expensive.”

As resources dwindled, concern for cost-efficiency

sometimes resulted in formal administrative proposals for the complete or partial
termination of low-WSCH units.

Programs such as nursing, which are not code

mandated, and which qualified for elimination under the reduction in force (RIF) and
teacher dismissal provisions of Section 13447 of the Education Code, were sometimes
targeted. Indeed, twelve nursing directors reported administrative proposals to terminate
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Table 19

Program,Status-Changss
Program
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40

Membership Cutback Productivity Requirements
Na
Na
ybc
Na
Na
N*1
N4*
N*1

Y
Y
N
Y
Y
Y
Y
I*5
Y

Termination Proposals
Y
Y
N
N
yh
Y
N
N
N

-

.

N41
Na

Y
N

Yh
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N

Nd
Nd
Nd
Nd
Nd
Nd
Nd
Nd

Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
N®
Y
Y
N
Y

N
N
N
Y
N
N
Y
Y
N
N

Y®
yC

Yf
N

tP
Yb
Na

Nd
Nd
Nd
Nd
Na
Nd
Na
Na
Nd
Na
E n = 3 3 . I y= 4

N
Y
Y

N
Y
Y
N
YS
N«
N®
Y
Y
Yf
I n = 1 2 .Iy =25

N
N
N
Y
N
N
N
Y
Y
Y
I N= 26, L Y= 12

Note. Y = yes. N = no. Hyphen = not queried. aNLN accredited. °NLN membership dropped. CNLN
accreditation dropped. ^No voluntary accreditation-funding a factor, eNo increase in productivity pressure.
*New WSCH “targets” given. ^Enrollment increased without commensurate increases in full-time
faculty. ^Termination warnings given.
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or partially terminate nursing programs.

Programs #6 and 40, for example, were

recommended for a 30% faculty reduction; #1, 27, and 34 for a 50% reduction; and #39,
along with two of eight programs in District #2/22/28/38, for closure. Further, directors
#5 and 10 reported that they received informal termination warnings under which they
anticipated the complete or partial termination of their programs. Table 20 summarizes the
findings on program terminations.

Administrative Strategies and Resource Decline

The Levine et al. (1981) model postulates a link between institutional resources
and administrative strategies. Severe decline, according to the model, demands layoffs
and program terminations. To determine whether in fact such strategies were a response
to impending financial exigency, it is important to examine that link from the standpoint of
the data in this study. Three ratios are helpful for that purpose, the adjusted reserve
position defined earlier, the full-time faculty/student ratio—a measure of program
efficiency as related to unit productivity (Gordon and Dawson, 1991; Jones 1985), and
the unit enrollment/college enrollment ratio--a rough index of the cost-burden a unit places
on an institution. Table 21 reports the indicators for the districts proposing nursing
terminations. Table 22 gives the same indicators for districts in which nursing programs
reportedly faced no increases in pressure for unit productivity. The full-time faculty-tostudent ratios for the entire sample varied from 0.14 to 0.03, with a median and mode of
0.07. A complete list can be found in Appendix J.

The nursing enrollment-to-college

enrollment ratios varied from 4.3 to 0.3 with a median of 1.0, and appear in Appendix K.
By comparing Tables 21 and 22, it is clear that termination proposals are a
complex administrative determination involving additional decision factors not revealed by
this study. The faculty-to-student ratios, for example, did not differentiate programs
proposed for termination from those not (although Program #1 stood out as being
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Table 20
Summary of Nursing Terminations
District
1
2/22/28/38
5
6
10
27
34
39
40

Type of Termination Proposed
Partial
2 Complete
Complete*
Partial
Complete*
Partial
Partial
Complete*
Partial

Recommended Faculty Reduction
17 of 30
20 of 110
2 of

7

0
7 of

15

3 of

12

Note.* Programs #5, 10 received informal warnings; no RIF proceeding followed.

Program #39 was

included in an optional proposal given the board of trustees; no RIF proceeding followed.

Table 21
The Financial Position. Nursing Program Efficiency, and Cost-Burden of Districts
Proposing Nursing Program Terminations
District

Year of
Proposal

Prior Year ARP

Nsg FT Faculty/
Student Ratio

1
2/22/28/38*
2
22
28
38
6
27
34
39
40

1983
1986

0.08
(0.01)

0.13

Nsg Enroll /
College Enroll
Ratio*
1.1

0.08
0.09
0.07
0.07
0.06
0.07
0.10
0.06
0.10

1.5
2.0
2.1
1.0
1.5
2.1
1.6
0.7
0.7

1987
1983
1983
1982
1984

(0.03)
0.05
0.14
0.15
0.07

Note. Parentheses indicate negative numbers. * Enrollment ratios are calculated for year of ARP.

Table 22

The Ei-naocial_P.QsitiQQ, -Nursing Program J5fQ£isngy,.aadJQoskBuKigojpf P istrias
Supporting the Organizational Continuity of Nursing Programs
District Lowest ARP-1982-1987
3
8
12
24
36
37

0.05
0.05
0.06
0.07
0.09
0.10

Nsg FT Faculty /
Student Ratio
0.10
0.09
0.08
0.07
0.07
0.09

Nsg Enroll / College
Enroll Ratio*
0.9
0.3
0.9
0.7
0.5
0.9

Note. *Enrollment ratios are calculated for year of ARP.
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comparatively inefficient).

Nor did financial position differentiate the two groups,

although the range of ARPs (0.15 to -0.03) in Table 20 was wider than that in Table 21
(0.10 to 0.05), which suggests that harsh cutback measures may be attractive to
institutions at the extremes of the economic spectrum—fiscally conservative institutions
presently well-off but concerned about eventual insolvency, and institutions already
financially troubled. Overall cost burden, on the other hand, did appear to differentiate the
groups. The enrollment ratios of the institutions proposing nursing terminations were
substantially above the sample median of 1.0. Clearly, officials differed in their tolerance
for economic risk. It is especially noteworthy that six of the ten districts (#7, 15, 16, 19,
30 and 31) with reserves at or below the criterion of severe decline avoided nursing
program terminations. On the other hand, five districts (#1, 10, 34, 39, and 40) with
reserves above or well above the reserve criterion proposed nursing program terminations

Administrative Strategies: Summary

These findings show the toll taken on nursing programs by Community College
retrenchment, 1982-87. All programs sustained reductions in one or more categories:
nonpersonnel, personnel, and/or program. No program went untouched by resource
decline. Indeed, the impact on the daily operations was significant in many instances, and
a frustration to many nursing faculties. Faculty attrition was widespread in the sample;
layoffs and nursing program termination proposals occurred in a number of cases—
frequently enough, it would seem, to foster a climate of job insecurity.

However,

termination did not correspond in all cases to a situation of imminent financial emergency.
To summarize, 81% of the nursing program directors reported reduced funding
for instructional materials, 88% reported reductions for laboratory supplies, and 91% for
laboratory equipment and teaching aids. A few programs (3) were forced to drop their
voluntary accreditation; many others (63%) found accreditation unattainable in part for
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lack of funding. In several settings, faculties were unhappy because of salary stagnation,
long work hours, or low or no funding for travel and continuing education. Numerous
programs (25%) experienced laboratory staffing cutbacks, while many others (31%) were
unable to hire needed laboratory personnel.

A number of directors (28%) reported

reductions in department secretarial positions; 58% reported faculty reduction by attrition;
16% reported full-time faculty layoff attempts in conjunction with partial or complete
program termination proposals.
Clearly, the impact of retrenchment was widespread and serious enough to require
adaptations to deal with the resulting shortages and inconvenience. Absent extra pay,
work condition improvements or other incentives, these could only have been achieved at
the expense of faculty energy, good will and morale.

The Political Behavior of Nursing Faculties

According to numerous authorities on institutional resource decline, a constituency
group's behavior derives from a perceived threat to its values inherent in the measures
administrators employ to facilitate an economic adaptation (Bowen, 1983; Deutsch, 1983;
Dougherty, 1981; Gumport, 1993 May-June; Mingle and Norris, 1981; Powers, 1982).
Further, the severity of decline determines the selection of managerial tactics which in turn
serve to politicize organizational decision making (Levine et al, 1981). Authorities also
point to perceived discrimination-inequities in the sorting out of winners and losers—
during retrenchment as another determinant of constituency responses (Bamer-Barry and
Rosenwein, 1985). These factors, moreover, are linked to constituency behavior by
notions of group endangerment and distributive injustice. The greater the threat, the more
intense the partiality perceived in retrenchment tactics, the more likely a constituency will
react by waging a political offensive.
Typically, organizations respond to resource decline with a

series
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administratively imposed adaptations.

In a hierarchical system, where authority is

contractually assigned, those adaptations constitute a program of externally generated
demands. Top administrators initiate a flow of requirements to which groups lower in the
hierarchy are obligated to respond. In the classical bureaucracy, the expectation is that
those at the lower level will conform to higher-level directives. Colleges and universities
differ from the classical bureaucracy, however, in that they function, at least to some
degree, as political systems in which organization policy decisions are subject to
constituency influence. As conditions change, a group (faculty, classified personnel,
students) may act in any number of ways to secure its interests and protect its values.
According to Elmore and McLaughlin (1982), in any political system,
constituencies have four options for dealing with externally generated demands. Those
are to comply fully, to adjust incrementally, to co-opt the demand maker, or to deny or
resist the demand. To this list, one might add the option of simply opposing (while
otherwise complying with) a demand. Figure 11 displays the definitions of these terms
which admittedly overlap to a certain degree. The following discussion reports on the
responses of nursing faculties to conditions of decline as described by program directors,
faculty members, and college administrators.

Responses of Nursing Faculties

As indicated above, retrenchment was pervasive in the California community
college system between 1982 and 1987. As a consequence, no nursing program avoided
cutbacks entirely.

Although not uniformly harsh, the cutbacks in most cases were

substantial enough to necessitate an adaptation. Faculties complied, sought altemauves
for an incremental adjustment, or resisted policy change in any of a variety of ways.
Table 23 summarizes the responses of nursing faculties to each type of cutback. Table 24
tallies those responses, and establishes their relative importance as a pattern of adaptation.
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(1)

Full Compliance - A constituency group does what it is required by authority to
do; denotes a rapid, more or less complete adjustment, the strain of which may be
reduced by careful management

(2)

Incremental Adjustment - The constituency group makes a cautious response in
the direction of compliance; denotes a response that minimizes the reduction of
services but involves an alternative plan (negotiated time delays, procurement
of substitute resources).

(3)

Denial / Authoritative Resistance • The constituency group acts to fend
off external pressures by ignoring them or by instituting countervailing
pressures Qawsuits, legislative initiatives, coalition building, electoral activity,
threat-making).

(4)

Co-optation - The constituency group reaches out to enfold its adversary by
influencing the adversary's cultural or political outlook (often through an effort to
educate) or by engaging in pro forma responses.

(5)

Opposition - The constituency group expresses its opposition to an external
demand by various means (demonstrations, rallies, press conferences).

Figure 11. Political options for dealing with an external demand. Adapted from Elmore and McLaughlin
(1982), p. 110.

Responses to nonpersonnel strategies. Because nonpersonnel cutbacks posed a
potential threat to instructional quality, faculties, with few exceptions, took steps to
minimize the impact of cutbacks in that category. Usually, they responded by conserving
existing resources, but many also sought to locate new resources for a slower, more
incremental adjustment to funding reductions. A summary of those measures appears in
Table 25.
To ease the strain of compliance, faculties-a total of 38 in all—stretched their
resources, minimized consumption, and set priorities for the use of allocated funds. They
stockpiled essential items as unit funding allowed—19 faculties engaged in supply
stockpiling-and conserved accumulated inventories through recycling.

Indeed, 32

faculties practiced recycling. Laboratory supplies, for example, were repackaged and
reused, sometimes to a point where they could no longer be reassembled. “Some of our
students never got to open a fresh sterile package,” lamented Director #19.
Another mode of response was fund-shifting-the practice of moving allotted
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Table 23
Nursing Faculty Responses to Administrative Strategies

Program
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40

Responses to
Nonpersonnel Strategies
Materials Supplies Media and
Equipment
NA
NA
NA
C
C/IA
IA
IA
C/IA
IA
IA
C/IA
IA
IA/Co
C/IA
IA
Co
IA
C/IA
NA
Co
C/IA
NA
C
C
NA
C/IA
R

Responses to
Personnel Strategies
Attrition
Layoffs
D/R/O/IA
D/Co/R/O
NA
NA
Co*
RAD
NA
NA
NA

NA
NA
C
NA
NA
C
C
C
C

NA
C/D
NA
C
C/Co
C
C
C*
D

R/O/IA
R/O
NA
NA
Co/R*
IA/R/O
NA
NA
NA

D/Co/R*
NA
NA
NA
NA
Co
NA
Co
NA
NA

IA
C
C
C
C
NA

C/Co
NA
NA
NA
D
C

IA
NA
NA
C
C
C

-

-

.

-

C/IA
C/IA
C/IA

IA
IA
C

Co
NA
C
IA/Co
C
R/O
NA
C/Co
C
C

C/IA
C/IA
C/IA

C/IA
C
C

IA
C
IA
IA/Co
C
IA
C
C
C

C
R/O
IA
C
C
C
C
C
C/Co

NA
NA
D/Co/R/O
NA
NA
C
D/R/O
NA
NA

C/IA
C/IA
C/IA
C/IA
C/IA
C/IA
C/IA
C/IA
C/IA
C/IA

C
C
Co
IA
C
IA/O
IA
IA
C
C

NA
Co
C/Co
NA
C
Co
C
C
NA
C

NA
NA
NA
R/O
NA
NA
NA
D/Co/R/O
D/R/O
O

IA
IA
IA
IA
D
DVD

NA
C
C
NA
-

IA
IA
C
D
C
-

C
IA
IA

-

C
c

Membership Productivity Termination

IA
C/Co
C
C
NA
NA
NA
NA
C

C/IA
NA
NA
C/IA
NA
C

IA
IA
NA
IA
IA

Responses to Program Strategies

-

.

C
NA
C

C
NA
Co

Co/R*
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA

C

Co
Co
C/D
Co
D
C/R
C/D
Co
D

NA
NA
R/O
NA
NA
C
R/O
NA
NA

NA
C/Co
Co
NA
C/R/O
NA
Co
C/D
NA
C

NA
NA
NA
R/O/IA
NA
NA
NA
R/Co/O
R/Co/O
O

c
c
c
c
c

c
c

C
c
c
c
c

NA

c
NA
NA
C
NA

Note. Hyphen = Not queried; C = Compliance; IA = Incremental adjustment; D = Denial; R = Resistance;
Co = Cooptation; O = Opposition; NA = Not applicable; * = termination warning only.
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Table 24
Nursing Faculty Response Tallies
NP

NO

NA

NC_____________________________ » of Responses__________________________________
C

%

IA

%

D

*

k

%

Co

O

%

Nonpersonnel
Materials

38

32

5

27

6

(22.2)

19

C70.3)

2

Supplies

38

36

4

32

32

(100)

27

(84.4)

Equipment

38

37

3

34

IS

(44.1)

15

A ttr itio n

38

38

ll

27

21

(71.7)

Faculty

38

38

26

10

1

(8.3)

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

(44.1)

0

I

3

( 11. 1)

0

2

1

(8.3)

0

8

(7.4)

5

(14.7)

0

(7.4)

8

(30.0)

2

(7.4)

(80.0)

6

(60.0)

8

(80.0)

(2.9)

Personnel

L a y o ff

Program
Membership

38

37

10

27

26

(96.3)

1

Productivity

38

37

10

27

18

(66.6)

0

Termination

38

38

26

12

1

(8.3)

3

(3.7)

0
8

(25.0)

0

0
(29.6)

0

0

2

(7.7)

10

(38.5)

0

10

(83.3)

5

(41.7)

7

(58.3)

Note. NP = # of Programs; NQ = # Queried; NA = Not Applicable; NC = # Cut C = Compliance; IA =
Incremental adjustment; D = Denial; R = Resistance; Co = Cooptation; O = Opposition

funds from lower to higher priority uses. Twenty faculties practiced fund shifting. This
sometimes meant taking money from capital outlay (object 6400), if funded, and putting it
into instructional supplies (object 4000). Teaching aids and new equipment were often
sacrificed to maintain adequate inventories of classroom materials and laboratory supplies.
State regulations, however, stipulate that intercategory transfers must be approved by
district trustees. Therefore, many directors favored intracategory transfers—the transfers
over which they maintained complete discretion-and made such transfers a regular part of
their unit budget strategy. To assure a budget reserve, for example, Director #5, allotted
extra money for teaching aids under Supplies and Materials (Object 4000). “If you run
short in duplicating or lab necessities, you take it from AV!” she acknowledged.
To reduce gaps between unit needs and allotments, faculties also coped by
locating alternative resources. Thirty-three faculties in all used such an approach. One of
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Table 25
Compliance and Incremental Adjustment to Nonpersonnel Strategies
Compliance
Incremental Adjustment
Program
Supply
Fund
Supply
Fee
Fund
Solicit
Stockpiling Shifting Recycling
Donations Increases Raising
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40

♦

*

♦

*
*
*

*
*
*

4c

♦

4c

*

*

4c

4c

4c

4c

4c

4c

4c

4c

4e

4c

4c

4c

4c

4c

4c

4c
4c

4c

*

*

4c

4c

*

4c

4c

4c

4c

4c
4c
4c

*

*

4c

4c

4c

4c
4c

*
*

*

4c

*

4c

*

4c

4c

4c

4c

4c

4c

*
*

4c

4c

4c

4c

4c

4c

4c

4c

4c

4c

4c

4c

4c

4c

4c

*
*

*

4c

4c

*

4c

4c

4c

4c

*

4c

*

*

4c

*

*

4c

*

4c

4c

4c

4c
4c
4c

4c

4c

*

♦

*
*
*

*

4c

4c

4c

4c

4c

4c

4c

4c

4c

4c

4c
4c

4c
4c

*

E sr

= 32

I * 1= 22

It

I*s = 20

4c
O
CM

I s s = 19

4c
4c

I tr = 20

Note. * = Strategy included the transfer of basic skills teaching to the hospital. A total of 33 faculties
used compliance; 33 faculties used incremental adjustment
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the more common practices was to solicit donations of supplies and equipment from
hospitals and medical supply companies. Not a new practice, soliciting supplies became
increasingly popular as cutbacks deepened after 1982.

Some faculties eventually

extended the practice to include equipment, although those efforts frequently yielded items
in need o f costly repairs. A few faculties (#7, 36) encouraged donations by setting up
formal solicitation protocols which incorporated third-party appraisals and donation taxreceipts. There were also variations on this tactic, such as to prevail upon hospitals to sell
medical items at discounted prices (#10), or to provide free services (laundering linens-#6). Yet, another variation, a form of inter-organizational cost-shifting was to conduct
teaching activities in the hospital. Numerous faculties took advantage of the hospital as a
source o f supplies and equipment by simply taking students into the clinical setting for
their basic skills training. Indeed, many embraced this tactic as an acceptable solution to
campus shortages. “Nursing has that wonderful laboratory in the hospital!” exclaimed
Director #2. Director #21 observed, “We coped by taking our students to the hospital
from day one.” “It’s better for the students,” asserted Director #36. Or as Director #13
noted, “W e’re lucky. It’s not like down at autobody where the students have nowhere
else to go.”
Another common practice was to pass a portion of the cost of materials and
supplies on to the student. Nearly two-thirds of the programs in the sample relied on
student fee increases to ease the impact of budget cuts.

After the 1984 tuition

compromise, however, fee increases replaced by tuition under the conditions of the
compromise, were eliminated as a budget strategy.

As a consequence, a substantial

number o f programs turned to fundraising to help make ends meet. Grantwriting became
a more common management practice than it previously had been, as did the pursuit of
“soft-money” arrangements for supporting program operations. Indeed, a majority of
directors undertook educational grant-writing. “This whole period has been a time of
increasing attention on my part to getting extramural funds!” said Director #37. Although
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small grants (less than $5000) were common, some directors reported large grants.
Director #22, for example, obtained a $40,000 foundation grant for program equipment;
Director #38 secured a $75,000 foundation grant to renovate and equip a skills laboratory;
Director #20 obtained $80,000 for a similar purpose. Only one group (#10) turned to
direct fund-raising as a means of paying for unit needs, and no groups initiated plannedgiving programs, perhaps because most community college foundations were at that point
in a developmental stage.
Another route for pursuing allotment increases was through the bureaucratic
budget construction process. However, directors found that as decline continued, that
avenue became increasingly unproductive. “Every year I ask for more money, and every
year they [campus executives] give me less,” lamented Director #29. “I've had a roll-over
budget for the last five years,” commented Director #36. Many complained that their role
as unit managers provided them too little access to the district executives who controlled
allotments. “How much influence you have depends entirely on who you report to,”
observed Director #23.
Nevertheless, some directors did succeed by focusing their efforts on restricted
college funds-those monies designated by law for specific purposes, which in this case
referred to the federal subsidies available to nursing programs under the Vocational
Education Act (VEA). At the local level, those funds were often distributed by middlemanagement committees accessible to influence from below, and many directors made
efforts through that channel to procure or increase their allotments. The pursuit of such
funds sometimes required directors to challenge the established protocol. Director #7, for
example, found it necessary to demand a membership on the decision committee.
Although some directors (#5, 7, 23) succeeded in their effort, others were unsuccessful.
Ironically, a few of the unsuccessful directors (#6, 13, 22) reported that the competition
for VEA funds among subunits worked to the disadvantage of nursing programs, because
the VEA decision makers in their institutions required that those with access to alternative
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resources defer to those totally dependent on college allotments. “There was a lot of give
and take, but it was usually nursing that did the giving—they knew that we could go to the
hospital!” said Director #13.
Aside from the many programs that adapted through modes of compliance and
incremental adjustment, there were a few which pursued co-optive, resistance,
oppositional or denial tactics.

Director #23 successfully co-opted her superiors by

preparing an elaborate cost-benefit analysis to justify her request for capital outlay funds.
“I showed the administration how, with a little investment, they could not only get their
money back, but pull in additional ADA.” That effort succeeded in part because members
of the nursing faculty concurrently lobbied members of the college budget committee for
the funding increase. Director #9 described a resistance tactic. “We [members of the
nursing faculty] went to our administration as a group with the message that if they didn't
fund our laboratory, they wouldn't have a faculty!” Director #35 adapted by ignoring
nursing’s assigned budget limits for supplies and materials: “They [administrators] never
say anything—I guess they know I never ask for anything I don't need.” Director #23
described a similar approach: ‘There's an unwritten rule on this campus that says ‘He
who overspends gets rewarded.’”

Responses to personnel strategies.

Personnel reductions, part of the gradual

progression of administrative tactics for dealing with decline, became increasingly
common after 1982, as economic deterioration in the community college system
accelerated. Most nursing programs (see Table 18) faced hiring freezes which down
graded full-time positions, and resulted in staff attrition. However, a few were able to
replace lost personnel with funds acquired from the soft-money arrangements they
negotiated with local hospitals. Although the attrition of personnel put pressure on the
full-time faculty remaining to absorb extra instructional tasks, faculties mounted little
resistance or formal opposition to the policies resulting in vacancies. The groups in this
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study, with a few notable exceptions, reluctantly accepted the staff changes resulting from
personnel attrition. Those that did not accept the changes used a variety of tactics.
Director #21 resisted when her program lost three full-time faculty in a single year. “The
district’s part-time policy was destroying our program,” she explained.

Director #21

called a meeting of her program advisory committee, and focused the agenda on the
drawbacks of using part-time personnel. She invited local health care administrators,
college executives, and a state assemblyman. The effort was unsuccessful; no staffing
changes resulted. Members of the Program #15 faculty tried to dissuade their board of
trustees from applying a policy of attrition to the nursing department The institution was
facing bankruptcy, however, and the board made no concessions. Director #10 went
over the chancellor’s head to the board of trustees with a request for a unit secretarial
replacement. She succeeded, but at a social cost Her fellow unit managers disapproved
of the tactic.
The responses of nursing faculties to layoff proposals were, on the whole, more
aggressive, and will be discussed below, along with the program termination plans of
which they were a part.

Responses to program strategies.

Nursing faculties responded to cuts in

membership funds by complying-that is, by giving up, postponing, or putting off
indefinitely, the pursuit of voluntary accreditation. Only one faculty, #10, pursued an
incremental solution, turning to direct fundraising to pay its accreditation fees, and no
faculties opposed membership funding policies.

Faculties clearly differed in their

outlooks on voluntary accreditation. Some considered certification helpful to students
seeking transfers to four-year colleges; others looked at it as a professional luxury. “We
never could decide whether the expense was worth it!” said Director #19.
Compliance and co-optation were the most common faculty responses to demands
for increased ADA productivity. Table 26 summarizes those responses. Twenty-seven
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faculties pursued some form of compliance tactic. Compliance usually required a measure
of reorganization to achieve the necessary WSCH increases. Reorganization took one of
three forms: (1) class section consolidation; (2) curriculum expansion; or (3) clinical
faculty-student ratio increases. Nineteen faculties consolidated, small, frequently repeated
classes into large lecture sections. By that means, they were able to increase their faculty
contact hours, but at a risk to student performance: students in the expanded courses
received less individual attention. Other groups added courses to the curriculum within
the limits of the credit caps set by the Board of Registered Nursing, (BRN).

A few

faculties directed their new courses to prenursing students with the intention of taking
advantage of the WSCH potential of that group. Another tactic was to do a more basic
program restructuring. A few programs (#5, 8) converted from a career ladder (one-year
LVN to RN) design to a generic (two-year comprehensive) structure.

That not only

assured WSCH increases, but helped rejuvenate program vitality for those programs
suffering from a decline in their pool of career-ladder applicants. Another program (#35)
added a career ladder tract to its comprehensive curriculum to boost its WSCH.
Finally, some faculties adapted by increasing their faculty-to-student clinical
teaching ratios-the most powerful factor depressing nursing unit WSCH. Clinical ratios,
which ranged from 1:9 to 1:13 in the sample, were set, subject to the provisions of the
California Administrative Code, by contract between a program and a hospital at a level
compatible with program objectives and hospital safety standards. Ten faculties in the
sample implemented marginal increases (1:9 or 1:10 to 1:11 or 1:12) as a way of
increasing unit WSCH. Such increases, widely perceived to hinder clinical supervision,
were controversial. As a consequence, several groups considered but ultimately rejected
ratio adjustments. Indeed, a few faculties resisted administrators' attempts to increase
ratios. Director #27 threatened to contact the Board of Registered Nursing (BRN) when
college administrators insisted on an increase. “Clinical ratios are where I draw the line!”
she said.
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Table 26
Compliance and Co-optation in Response to Program Strategies

Compliance
Program Increased Increased
Increased
Class Size Courses Clinical Ratio
1
*
*
2
3
♦
*
4
*
5
*
*
6
*
*
7
8

Courses
Split

Co-optation
Units Reduced
Added Courses

ADA
Study

*
*
4c

*a

4c

4c

4c

9

*

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19

*

20
21
22
23
24
27
28
29
30

*

31
32
33

34
35
36
37
38
39
40

*

4c

*a

4c

*
*

4c

*
*

4c

*

*

4c
4c

*

*

4c

4c

*
*
+

4c

*

*a

*

*

*
*

*a
*

4c

*

*

*
♦
*

*
*
*a

4c
4c

*

*
*

*
I'cs = 19

*

r c =5

Xicr= l l

*a
*a

4c

*= increased faculty-student ratio considered but rejected.

o
II

*

*

&

Note.

*

£ ua = 2

xrc = 5

Xa s=

14

Twenty-six faculties pursued compliance

tactics. Twenty-three faculties pursued co-optation tactics. Conducted as response to termination threat.
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Several faculties—23 in all—fashioned co-optive responses to WSCH pressure.
Their featured pro forma curriculum changes—program alterations which entailed a
minimum of substantive change. One tactic (employed by ten faculties) was to split
existing courses. Nursing courses are often large, multiunit entities which incorporate a
range of subjects such as the medical, surgical, procedural, nutritional, developmental,
and psychosexual aspects of caring for children, adults, or the elderly. Such courses can
be and in several cases were subdivided into freestanding subunits which increased the
total credit value of a program’s course offerings. Credit increases were factored into
WSCH computations to expand a nursing department’s WSCH.

Another pro forma

approach was to add a unit or two to existing courses without changing the course
structure or content. Both tactics were essentially “paper” changes, designed, as Director
#10 and others noted, “to get administration off our backs!” Voluntary course cutting
was yet another co-optive tactic by which some faculties coped. The faculty of Program
#17, for example, voluntarily reorganized to eliminate certain non-essential courses.
Members speculated that the cost savings achieved from course-cutting would divert
administrators' attention from the overall expense of the nursing department.
The most ambitious co-optive tactic of all, however, was to use ADA data to
redirect local college debates on the cost of nursing programs. As resources dwindled,
college executives, according to numerous program directors, increasingly favored an
accounting perspective that treated all units and programs as independent cost-centersthat is, as separate economic entities for balancing costs with ADA.

Under that

perspective, every department was expected to “carry its own weight,” or “break even,”
which low-WSCH programs such as nursing often had difficulty doing. Several nursing
faculties countered with the argument that a college is not merely a collection of cost
centers, but rather an economic unity.

They emphasized that nursing, as a primary

student attraction, made an indispensable economic contribution.

To back up their

argument, 14 faculties conducted ADA studies and/or student interest surveys to
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determine the amount of ADA contributed by nursing and prenursing students to the ADA
totals of other departments-so called indirect ADA.
Other, less common, responses to WSCH pressures included denying the
importance of WSCH demands, or ignoring WSCH-related directives. Director #24, for
example, down-played the significance of complaints made by her supervisors.

“They

[college executives] say that nursing is expensive, but they never do anything about it!”
Directors in District # 2/22/28/38 failed to devise a plan for program consolidation as
directed. Embroiled in an internal power struggle, they subsequently lost their chance to
influence district retrenchment decisions as they pertained to nursing.

Responses to terminations and layoffs.

Most nursing faculties subject to

termination proposals mounted a public campaign to meet their anti-termination
objectives. These campaigns commonly incorporated resistance and opposition tactics
such as coalition building, public demonstrations, testimony before the board of trustees,
legislative and regulatory initiatives to gain government intervention and action taken to
influence. The features of these campaigns and the termination proposals that prompted
them are summarized in Table 27; campaign tactics are summarized in Table 28.
In most termination situations, nonspecific indicators pointed to the possibility of
program termination well before an official announcement was made. Those indicators
included preparations for change such as district-conducted community need surveys, and
curriculum forums, program efficiency and vitality reviews; special board meetings
convened to consider district priorities; persistent layoff and termination rumors focused
on the demise of low-WSCH programs; and media accounts of impending district budget
crises and restructuring strategies. Most of the nursing groups slated for termination,
however, ignored or failed to heed these clues for reasons that will be discussed later.
After policy proposals were announced, however, nursing faculties organized to resist.
Only the faculty of Program #27 complied without opposition. Its members were offered
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Table 27
Administrative Proposals and Nursing Campaign Features
District Proposal Features

Nursing (Campaign Features

Year
Status of
RIF Initiated
_________ Proposal___________________
Prog
1
2
5
6
10
22
27
28
34
38
39
40

1983
1986
1983
1987
1984
1986
1983
1986
1983
1986
1982
1984

Formal
Formal
Informal*
Formal
Informal*
Formal
Formal
Formal
Formal
Formal
Formal
Formal

Leadership Type
Coalition Type
_________________________________
Ad Hoc
Ad Hoc
Formal
Formal
Formal
Ad Hoc
None
Ad Hoc
Formal
Ad Hoc
Formal
Ad Hoc

Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes

Mixed
Mixed
Internal
Mixed
Internal
Mixed
None
Mixed
External
Mixed
External
None

Note.* Warning only - no public proposal followed.

Table 28
Resistance and Opposition to Termination Proposals
Resistance_____________
Coalition
Building

Regulatory
Initiative

Electoral
Activity

4c

*

*
*

*
*
*

*
*

*
*
*

*
*

Opposition
Board
Public
Testimony Demonstration
*

Letter
Lobby

4c
4c

4c
4c

4c

4c

4c

4c

*

*

4c

4c

4c

4c

4c

*

*

*

*

4c

4c

4c

4c
4c
4c

P b = 10

Xh = 3

I ri = 4

Ze* = 5

Zb*= 8

1^ = 6

bd
it

Program
I
2
5
6
10
22
27
28
34
38
39
40

Legislative
Initiative

jobs at another institution.
Faculties facing termination varied in the extent to which they were prepared for
their new situation.

Some groups had the resources to mount an anti-termination

campaign, for example, the political leadership, faculty cohesion, and access to political
information necessary to support planning. They (#5, 6, 34, 39) reacted quickly. Other
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groups lacked resources, were slower to organize, and often had difficulty consolidating
anti-termination campaigns. Faculties #1 and 40, for example, suffered from serious
internal social divisions that significantly complicated their efforts to deal with
termination.
One primary requirement was political leadership.

Some faculties had formal

leaders (program directors) with the political experience, skill, and determination needed
to mount a campaign, others did not. Among those that did, (#5, 6, 10, 34, 39), it was
the formal leaders who automatically took charge of the faculty’s anti-termination efforts.
In the other cases, where the formal leaders lacked the necessary experience, skill, or
determination to openly oppose district plans, ad hoc leaders emerged to assume the
direction of campaign activities.
Nursing faculties used coalition building, public demonstrations, and board
testimony as their primary anti-termination tactics. Through coalition building, faculties,
formed alliances with other internal (students, other faculty) and external (program
alumni, local health professionals, civic and business leaders, local politicians) groups
interested in their effort. Coalitions, which varied in configuration, provided faculties
with the political solidarity needed for a successful anti-termination effort. They also
provided sources of tactical support

Union leaders, for example, often gave political

advice, while students helped with media campaigns, and alumni activated community
support networks. Coalitions also facilitated complex political strategies. With the help
of local union leaders, the nursing faculties in District #2/38, for example, undertook a
complex strategy they otherwise could not have pursued. Such alliances bolstered the
authority of faculty efforts. The nursing faculties in District #2/38, for example, sought
help from local legislators to advance their anti-termination arguments. “They [district
officials] don't listen to us; that’s why we have to find politicians to back us up!” said a
District #2/38 campaign leader.
The coalitions initiated by nursing faculties were not always easy to consolidate.
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Notably, several faculties (#1, 2/38, 6, 39, 40) found alliances with internal groups
difficult to arrange. They reported that broad-scoped RIF and restructuring proposals
spawned a degree of subunit self-survivalism that in turn damped unified faculty action.
In addition, some groups (#2/38,6,10) had difficulty establishing alliances with external
groups such as with hospital executive councils, particularly after 1983 when hospitals
fell on economic hard times, and a surplus of nurses developed in many regions of the
state.
Shaping public opinion was another important tactic. The outreach efforts of
nursing faculties took several forms—formal press conferences, newspaper interviews,
radio and TV talk-show appearances, public rallies, and campus demonstrations. The
purpose of those efforts was to increase public awareness of the district’s intentions and
the elements of the termination plan to promote anti-termination sentiment.

Notably,

nursing faculties enjoyed a natural advantage over other faculty groups in gaining media
attention for their cause. This is perhaps because of their strong vocational identity and
clear public mission, the power of which was recognized but not shared by other faculty
groups. “The media could care less about art or history, but you mention nursing and
they're right there!” said a frustrated history teacher in District #2/38.
Students played an important part in executing public demonstrations. Indeed,
they often overshadowed faculty members who sometimes feared an administrative
reprisal, and were frequently reluctant to participate in a public display of opposition to
district policy.

Students had no such constraints, and enthusiastically undertook

attention-grabbing actions such as parading and picketing. Indeed, some student groups
showed an intuitive understanding of the power of visual symbols by wearing uniforms
or carrying lighted candles to create evocative images of nursing's ministering tradition.
Such efforts created an impression of political organization that district policy makers
found hard to ignore.
Another important tactic was direct lobbying.

This took the form of oral
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testimony to the board of trustees and/or letters directed to district officials. By law,
district boards were (and are) obliged to conduct their business in public, and to take
public testimony on the issues before them.

Accordingly, several nursing faculties

carefully planned testimony to present to their boards of trustees. Most groups, however,
lacked experience in making such presentations, and thus several faculties turned to union
leaders or other sources of authoritative guidance.

Indeed two groups (#1, 5) hired

outside consultants to provide political advice. With assistance, faculties were usually
able to identify their priorities and organize the tasks at hand. Such help provided the
boost of confidence that groups needed to orchestrate a show of strength for nursing’s
issues.
Shows o f political solidarity, in fact, were an important campaign feature. Most
groups took steps to ensure that a crowd of supporters turned out on behalf of nursing’s
anti-termination position. They organized telephone trees, published flyers, and passed
out meeting bulletins to alert to the public of the dates and agendas for important board
meetings. Such tactics, aided by media coverage, helped to produce unanticipated levels
of public interest in several districts, and unprecedented crowds at board hearings where
nursing proposals were discussed.
The oral testimony featured a variety of anti-termination arguments and speakers.
Those who spoke on behalf of nursing represented various constituencies, and their
testimony varied according to their specific interest in the anti-termination effort Student
speakers, for example, emphasized a concern for completing their course of study. Often
student speakers stressed the personal inconveniences and hardships that they anticipated
to accompany program termination. Health administrators, on the other hand, accentuated
the impact of program termination on local health care delivery; politicians and civic
leaders addressed the need to maintain job training opportunities for those (women,
minorities) attracted to nursing.

Members of nursing faculties offered a variety of

arguments which reflected their theories on the origins of the termination policies.
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Members’ arguments challenged district policy on the basis of social equity, economic
assumptions, instructional outcomes, and/or consequences for the institution.
Finally, a faculty’s choice of tactics depended on the termination situationwhether a formal RIF action was undertaken, or the district merely threatened a RIF.
RIFs, which initiated a progression of public hearings and statutory deadlines, pushed the
action directly into the public arena. Targeted groups had few options other than to mount
a public campaign. Warnings, on the other hand, were less public and allowed targeted
groups a wider range of options for responding. Groups subject to warnings thus relied
less on resistance and opposition, and more on compliance and co-optation tactics than
groups facing formal RIF actions.

Responses to state policy. The nursing faculties in this study, while cognizant of
the roots of local austerity in state funding formulas, engaged in only limited efforts to
influence state policy, mostly in the form of lobbying campaigns undertaken to secure a
legislative solution to local funding problems. Most often their efforts were organized in
conjunction with the actions of local college executives, union or academic senate leaders,
as part of a collegewide campaign. Occasionally, nursing faculties acted on their own to
lobby state officials.

Lobbying, however, was not a universal practice.

Table 29

identifies the faculties that organized or participated in letter lobbies. Although a large
majority of faculties (74%) lobbied state officials, many groups did not. The reasons for
nonparticipation varied. Several directors indicated their members simply doubted the
benefits of lobbying. “You can’t change what they do in Sacramento,” said Director #3.
Aside from the local efforts, state groups (California Teachers' Association, the
California Federation of Teachers, the Faculty Association of the California Community
Colleges, and the Academic Senate for the California Community Colleges) also
orchestrated lobbying campaigns. Very few nursing faculty members, however, had
representatives in state faculty organizations at the time of this study. Indeed, only two
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Table 29
Nursing Participation in Faculty Letter Lobbies
Faculties Participating1
#1, #2, #4, #6, #7, #9, #10, #12b, #13, #14, #15",

Faculties Not Participating
#3, #5, #8, #11, #16. #23. #24, #27, #30, #40

#17b, #18, #19, #20, #21b, #22b, #28, #29, #31b,
#32, #33, #34, #35, #36, #37, #38, #39
N ote. * = participation defined as action by one or more faculty m em bers. b = students included in effort.

faculties (#9, 13), had members in such groups.
Affiliations with the California Nurses’ Association (CNA) were also weak. The
problem centered the CNA's endorsement of the American Nurses' Association policy to
promote the baccalaureate degree as the entry-level credential for professional nursing
practice. Indeed, many of the nursing directors interviewed for this study viewed the
CNA's position as antagonistic to the interests of associate degree nursing education.
They therefore made little effort to work through the CNA to secure legislative support for
their issues. “We have found the CNA to be totally unhelpful-their stand is so different
from ours,” exclaimed Director #12. Even Director #10, a high-ranking CNA officer at
the time of this study, concurred. “It was a real downer for us [faculty #10] knowing that
we didn’t have the backing of our own professional organization!” she said.

As a

consequence, few anti-termination campaigns went to the CNA for assistance. “CNA
played no role at all in our situation,” said Director#!.
Other organizations with the potential to influence policy at the state level were the
Associate Degree Nursing Directors' Associations of Northern and Southern California.
Both of these groups focused primarily on assisting members in their administrative roles,
however.

Director #7, president of the Southern California association recalled her

group’s activities. “We had seminars on how to cope when monies are tight.” Director
#12, president of the Northern association had a similar recollection: ‘W e tried to help
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individual directors deal with their problems.” Neither group worked, for example, to
establish coalitions with other state organizations, or to pursue legislative initiatives to
relieve the economic pressure on nursing programs (such as, for example, by altering the
Education Code on WSCH computation).

Neither group employed a professional

lobbyist at the time of this study. Aside from occasional letter lobbying, they did little
political problem solving in the state arena.

An exception was the direct lobbying

campaign undertaken by the northern directors in 1985 when it appeared as though the
CNA would press its entry-to-practice agenda in the legislature.

Patterns in Nursing Faculty Political.Behavior.

The findings of this study reveal two well-defined patterns in the political behavior
of nursing faculties--accommodation and contention. Accommodation was a pattern of
cooperative, non confrontational behavior in which nursing faculties endeavored to meet,
or appear to meet, the demands imposed by institutional cutback policies. Contention, on
the other hand, was a pattern of opposition in which nursing faculties resisted cutback
policies.
These patterns were apparent in relation to two district retrenchment situations—
across-the-board operational (nonpersonnel and personnel) cutbacks, and selective
program retrenchment. Indeed, accommodating faculties cooperated with college goals as
long as those goals were promoted by nonselective cutback strategies. They complied
with or incrementally adjusted to cutbacks, and often employed an assortment of cooptive tactics to diffuse the economic pressure on their programs.

Accommodation,

however, was reserved for those cutback situations in which nursing programs were not
threatened with termination. As Table 24 shows well over 90% of the tactics used by
nursing faculties in such situations fell into the accommodation category.
In contrast, contending faculties used resistance, opposition, and co-optation
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tactics to redirect policies and fend off targeted threats, suggested or proposed, to their
jobs and the status of their programs. Again, as Table 24 shows, well over 90% of the
tactics used by nursing faculties in those situation fell into the contention category.

Factors in Accommodation

Accommodation to Nonpersonnel Policies. Nursing faculties tolerated across-theboard nonpersonnel cutbacks for a variety of reasons related to the fact that, in general,
their members did not perceive a crisis in nonselective tactics.

Frequently, members

perceived some level of austerity as unavoidable in view of the economic changes
confronting the community colleges. Indeed, most of the nursing directors in this study
associated institutional retrenchment with funding policy changes at the state level. Thus,
they recognized that conditions external to the institution created a need for local
retrenchment, and that helped them and their faculties to rationalize a course of
accommodation. “We understood that Proposition 13 was in place, and that it would
have a negative effect,” observed Director #18. Further, the directors associated cutbacks
with the tuition issue dominating state politics. They therefore tended to dismiss the
inconveniences imposed as temporary in nature. “We were told the situation would be
short-lived, and so we were willing to put up with cuts, knowing there would be relief,”
commented Director #3.

Anticipation of relief promoted optimism, and faculty

cooperation with the efforts of administrators. Typically, nursing faculties were eager to
contribute to the welfare of the college. As Director #3 observed, “Nurses like to do the
right thing!”
In fact, nursing faculties accommodated to nonpersonnel funding reductions
regardless of the degree of austerity the cutbacks caused. As discussed above, some
colleges remained comparatively better off, while others suffered more severe losses.
However, the size of institutional losses did not directly correspond to the level of
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austerity experienced by nursing programs. Indeed, unit conditions prior to tax limitation
constituted an important balancing factor. Thus, programs well-outfitted, even those in
institutions suffering severe losses, had less difficulty adjusting to budget decreases than
ones poorly outfitted at the outset of decline. “We had availed ourselves generously of
federal capitation grants, so our equipment was up-to-date when money tightened,”
Director #18 recalled. Numerous programs (#1, 2 ,3 ,4 , 12, 14, 17, 21, 22, 27, 29, 34,
35, and 37) fell into the well-outfitted category. Others (#5, 7, 10, 13, 19, 28, 32, 33,
38, and 40), however, were less well-endowed and thus more seriously affected by
institutional losses. “We had cords running everywhere because we couldn't afford to
put in electric oudets,” noted Director #7. Lack of paraphernalia, did not prevent faculties
from accommodating, however.

“You can't create money where there isn't any!”

lamented Director #32. In fact, prior austerity helped to mitigate the perception of loss.
“This program has never had adequate facilities-defunding only postponed things
further,” noted Director #5.
An important reason faculties were able to accommodate cutbacks was that
substitutes and alternative resources were readily available. “We found other sources of
supplies—we're getting a lot more things from hospitals now,” commented Director #18.
Increases in student fees, discussed above, also helped to insulate faculties from austerity,
as did grantwriting and careful management practices. Rather than purchasing items,
faculties rented, leased or borrowed costly equipment, or did without. When forced to do
without, faculties often rationalized the items not obtained as nonessential adjuncts. “We
find that our students don't have enough time to use videos”, said a member of Program
#13. Thus, rather than resisting the policies causing austerity, nursing faculties adjusted
by lowering their expectations for instructional support, and by modifying their teaching
routines, often emphasizing clinical demonstrations over campus simulations.
Thus, nursing faculties were able to successfully defend the quality of instruction
against material austerity. Most groups, however, were unable to completely close the
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gap between their needs and resources. “They just kept whittling away at our budget over
a number of years,” noted Director #38.

Incrementalism, in turn, assuaged faculty

frustration. Indeed, the insidious transition to scarcity helped to minimize the toll of
cutbacks on faculty morale. “We got used to cutting back!” said Director #39.

Some

groups seemed to take pride in their ability to adjust. “As nurses, we don't need a lot of
frills to do the job!” exclaimed Director #3.
Other factors, such as the perceived fairness of administrative decisions, also
helped assuage faculty frustration. In general, nursing directors perceived nonselective
cutback decisions as rational and meted out fairly. Many lauded the measures (capital
request procedures, budget priority lists, and formal priority reviews) used by their
administrators, measures perceived to assure the equitable treatment of sub-units.
“Wishlists,” a way for departments to designate capital purchase priorities, for allocation
on a rotating basis, were a common practice. Such measures fostered a perception of
fairness and contributed to a sense within faculties that administrators were doing their
best under difficult circumstances. “We've all had to take cuts—our administrators have
been trying to preserve instruction,” noted Director #19.
In general, across-the-board nonpersonnel policies bolstered faculty morale.
Nursing directors took comfort, for example, in the observation that their units were no
worse off than other departments. “Nobody on this campus got capital outlay,” said
Director #5. “There was no sense here that anyone got hit any worse than anyone else,”
Director #37 likewise noted. Fairness was not a universal perception, however. A few
directors became convinced that administrators gave greater consideration to institutional
subunits more economically productive than nursing.

“They gave the high-WSCH

departments everything they wanted, but we had to prove ourselves,” Director #20
observed.

“They told us to go to the hospital, and gave the equipment to other

programs,” Director #21 also recalled. There were, however, instances (#16, 30) in
which nursing departments received special consideration. Overall the directors were
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satisfied with the way nonpersonnel cutbacks were managed.

Accommodation to Personnel Policies. Personnel cutbacks presented a different
story. For years, many of the nursing departments in this study benefited from staffing
decisions favoring units with stable enrollments, as confirmed by 19 of the 24 college
administrators who returned surveys and anecdotally by numerous nursing directors.
“Other programs were cut to almost zero, but we’ve been able to fill our full-time
positions,” said Director #7.”
Benevolent staffing decisions promoted a sense shared by numerous directors that
nursing enjoyed a distinct advantage in personnel decisions. “We got positions filled
when nobody else around here could,” exclaimed Director #4.

Such perceptions,

however, made it difficult for faculties to foresee the possibility of layoffs or program
terminations. Thus, for many directors, the worst-case scenario was one of voluntary
faculty departures. “The worst thing that could happen to us is that we could lose a
position or two!” exclaimed Director #7.
With the passage of time, however, many groups did eventually experience
difficulty filling positions. As districts tightened their hiring policies, in response to
accumulating fiscal stress, faculty attrition accelerated. Coincidentally, the job market for
nurses weakened in many regions of the state (Morse, 1987), and, insidiously, women’s
occupational preferences began to change (Aiken, 1987, 1990). Those trends converged
in 1982-83 to reduce applications to nursing schools, which in turn contributed to
enrollment losses, and to policies freezing faculty vacant positions in nursing. (See
Appendix L for nursing enrollment data by district)
Nevertheless, despite those trends, most nursing directors remained optimistic.
Indeed, few foresaw the possibility of program termination as a threat to their programs.
The directors based their judgments on a variety of considerations. Many pointed to the
evaluation criteria used by local administrators, in particular, the application and attrition
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numbers, graduation and licensure exam pass rates, and job procurement statistics that
administrators considered. Those were criteria on which nursing programs generally did
well. Some directors, for example, considered termination unlikely based on the success
of their students. “Our students graduate, transfer, and go on to get jobs, all the things
the review committee looks at,” noted, Director #23. Others based their judgments on
other factors.

Some stressed the importance of the nursing program as a student

attraction. “Nursing attracts students to this campus—the administration would be foolish
to cut us!” Director #30. Others pointed to the prestige of their programs within the
spectrum of institutional services.

“The administrators on this campus consider our

graduates one of their elitist products,” Director #2 boasted.

Still others emphasized

nursing’s importance to the community. “The hospitals would never allow the district to
close nursing” observed Director #40. Several directors also recognized the political
power derived from community support as an insurance against termination.
“Administration wouldn't dare mess with us—our community advisory committee has
some very important people on it!” noted Director #4.

In all, 27 directors made

statements reflecting their presumption that program termination was unlikely. “I've been
here since 1960. Things wax and wane, but we always survive!” reflected Director #3.
(See Appendix M for a complete file of statements on retrenchment probability.)
Notably, these perceptions endured even as RIF procedures outlined in Section
13447 of the Education Code, which allows fiscally stressed districts to reduce
certificated staff (teachers, counselors, librarians, administrators) in reverse order of
seniority (Ozsogomonyan, 1979), threatened nursing faculty jobs in a number of districts.
Several nursing directors reported that, in fact, their districts distributed seniority numbers
in preparation for a RIF. “There was a lot of attention paid to seniority for a while!”
noted Director #33. This promoted a level of job insecurity in some faculties. However,
because of the seniority requirement the accompanying anxiety affected the ranks of the
junior faculty only.

Senior faculty members, whose jobs were protected by the RIF
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statute, generally remained complacent “Most of us have been here 15 years or more—
we didn’t feel threatened,” said Director #36. Frequently, however, the anticipated RIFs
never materialized, and the anxiety, where it existed, quickly faded as business-as-usual
resumed.
In short, few directors or their faculties regarded operational cutbacks as a cause
for crisis. Indeed, the mitigation of perceived urgency by the factors described above
reinforced the pattern of accommodation, which, again, stressed cooperative managerial
approaches over the self-promoting, advantage-seeking tactics that many directors clearly
saw as inappropriate in the absence of a clear, objective threat to unit survival.
Aside from the factors just mentioned, however, nursing faculties had deeper
motivations for accommodating. In fact, most groups sought to minimize the impact of
budget cutbacks in a manner compatible with their work routines, which featured long
clinical laboratories held at off campus sites. Thus many groups ignored the activities of
the academic senate, college advisory committees, and faculty collective bargaining unit as
an alternative mode of response. Indeed, as Table 30 shows, the governance participation
of many nursing faculties was constricted in scope and intensity. Few faculties, in fact,
participated frequently or consistently in college governance bodies, or had members in
leadership positions.
To some extent, the problem was structural and to some extent, attitudinal.
Participation required attendance at on-campus meetings, the schedules of which often
conflicted with the off-campus teaching routines of nursing faculties. “Our eight-hour
labs make it hard to get to advisory meetings,” noted Director #9.

The demands of

clinical teaching-extra travel, assignment preparation, long hours of student supervision—
in turn—promoted a sense of strain in many groups. “We just go to clinical, and come
back to class, and work the eighty-hour week necessary to get the job done,” lamented
Director #36.

Further, members tended to regard governance participation as

nonessential, “extra” activity. “Most of our faculty feel they put in so many hours what
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with labs and going to the hospital that they feel they’ve paid their dues,” noted Director
#7. (See Appendix N for a complete file of statements on governance participation.) That
was particularly true for budget governance. Indeed, several groups showed a particular
disdain for budget governance, and, as Table 30 shows, few had representatives on
college budget committees. ‘The budget is something that seems very far away from our
daily routines,” observed Director #21. (See Appendix O for a complete file of statements
on budget governance.) Feeling taxed by the demands of teaching, few faculties were
attracted to college governance as a means of dealing with budget reductions. Indeed, the
interest of nursing faculties in college governance can best be described as perfunctory.
“We always have someone in the faculty senate, but I don’t think it has ever been taken
quite seriously,” indicated Director #32.

Disinterest, in turn fostered a level of

detachment from the college-as-organization which was apparent even to outside
observers. “The people in nursing seem to prefer their own company,” observed a
division dean, #10. “Our nursing faculty is very good, but they do keep to themselves,”
the Vice President of Instruction, #35, lamented. Indeed, as Table 30 shows, numerous
college administrators described their nursing faculties as less active in college governance
than other faculty groups.
Although the structure of teaching was a cause of nursing faculty detachment,
other social and attitudinal factors also played a role. Some faculties, for example, failed
to fully appreciate the link between governance participation and department goals. “I
don’t think our faculty is aware of how involvement in the college can benefit the
program-they’re just not sophisticated in that respect,” noted Director #4. Others were
detached because professional values and the professional identity of members nurtured a
tendency toward self-segregation.

“Our faculty see themselves as nurses first, and

educators second,” observed Director #37. Many groups regarded clinical teaching as the
uniquely professional aspect of their jobs and were reluctant to shift their focus to larger
organizational interests. “This faculty’s primary interest is in the clinical preparation of
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Table 30
Nursing Faculty Governance Involvement
Program

Academic
Senate

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

Advisory
Committees

Comparative
Collective
Bargaining Unit Participation#

*
*a

*

*

*bc

*d

*

*=

*

<
<
<

*

<
<

*a

<

*a

*

< >

*a
*d

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18

* ab

*

*

e

*

-

<

*d

< >

*

<

*

19
20
21
22
23
24
27
28
29
30

< >

*

*c

*a

%ac

*a

*ac

*a

-

e
e
<

*

*

*d

*a
*a

*a
*a

<

*ab

<

*

<
*ac

*a

*

<

*a

31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40

< >

*a

<

*

*ac

*

<

-

-

-

< >

e

< >

f
*
*
*a

<

f

<

*a

N

=

31

N = 16

e
N

<
=

6

<=18

infrequent, b = participation includes budget committee, c = curriculum committee, d =
member in leader role, e = no union, f = no academic senate in district. # = data from
administrator surveys (N = 24); > = greater, o = no different, < = less than other college
units.
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students,” Director #20 exclaimed. Another factor was the identity confusion fostered by
the dual organizational attachment of nursing programs to hospital and college.

A

classical problem, it was a source of member anxiety in some groups. “We always have
to deal with two bureaucracies, and we don’t know where we fit,” noted Director #2.
Such identity strains discouraged the attachment of nursing faculty members to the
college-as-organization. “Our thrust has been to be more like other units, but we always
look at ourselves and conclude that we’re different.” a Faculty Member, #1 noted. (See
Appendix P for a complete file of statements on faculty identity.)
The detachment of members from organizational governance brought with it a
corresponding isolation from campus life.

Indeed, members of numerous groups

complained that their interactions with other departments were infrequent, and that,
consequently, their relationships with other faculty members remained distant. “People
I’ve seen for twenty years, I still don’t feel like I know,” said a Faculty #7. (See
Appendix P) Sequestered from their nonnursing peers, they thus had a tendency to
minimize the significance of changes in the funding environment, and as a result, avoided
the bodies involved in shaping college policy. Absent a strong sense of urgency, they
instead perpetuated their regular routines, and dealt with austerity from a resource
management framework. “My faculty told me their frustrations, but they expected m£ to
implement change.” lamented Director #32.
There were, of course, exceptions.

Highly participative decision cultures

flourished at some colleges (#9, 12, 15, 19, and 23, for example) where policy
requirements overrode the tendency of nursing faculties to ignore their governance
opportunities.

And, indeed, some groups did eventually come to understand the

competition for funding that developed on their campuses. “Other groups did better than
we did because they fought harder,” noted Director #32. A striking finding, however,
was the number of nursing faculties that dealt with cutbacks, not by joining or competing
with other faculty groups to effect unit gains, but rather by remaining immersed in a
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subculture reflecting their common identity as nurses.

Factors in Contention

Confronted with termination warnings or proposals, nursing faculties generally
dropped their accommodation tactics in favor of a pattern of contention, which stressed
resistance and opposition in place of compliance and incremental adjustment
Termination proposals dealt a sudden, hard blow to the standing of nursing
departments, and thus generated among their faculties an unusual level of concern about
the future, and an urgency to act which propelled groups to organize anti-termination
campaigns. Termination proposals threatened faculty job security and nursing program
status, but at a more subjective level they also threatened members' sense of the
importance of their professional mission, their institutional identification, their
professional identity, self-esteem, and the continuity of valued social relationships.
The threat to job security was a primary factor motivating nursing faculties to
change their behavior. Targeted RIF proposals made job loss an imminent and real
possibility. Such proposals bred rampant job insecurity. Job insecurity is anxiety related
to the possibility of being involuntarily dismissed (Greenhalgh and Rosenblatt, 1988). It
was clearly a problem experienced by the teachers in this study who received dismissal
intention notices-commonly referred to as “March 15th” notices-as evidenced by their
reports. However, it also plagued teachers who received no notice but who nevertheless
feared they might at some future point “I'll be next to go, if they [district officials]
decide to cut again,” said a member of Faculty #38. It also affected members likely to be
reassigned rather than terminated. Indeed, those worried about being transferred also
experienced a kind of job insecurity. That insecurity, to which advancing age, dated
clinical skills, or lack of specialty training frequently contributed, took the form of doubt
in relation to one's ability to adapt to new job expectations.

Program directors, for
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example, frequently worried about the possibility of returning to clinical teaching, an
adjustment that might necessitate retraining.
Another factor was the RIF procedure itself. The ritual of dismissal letters served
to heighten job insecurity, and intensified the climate of threat. “It was scary. I got a
registered letter in the mail. It said I had the right to an attorney—I wasn't sure why I
needed one,” commented a member of Faculty #40. Not all of the teachers who received
letters experienced the potential for dismissal as a threat, however. There were in every
group some who were willing to move on, and consequently did not worry about job
loss. “It didn't bother me—I have a nurse practitioner credential—I always knew I could
find another job,” observed a member of Faculty #39.
The threat to program continuity embodied in termination proposals was another
source of member anxiety. Teachers worried about the impact of faculty reduction on the
quality of their programs. Junior faculty members, who often had more recent degrees,
were more current in their clinical skills, and frequently had more specialty training than
senior faculty members, were the ones most threatened by downsizing, and their potential
loss threatened program quality at some sites (#1, 10, 2/38). Program disruption was a
major concern, however, in those situations where departments were slated for closure.
Faculty members became concerned over the fate of their enrolled students as well as
those seeking enrollment. They feared that students forced to transfer might leave school,
fail to complete their programs, or give up their goals. Finally, the teachers also worried
about each other, and the fate awaiting those colleagues laid off. Survivor guilt-remorse
in relation to the termination of others (Brockner, Davy, and Carter, 1988), was evident
in the sample. More than any other factor it energized the anti-termination activities of
teachers with seniority. “These people are my friends. I can't stand by and do nothing,”
said a member of Faculty #22 who was approaching retirement.
The aura of program termination threatened members' sense of the importance of
their professional mission, which in turn dealt a blow to their professional pride.
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Termination proposals contradicted members’ view of the degree of importance attached
by others, namely, administrators and other college officials, to nursing's mission.
Members not infrequendy interpreted termination proposals as symbolic o f the lack of
value college officials placed on nursing. Frequently, members also viewed termination
as an affront to their collective achievement

“The administration didn't research its

decision-most of them didn't know that one of the first ADN programs accredited
nationally,” noted a nursing faculty member in District #2/38.

At a practical level,

members also feared that closures and enrollment reductions would result in nursing
shortages.
Ironically, despite the organizational detachment that typified many faculties in this
study, termination proposals also threatened the institutional identification of many faculty
members, particularly those who taught in older programs (#1, 2, 22, 28, 38). Thus, it
was not uncommon to find teachers who had graduated from the program in which they
taught. Not infrequently, those individuals identified strongly with their college, and
derived a deep personal gratification from their continued association with i t Termination
proposals threatened that identification, and heightened the anxiety that some felt There
were also some teachers who for personal reasons experienced termination proposals as a
profound threat to their self-esteem. “When you are told over and over again that you are
not needed-it takes away from your self-esteem,” said a member of Faculty #1 who
became seriously depressed after receiving a dismissal notice.
Finally, numerous members looked at termination proposals as an affront to their
status as women and female professionals. An interesting finding was the number of
interviewees who were clearly aware of nursing's passive image, and who linked their
circumstances to nursing’s status as a woman's profession. “Being female, being nurses-we're nurturing, caring, giving type of people-you know, we give in. Somebody tells
us to do something—we say 'okay,'“ said member of Faculty #13, with a note of irony in
her voice. Indeed, a fairly common belief in some groups was that nursing’s status as a
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female occupation rendered their programs vulnerable to exploitation by administrators.
“We knew they'd never try cutting those people down in engineering!” said a member of
Faculty#!.
Thus, termination proposals embodied numerous sources of threat, and those
sources of threat engendered a sense of urgency that motivated members to engage in anti
termination activities. “We knew we had to do something.” said a member of Faculty # 1.
It was that sense of urgency that prompted groups to give up accommodation and engage
in the tactics of contention, characteristic of anti-termination campaigns.
The change in faculty behavior did not happen over night, however, but usually
occurred in a progression of stages.

Immobilization was the first stage.

frequently did not anticipate termination.

Groups

On hearing about a proposal to cut their

program, members were quite frequently surprised, often to the point of shock. “Out of
the blue, we got word that half of our department was getting pink slips,” recalled
Director #1. (See Appendix Q for a file of statements on faculty surprise.)

In every

group, in fact, there were members who ignored the indicators of impending termination,
or who denied the likelihood that a RIF was imminent. ‘W e knew the college was having
problems, but we never thought it would lead to anything for our department,” a member
of Faculty #1 observed.

It is notable, however, that the policy development process

contributed to the difficulty many faculties had in foreseeing termination.

College

committees often comprised mainly of executive administrators who set retrenchment
plans in most institutions. Often they hoped to avoid a RIF, and post-poned their policy
decisions, made their final plans without consulting targeted personnel. Thus, in several
cases, faculties, had no clear, definitive forewarning, and thus found themselves in a state
of unpreparedness when termination proposals were finally made.
The shock of termination was frequently accompanied by a decline in faculty
morale. As a member of Faculty #40 observed, “Everybody was scared and frightened.”
Members frequently experienced a loss of morale regardless of their job status.
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“Bumping,” a statutory right allowing those teachers about to be dismissed to bump (take
the job of) less senior faculty in other departments, if qualified, kept senior teachers on
edge in some nursing departments. “I’ve been here 17 years, but I still feel threatened—
you never know who might show up for your job,” said a member of Faculty #38.
Severe anxiety together with lowered morale prevented several faculties from
quickly coming together to address their common situation, which made planning and
organizing difficult for several groups. Often members were unable to quickly come to
grips with the perceived abrupt change in their circumstances. Although the duration of
the immobilization period varied, in all cases, sooner or later the shock abated. Indeed,
the resolution accelerated as members began to exchange ideas on the meaning of their
situation and those exchanges heralded the onset of the second stage of the transition,
interpretation.
Interpretation, which overlapped immobilization, preceded the final stage in which
members organized a planning group. In the stage of interpretation, faculties struggled
for answers to the question, “Why Nursing?” During this phase, targeted faculties began
a search for answers. During this stage, faculties also engaged in rethinking the causes of
retrenchment. Old explanations, such as those related state funding changes or political
stalemates came into question as members sought new reasons--ones closer to home.
“We knew the cuts were coming from Sacramento, but we still looked at it as, W ho is it
here that is doing this?'“ noted a member of Faculty #1.
Finding answers was not an easy process.

Faculties typically turned to

administrators and other college officials who were often unable or unwilling to provide
information. Sometimes the constraints were legal. A member of Faculty #22 noted, “I
called the planning coordinator for an explanation, but was told that the attorney for the
district had counseled people in the district office not to talk to us.” Sometimes they were
situational. “The president visited our center to talk to us, but he just kept repeating that
we had better raise our WSCH,” recalled a member of Faculty #10.
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Short on information, groups often resorted to speculating.

Typically, their

speculations focused on the past behavior of district officials. Perceived opportunism,
gender bias, or hidden agendas on the part of officials gave rise to faculty theories that
officials were exploiting nursing. Faculties also scrutinized cutback policy and examined
officials’ public statements in search of clues to explain the policy or bolster their theories
(See Appendix R for a file of statements on causal theories). Faculty #39, for example,
noted that their president had previously tried to downsize nursing by painting a false
picture of program costs. They theorized the president “didn’t value nursing.”
Theories helped faculties endure the uncertainty and ambiguity of their termination
situation, and also served to heighten and focus member anger (see Appendix Q for a file
of statements on member anger), which in turn made it possible for them to move ahead
to the next stage of the transition.
The stages of immobilization and interpretation usually lasted from a few days to a
number weeks. Faculty #1, for example, took two weeks to resolve its initial shock, as
did Faculty #40. “I think it was ten days before I could get people rallied—it took a while
for them to believe that this [downsizing] was going to happen,” said Director #40.

In

both cases the period of adjustment was made more intense by looming deadlines and
dates for board hearings.
The third stage, organization, involved the planning and implementation of a unit
defense. Most faculties found their political skills challenged by this process. None had
had prior experience with labor disputes. “We didn't have a clue what to do! We weren't
experienced like those nurses down at Kaiser who go on strike every now and then,” said
a member of Faculty #1.

The consolidation of political leadership was a problem for

some groups. RIF procedures, which are adversarial in nature, put an enormous strain
on targeted groups. They also placed program directors in an awkward position between
upper-level administrative supervisors and their unit-level faculty colleagues.

Some

directors embraced the unit cause, while others embraced the institution’s plans. Those
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who hesitated to challenge district policy generally espoused a “wait and see” approach,
often voicing a desire to minimize conflict “Maybe the district will rescind—they've done
it before,” said Director #38. Such preferences, however, failed to address the urgency
that most faculty members attached to termination, and differences fostered distrust in the
faculty ranks. Frequently, members saw their directors’ hesitation as evidence of their
complicity with management. “Our director doesn't approve of the faculty coalition—
she's got her eyes on an administrative position,” said a member of Faculty #38. Nursing
directors, who hesitated, on the other hand viewed their faculty peers as rash and
misguided. “It's [faculty opposition] a way for some people to vent their anger” observed
Director #38. Such clashes in perspective complicated the planning process, and, in some
cases and prompted faculties to seek ad hoc leaders for their anti-termination effort.
The selection of strategies was an important step in planning. A group's choice of
strategy was to some extent determined by the termination situation-whether a formal
RIF proposal or informal RIF warning. Again, proposals and warnings created different
circumstances. Official proposals, which activated statutory due process procedures,
established public hearings as the forum for decision-making.

In those situations,

governing boards, acting as quasi-appellate bodies, weighed the merits of a RIF against
the merits of constituents’ challenges. Thus, targeted faculties had little recourse other
than to become a party to the conflict.

Negotiated compromise, on the other hand,

became all but impossible in the context of a formal REF proposal.

Termination

warnings, by contrast, outlined contingencies which served to shape the retrenchment
circumstances. Warnings, which were less final, less formal, and less public in nature,
were generally, less adversarial in nature. Thus, faculties were able to explore strategies
other than public anti-termination.
The pressures to organize were substantial. Yet, in some cases (#1, 2/38, 40),
members disagreed among themselves about the proper strategy to take.

These

disagreements, in turn, polarized factions for and against resistance tactics. Members
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who favored resistance usually prevailed, although the resulting lack of unity weakened
the their organization.
Finally, a few groups used contention tactics for situations other than program
termination. Those faculties (#9, 15,21, 35) came to view austerity as a crisis, and thus
were willing to engage in the local conflict in order to influence local policy changes.

Outcomes of the Political Behavior ofNursing Faculties

The tactics of accommodation were useful to nursing faculties because they
enabled them to reduce the gap between resources and needs, while preserving their
regular routines, which protected their primary value, clinical teaching.

Such tactics

conveyed a desire to cooperate with institutional goals, but in some cases, brought
political rewards as well.

As the dean of occupational education from District #36

indicated, “The nursing faculty has a cooperative spirit.

They fared well during

retrenchment.” The benefits of accommodation diminished in situations where subunit
allocations grew competitive, however. As District #7’s dean of instruction noted, “Most
departments with supplies, equipment rental, and capital outlay budgets assert themselves
and take an active role in the budget process,” adding, “Our nursing faculty just wants to
be left alone to do its own thing.” Thus, accommodation tactics fit within the overall
pattern of detachment from campus life maintained by many nursing groups which may
have reduced their sensitivity to indicators of termination or downsizing, and, arguably,
their preparedness for change.
On the other hand, the groups targeted for termination generally dropped
accommodation in favor of a contention strategy once they realized their political situation
had drastically altered.

In most cases, those faculties organized anti-termination

campaigns, which in every instance supported their policy interest by promoting a policy
reversal or a reduction of policy scope. Faculties #6, 34, and 2/38, for example, avoided
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layoffs altogether, and #39 eluded program closure, while #1 reduced its layoffs by 75%.
Only program #40, which mounted almost no resistance, failed to make gains.
The extent to which the anti-termination campaigns influenced those achievements
was unclear. Press accounts, and many, but not all, administrators linked the nursing
campaigns to policy reversals. “The people in nursing made a very strong case for their
contributions to the campus, and that made a difference,” noted a District #10 college
president. Some, however, credited intervening factors—such as third party intervention,
or the retrenchment tactics of institutional officials. “You send 100 notices and layoff ten-people feel grateful. I hate to sound cynical, but that's the way it works,” said District
# l ’s dean of occupational education.
Nursing faculty members, on the other hand, uniformly regarded their campaigns
as instrumental. “I feel certain that if we had not done what we did, we would have lost
the program,” exclaimed Director #6. Most members, in fact, believed their efforts were
the deciding factor in the policy turnaround. “We didn't stop them [district officials] from
closing the two programs, but I know the pressure we put on them saved a lot of jobs,”
said a member of Faculty #22, with a tone of conviction.

Several interviewees also

pointed to the intangible benefits accruing from their activities, benefits such as improved
faculty morale, elevated campus standing, or a new, shared sense of political efficacy
within their faculty group. “It was an awful time, but the crisis put us on the map. The
administration finally saw for themselves the kind of community support this program
attracts,” Director #39 commented.

Summary and Discussion of Findings from the Statewide Study

The question asked in this study was whether or not California community college
nursing faculties, faced with retrenchment, would take action to influence organizational
policy. The data from the statewide study showed that most faculties did take action, but
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that the pattern and complexity of their activity varied according to their retrenchment
situation.
As the financial data showed, resource change was a common condition in the
California community college system, 1982-1987. Indeed, the fiscal events highlighted
in this study-defunding and the revenue veto-contributed to severe economic decline in
many districts, but other events, such as interim state funding formula changes, also
aggravated the financial circumstances initially imposed by Proposition 13. Thirty-three
community college districts diverse in size, structure, and location, constituted the
sample. Of those institutions, 17 reached a state of severe decline as defined by a
criterion of revenue reduction. The average losses from defunding and the revenue veto,
at 6.24%, were devastating, coming, as they did, at a time when districts had already
substantially curtailed their costs and spent down their reserves. Indeed, to address their
revenue losses, all of the districts in this study cut their spending, some in a highly
conservative pattern, and many to levels below their pre-Proposition 13 expenditure
levels.
Administrators commonly sought to preserve instructional programs while
reducing costs. Thus, they employed general cost-cutting measures such as deferring
maintenance and reducing noninstructional services.

When further cutting became

necessary, they made across-the-board reductions in materials supplies, and capital
outlay. Many administrators also imposed hiring freezes, part-time faculty adjustments,
and classified staff reductions to reduce costs.

Some went beyond those measures,

however, to attempt involuntary reductions-in-force and targeted program terminations.
As a costly component of the occupational curriculum, nursing programs were not
exempt from administrative efforts to reduce instructional costs. Indeed, none of the 38
programs in this study escaped the impact of resource decline.

All were subject to

nonpersonnel and/or program spending cuts, many to hiring freeze and personnel attrition
policies, and some to proposals or warnings of program termination and faculty layoff.
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To reiterate, 78% experienced reductions in funds budgeted for instructional materials,
88% for supplies, 91% for capital outlay; 29% experienced support staff reductions, and
58% faculty reduction by attrition, and 31% faculty layoffs and program termination.
Nursing faculties subjected to across-the-board spending reductions, typically
responded with a pattern of accommodation. Accommodation was a collection of tactics
largely managerial in nature employed under those conditions in which cutbacks were
perceived to be evenly applied to all departments and no threat to the survival of nursing
programs was seen to exist.

Factors that made accommodation tactics attractive to

nursing faculties included members’ (1) shared belief that decline was unavoidable and
temporary, (2) the easy availability of substitutes and alternative resources to minimize the
need-resources gap, (3) members’ desire to support institutional retrenchment goals, (4)
their strong motivation to preserve their functional routines which a pattern of
accommodation made possible, and (5) the insidious course of decline which served to
mitigate a perception of crisis. Accommodation benefited faculties by allowing them to
preserve the status quo, while inviting the approval of embattled administrators.
As the data showed, a relatively small number of districts reached a state of severe
decline as defined by revenue reserves, a benchmark set in this study at two or more
consecutive years of reserve levels five percent (5%) or lower.

Indeed, ten districts

reached a level of severe decline as defined by that criterion, only four of which proposed
to downsize or terminate their nursing programs. Six other districts, all with reserves
above the criterion also proposed to downsize or close their nursing programs. Thus,
financial exigency, the condition which justifies restructuring, did not exist in many cases
where district policy proposals targeted nursing programs.

In all, twelve nursing

programs became the object of threatened or proposed faculty layoffs and program
termination.
As the data showed, under such conditions, must nursing faculties changed their
strategy and adopted a pattern of contention to deal with their new circumstances.
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Contention featured resistance and opposition tactics, tactics common to anti-termination
campaigns.

Faculties formed coalitions, lobbied district and government officials,

presented testimony to boards of trustees, attracted media attention with public
demonstrations, and participated in initiatives of various kinds, all of which were directed
toward the goal of influencing a reversal or reduction in scope of the nursing termination
policy.
Factors that made the change of strategy attractive to nursing faculties included
members’ (1) assessment that a termination proposal significantly raised the probability of
important losses, (2) their interpretation that termination posed a crisis for individual and
group welfare, (3) their evaluation that accommodation tactics were inappropriate to their
new circumstances, (4) their sense that termination constituted an injustice to themselves
and their educational mission, a sense heightened by the threat termination posed to their
professional identity, and (5) the fact that they had no contingency plans.
The change in strategy required new behavior of nursing faculties, particularly
those detached from governance before the policy announcement. Thus, the transition did
not happen quickly or easily as groups struggled to surmount barriers to organization.
With only a few exceptions, however, anti-termination campaigns were central to nursing
faculty efforts to influence a policy turnaround.
Accommodation and contention as patterns of political behavior were used by
nursing faculties to address local retrenchment policy, the primary focus of most nursing
faculties in this study. Many groups, however, participated in activities designed to
influence funding policies at the state level. These activities took the form of faculty letter
lobbies. Beyond such tactics, however, nursing groups took few actions to redirect state
policy, and, notably, did not attempt to alter the statutes driving up the cost of community
college nursing programs.
The findings discussed above are consistent with the conceptual framework of
Levine et al. (1981) who suggested a model of organization adaptation in which severe
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resource decline politicized organization decision structure to limit administrative
discretion in dealing with decline. According to the model, how organizations cutback,
whether across-the-board or selectively, depends on the relative strength of the groups
exercising power over organizational policy.
The data from the statewide study support the Levine proposition. To the extent
that administrators refrained from targeting nursing programs, nursing faculties remained
cooperative with institutional retrenchment goals.

They refrained from entering the

competitive fray that typified decision making on many campuses.

However, when

officials targeted nursing programs, nursing faculties, even those groups ordinarily
detached from institutional governance, entered the struggle to control cutback policy
decisions.

Faced with termination, they became parties to the conflict in which

termination decisions were made, and indeed, in most cases achieved a reduction in scope
of the plan initially proposed.
Nursing faculty members may have a particular tendency to reserve aggressive
approaches for the most competitive situations.

Indeed, several authorities noted

conditions unique to nursing which shape the organizational behavior of nursing faculty
members in characteristic ways. Conway and Glass (1978), Kritek (1985), and Steele
(1991) all pointed out that nurses are professionally socialized in hospitals which are
much more bureaucratic then colleges. Thus, nurses may have difficulty actualizing the
values and norms o f educational settings. Steele (1991) further noted the role strain
caused by competing organization loyalties which prompts many nursing instructors to
prioritize conflicting demands so as to stress clinical responsibilities. Such strain, as the
data in this study and one done by Bahrawy (1992), impedes the participation of nursing
faculty in organizational governance even in times of economic decline. Thus, nursing
faculties will accommodate decline until their political circumstances force them to do
otherwise.
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CHAPTER V

RESEARCH FINDINGS FROM THE STUDY OF SELECTED NURSING
PROGRAMS

Introduction

The previous chapter presented an overview of findings from 38 community
colleges on the political behavior of nursing faculties in response to resource decline and
organizational retrenchment, and, more specifically, to nursing program cutbacks, 198287. This chapter presents the findings of six case studies which focus in greater detail on
the institutions, people, circumstances, and events that surrounded resource decline, as
well as the perspectives, attitudes, theories, and actions of nursing faculty members as
they reacted to local administrative strategies and their impact on nursing programs.

Findings of the Selected Site Studies

Nine nursing departments located in six community college districts participated in
the selected site phase of this study. The characteristics of these units, summarized in
Table 31, make it clear that they shared in the diversity found in the sample as a whole.
They varied not only in size, but in location and environment. There were, for example,
large and small programs situated in large and small institutions which in turn were
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Table 31
Characteristics of Colleges Participating in the Selected Site Study
District/
Program
1
2/22/28/38

District
Typea
SCoID
MColD

Location^
SC
SC

2
22
28
38
10
13
35
39

MColD
MColD
SCoID
SCoID

Environment College
c
Enrollments
U
21.8
S
U
u
s
S
s
R
s

NC
NC
SC
SC

Nursing
Enrollment?
248

22.6
12.7
20.0
23.0
9.5
14.6
5.1
4.2

363
159
146
179
172
98
180
31

aAdministrative Organization: SCoID = Single College District, MColD = MultiCollege District,
MCamD = Single College/Multicampus District, MCtrD = Single College/MultiCenter District.
^Location: NC = Northern California, SC = Southern California. .
Environment: U = Urban, S = Suburban, R = Rural.
College Enrollment:

Expressed in thousands of full and parttime students.

Data from 1982-83

Occupational Programs in California Community Colleges by Leo A. Mayer, 1982.
Cursing Enrollment: Data from State-Approved Schools of Nursing R.N.. 1983. 41st Edition, National
League for Nursing, 1983.

located at various Northern and Southern California sites, in urban, suburban, and rural
environments. Seven units (#1, 2, 10, 22, 28, 38, 39) experienced termination crises,
while two (#13, 35) did not The latter served as comparison cases.
The termination cases are presented chronologically by year of retrenchment crisis;
the comparison cases follow in order.

At each site, individuals acting in various

capacities were interviewed: cabinet, division and/or department-level administrators,
nursing program directors, and nursing faculty members, nonnursing faculty members
and the leaders of faculty organizations-see Table 1 for the totals. Their identities have
been withheld and fictitious names are used for people and institutions in accord with the
researcher's agreement to protect the confidentiality of study participants.
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Nursing Faculty Behavior at Arrovo College. (No. 39)

The situation at Arroyo College illustrates the social and political complications of
aggressive retrenchment management for a small institution and its nursing programs.
College officials acted early and affirmatively to protect Arroyo's fiscal balance from the
burden of a number o f expensive programs acquired when funding was abundant and
certain. As part of their strategy, they proposed to eliminate the nursing department
Caught in this situation, the nursing faculty assembled a successful anti-termination
campaign.

Introduction

Faced with a potential shortfall of $120,000 for the 1982-83 budget year, the
Arroyo Board of Trustees asked President Kenneth Blockman to compile a list of ways to
trim the budget.

Blockman, having already proposed to terminate the intercollegiate

football program, presented the trustees with a list of 12 instructional programs for
closure. The list included Arroyo's RN and LVN nursing programs.
Coming on the heels of a reduction-in-force the previous year in which three
counselors and three tenured teachers were laid off, this action caused another social crisis
in the college and a renewed uproar in the community. In a well-publicized series of
meetings, the board o f trustees, newly reconstituted after an electoral turnover, debated
the merits of program c u ts- the so-called “low-risk” option, versus the consequences of
doing nothing-the “high-risk” option. The local press covered the story in a series of
front page articles, one of which editorialized under the eye-catching banner headline,
“Bedpans and Jock Straps” (The Signal. March 7, 1982, p. I). In its final decision, the
Arroyo Board of Trustees bowed to community opinion by voting to retain the nursing
department.
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Background

Arroyo College is a small, suburban institution serving a cluster of bedroom
communities 40 miles north of the populous San Fernando Valley in Southern California.
Despite its size--the smallest in the sample-Arroyo offered 23 occupational programs in
1981, including programs in registered (RN) and vocational (LVN) nursing, and
supported, along with its academic offerings, an impressively large athletic department
(Meyer 1980).

Opened in 1969, Arroyo operated initially out of a local high school

before moving to its present 158 acre site, at which one of the First permanent structures
was a state-of-the-art stadium built to accommodate an intercollegiate football program.
Arroyo's early history reflected a time of growth and development for
instructional programs. One of the first, LVN nursing, was initiated in 1970 at the
request of the regional hospital council on behalf of the hospitals in the area. Within a
few years, the LVN program had acquired a reputation for excellence, and become a
source of nurses, not only for the local communities, but also for the surrounding region.
A decade later, with college revenues no longer certain, local hospitals contributed the
resources for the addition of an RN career ladder component to the curriculum. Although
the department remained small in comparison to others in this study, the addition of the
RN program brought the number of full-time faculty in nursing to a total of six, or 14%
of the contract teachers at Arroyo.
Intercollegiate football, the centerpiece of Arroyo athletics, was initiated at about
the same time as LVN nursing, and gradually evolved into a sophisticated athletic
operation not unlike those in big universities. In contrast to nursing, which had the full
support of the community, football invited controversy. Although supported by local
business, the program raised questions about the district’s priorities. Outspoken residents
who objected to the fact that many of the players were recruited from outside the district
opposed using district funds for underwriting the education of nonresidents. When, after
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several years, it became clear that the games had not attracted the expected attendance,
many people at the college-administrators and faculty-also began to question the
legitimacy of the football program.
Although football conferred prominence on Arroyo as a institution, it added
considerably to the overall burden on college finances. Typical of small institutions,
Arroyo lacked economies of scale, and therefore had high maintenance, operation, and
general support costs—some of the highest unit-for-unit of any college in the community
college system (Gooder, 1984).

Those expenses, added to the output for plant

construction and program development, created pressure to overspend even before the era
of expanding revenues ended. Indeed, for five years prior to tax-limitation, the district
spent more than it received in total revenue (see Table 14), depleting its reserves from
47% in 1973-74 to 21% in 1978-79 (see Table 15).
With the passage of Proposition 13, the amount of money derived from local taxes
dropped 29% (see Table 12), a reduction which state funding increases fell $320,000
short of making up. To balance the budget, officials launched a host of across-the-board
economies including reductions in class sections, as well as cuts to the instructional
services, capital outlay, and plant maintenance budgets. Although those steps helped to
curb college spending, they failed to stop the erosion of reserves, with the result that
fiscal stability became the paramount concern of district officials in the wake of
Proposition 13.
Concerned for the long-term fiscal stability of the college, the Arroyo Board of
Trustees, well in advance of other boards, embarked on a sequence of actions intended to
correct the college's deteriorating financial situation. Their most important decisions in
that regard were to change the executive leadership of the college, and to endorse a
program of aggressive retrenchment measures. Although their moves proved successful
from a fiscal standpoint-equilibrium was reestablished—they led ultimately to a serious
crisis in employee morale, and an uproar in the community that resulted in the electoral
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unseating of some members of the board.

The 1981 crisis. For a number of years, Arroyo was run as a virtual hegemony
under the direction of its original president, Richard Lockwood, and business manager,
Leo Matthews, who established and maintained tight control over the board of trustees
and college policy. By all accounts, these men approached decision making in a high
handed way, addressing personnel matters with a benevolent paternalism that expressed
their executive authority as much as it spoke to the needs of college personnel. In that
atmosphere faculty interest in college governance gradually withered to the extent that in
1974 faculty leaders allowed the college's fledgling academic senate to die.
Only in 1977, after the state authorized faculty collective bargaining, did the
faculty’s interest in governance rekindle. A CTA faculty association initiated that year
moved quickly to assert itself by pressing demands for information, to which the
administration reacted by “clamping down.”

As a member of the math department

recalled, “The faculty association tried to follow the budget but Matthew had things
buried, and nobody could figure out how much money we had.

The administration

refused to give us any information, so we got help from the CTA.” This initial tug of war
then escalated and spilled over to other personnel groups. For the next two years, the
adversarial tension grew.

Finally, Business Manager Matthews' hard-line, take-it-or-

leave-it posture in contract negotiations alienated both the teachers, association and the
classified employees union. Better organized than the faculty, the classified employees’
adopted an electoral strategy, and supported one of their own members in the 1979 trustee
elections.

With the union’s help, Chester Brady, a former classified union officer,

succeeded in displacing a pro-administration incumbent on the board of trustees, his
election a clear sign of growing union strength.
In the spring of 1980, the prospects for Proposition 9 - a ballot initiative to reduce
state-income taxes-looked good. Indeed, the possibility that it would pass appeared to
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pose an additional threat to Arroyo’s long-term fiscal stability. Thus, the Arroyo Board
o f Trustees sought to redirect the institution. To expedite a change, the trustees made an
offer o f early retirement to Lockwood. They then set about an executive search which
was contracted out to a private search firm. Although in no way imprudent, the board’s
move suggested a state of urgency to many in the college, and raised questions among the
faculty about the possibility of changes in a major retrenchment
As Lockwood's successor, the board hired Kenneth Bloc km an. A former K-12
administrator, Blockman had little four-year college and

no

two-year college

administrative experience. What he did have was a reputation, acquired in a series of
positions at financially-troubled institutions, as a bottom-line manager who would not
hesitate to do whatever it took to balance the budget. Indeed, in his most recent position
at a large, urban high school, Blockman oversaw, in the wake of Proposition 13, the
termination of the freshman athletic program (The Signal. February 12, 1982).
Blockman arrived at Arroyo in the summer of 1980. During the summer, a group
of disgruntled coaches from Blockman's previous district contacted members of the
Arroyo athletic department with reports of the chaos Blockman had caused in their school.
Word of these reports spread quickly within the Arroyo faculty. By the time the fall
semester arrived, many members had concluded that Blockman was a professional
terminator, and were braced for immediate cutbacks.
Their speculations were not unfounded. Shortly after his arrival, Blockman made
a series of decisions that appeared to confirm the faculty’s worst expectations, the most
egregious of which from the faculty’s standpoint was a decision to undertake a
comprehensive review of Arroyo's instructional programs. Rather than appoint a faculty
task force Blockman contracted the review to an outside firm, the Carvell Education
Planning Management group. Under the direction of Vincent Berra, dean of instruction,
it assumed the task of evaluating the efficiency of Arroyo’s academic programs. Having
excluded the faculty, however, Blockman added to suspicions that he was preparing for a
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RIF.

Despite efforts to reassure the faculty with informal round table talks and a

president's advisory committee the social tension only intensified. Further, Blockman’s
personal style, which included displays of temper, put people off. As one member put it,
“He'd invite you to come in whenever you needed something, but if you went in, he'd
yell at you!” Not surprisingly, many teachers concluded that Blockman’s gestures were
gratuitous.
In the spring of 1981, six months after Blockman’s arrival, the college faced its
first serious fiscal crisis-a projected revenue shortfall of $593,000, or 10% of Arroyo's
total annual budget (The Signal. October 4, 1981).

As members of the faculty had

predicted, Blockman recommended faculty layoffs and program closures, however, the
layoffs he requested (in music, psychology, athletics, and counseling) did not conform to
the findings of the review study.

Again, rumors spread.

Rejecting the official

explanation that statutory teacher dismissal procedures mandated the deviations, many
teachers speculated that Blockman was trying to rid the college of trouble-makers.
Faculty morale plummeted.
The subsequent REF hearings were relatively uneventful. With Matthews’ help,
Blockman dominated the public debate. His proposal, which reduced the faculty but did
not cut the administration, was passed by the trustees.

Indeed, Blockman successfully

argued that, the budget process would be blind without a layoff plan (The Signal. October
4, 1981). The faculty, many members of which were fearful for their jobs, mounted
almost no resistance. As one member put it, “I believe in standing up for my beliefs, but
not if it means I’m going to have to starve.”
Community reaction was also slow to build. Indeed, nothing happened until two
independent probes of the college budget, published after the vote, aroused public
interest. One study was conducted by an analyst for The Signal, the local paper, the
other, by an analyst for the classified employees’ union. The findings of both identified
significant discrepancies in the budget figures anchoring Blockman's plan. Among other
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errors, the analysts discovered that local revenues had been underestimated by $400,000,
and expenditures overestimated by $150,000.

Further, the union analyst noted that

Arroyo's reserves, at 13%, were high by comparison to other institutions (The Signal.
October 4, 1981). Both studies suggested that Blockman's measures could have been
avoided.

Indeed, that point was emphasized by The Signal in a front page article

headlined, “Arroyo Faculty Cuts May Have Been Unnecessary.” The paper singled out
Matthews’ questionable accounting, and criticized the administration for its failure to use
up-to-date figures in its budget proposals. It also criticized the administration for failing
to accurately portray college resources, and chided the board of trustees for failing to
challenge the layoff proposal, and encourage public debate on fiscal matters. As the paper
noted, “Only on a few occasions were items publicly discussed in the three-stage process
that led to the budget's approval,” (The Signal. October 4, 1981, p. 14).
Within days of that report, The Signal printed another piece on a state
investigation into Arroyo's 1981 counselor layoffs, which had all but gutted a statemandated minority opportunity program at Arroyo (The Signal. October 7, 1981).
Together, these articles succeeded in drawing public attention to the college. Published
just four weeks before the trustee elections of 1981, The Signal’s reports became an
important factor in the election. As the campaign developed, two challengers who were
running on a platform of reform and fiscal accountability gained the support of the Arroyo
Faculty Association in its first foray into Arroyo electoral politics. On November 4th, the
association’s candidates successfully unseated two of the board's more entrenched
incumbents in a low turnout election (The Signal. November 6, 1981).
The election altered the profile of the board. The challengers, eager to assert
themselves in the post-election period, aligned themselves with Trustee Brady. That left
Blockman without a dependable majority. Only Peter Mason, board president, remained
securely in Blockman's comer. A fifth seat remained open pending a special election
scheduled for April, 1982 (The Signal. February 17, 1982).
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The 1982 crisis. In the spring of 1982 as the state implemented the growth caps
enacted by AB 1369, Arroyo officials braced themselves for another budget shortfall.
Early revenue projections forecast a deficit of $120,000.

Again, Blockman called for

program cutbacks. This time, however, he made his recommendations under the intense
scrutiny from the press. Blockman portrayed the situation in the gloomiest of terms. In
an interview with a reporter for The Signal, he attributed the deficit to inadequate growth
funding, specifically an 11% enrollment increase funded at a 4.8% rate. Sounding a note
of alarm, Blockman noted that the very future of the college was up in the air, and
reflected on his retrenchment philosophy. “With today's system, more students do not
mean more money. The job of the board of trustees is to narrow the scope and mission of
the college,” he said (The Signal. February 3, 1982, p. 20).
Bowing to public pressure, Blockman announced an intensified board schedule
for a full public airing of Arroyo’s retrenchment plans (The Signal. February 3, 1982).
At the first meeting, Blockman presented the trustee with a high-risk (no immediate
cutback) and a low-risk (immediate cutback) option, and recommended the low-risk
alternative, urging the board to act in order to meet the statutory deadline for layoff
notices.
The reaction from the audience was predictably emotional. Not suprisingly, the
classified employees lambasted the high-risk option.

Delaying a decision on faculty

layoffs, they argued, would place the brunt of any later cutbacks on classified positions,
which were exempt from statutory RIF deadlines. ‘W e are a total school,” the classified
union representative pleaded, “All of us should share equally” (The Signal. February 7,
1982, p. 12). Wary of further program outs the board nevertheless voted 3:1 to accept
the high-risk option, and directed Blockman to come up with a list of other options to
balance the budget.
At its next regular meeting, the board took up the issue of Arroyo’s tarnished
public relations image. Linda Coolidge, one of the newly elected trustees, made several
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specific proposals that would make it easier for members o f the public to address the
board.

Her ideas were summarily adopted, in a move The Signal described as “a

welcome effort to open the doors of communication that many people thought had been
rusted shut permanently” (The Signal. February 10, 1982, p. 1).
Two days later, the board met again, this time to discuss the fate of Arroyo’s
football program. Hastily called, the meeting brought a crowd of faculty, students,
residents, and business leaders. Blockman, in a long-anticipated move, announced the
resignation of the head football coach. He then proposed that football be eliminated for a
savings of $75,000.

Many people rose to speak on behalf of continuing the football

program, however, there were also several who voiced concern about Arroyo’s priorities.
One woman, for example, argued strenuously that athletics should not be saved at the
expense of academics. Her comments drew applause from the audience. After hours of
heated debate, the board, still reticent to cut programs, refused to vote on Blockman's
proposal (The Signal. February 12, 1982). The next day, The Signal printed a front page
editorial which referred to Blockman’s football proposal as a “horrid recommendation.”
In an adjacent article headlined, “Backlash Familiar to Arroyo President,” it also detailed
Blockman's history as a program terminator (The Signal. February 12, 1982, p. 1).
Two weeks passed during which rumors began to circulate to the effect that
Arroyo’s nursing programs would be on Blockman's cut list Within days, these were
confirmed by a front-page press report, entitled, “Arroyo Nursing May Be Cut” (The
Signal. February 28, 1982). Blockman was quoted as saying that nursing, which he
noted consumed almost $150,000 annually and served relatively few students, would
make an excellent choice for termination (The Signal. February 28, 1982).
Finally, on March 2nd, thirteen days before the statutory deadline for layoff
notices, Blockman presented his alternatives to the board. His proposal called for closing
twelve academic programs (including autobody, horticulture, physics, economics,
journalism, and nursing) for a total savings of $281,000.

That amount, he said, was
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needed to offset to the district’s newly revised deficit projection. No vote was taken at the
meeting, but The Signal, with a choice of academics or athletics, thereafter changed its
editorial position. Three days later, in a front-page headline, it trumpeted, “Don't Touch
the Nurses” (The Signal. March 5, 1982, p. 1).

The campus reaction. Members of Arroyo's demoralized general faculty were not
surprised by Blockman's proposal, although many members were taken aback by its
scope and structure. They were not, however, surprised by its nature. One member
likened Blockman’s strategy to Vietnam War tactics. “It was like the administration was
trying to destroy the college to save the college,” said Don Corbin of the science division.
Suspicious of Blockman, many of the faculty doubted the economic necessity for
sweeping closures.

Accurately or not, the press reports had confirmed what many

members suspected all along, that administration had manipulated the accounting system
to advance its retrenchment priorities.

As Tom Larry, a math teacher, said to the

researcher, “It’s entirely possible that the college was short and had to do something, but
because of the administration's style of keeping their cards under the table, everybody
was really suspicious.” He added, “It always comes down to what the board wants to
do. Until recently our board has been kind of a rubber stamp.”
In that context, two theories about Blockman’s action emerged. In one theory, the
faculty cast Blockman’s list as part of a strategy to eliminate football.

Faced with

community pressure and an unpredictable board, members argued, Blockman needed a
strong political lever in his campaign to terminate football. For that he chose nursing,
another high-profile, expensive program as disingenuous, alternative for elimination.
According to logic, no responsible administrator would drop an academic program,
particularly a strong one like nursing, to save an athletic program. “It was obvious that it
was just a ploy,” Lee Tobin, another math teacher, commented.
A second faculty theory argued that Blockman, in complying with the board's
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request for alternatives, was merely supplying the trustees with the trial balloons they
needed for testing public preferences. Those who held this theory viewed Blockman's
action as reflecting sensitivity to the political pressure on the trustees. As Ron Taylor,
dean of life science, noted, “Blockman knew the pressures the trustees were under. He
was just trying to help them test the water.”
Whichever theory they held, most members of the faculty looked at Blockman’s
proposal as forcing inter-unit competition. Indeed, the press coverage put the focus
almost exclusively on nursing and football.

As a consequence, members of those

departments believed themselves parties to a contest Les Olson, head of the Arroyo
athletic department lamented, “We didn't have anything against nursing-all we wanted
was to survive ourselves!” Ellen Finley, nursing director, likewise noted, “I don't like
being pitted against fellow faculty members.”
Members of the athletic department were particularly devastated. Having lost a
member to the 1981 RIF, they had anticipated Blockman's move but, because of their
weakened position in the college, felt powerless to do anything about it. The coaches
were aware, for example, of the symbolism in the choices before the board.

As Olson

noted, “Everybody knows you need a nurse. Who the hell needs a football player?”

The Political Behavior of the Nursing Faculty

The Arroyo nursing department fared well after Proposition 13. While it shared in
the across-the-board cutbacks made by college officials, nursing had sources of supplies
and money not available to other units.

Indeed, in 1980, as other units lost part-time

faculty, nursing expanded its curriculum with on-going grants totaling $55,000 annually
from local hospitals and other health agencies. The course was not entirely smooth,
however.

Within a year of expanding, nursing became the target of a cost-reduction

scheme. Indeed, Blockman proposed to close the LVN nursing program on the basis of
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national trends to reduce the use o f vocational nurses in acute-care hospitals. A quick
response by Director Finley, however, foiled the action. Finley quickly documented the
continuing need for LVN's local long-term care facilities.

Blockman subsequently

dropped his proposal, but shortly thereafter, asked Finley to try to reduce the
department’s costs by increasing it’s clinical teaching ratio along the lines of the high-ratio
model used by medical schools.

Again, Finley challenged Blockman, this time by

arguing that such a move would pose a risk to the RN program’s state accreditation.
Despite the implications of these events, Finley never anticipated that Blockman
would try to close her entire department

In fact, she continued to believe that the

financial interest of local hospitals in the RN program would insulate the department from
termination. Finley was surprised, therefore, when, in early 1982, rumors began to
circulate about the closure of her department “I was shocked!” she said. Members of
her staff were likewise surprised. ‘T w o of our faculty were on soft-money, so part of the
funds for the program didn't even come out of the general fund!” said RN member Mary
Lenox. “I guess we didn't think that something like this could happen!”
Members of the nursing department interpreted Blockman's strategy as one of
forcing nursing into competition with football. Indeed, they were so convinced of this
that in interviews for this study no one mentioned the other programs on Blockman's list.
“They tried to equate us with football-we were the two programs being removed,” Nancy
Richardson, another RN instructor, told the researcher.

Although members of the

department suspected that Blockman’s real objective was to cut football, they nevertheless
feared that he might carry out his threat “The president--he didn’t care. He would have
liked to get rid of us too!” Finley said.

Several of them speculated that nursing was

being targeted because it lacked academic status. “We felt the administration wanted to
emphasize academic areas and didn't consider nursing an academic area!” said
Richardson. Finley, however, was convinced that members of Blockman’s all-male
cabinet assumed nursing would capitulate without a fight. “I think they thought we'd roll
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over and play dead, but I picked up the gauntlet He [Blockman] put us in a very weak
position-I couldn't take a chance,” she said adding, ‘1 was irate--they were equating us
with football!”

Strategy and tactics. Indignation spurred Finley into action.

With only two

weeks to plan a defense, she pressed her faculty into action. A civic activist with years of
experience in community politics, Finley took over the tactical planning. Her strategy
was to knock holes in Blockman's economic argument and mobilize community support.
In line with the first objective, she conducted an in-house survey of Arroyo's general
faculty, the purpose of which was to document nursing and prenursing enrollment in
general education courses.

From that information she estimated the indirect ADA

accumulated by nursing students—that is, the ADA they generated in other departments.
“I'm tired of hearing that nursing is expensive,” she said.
Then Finley set out to mobilize an anti-termination coalition. To generate support,
she turned to the local medical and business establishments. She aimed to put together a
strong show strength on the part of those with an interest in the department.

Her

objective was to counter the influence of the local football boosters which she suspected
would be substantial. She notified numerous regional hospital administrators, many of
whom were community leaders in their own right, about the board’s decision, but also
broadened her outreach to include a “who's who” list of local civic and business people.
“I knew from my experience in local politics that it was important to get the people with
clout involved!” she explained.
Finley understood the importance of the media.

She actively sought to draw

media attention to the nursing issue, and was encouraged to do so by a colleague at
another community college. Hesitant at first, she approached a local radio station, and
obtained an invitation to appear on a talk-show. Recognizing that her motive might be
misinterpreted, Finley deemphasized her role as a college official when she was
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interviewed, and used the opportunity to stress the impact of community college fiscal
decline on nursing. Her purpose, as she described it, was to educate the community, but
she clearly felt there was a risk involved, and worried that her action would jeopardize her
position in the college. “I went on the radio, and I talked to people in the service area,
yes. But I didn’t go out and make a big brouhaha,” Finley reported to the researcher.
As Finley pursued those avenues, members of her faculty went to the faculty
association for support. However, officials of the faculty association declined to help.
They explained that their responsibility was to advocate for the faculty as a whole. The
nursing members then went to their peers in the general faculty but found them also
hesitant to help. Even teachers in the life sciences, many of whom taught prenursing and
nursing students, hesitated to pressure the administration for nursing. Members of the
nursing department interpreted their reticence as an expression of the survival mentality
operating in the institution. “People were afraid for their jobs!” Richardson explained.
However, Steven Smith, president of the faculty association, had another explanation.
Smith claimed that the general faculty, a small, close-knit group by his description, had an
aversion to taking sides. That aversion in the context of the pending RIF, he said,
interfered with the organization of a collective response. “Just like the faculty association
can't take sides, people in the faculty won't either—they won't get behind one program
versus another program!” He added that the teachers were also unwilling to lobby a
board long regarded as insensitive to faculty concerns.
Unsuccessful with their campus peers, members of the nursing faculty, assisted
by their students, then engaged in word-of-mouth networking, primarily at local hospitals
and health clinics. They also organized an alumni telephone tree to spread information
about the board's schedule and agenda. Both efforts helped to generate a flurry of calls
and letters to the board of trustees prior to the hearing on nursing.
Throughout the two-week period, Finley worked alone, independent of her staff.
She recognized that clinical teaching schedules limited faculty time. However, it was also
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Finley's habit to work alone. Indeed, members of her faculty described Finley as a “take
charge” administrator with boundless energy to devote to a cause. They regarded her as a
good spokesperson for the department, and a politically competent leader. “Ellen is a
powerful woman—she went out and got the community behind us,” Richardson
commented.

The decision. A large crowd, unprecedented in Arroyo history and estimated at
between 250 and 300 people, congregated for the March 6th board meeting. Indeed the
crowd was so large, that the meeting had to be moved from the board room to the college
cafeteria. A wide variety of interests was represented among those who assembled.
Various departments, including football and nursing, and representatives from other
constituencies, including students and classified staff, were on hand. The most heavily
represented interest, however, was nursing. Numerous health care administrators were
there to defend the department, along with scores of nursing students, members of their
families, a large contingent of program alumni, and a legion of local residents, all of
whom came to show support for the department (The Signal. March 7, 1982).
The first item on the agenda was football. At issue was whether the college
should immediately search for a new permanent football coach, or install a temporary
coach for the next year. However, the discussion was quickly redirected to the larger
issue of college priorities when a number of people in the audience raised questions about
the wisdom of maintaining a football program at a time when academic programs were
being considered for elimination. As the discussion developed, most of the opinions
expressed were clearly on the side of academics. Indeed, only one person, the athletic
director, rose to speak on behalf of football. Les Olson argued strenuously that football
should continue because it attracted students to the college. That drew Trustee Coolidge
into the discussion. Coolidge presented a litany of reasons for dropping football, and
then moved to convert it to an extramural program.

Her motion, which elicited no
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audience objections, passed with a unanimous vote of the board (The Signal. March 7,
1982).
Next, the board entertained the nursing issue. The question was whether or not to
close the department. Finley, the first to speak for nursing, took care to place Arroyo’s
problems in the larger context of the state funding changes.

After summarizing her

understanding of Arroyo’s fiscal situation, Finley said, “If the state doesn't do something
to bail out the community colleges, we're all in trouble!” (The Signal. March 7, 1982, p.
10). Finley then went on to present her survey data. At the conclusion of her remarks,
she warned that doing away with the nursing department would create “a major health
care crisis a few years down the road.” At a dramatic point in her argument, she pointed
to the audience. “In case you have any doubt,” she said, “those are my folks out there!”
(The Signal. March 7, 1982, p. 10). Her gesture drew enthusiastic applause from the
audience. Throughout the evening Finley appealed to rationality. “I tried to present the
facts and not use emotion,” she said.
Following Finley, Leo Winters, the chief administrator of a large local hospital,
addressed the board. He expressed concern that the local health agencies would lose their
investment in the RN program. “We fought like hell to get the registered nursing program
going, and now a year and a half later, it’s on the agenda to be cut,” he noted. Clearly
upset. Winters asserted that no one from the college had bothered to ask the hospitals for
additional money. “At the very least,” he exclaimed, “we're willing to sit down and talk.”
(The Signal. March 7, 1982, p. 10).
Winters was followed by a number of other hospital administrators, some from
other communities, and a miscellaneous group of local residents and program alumni, all
of whom argued to keep the nursing program. A few members of the science faculty
spoke persuasively on behalf of nursing. The discussion was heated.

Blockman at

points defended his proposal in rancorous interchanges with members of the audience.
After a lengthy debate, however, the board voted 4-0 to retain the nursing department
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Later that night the trustees also decided to keep journalism, physics, and auto body, but
voted to eliminate programs in fire control, consumer homemaking, and ornamental
horticulture (The Signal. March 7, 1982).
Only three members of the nursing faculty were present at the meeting.
Richardson from the RN program supported Finley's effort, but did not speak at the
meeting. “I guess I'm not political,” she commented, adding, “Ellen has a lot more
experience.” Lenox, Richardson’s colleague on the RN staff, did not attend the meeting.
“The nursing program here doesn't mean that much to me,” she said, “I knew I could
move on.” Lenox, a new teacher, accepted the administration’s rationale for terminating
programs. “If the money isn't there, what are you going to do?” she said. Further, she
acknowledged that she was struggling to meet the demands of the job. ‘1 was too busy
teaching to get involved,” she noted, admitting that her personal loyalty was to the
nursing profession rather than the college. Lenox observed, that, unlike herself, Finley,
and Richardson both had a strong personal interest in the future of the department

The aftermath.

Late in May, the Arroyo Board of Trustees finally rejected

Blockman’s structural reorganization approach and took definitive steps to revitalize
campus moral by opting to change Arroyo’s administrative leadership with a buy-out of
Blockman’s contract After an intense search, the trustees hired a new president whose
management philosophy stressed open communication and shared governance.

Other

changes followed. Matthews subsequently left the college, and in the fall of 1983, the
Arroyo faculty association successfully unseated Trustee Mason, the only long-term
incumbent remaining on the board.
With those changes, the climate at Arroyo began to improve, but the toll of harsh
retrenchment lingered for some time. For years, Arroyo had cut spending more than its
revenue losses demanded. Although its reserves never dropped below 12%, the social
cost of that achievement was enormous.
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Conditions also changed for the nursing department Within months of the crisis,
it moved out of Arroyo’s applied arts division and into the life science regarded by many
faculty members as more academically prestigious. Finley credited the move to influence
the department gained from it’s policy victory.

‘I t really put us on the map,” she

observed. B ut others disagreed with that assessment Indeed, Ron Taylor, dean of life
science, claimed that the reorganization was done for convenience.

“We shared a

laboratory—it made practical sense.”
Overall, Finley believed that her faculty’s campaign saved the nursing program.
However, Steve Smith, faculty association president disputed the significance she
attached to their effort He believed the crisis was contrived to eliminate football, and that
nursing was never in jeopardy.

“Anyone with eyes could see what happened,” he

observed, “In times of a budget crunch, people are not going to choose an athletic
program over an academic program that puts people directly into the workforce.” Finley
went on to become an administrator of the college, an achievement she also attributed to
the policy victory.

Discussion

The case of nursing at Arroyo College illustrates how programs conspicuously
high in cost and low in enrollment come to find themselves at the center of controversy
during times o f economic stress.

It also illustrates how institutional history,

environmental trends, and community politics converge to affect the fate of nursing
programs.
The cutbacks of 1981 and 1982 had their seeds in the early decision culture at
Arroyo. With the advent of faculty collective bargaining, the system at Arroyo evolved
from a benign administrative paternalism into a pernicious adversarialism. That change
more than any other factor explained the failure of college officials to reach out to the
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faculty at key points in retrenchment planning. As much of the literature in educational
retrenchment makes clear, failure to reach out is a serious error (Bowen, 1983; Deutsch,
1983; McTighe, 1979; Powers, 1982).
Intent on holding the faculty at bay, Arroyo officials failed to anticipate the public
response to harsh retrenchment As an important institution in an isolated area, Arroyo
College was a source of front page news. The local press thus enjoyed an enormous
potential to influence public opinion on college policy.

When it picked up on the

hegemony dominating retrenchment, it called attention to Arroyo’s management problems
and the oversight deficiencies of the board. Public reaction, although slow to develop,
eventually grew strong enough to alter the way business was done at the college.
Through the electoral process, a new board majority was assembled, one that invited
public participation in college decisions.

The changes at Arroyo thus illustrated what

Schattschneider (1960) referred to as conflict socialization--the process by which conflict
is expanded beyond closed-door privacy into the public domain.
This case illustrates how various college constituencies react to selective
retrenchment While much of the Arroyo general faculty was paralyzed by job insecurity,
the nursing faculty orchestrated an anti-termination campaign.

A high cost, low

enrollment programs, nursing was targeted as a possible loser in the administration’s
cutback proposal. Its director, however, quickly organized a response. Understanding,
as Behn (1978) pointed o u t that the outcome of termination is decided by a policy's
attentive constituency, she worked to mobilize a coalition by prevailing on nursing's
natural allies, the local health service administrators and community leaders committed to
the welfare of the community. Her hastily assembled coalition easily prevailed over the
demoralized athletic department faculty. The director’s actions were driven by a deep
sense of injustice, and a belief that college officials did not value her department. Such
feelings are not uncommon in persons threatened by retrenchment, and can be viewed as
part of a judgmental perspective aiding survival under threatening conditions.
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(1980) found that in retrenching organizations, people tend to categorize others into two
groups, those who oppose and those who support their interests, and judge them
accordingly.

Whatever personal attitudes the director held about the administration,

however, she clearly recognized the importance of appealing to reason as she made her
public presentations.
The actions of the nursing faculty, on the other hand, revealed a diversity of
identity and motivation. Clearly, the sense of crisis felt by the nursing director was not
shared by all of the department’s members. Rather than group pressure (as proposed by
Verba, 1961), or a need for conformity (as described by Staw et aL, 1981), their actions
derived from individual political judgments grounded on self and situational appraisals.
According to Bamer-Barry and Rosenwein (1985), such appraisals play an important role
in shaping political behavior.
Finally, the crisis at Arroyo derived from a philosophy that put economic
considerations above all other values.

Seeking to terminate an expensive athletic

program, the Arroyo administration sought a lever to push its recommendation through a
resistant board, and thus proposed nursing, a high-cost, low enrollment unit, and a useful
political target, as an alternative. From a Fiscal standpoint, it was a clever tactic, one that
revealed the high value placed on economic efficiency.

Whichever way the decision

went, for or against athletics, the college budget would be served.

Whether or not the

CEO actually intended to “pit” nursing against football, however, as so many Arroyo
faculty members believed, his action clearly elicited the nursing director's ire and
community values determined the policy outcome.

Nursing Faculty Behavior at Palomino College..(No. 1)

The situation at Palomino College illustrates the disabling effect of social conflict
on an institution facing severe resource decline. For several years, a recalcitrant college
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administration and equally unbending faculty union engaged in an adversarial war that
worsened the problems of retrenchment for the entire institution.

At a critical point,

college officials planned drastic cutback strategies with the potential to disproportionately
reduce the nursing department.

Although seriously demoralized, members of the

department organized to fight back.

Introduction

A year after Arroyo’s crisis, the officials of Palomino College announced a
reduction-in-force that would pare down the nursing faculty by 50% and close
Palomino's LVN nursing program. The centerpiece of a restructuring plan recommended
by Interim President Steven Miller, that drastic step, which proposed to cut numerous
departments, was taken to avoid an anticipated revenue shortfall for 1983-84 of $3.5
million. In all, layoff notices were sent to 101 faculty members-25% of the full-time
teaching staff—17 to teachers in the 30-member nursing unit.
Initially shocked, the nursing faculty responded slowly.

After a period of

immobilization, a group of members organized an anti-termination campaign to influence
the final decision. Their effort forced the board of trustees to back away from its original
plan. By June, the initial 17 notices had been reduced to eight. Then, during the summer
term that followed, a vigorous fundraising campaign pursued by the nursing chairperson
saved the LVN program and provided enough money to reinstate four teachers.
However, a drop in student enrollment caused in part by public confusion over the status
of the department led to their dismissal the following year. Unable to accept this turn of
events, several nursing faculty members blamed the chairperson, and the group lapsed
into a state of chronic conflict
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Background

Palomino College is a large, centrally-located, urban institution serving a
collection of old, residential communities in the greater Los Angeles area.

After its

opening in 1928, it underwent a series of transitions, at one point incorporating a second
campus.

In 1954, however, Palomino consolidated as a single, large college to

eventually become the Palomino Community College District, governed since 1966 by a
seven member board of trustees.
Over the course of three decades, Palomino established an array of health
occupation programs including two in nursing—LVN and RN—which gained regional and
national reputations for excellence. Indeed, the registered nursing program distinguished
itself as one of the first to be accredited by the National League for Nursing—a milestone
in the nursing profession's acceptance of the associate degree curriculum.
Over the years, the nursing department expanded to meet the personnel needs of
several large local hospitals, and achieved a high degree of prominence in the community
and college. At the dme of this study, it enrolled well over 200 students, and occupied
much of Palomino's Paramedical Science Building, an impressive structure financed in
part by a federal grant for the local expansion of nursing education.

The 1982-83 crisis. Interim President Steven Miller arrived at Palomino in the
middle of 1982-83 academic year to find an institution in full-blown organizational crisis.
His predecessor, David Bayer, had just departed, leaving the college in economic and
social turmoil. The board of trustees looked to Miller for a plan to deal with a looming
$3.5 million budget deficit.
The crisis that Miller inherited derived from a number of complicated economic
and social factors having to do with Palomino's struggles to adapt, not only to
Proposition 13, but also to collective bargaining, both of which converged on the college
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within a period of two years. Indeed, just prior to tax-limitation, a newly-certified CTAaffiliated faculty collective bargaining unit emerged as a major force in district policy
making. That development became a matter of concern to district officials as they looked
forward to Proposition 13. When, in the spring of 1978, Palomino's CEO retired,
district trustees looked for a new executive with the skills to maintain fiscal control. They
hired David Bayer, a man in his mid-30s who had no experience as a college president,
but who, as chief negotiator for a district besieged by union conflicts, had acquired a
reputation for being “tough on the union.”
As anticipated, Proposition 13 resulted in a precipitous drop in district revenues14% in Bayer's first year on the job (see Table 9). District officials identified two reasons
for the decline, (1) a state apportionment formula shorting district revenues (The StarNews. July 24, 1983), and (2) a less-than-maximum local property tax rate frozen into
law by the tax initiative leaving Palomino unusually dependent on state funds (Gooder,
1984). Revenues eroded steadily; by 1982, they were down 20% from pre-tax-limitation
levels, and by 1984, 25%.
Bayer’s job was to help the college adapt to decline.

From the beginning,

however, his efforts were hindered by faculty resistance. Indeed, CTA union leaders
regarded him as a union-buster, and distrusted him from the outset, as did the officers of
the Palomino academic senate who had backed another candidate for the CEO position.
Bayer’s early actions served to confirm faculty doubts. Shortly after his arrival,
for example, he reorganized the college hierarchy, adding at great expense to the college a
new executive layer consisting of four new vice presidencies. In another controversial
move, he then filled those positions with outsiders. Although Bayer’s reorganization,
which tightened executive control, had merit from a management perspective, it alienated
the administrators displaced by the new order, and offended numerous faculty members
who questioned the cost at a time when the college was deliberating serious spending
reductions. It also violated Palomino hiring traditions, and thereby reinforced faculty
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fears that Bayer was preparing for a campaign against the union.
Bayer’s new cabinet was not without skill.

Among its members were Don

Jeffries, head of administrative services, Jack Baden, head of personnel services, and
Mary Ogilvie, head o f instruction, later replaced by Vincent Berra from Arroyo College.
They worked diligently to maintain Palomino's fiscal balance, instituting a program of
spending reductions and strict budget controls. In 1979, they initiated the Palomino
College Foundation, a fund-raising organization, to pursue external sources of funding.
At first the new cabinet limited its budget cutbacks to capital outlay, supplies, and
plant maintenance.

(The latter caused the appearance of the college to deteriorate

noticeably.) For three years, 1979-1981, these tactics allowed the district to sustain a
healthy reserve level of 14% (see Table 15).

Subsequently, however, officials were

forced to lay off classified employees and institute a faculty hiring freeze. Numerous
positions went unfilled, resulting in the elimination of a few small academic programs.
Despite the cabinets efforts, budget deficit projections became an annual ritual.
Each year, in fact, Jeffries invoked a mid-year budget freeze to rein in spending.

His

freezes, however, were usually followed by end-of-year surpluses, and those surpluses
in turn nurtured faculty suspicions the cabinet was over-reacting to Palomino’s fiscal
circumstances.

Faculty doubts set the scene for conflict.

Indeed, the ambiguity

surrounding district budget projections led faculty union officials to press for salary
raises. As Ed Otis, local CTA executive director, explained, “We were determined that
the college would not balance its budget on the backs of the faculty.”
True to his reputation, Bayer met union demands with a get-tough approach that
invited faculty resistance. When both sides proved unwilling to compromise, a series of
fierce adversarial battles ensued. The warfare went on for a period of three years, 19791982, and literally tore the campus apart (The Star-News. February 12,

1984).

Unfortunately the acrimony of contract disputes spilled over to the campus, erecting tall
barriers between labor and “management”

Each side sought public vindication by
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pointing the finger of responsibility at the other. The faculty accused the cabinet of
“mismanagement”; the cabinet, in turn, accused the faculty of “fiscal naivetd”.
The intense conflict between the administration and the faculty had serious
organizational and fiscal consequences.

A shadow administration, which formed as

disgruntled middle administrators began taking their problems directly to members of the
board, gradually undercut Bayer's influence with the trustees.

Finally, with Bayer’s

influence waning, the trustees wavered on the issue of salaries. In an ill-fated attempt to
restore harmony, they approved a series of large faculty raises—nine percent for 1981-82,
and another six percent for 1982-83 (California Community Colleges, 1985, February).
That action led directly to a fiscal crisis in 1982-83. As Jeffries observed, “They hoped
the fiscal situation would improve but it didn’t.”
In the spring of 1982, AB 21 threatened the funding of numerous avocational and
physical education courses in the Palomino curriculum. Alarmed by the state’s action, the
board of trustees approved a plan to review Palomino’s mission. The trustees cited the
shift of authority and fiscal control to the state as the reason for the undertaking (StarNews. September 12, 1982).

The board then held a community forum to review

Palomino’s occupational education program, and surveyed the community to determine
the continued need for an array of occupational programs. Several hospitals participated.
By the end of the spring semester, it was clear, however, that the social climate at
Palomino had failed to improved and that a fiscal crisis was looming. The board at that
point acted to encourage Bayer’s departure by denying him a new four-year contract and
customary salary raise. Bayer resigned, but agreed to stay on to see the fall semester
through.
During the summer, Palomino officials announced an impending deficit of $5
million, 14% of Palomino’s annual budget The administration made immediate efforts to
gain a salary concession from the faculty union, ail of which failed. College officials then
began an anxious search for other ways to cut costs (Star-News. October 26, 1982).
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Various ideas, canceling the summer session and furloughing staff among others, were
considered, but none promised to balance the budget.

Pushed to the brink, college

officials agreed to reorganize the instructional program.
Vincent Berra was recruited from Arroyo College and installed in 1981 as
Palomino’s vice president for instruction. An ardent cost-cutter, he took on the task of
planning the reorganization. Berra lacked the requisite doctorate degree for the position,
but agreed to pursue one as he worked on Palomino’s retrenchment plan. Under pressure
from the start, Berra had difficulty gaining the faculty's trust. His approach, which was
to recruit the Carvell consultancy group to do a program review, drew harsh criticism
from the Palomino faculty, many of whom objected to the Carvell evaluation criteria
which members believed failed to consider the factors driving up costs in some
disciplines.

Berra proceeded with the study, however, which eventually found

engineering, nursing, and a few allied health programs at the bottom of Palomino’s
efficiency list.
After completing the study, Berra convened a committee comprised primarily of
Palomino’s top administrators, but included a few faculty members and students. The
committee’s task was to make reform recommendations. Over the course of the 1982 fall
semester, it developed a plan to reduce spending without lowering college revenue.
Members were aware that California RIF statutes required all part-time faculty to be
dismissed before full-time faculty could be laid off (Ozsomogonyan, 1976). In accord,
they avoided units with high numbers of part-time personnel, especially those with highenrollments, since cutting those units would reduce revenue. Members looked instead for
units with large full-time faculties and low enrollments, one of which was nursing. As
Baden, the vice president of personnel services, explained, “Nursing was a target of
opportunity that was also a high-cost target”
The committee deliberated under difficult conditions during the fall of 1982.

It

was an election year, and as the political season went on, the cost of education became a
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big issue in the gubernatorial campaign. Indeed, the debate at the state level contributed to
a climate of uncertainty and tension on the Palomino campus. To preserve calm, college
officials decided to put off their retrenchment decision pending the outcome of the
election. That delay, however, only fueled speculation, as the faculty focused itself on
the nature and extent of the impending cuts. One popular faculty theory was that the
district would target high-cost, low WSCH programs such as nursing, in its restructuring
effort.

The cutback proposal. Steven Miller, the interim substitute for Bayer, arrived in
February, just in time to guide the administration in making its final decisions (The StarNews. February 4, 1983). The retired CEO of a neighboring district and a one-time
superintendent of Palomino's K-12 district, Miller was welcomed as an insider.

He

bonded quickly with the other members of the Palomino administrative cabinet
As Miller began work, revised revenue forecasts projected an impending budget
deficit of $3.5 million.

Miller quickly approved the plan put together by Berra's

committee, which included a proposal to cut nursing. Further based on the results of the
community survey, which showed a sagging job market for vocational nurses, Miller
recommended closing the nursing department’s LVN program and downsizing the
nursing faculty by 50%.

As Baden explained, “Miller had a lot of experience with

nursing programs. He thought that would be the easiest way to do it.”
Members of the Palomino board were skeptical of the plan at first

Several

trustees, in fact, raised questions about the likely community’s likely reaction to a
reduction in nursing. They wanted to avoid a public outcry. Obliged to sell the idea,
Miller supplied the board with information on comparative program costs.

Much of it

supported the conclusion that Palomino nursing, with its large, all full-time faculty, was
unnecessarily expensive. Jeffries, using a metaphor popular with the cabinet, explained,
“What we had was a Cadillac program that we could easily reduce to Chevrolet size
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without losing the balance of instructional offerings at Palomino.”
On March 3rd, Miller went before the board to publicly unveil Palomino’s
retrenchment plan. His proposal called for salary and benefit cuts but also called for the
closure of nine instructional programs, including LVN nursing, the reassignment of unit
administrators to teaching positions, and an immediate spending freeze (The Star-News.
March 4, 1983). Additionally, Millers recommendations specified major faculty layoffs
for nursing (17), physical education (6), music (6), counseling (6), with smaller
reductions for art, English, foreign languages, science, communications, engineering,
allied health, and the library. The trustees unanimously approved the plan (The StarNews. March 4, 1983). As Jeffries put it, “They finally swallowed the bitter pill—I'd
been preaching the sky is falling for three years.”

Campus reaction. The Palomino faculty reacted with predictable outrage.

So

angry were its members that the Palomino Academic Senate took the unprecedented step
of formally censuring Miller and the executive cabinet (The Star-News. March 4, 1983).
George Smith, president of the senate, told the press, “There seems to be a philosophy
that cost-effectiveness is the only criterion by which a program is evaluated” (The StarNews. March 18, 1983, p. A-l).
Faculty union leaders also joined the fray. They called the plan “catastrophic to
the profession” (The Star-News. April 11, 1983, p. A-5). Ed Otis, executive director,
claimed the layoffs were part of a strategy to intimidate the union, and force the faculty to
accept a salary cut. He downplayed the role of the deficit “The board will not use its
resources, and that’s what's causing the problem” (The Star-News. April 11, 1983, p. A5).
The cabinet stood firm. Miller, for example, reacted to the faculty’s outrage with
a detached dismissal. “The faculty hasn't accepted the reality of where the college is
financially. It's hard to deal with an illness when people refuse to admit that they're
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sick!” he said. Indirectly confirming Otis' charge, Miller observed, “The only way to
address the [fiscal] problem is to look at salaries,” (The Star-News. March 18, 1983, p.
A-backpage).
Communication between the faculty and the administration continued to
deteriorate. For the remainder of the semester, Miller declined to meet with unit-level
personnel, and routed all communication through his administrative cabinet.

Many

faculty members interpreted this action as evidence of a short-timer’s attitude and
concluded that Miller lacked concern for the institution.

“Miller didn’t care about

Palomino,” observed the nursing chairperson. Determined not to acquiesce, the union
filed a class-action lawsuit on behalf of the teachers. Thereafter, meetings of the board
became the main forum for interchanges between the faculty and the administration.
Numerous departments, academic and vocational, appealed to the community for help, as
groups of Palomino students repeatedly staged dramatic anti-termination rallies, (The Star
News. March 26, 1983).

The Political Behavior of the Nursing Faculty

Social and organizational trends beginning in the mid 1960s and continuing
through the 1970’s set the scene for a crisis in the nursing department. During those
years, the department expanded its faculty and its enrollment, to eventually become
Palomino's largest occupational unit, a unit which, unlike other departments, occupied its
own building. Indeed, because of its size and unique accommodations, nursing was
widely perceived to have substantial power in the college. In the mid 1970s, however,
district demographics began to shift, and language barriers, a consequence of Palomino’s
growing ethnic diversity, increasingly interfered with student success in nursing's
professional courses.

Declining student preparedness in turn caused rising nursing

attrition rates which slowly undermined the stability of nursing’s enrollment
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During most of the 1970’s, the leadership of the nursing department remained
stable. Nursing’s long-time department chairperson managed the department’s problems
in a decidedly authoritarian style, but allowed the local demand for nurses and the
department’s community reputation to push her policy of expansion. Characteristically,
members of the nursing faculty deferred to the chairperson’s decisions. Indeed, isolated
from campus life by their clinical teaching schedules, they made little effort to participate
in the management of the department or in college affairs. A leadership change did finally
occur in the late 1970’s, but it resulted in no change to the department’s administrative
pattern. In fact, the nursing programs continued to grow. Thus, while the department
outwardly appeared to gain power, the conditions were set for a decline.
That change began in the early 1980’s. As the college prepared for retrenchment
in the spring of 1982, the nursing faculty turned its attention to choosing a new
chairperson.

Indeed, the selection process preoccupied its members for most of the

semester. Three candidates, differing in personality, style, management philosophy, and
ethnic background emerged to seek the position.

Their candidacies, to some extent

reflecting the diversity of the faculty itself, generated strong partisan divisions and intense
undercurrents of competition. As the election approached, a power struggle ensued, and
rivalries solidified which the vote did not resolve. Inadvertently, the college executives
contributed to the conflict. The results of the final vote conducted by the central
administration were never conveyed to the faculty. That oversight nurtured suspicion that
the candidate approved was not the one recommended. Faculty resentments lingered, and
carried over to the fall semester to profoundly affect the operation of the department.
Kris Munoz, a twenty-year veteran of the department, was chosen as the new
chairperson.

She took over in the summer of 1982, just as fiscal crisis engulfed the

college. With tensions running high in the administration, Munoz kept a low profile, and
waited for fall to address the problems of her department. When fall arrived, however,
she found the faculty tense and divided. Munoz made several attempts to restore group
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cohesion seriously weakened by the election. At one point she hired an outside expert to
work on team-building and race relations, but her efforts were unsuccessful.
Eager to make a mark, however, Munoz went ahead with her own agenda.
Munoz wanted to revise the way decisions were made in the department Departing from
tradition, she imposed a new participatory system of decision-making under which she
directed unit problems to her staff for solutions. A large part of her faculty, however,
preferred the more directive style of her predecessors.
collegiality for laissez-faire management

Some even mistook Munoz’s

Several of the teachers registered their

dissatisfaction by bickering and sniping in faculty meetings.
As the nursing unit struggled internally, and Palomino’s fiscal situation failed to
improve, the Palomino general faculty turned its attention to the developing Fiscal crisis.
Rumors circulated that low-WSCH programs such as engineering and nursing would be
eliminated from the curriculum. Members of the nursing department failed to take the
rumors seriously, however. “We knew the college was having trouble, but we never
thought it would affect our department,” said Betty Silvers, a senior nursing faculty
member. Even Munoz, who was aware of nursing RIFs in other institutions, considered
her department secure.

Immediate reaction.

The March 3rd retrenchment proposal took the nursing

faculty by complete surprise. The immediate response of the faculty was shock, indeed
severe enough to immobilize purposeful action. For days, members went about their
daily routines in a dazed disbelief. Indeed, they were so overcome that no special faculty
meeting was called. A week after the announcement, when they finally met for a regular
faculty meeting, they were still unable to act, and spent their time speculating on who
would receive layoff notices. That process, in which members focused intensely on their
tenure status, gave rise to a new schism in the group—one in which members who had
little seniority began to distance themselves from those who had considerable seniority.
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Liu Lau, a second-year teacher described the situation.

As Lau noted, “There were

divisions. It was like, ‘Okay, you guys are safe. We’re not!’ The tension was very,
very high.”
As days went by, the initial paralysis began to subside.

Members gradually

turned their attention to identifying which college officials were responsible for the
termination plan. Campus rumors pointed to Vincent Berra, but members of the nursing
faculty also questioned Munoz’s role. Munoz was perceived by some as overly passive
in her dealings with college executives, a tendency members attributed to her Asian
heritage. Doubts about Munoz’s style led to speculation that she may have known about
the plan prior to the announcement, but out of loyalty to the administration remained
quiet. Members of the nursing faculty also questioned the role of the board of trustees,
particularly two long-term incumbents who had taken controversial positions on women’s
issues.
Frustrated, some members confronted Munoz demanding explanations of
nursing’s layoffs. In particular, they wanted to know why nursing’s cuts were larger
than those of other units. As Lau recalled, “We wanted to know how did they decide that
nursing should take the most of it?” Munoz tried to obtain answers, but her efforts were
frustrated. Miller, Interim President who was referring his calls to Berra, refused to talk
to her. Berra, although willing to meet, dodged her requests for a full accounting by
repeating what he was saying to the press-that nursing had the worst ratio of
expenditures to income of any program on campus, and consumed $1.5 million of
Palomino’s $38.5 million budget (The Star-News. April 4, 1983). The nursing faculty
rejected that explanation.
Coincidentally, a member of the nursing faculty heard about the crisis at Arroyo
College. That led someone to call director Finley for information on Berra’s role in
Arroyo’s nursings crisis. Finley reported that Berra had departed Arroyo before her
department’s problems occurred, but that did not deter some of the more outspoken
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members of the Palomino group to attribute responsibility for their situation to him
anyway.
As the search for explanations went on, many members were overtaken by anger
and a deep sense of the injustice being done to their department.

Some members

experienced the layoffs as a personal rejection. Others, some of whom were graduates of
the Palomino nursing program, identified strongly with the department They felt a loss
of personal and professional identity.

In one way or another, almost everyone

experienced the cutbacks as an insult to the faculty’s achievements. As Lau put it, “We
were thinking of our jobs, but we were also thinking of the program-it was a forerunner
in community college nursing education.”
Offended by the disproportion of nursing’s cuts, several members concluded that
Palomino’s all-male cabinet was responsible for the proposal. They speculated that under
Berra’s influence, the executive cabinet decided to target nursing for reasons of political
expedience. Members reasoned that the administration was gambling that women faculty
members would offer little resistance to being laid off. As Ruth Gray, a fundamentals
teacher, observed, “We knew the administration would never try this [the heavy lay-offs]
down in engineering.” Not everyone in the unit, however, accepted that theory. Indeed,
several members remained skeptical. Lau, for example, said “I’m Chinese—I don’t think
of things in terms of male and female.” Nevertheless, gender bias became the primary
operating theory of the group. It kindled a sense of outrage among members that finally
lifted the group to action.

The planning process. Palomino officials scheduled a hearing on the nursing
issue for March 24th to coincide with the regular meeting of the Palomino Board of
Trustees. With two weeks gone, the nursing faculty had little time for planning. Further,
some members’ had doubts about whether the faculty had the resources to mount an anti
termination campaign. “We weren’t like those nurses at Kaiser who go on strike every
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now and then,” said Rose Stuart, a first-year teacher, “We’d never been involved in a
labor dispute.”

While these doubts slowed the action, the group went on to begin

planning. “We knew we had to do something, or we would have no chance at all,”
Silvers explained.
Member participation varied. Ten members took an active role in group planning
while the others gave their tacit support. Faculty interviewes reported that several junior
faculty members felt intimidated by the RIF.

Thus, they and the teachers close to

retirement comprised the inactive group.
Although politically inexperienced, Munoz served as group moderator. An idea
person, she acted as a strategist. Characteristic of her style, Munoz brought in outsiders
to help organize the group, for example the team building consultant, and the director of
the faculty association. Otis, the CTA director, consented to help with strategy, but
declined to advocate for the department He explained that his responsibility was to the
faculty as a whole.

“He kind of told us we had to fight our own battle,” Silvers

explained.
The faculty rallied to support the problem solving process. Members decided that
nursing’s base of support was in the community. They quickly endorsed a strategy for
mobilizing community support, and drafted a list of health service professionals for
Munoz to contact All agreed to undertake a word-of-mouth networking effort to activate
community assistance. Barbara Baines, faculty counselor to the senior students, met with
student leaders who were planning a public demonstration. Notably, many interviewees
were reluctant to discuss their personal roles in the campaign with the researcher.
Several, including Munoz, hesitated to divulge the actions they took-especially in regard
to student participation—which they believed if misconstrued could put their jobs in
jeopardy.
The faculty appointed three members—Munoz, Silvers, and Baines—to serve as
spokespersons to the board. With the help of the outside consultant, the group worked
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together on the arguments for the testimony that would be presented. One idea was to
direcdy confront the issue of gender bias.

The board meeting. The March 24th board meeting was held in The Forum, a
large indoor amphitheater suitable for big events. The meeting drew a capacity crowd of
1500 people noted by the press to be the largest ever to assemble for a Palomino board
meeting.

Nearly a hundred uniformed nursing students paraded outside as people

arrived. Carrying lighted candles and placards, the students caught the attention of local
media crews.

Indeed, their demonstration was highlighted on the eleven o'clock TV

news and pictured in the local paper the following day (The Star-News. March 25, 1983).
The entire nursing faculty attended the meeting en masse in a show of department
solidarity. Dozens of prominent hospital administrators and other health professionals
were also on hand. As the meeting got underway, officials acknowledged a flood of mail
supporting the nursing department. Almost immediately the nursing layoffs came under
heavy attack from members of the audience. Thomas Hughes, a spokesman for the
regional Hospital Council castigated the administration’s termination plan. “California has
always been a debtor state where nursing education is concerned... A further reduction in
the number of RNs prepared in the community colleges will be nothing short of
disastrous,” he told the trustees (The Star-News. April 4, 1983, p. A-1). A prominent
local internist followed Hughes.

He made an eloquent speech which made numerous

references to the physician's dependence on nurses to do the job of healing. Finally, a
nursing service director rose to speak about her institution's reliance on the Palomino
nursing programs for a continuing supply of nurses.

Numerous students and their

families also made appeals that evening.
As the meeting went on, the department's official spokespersons stood in
succession to address the board. Silvers and Baines focused on instructional quality.
Silvers stressed the excellence of the nursing faculty, the students' high pass-rate on the
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state licensuie exam, and the long history and fine reputation of the program. Baines, an
NLN accreditation visitor, introduced herself as an authority on accreditation.

She

pointed out how the layoffs failed to consider teacher specialty credentials and could
therefore jeopardize the department’s accreditation status. However, Trustee Adams, in
response, demanded. “How is it then that the Long Beach program is able to handle more
students with a much smaller faculty?” Baines pled ignorance in what proved to be a
tense moment for the nursing faculty.
Munoz followed Baines. Her remarks briefly touched on the issue of economy.
Munoz pointed out that the department's high licensure exam pass rates made the nursing
programs cost-efficient. She then went on to the centerpiece of her argument, which was
the gender bias theory. “We...wonder whether there is more than cost involved here,” she
said, adding, “The fact is, the largest number of pink slips went to the department with
the largest number of women faculty” (The Star-News. March 25, 1983, p. A-3Z).
Munoz’s remarks drew immediate anger from the trustees. Trustee Stanton, a
lawyer, quickly retorted that the board had made its decision “solely on economic
grounds.” In response to Munoz’s suggestion that sexism might have been a factor, he
snapped, “That is just not the case!” (The Star-News. March 25, 1983, p. A-3Z).
The meeting then went on to other issues. An item on the agenda was Palomino’s
$2 million fund-raising effort. At a point in the discussion, Trustee Alexander addressed
Munoz, and remarked that she might save her department by obtaining extramural funds.
Taken off-guard, Munoz huffed, “I’m not in the money-raising business!” Her sharp
dismissal drew gasps from the audience.

However, Alexander's comment marked a

change in the expectations of unit managers at Palomino, which until that moment had not
included fund-raising. Nevertheless, Munoz's surprise, and the audience reaction to her
remark, embarrassed some members of the nursing faculty who were not reluctant to hold
her accountable for new standards of unit management.
The reactions of nursing faculty members to the meeting were mixed. Several
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were buoyed by the show of community support.

Munoz's accusation of sexism was

prominently reported in the next day’s paper, (The Star-News. March 25, 1983),
however, and worried some that her remarks had been too blunt. Others noted that the
officials had appeared to shut out the speakers, and concluded that the decision on nursing
had already been made. Furthermore, complaints from nursing service administrators
about the student demonstration kindled further anxiety, and caused some members to
worry that nursing’s open resistance would backfire.
Unknown to the nursing faculty, the trustees were, in fact, impressed by the
nursing effort. The size of the audience and particularly the stature and community
standing of the stature of those who spoke, and the apparent organization of the
department’s effort caught their attention.

According to Baden, VP of Personnel

Services, several of the trustees began to have doubt about the plan to cut nursing, and
reacted by backing away from it. That caused tension between the board and members of
the cabinet. As Jeffries explained, “Not many boards will stick with you when the going
gets rough!” Publicly, however, the trustees maintained support for the plan. “We have
to have a mix of classes,” Trustee Adams commented in a press interview (The StarNews. April 4, 1983, p. A-l).
Unfortunately, tensions in the nursing departihent increased. Several members
refocused on Munoz, and her weaknesses, and the bickering and sniping resumed. Some
members went to their peers in other departments for support but those efforts produced
little more than expressions of sympathy.

Although they recognized that a survival

mentality that had overtaken the campus, they also recognized that nursing's social
isolation—few members participated in college governance or attended general faculty
functions—was part of the problem. As Gray noted, “We’re accused of being very ivory
tower.” Some also believed that professional envy, derived from nursing’s standing as
the occupant of the newest and largest structure, on campus, contributed to the general
faculty’s apparent disinterest in helping. “People are jealous of us!” said Munoz.
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During the long weeks before the final decision, the group considered undertaking
other tactics. The idea of documenting nursing's indirect contributions to college ADA
came up. According to Silvers, that idea was discarded as too time-consuming. In fact,
she and others seemed unaware of the political value of such documentation. Silvers
discounted the importance of indirect ADA. “Other departments use that ADA, so it
doesn’t really reflect on us.”

The decision. On June 2nd, the board of trustees voted to reduce the total number
of teacher layoffs from 101 to 28. The trustees cited savings from maintenance cutbacks,
class size increases, and an unusual number of faculty retirements as the factors that made
the reduced number feasible (The Star-News. June 3,

1983).

However, their

announcement followed by days a decision by the faculty association to form a political
action committee to seek candidates for the November trustee election (The Star-News.
May 20, 1983). Robert Holbrooke, dean of occupational education, disputed whether
there was a link between the two events, however.

Palomino officials, he said, never

intended for the original plan to be implemented. “You send a hundred notices and lay off
ten,” he said, adding, “People are grateful-1 hate to sound cynical, but that's the way it
works.”
The final decision reduced the number of layoffs in nursing from seventeen to
eight The board, however, voted to go ahead with the termination of the LVN program.
Asked whether gender bias was a factor in the trustees' decision, Jeffries responded,
“Nursing had a large all full time faculty, and the hospitals weren’t hiring vocational
nurses. It was an administratively justifiable decision.”
The impact of the nursing faculty's anti-termination campaign on the final decision
remained unclear.
considerable.

Members of the administrative cabinet claimed that the effect was

Jeffries, for example, described the nursing effort as “impressive” and

“better organized” than those of other groups.

Baden noted that other faculty groups
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failed to generate the enthusiastic community support displayed for nursing. He, in fact,
characterized the nursing decision as a policy mistake. “It was a reasonable move,
although politically not a good move,” he said.

But he added with a note of irony,

“There never would have been any layoffs if the union had accepted the salary
concessions.”

The aftermath. A calm spread over the Palomino campus in the initial weeks after
the decision.

Interim President Miller departed, as the Palomino faculty awaited the

arrival of a new chief executive for which the college hired John Lacey. As president of a
large community college in the state of Washington, Lacey had experienced the problems
involved in the transition to statewide tuition, and thus was well-equipped to manage for
Palomino's forthcoming challenges.
Lacey's first test came six weeks after the board’s final retrenchment decision
when, just as the college was beginning to recover, another major crisis—the governor's
revenue veto—descended on Palomino. The estimated impact of the revenue veto on the
budget was $1.8 million. Lacey took immediate steps to reassure the community. “We' 11
come up with a plan that will do the least amount of damage,” he indicated in one of his
first interviews with the local press (Los Angeles Times. July 31, p. B -l).
Over the next several months, the college dealt with budgetary planning and
faculty contract negotiations, a process stalled since the previous spring. With the tuition
issue unresolved, and another budget deficit looming, the negotiations never got off the
ground. Both the union and the district filed unfair labor practice charges with the state
labor board (The Star-News. October 20, 1983.) How to reduce the deficit without
further alienating the faculty was the major dilemma facing Lacey. In the middle of the
standoff, Lacey took the bold and unprecedented step of taking personal charge of the
contract negotiations. Under his guidance, a compromise was finally reached in which
the college, in return for a workload concession, promised not to make a salary or fringe
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benefit reduction.

Bob Lucus, president of the faculty association, heralded the

agreement as symbolic of a new era at Palomino. “We've been at war during the last five
years. This is a sign of peace,” he said (The Star-News. December 16, 1983, p. A-l).
As the contract negotiations concluded, Lacey unveiled a plan to resolve the
budget deficit It stressed across-the-board reductions and further cuts to capital outlay,
travel, and maintenance; but it called for no further staff reductions. Lacey said he would
use college reserves to preserve faculty jobs, but garnered savings by eliminating two of
the unpopular cabinet vice presidencies that had become focus of campus discord (The
Star-News. December 9, 22, 1983).

In an article on Lacey's plan, the local press

heralded the new president as a “clearly competent administrator” (The Star-News.
February 12, 1984, p. A-l). After reaching a low of 8%, Palomino's reserves stabilized
on the Lacey plan at 11%.
As Lacey worked on Palomino's administrative problems, the district held its
1983 trustee elections. The campaign focused on the candidacies of two challengers, both
of whom were women seeking to unseat long-term male incumbents.

One of the

challengers centered her campaign around the need to bring a “feminine perspective” to
Palomino policy (The Star-News. February 12, 1984).

A corps of nursing faculty

engaged in a range of campaign activities to advance the challengers' efforts. Both were
ultimately elected (The Star-News. January 1, 1984).
As district and campus conditions improved, however, the situation in the nursing
department gradually worsened. During the summer of 1983, the department made some
short-lived gains as Munoz took an offer of money from a long-term care corporation to
fund LVN faculty salaries.

The offer was contingent on having the LVN program

reinstated and the department's success in locating matching funds. By August, Munoz
had a total of $113,000 in grants, and an agreement from district officials to rescind the
termination of the LVN program. With that, she rehired four faculty members.

In an

article featuring the nursing program director’s picture, the local press attributed the
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turnaround to Munoz's personal efforts (The Star-News. August 26, 1983). Even press
accolades, however, failed to change the attitudes of some members of the nursing faculty
who continued to be harshly critical of Munoz. “They needed somewhere to put their
anger,” explained Silvers.
In the fall of 1983, student applications to the nursing department took a sudden
and unexplained plunge. An apparent explanation was discovered on the editorial page of
The Star-News where members found a letter to the editor indicating that the Palomino
nursing department had closed. The faculty concluded that the public was confused about
the status of the department

Members took immediate steps to correct the situation.

They wrote their own letter to paper to correct the misinformation and placed a large ad in
The Star-News for the department The ad was financed with personal contributions and
donations solicited from faculty in the life sciences.
Despite those actions, student applications continued to dwindle.

Munoz

proposed a recruitment program, but her teachers viewed the enrollment situation as
temporary. In fact it reflected a decline in the regional job market for nurses (Morse,
1987), but that was not clear at the time.
By the spring, it was clear that nursing’s 1984 fall enrollment would be
decreased.

Based on projected needs, Lacey decided to dismiss the rehired faculty.

Members of the department however, resented the decision. Although some recognized
it as an administrative necessity, others, critical of Munoz, attributed the decision to a lack
of leadership on Munoz’s part “Some of them would have preferred to have Kris defy
the administration,” Silvers explained.

Coincidentally, Munoz, in a gesture of

cooperative sharing, invited another faculty group to occupy space in the Paramedical
Science Building.

That reinforced as belief held by many of her critics that she was

“giving the department away.”
As the events of 1983 began to fade, a bizarre turn of events served to refocus
members on their original theory of the nursing cutbacks. Vincent Berra, who had been
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demoted in Lacey's reorganization, was about to resume teaching when he suddenly
resigned his position at Palomino. That action, as it turned out, was taken under duress.
Members discovered that Berra stood accused of making lewd and threatening phone calls
to scores of women at the college, two of whom pressed charges to which Berra pled no
contest in Palomino Municipal Court (The Weekly. September 6, 1984; The Star News.
September 7, 8, 14, 1984). A few members, including Munoz, recognized the behavior
as a symptom of enormous stress. “It was professional suicide,” Munoz said, “He just
cracked.” But others saw the revelation as confirming the nursing losses as an act of
gender bias by a “bad apple” in the Palomino upper administration.
Unfortunately, the damage to the nursing department was not repaired in the
period of this study.

After several poor job evaluations from her department peers,

Munoz retired.

Discussion

The situation at Palomino College again illustrates how institutional history and
events such as the transition to collective bargaining complicate the management of
decline.

It also shows how those complications, in conjunction with subunit internal

problems, indirectly shape the fate of nursing programs.
For several years, Palomino College struggled with economic uncertainty by
moving in the direction of ever-increasing fiscal and organizational control.

Along the

way, serious mistakes in management compounded Palomino's problems.

Most

egregious was the high-handed disregard of the top executive for existing college
structure and traditions. The animosity generated by his reorganization spilled over into
faculty contract negotiations.

That, unfortunately, established a battleground for

adversarial warfare at a time when union cooperation was essential.

McTighe (1979)

emphasized the importance of management openness and union cooperation in times of
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retrenchment

He stressed that administrators should involve unions in strategies for

coping with decline. Moriarty (1985) further described the negative consequences of a
competitive model of collective bargaining, particularly during decline, and proposed an
integrative model emphasizing win-win solutions not unlike the ones finally implemented
at Palomino.
Institutional crisis clearly shaped events for the Palomino nursing faculty. In the
fall of 1982, when it appeared that college finances were about to collapse, the executive
administration began a search for easy ways to cut costs, and found an opportunity in the
nursing department. Its large full-time faculty provided a natural and administratively
justifiable target
Faced with large scale retrenchment and termination, the Palomino nursing
faculty, established a loose coalition with its supporters in the community to promote
department interests and prevent enactment of the termination proposal.

That effort

although partially successful, was hampered by the faculty’s social dynamics, and the
management errors of a new department chairman who failed to accurately size up her
staff before imposing a new management model.

Sergiovanni and Staratt (1979)

described a “fight” profile of group dynamics, not unlike that found in the Palomino
nursing faculty, for which they recommended an autocratic style of management
Clearly, the prospect of termination exacerbated the department's internal
problems. Staw et al. (1981) described a behavioral tendency on the part of individuals,
groups, and organizations to act rigidly in the face of threat Some of the manifestations
they described were in the Palomino nursing faculty including (1) the tendency of
members to rely on old assumptions about the college in evaluating the threat of
termination to the nursing unit; (2) members’ difficulty putting together an effective
planning process; (3) their failure to grasp the administrative aspects of the situation; (4)
failure to acknowledge administrative values in the department's public testimony, and (5)
their scapegoating of the department chairperson and other personnel for the unfortunate
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situation in which they found themselves. Ironically, the department chairperson showed
herself to be more flexible than members of her staff.

Nursing Faculty Behavior at Pine Hill College f#10)

The situation at Pine Hill College illustrates how a clash in values—in this case the
educational idealism of the faculty versus the economic realism of administrators— can
complicate an institution's adaptation to decline, and lead administrators to use harsh
measures that put high-cost programs in a tenuous position. Although never targeted by
an official termination proposal, the Pine Hill nursing department did undergo a crisis of
“suggested” termination in 1983-84.

Introduction

The San Juan Community College District (SJCCD) entered the era of decline
with a rapidly growing enrollment, and a firm commitment to taking all students. Ample
reserves made it possible for officials to meet the demands of double-digit headcount
gains for three years after Proposition 13. That pattern changed when the board of
trustees elevated Richard Ruff, SJCCD business manager, to lead the district.

As

chancellor, Ruff implemented a phased-in, three-year cutback program to stop the drain
on district reserves. Among other measures, his plan called for increases in instructional
productivity. In accord, Pine Hill executives set drastic new productivity criteria for
college subunits to meet or risk the possibility of termination. At several critical points,
an internal coalition of faculty and middle managers worked to bolster the position of the
nursing department—temporarily weakened by a lapse of unit.
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Background
Pine Hill College, one of two institutions in the San Juan Community College
District (SJCCD), serves a large suburban community in California's central coastal
region where local industry is heavily oriented toward technology. In response to local
needs, the district established Pine Hill College in 1975 as a forward-looking institution
of moderate size.

The college is unique for its innovative structural plan grouping

academic departments into a number of multi-disciplinary centers each of which features a
vocational core, and for the emphasis it puts on democratic ideals in a system of facultyelected middle managers. The San Juan Community College District of which Pine Hill is
a part is governed by a five-member board of trustees.
The Pine Hill nursing program, an RN nursing program serving the needs of a
two-district region, was moved from San Juan City College, Pine Hill's sister college, in
1975 to become part of the Center for Nursing, Mathematics, and the Physical Sciences at
Pine Hill. It maintains a strong reputation for educational excellence and community
service.

A large program in a mid-size college, its 10 full-time faculty members

comprised, at the rime of this study, 10% of Pine Hill's contract faculty.

Transition to decline. An enormous reserve fund ($14 million in a $27 million
budget—54% ARP) and generous state bail-out softened the initial impact of tax limitation
on the San Juan district (The Mercury News. August 22, 1984). That enabled Chancellor
Joseph Deming, a man known for his educational idealism, to continue funding district
programs on a business-as-usual basis. After Proposition 13 passed, however, changes
in district politics forced a turnover in the leadership of the district A serious rift, which
developed between Deming and W.J. Harry, an outspoken member of the board of
trustees, led to the change. While Deming emphasized instructional quality, Harry, a
businessman, preferred that district decisions be made on a strict cost-accounting basis.
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As tax-Iimitation approached, Harry became adamant about fiscal accountability.
Deming's educational perspective prevailed until the trustee elections of 1979 when two
new trustees were elected to the SJCCD board. Thereafter, it lost ground to the more
business-oriented outlook of Harry and the new trustees. When, coincidentally, leaders
of the CTA-affiliated faculty association became disgruntled over the faculty contract and
withdrew their support from Deming, Harry used his influence to push for a change in
leadership. Powerless in the face of Harry's coalition, Deming resigned at the board's
request
To fill Deming's position, the SJCCD board promoted Dr. Richard Ruff, a man
with strong credentials in educational finance and accounting but no experience as chief
executive. A tough-minded manager, Ruff had a reputation among the faculty as a “no”
man for the strict spending policies he imposed. Ruff hired Michael Collins, who was
also economy oriented, as district business manager, and together they redirected district
policy.
The timing of these changes was propitious. Not long after Ruff assumed the
chief executive position, the state enacted AB 1369, which slashed San Juan's growth
allowance to 2.5% of its 1980-81 ADA totals (The Mercury News. January 22, 1982).
The district continued to fund growth, but in 1981-82, as enrollment, driven by an influx
of Asian immigrants, jumped 18%, the drain on district reserves—$4 million in a single
year-reached runaway proportions (The Mercury News. January 22, 1982). Facing the
likelihood of similar deficits in the future, district officials decided to change course, and,
in 1982 ratified a new limited-enrollment policy. Ruff blamed the state's funding policy
when he announced to the press that it would be necessary “at some point in the next two
years” to reduce district attendance (The Mercury News. January, 22, 1982, p. IB).
In the fall of 1982, the SJCCD embarked on a plan of sequenced program
reductions. Ben Carr, Pine Hill College provost, explained the plan as a matter of fiscal
necessity. “We had to start doing reductions to live within what the state was giving us,
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but we staged it over a three-year period to ease the impact.” The initial steps centered on
closing nonessential satellite centers and the SJCCD's underused Milpoco campus, but
included other economies such as support service cuts, personnel reductions, a salary
freeze for certain groups. Ruff and Collins exempted the faculty from the salary freeze,
however, an adroit move that placated the faculty union.

The impact of resource decline at Pine Hill. The initial impact of Proposition 13 at
Pine Hill was minimal. For the first two years the college made few alterations to its
instructional program, an achievement attributed by faculty interviewees to the
management of Dr. David Stoller, Pine Hill president Indeed, Stoller, who was well
regarded by the faculty, dedicated himself to saving instructional programs.

“Our

president cut everything a little so that when things got better, there would be programs in
place to rebuild,” explained one interviewee.
Under Stoller's management the nursing department experienced only minor
inconveniences. According to faculty interviewees, the unit's capital outlay was reduced,
but little else changed. Eve Landow, the acting program director in 1982-83, described
the situation. “Proposition 13 didn't impact the college much at first—and certainly not the
nursing department We had a lot of support from the administration.”
That picture changed in 1982-83 when Stoller came under pressure from the
district office to improve Pine Hill's instructional productivity. Encouraged by the district
to terminate low-WSCH units such as nursing, Stoller instead impaneled an in-house task
force to do a comprehensive study of Pine Hill's programs.

Stoller believed in the

benefits of faculty involvement, and therefore initiated what he referred to as a
“quadripartite process” in which he brought together representatives from four college
constituencies—students, administration, faculty and classified.

“When you involve

people,” he explained, “it usually helps to make the effects of cutting back less violent on
the entire campus.”
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Stoller appointed Landow, the acting nursing director, and Randy Beckett, a
counselor serving as administrative coordinator for the nursing center, to represent
nursing on the task force.

These appointments were important.

Not only had the

chancellor singled nursing out for possible reductions, but that year the department had no
permanent director. Dr. Joan Bullock, its long-time director had become ill and taken a
leave of absence. That left Landow, the associate director to cope with the problems of
the department, which included a scheduled accreditation visit Unfortunately, she lacked
the skills for the job. Landow immersed herself in the accreditation process, and ignored
what was happening outside of the department As a member of her faculty noted, “Eve
would have been fine if things hadn't been changing—she wasn't aware of what was
going on in the college.”
Thus, Landow left the program review to Beckett Beckett, as center coordinator
was attuned to district developments and eagerly took on the task. He admired Bullock,
and had a special affinity for the nursing department. “It was Joan who encouraged me to
run for the coordinator position. When she got sick, I felt responsible for the program,”
Beckett explained to the researcher.
Beckett involved the nursing faculty in the department’s self-study. Together,
they devised an approach not unlike the one used at Arroyo College to document the
indirect ADA that nursing student's contributed to other departments. Members went to
Pine Hill's general education classrooms to count the nursing students taking nonnursing
courses. At the same time, they surveyed the students to assess nursing’s strength as a
student attraction, and gathered affidavits from local hospital executives on local job
availability and the demand for program graduates. They recognized that the study was
important. As one faculty member put it, “We knew we looked bad on paper.”
The data, compiled from more than 700 students, showed that nursing was a
major ADA producer and major attraction to the Pine Hill campus. It also showed that the
local need for nurses had softened somewhat but remained strong. The data gathering
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effort had a downside, however, and damaged nursing's campus relations. Mary Biggs,
a nursing member, commented, “There were people in the general faculty who saw the
survey as a threat. They knew somebody was going to be cut!” Beckett submitted the
data to the review committee.

The 1982-83 board decision. Early in the spring of 1983, Ruff announced an
impending $2 million shortfall. The chancellor indicated that balancing the deficit would
require program cuts at the district’s major campuses, and again singled out nursing, this
time publicly. “Although it is not clear which fields of study will be hit hardest,” he told
the press, “nursing and engineering technology are proposed for program reductions”
(The Mercury News. February 4, 1983, p. A-l). Coincidentally, Bullock succumbed to
her terminal disease, and died.
Within weeks, the Pine Hill task force met to make its final recommendations. At
175 WSCH, a figure far below the district’s 420 WSCH average, the committee found
the nursing department insufficiently productive, but noted its vitality, well document in
the self-study, and it did not recommend termination. Based the committee's findings,
Stoller accepted the recommendation and passed it on to Ruff, who put nursing on the
“cutlist” presented to the board.
At that point, Landow awakened to the threat these developments posed.

On

learning about Ruffs action, she made a last-minute, behind-the-scene effort to prevent a
cutback, and called Bonna Wainwright, the president of the SJCCD board of trustees and
a practicing nurse.

Landow asked for her support.

Wainwright, however, was

noncommittal.
The board subsequendy approved Ruffs recommendation, and approved a
massive general reduction plan calling for a huge cut-back in part-time faculty for the
1983-84 academic year. As part of that plan, the trustees eliminated a number of small
academic programs, and reduced nursing by two full-time positions.

They further
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directed Landow to devise a plan for improving nursing's WSCH. There was little public
debate. As Beckett pointed out, the decisions had worked their way through the college
advisory process. “Most things that go before the board have already been decided on.
That's why it didn't develop into a floor fight,” he explained.
Members of the nursing faculty accepted the decision with equanimity. By that
time Bullock had died, and one of their peers had decided to retire. “It was a good time to
cut back,” Biggs said. In fact, compared to other departments, some of which lost
programs, members considered themselves fortunate.

“Geology lost its weather

program, and the astronomy program was canceled!” Biggs noted.
Beckett, however, had a different point of view.

He was concerned that the

district had taken advantage of nursing's temporary weakness. “It was clearly an attack
on a particularly excellent program weakened by the absence of a very powerful
personality!” he commented, in a reference to Bullock.

The search for a new nursing director. Shortly after the board's decision, an
opportunity to rectify the leadership problem in nursing presented itself when Provost
Carr asked Beckett to organize a committee to find a new director.

For the sake of

economy, they agreed to an “in-house” search.
Beckett set out to find qualified people to sit on the search committee, and looked
for individuals whose judgment and opinions carried authority in the college. Beckett
handpicked four teachers from Pine Hill's science departments, all faculty leaders in their
own right His choices included Tom Ravin, biology center coordinator, and three other
teachers known for their professionalism, all of whom not by accident shared Beckett's
concern for preserving the nursing program.
Beckett was aware of the pitfalls of promoting from within, “I knew very well that
the wrong director might cause so much dissension in the nursing faculty that the program
would collapse internally.” His committee reviewed three applications, and recommended
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Carla Conner, a seasoned teacher well-liked by her department peers.

Among other

qualifications, Conner had years of experience as an officer of the California Nurses'
Association, and, in that capacity as a player in state politics.

Beckett admitted that

Conner's experience was a factor in the committee's deliberations. “Carla had all the
important points--it was clear she was a fighter,” he noted. Conner's appointment was
approved by the college administration.
Faculty action on the nursing WSCH plan stalled during the search. “Everyone
was involved with accreditation,” Landow noted. Landow acknowledged, however, that
her faculty felt little urgency. “There was no crisis that spring. That didn’t develop until
the fall term,” she said.

The 1983-84 crisis. At some point during the spring semester, SJCCD officials
recognized that the revenue decline was going to continue to outpace their efforts to
economize. Their projections pointed to a $1.5 million shortfall for 1984-85, even with
the proposed cuts in part-time faculty which numbered 150 teachers, and which promised
to contribute to larger deficits over the long term (The Mercury News. February 4, 1983).
In April, however, the situation appeared improved when CPEC altered its position on
initiating tuition. The district officials decided to push back the April registration to July
to avoid the need to re-register students.
By late June, however, the governor and legislature were still at odds over tuition,
which contributed to a delay in the approval of the state budget (Los Angeles Times. June
24, July 15, 1983). As the July registration concluded, SJCCD administrators noted a
sharp enrollment d ro p -11%-- which they publicly attributed to the course section cuts,
and the local confusion over state tuition policy (The Mercury News. October 20, 1983).
That was followed in late July by the governor’s revenue veto which effectively froze the
SJCCD’s fall revenue. Although serious, the situation of the SJCCD was far from
desperate-the district had $7 million in cash reserves and expendable real assets worth
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another $18 million. Nevertheless, the chancellor directed college executives to come up
with another $3 million in cuts.
The result was a full-blown organizational crisis. Asked to trim $1.7 million from
his budget, George Margolis, president of San Juan City College said publicly, “A $ 1.7
million budget cut is not a reduction, it's a plan for disaster'’ (The Mercury News.
October 20, 1983, p. IB).
After the announcement, Ruff convened upper and middle level managers for a
series of emergency meetings the agenda for which was to formulate strategies for
preventing fiscal disaster. Among other measures, the administrators considered program
terminations and personnel layoffs, but also another option which they referred to as a
“WSCH contract” system. That option focused on improving instructional productivity.
According to Beckett, the message in the meetings was direct and clear. “The
district office basically said, 'You've got to cut by this much. Where you cut is up to
you, but we recommend you eliminate the nursing program."* Ravin confirmed his story.
“We were told several times and in so many words that areas low in WSCH production
might be necessary to eliminate.”
Beckett and Ravin agreed to a mutual-help strategy. “A group of us felt it was
wise to try to protect the nursing program in view of the threats,” Ravin explained.
Ravin's interest in nursing was to maintain it as a feeder program for biology. As a center
coordinator, he was acutely aware of the economic interdependence of biology and
nursing, and he recognized that part-time staff reductions, which had been heavy in the
sciences, exposed his faculty to the possibility of layoffs.

The campus reaction. When school reopened in the fall, a compromise on tuition
had yet to be reached, which, added to the previous stresses, took a serious toll on faculty
morale. An atmosphere of crisis prevailed under which old rumors gained new life.
Stories circulated about the direction further budget cuts might take.

Indeed, faculty
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groups on both campuses feared a scenario in which numbers of instructional programs
and faculty jobs would be lost. At Pine Hill, the competition for funding continued to
grow. Unit-level administrators had begun undercutting one another as they positioned
their departments for the survival battle ahead.
During this period, the academic senates, historically strong, provided the main
forums for faculty discourse on the situation. Indeed, the senates overshadowed the
faculty association which played almost no role in the situation. “What could they do?” a
faculty interviewee asked. Throughout the fall, the debate centered on how to protect
instructional quality from the upcoming cutbacks. Senate leaders made repeated appeals
to district officials to include them in district decisions. Ruff responded by inviting the
senates to select representatives to sit on a newly formed budget reduction committee,
which he set up to make recommendations for another round of cutbacks.

Pressure for productivity, the 1983-84 academic year was tumultuous. Faculty
tensions escalated over the course of the fall. The main source of pressure turned out to
be the WSCH contract system under which department faculties were asked to voluntarily
increase their WSCH per FTE levels by whatever means they could. College executives
pushed the plan as voluntary, but they also referred to it as a way to “save” programs,
which members of the faculty interpreted as a veiled threat. Indeed, many groups came to
view the program as a form of coercion, and reacted with suspicion. Thus, although the
plan on its face had practical merit, the social climate was not conducive to its
implementation, and the tension mounted.
In November, the SJCCD held its district trustee elections.

Local interest,

galvanized by the tuition issue, was high. Five candidates challenged the four incumbents
up for reelection that year. The main election issues were (1) district priorities, whether
academic or economic, and (2) the use of SJCCD reserves (The Mercury News.
November 5, 1983). The latter was especially controversial. Although district reserves
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were down substantially, at 22% they remained high by comparison to other institutions.
Charlene Bowers, a librarian for the K-12 district, opposed W.J. Harry with a platform
that stressed the need to preserve educational quality. “I am concerned that educational
priorities for the student will not remain as the primary goal,” she said in a press interview
(The Mercury News. November 5, 1983, p. 5B).
Chancellor Ruff used the election press coverage to remind voters of the continued
need for economy. “The new board must decide on cuts for 1985-85 that could be as
high as $3.3 million,” he said, “Programs that are expensive to operate, such as nursing,
drama, electronics, and athletics are likely candidates for future budget cuts” (The
Mercury News. November 5, 1983, p. 4B). Bowers unseated Harry.
As the end of the fall semester approached, the SJCCD took another step toward
restoring fiscal balance and prepared to sell its 122 acre Milpoco campus property. “The
well is now dry,” Ruff told the press (The Mercury News. December 29, 1983, p. 3B).
As part of an overall plan, he Recommended another $2.4 million spending reduction,
and proposed to layoff six counselors and four tenured faculty members, and terminate
several small programs including diesel technology (The Mercury News. January 18,
1984).

The Political Behavior of the Nursing Faculty

Early in the fall of 1983, Pine Hill executives Stoller and Carr conducted a series
of center visits in which they met with many faculty groups, including the nursing
faculty. Their purpose was to emphasize the urgency of increasing subunit WSCH. With
the nursing faculty, the president and provost were particularly emphatic. Stoller, in a
dramatic departure from his usual reassuring style, suggested to the teachers that nursing
might well be a target for termination, if they failed to increase its WSCH.
The group was stunned.

Caught completely offguard, the faculty reminded
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Stoller about the unit's achievements, and went on at length about how the program was
important to the community and benefited the college. Stoller and Carr, however, were
unmoved. “We can't guarantee what will happen if you aren't able to get your average
up,” Conner recalled Stoller saying.

Stoller announced a new productivity target—300

WSCH per FTE—the break even point for covering unit salaries, and asked the members
to cooperate by doing what they could to meet the target
Members of the group were frightened by the sudden change in Stoller. As Biggs
noted, “We didn't know where he stood~it seemed like he wanted to get rid of the
program,” Fearing that he did, the faculty made immediate plans to comply. “A lot of
people left the meeting thinking they better start looking for a new position,” said Biggs.
With their administrative support in question, Conner and Beckett decided to go
directly to the chancellor, and asked Linda Morrison, the new assistant nursing director,
to accompany them.

As the most junior member of the nursing faculty, Morrison

recognized that her job was at risk, and was therefore eager to go.
The three conferred with Ruff some days later. During the meeting they made
arguments for keeping the program based largely on quality. To their chagrin, Ruff
seemed unpersuaded, and brushed off their arguments. “How can we justify a 1:10
teaching ratio under these economic circumstances?!” he challenged. They concluded that
Ruff was looking at the nursing department solely from the standpoint of c o st “We had
this interesting situation, where, instructionally, we had achieved a very successful
program, but the district office didn’t see things in the same light—it was very
disillusioning,” Beckett observed. Having gained no assurances, they left convinced that
they would have to come up with a budgetary justification for the program.
Thereafter, Conner, Morrison, and Beckett worked with several members of the
science faculty. Their purpose was to bolster nursing's position in the college. Beckett
acted as a liaison between the science and nursing departments, and put together a loose
coalidon that used a crisis management model to deal with important developments in the
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college and district

The action took place on several levels—within the nursing

department; within the college administrative hierarchy and advisory bodies; and in the
public forum of the board of trustees.
A major goal in nursing was to comply with the department's WSCH target
Conner and Morrison set up a task group comprised of the entire nursing faculty. Its job
was to look for ways to increase unit WSCH. The group looked for a plan that would not
substantially alter the program's structure or department routines. After numerous brain
storming sessions, they settled on a set of curriculum changes described by members as
“paper changes,” changes with little actual impact on instruction.

It was to remove

smaller content tracts-nutrition and pharmacology to name two—from larger nursing
courses and assign them separate course numbers and credit units.

The group also

decided to modify a nursing trends course to appeal to pre-nursing students, which was a
sizable population the department had not tapped. They allocated credits for student hours
spent in the media laboratory, made a marginal upward adjustment in the clinical teaching
ratio, and added a new computers in health care course to the curriculum, all of which
were calculated to move nursing’s WSCH average closer to the 300 target
The group met frequently to finish their work by the November deadline. Work
sessions were concentrated and intense, but provided time to talk about issues and events.
Morrison used the opportunity to update the group on events in the college and district
Few members were active in campus affairs, and she worried that they would revert to the
complacency they sometimes displayed. “Half of them didn't understand what was going
on in the district as far as the competition for funding was concerned.” she explained to
the researcher.
While the nursing faculty worked on their program, Beckett's coalition labored to
defend the unit against the competitive infighting going on in the college.

Conner,

Beckett, and Morrison each took on important roles.
Conner's role was to defend nursing during regular administrative meetings. Her
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strategy was to fend off the challenges made by her administrative superiors with counter
arguments and challenges of her own. Some of her superiors, Carr for example, seemed
to favor further nursing reductions. Her response was to describe the disorganization that
would occur if further nursing cutbacks were made. She also emphasized the economic
links between nursing and other Pine Hill units.

“The nursing department is not a

separate entity. It is an integral part of the college. We all share the same students!” she
often argued in her meetings with Carr and others.
Conner did not restrict herself to defending the unit, but applied pressure of her
own in the area o f funding. She directly confronted, for example, the issue of VEA
funds—funds to which nursing was entitled but did not receive. “I became aware of the
voc ed funds that got swallowed up on this campus,” she recalled, “and I asked Carr and
Stoller, 'Doesn't nursing come in under VEA?' and they said, 'Oh, well, yes nurs;ng
does.'"
Her purpose was to stave off further economic pressure from the administration.
“If push ever came to shove,” she said, “they knew we had a viable program, and they
knew I knew they were getting voc ed funds to the tune of $350,000!” Conner enjoyed
the give and take in such interchanges, but was careful to weave in expressions of
support. “I always let them know I knew their problems were coming from the state, and
they were just doing their job,” she said.
Conner’s job was not always easy. Despite her years as a teacher, Conner had to
establish her authority as an administrator. Although approaching her role assertively,
she still found it necessary to cultivate her own influence by talking with her supervisors
about her experiences in state politics. “State politicians are very instrumental in this
district—people here listen to them. I knew them all, so I let Ruff and the others know I
was active at the state level-that got their attention!” Conner complained about her
treatment, however. “I got tired of being treated like a little girl!” she lamented.
Beckett and Ravin did the job of trouble-shooting in center coordinator meetings.
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They defended nursing from the challenges of other departments which grew more
frequent as the fall semester wore on. Shortly after the initiation of the WSCH contract
program, the competition for funding took off.

The center coordinators began to

scrutinize each other’s budgets. George West, a humanities coordinator who was known
to influence Provost Carr, began making regular references to nursing's high-cost and
economic inefficiency. West was upset

With the reduction of part-time faculty, his

center had sustained a heavy loss of class sections. He wanted the college to terminate
nursing and redirect the savings to his center. Beckett and Ravin met his challenge,
however, by using nursing’s WSCH data to counter the West's offense. Over and over,
they emphasized the economic links between nursing and other departments, citing the
ADA figures derived from nursing's self study. As Ravin noted, “In all sorts of ways we
assaulted the idea that closing nursing would solve the college's financial problems!”
Morrison centered her action in the academic senate and district budget reduction
committee. She used the senate as a forum to educate the Pine Hill general faculty on the
cost of nursing education, and the reasons nursing was expensive.

She talked, for

example, about the low clinical-teaching ratio, and to help her case, invited the officers of
the senate to visit a clinical laboratory. Morrison promoted nursing’s WSCH plan in the
senate forum, making an articulate case using WSCH survey data for nursing’s value as a
college attraction and source of revenue to other departments.
Morrison made another important contribution, however, as a member of the
budget reduction committee established by Chancellor Ruff.

Her appointment to the

committee was expedited by Beckett and Ravin. They recognized the value of having a
direct voice in district policy-making and worked behind the scenes to see that Morrison
got a seat on the committee. Beckett and Ravin wanted to prevent the seat from going to
anyone who might have a competing agenda.
Morrison's appointment proved to be an important tactical measure. Chaired by
Collins, the district budget manager, the purpose of the committee was to establish the
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advisory recommendations on which the fate of district programs, in particular the highWSCH programs might well rest The committee reviewed academic offerings, including
nursing, at Pine Hill and its sister campus, and evaluated the WSCH productivity
proposals submitted by their faculties.
Morrison used the opportunity to advance nursing’s WSCH plan through the
committee. As she sat through early meetings, she gained insights on the importance of
protocol, and the value of framing proposals in the proper format and terminology. She
learned that plans poorly conceived, or presented in the wrong format, often were
disregarded.

Those insights helped her to tailor her own effort to administrative

expectations. Before nursing's hearing, Morrison realized that the task of finalizing
nursing’s plan would be hers. Concerned, she arranged to see Collins, and from him
learned how to assign credit units to the various elements of the proposal. Together, they
put the plan in form in order to demonstrate that it met the 300 WSCH per FTE target.
The benefits were considerable. Not only was the proposal ready for presentation, but
Morrison had gained Collins’ support for the plan. The committee recommended the
nursing WSCA proposal for approval.
The local hospitals did not factor into the coalition's strategy. By the fall of 1983,
the acute-care facilities in the local area were encountering financial difficulties of thenown, as evidenced in the fact that Conner's efforts, to obtain grant money from them
failed. Conner also sought support for the community college issue from the CNA but
was likewise unsuccessful. An officer of the CNA, she knew its entry-to-practice policy
conflicted with the interests of community college nursing programs. “Its depressing to
know that your own professional organization doesn't care,” she said. She used her
CNA-related legislative activities, however, to draw attention to the problems of the
community colleges and associate degree nursing education.

The final decision. The policy climax came at the regular meeting of the SJCCD
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board of trustees held December 6, 1983. At the request of the Pine Hill Academic
Senate, the board of trustees agreed to devote its agenda to the issue of program cuts at
Pine Hill College.
The meeting was an important event. The coalition prepared for it by holding
advance conferences with members of the SJCCD Board of Trustees. Given the local
decline in job availability, Conner feared that President Wainwright might lean toward
additional nursing cuts. She and Beckett therefore arranged a series of conferences with
Wainwright and other members of the board, in which they stressed the economic
themes, and nursing's WSCH proposal. The trustees gave no assurances.
More than a third of the Pine Hill faculty attended the December 6 board meeting.
Numerous teachers from the sciences spoke on behalf of nursing, however, Conner and
Beckett were the primary spokespersons for the department

Conner highlighted the

survey findings and WSCH proposal; Beckett stressed a need to preserve the specialized
expertise of the faculty. Further downsizing, he said, would reduce the ability of the
faculty to provide up-to-date technical instruction in all areas of the curriculum.
The board took no action that evening.

However, two weeks later, Ruff

recommended that the district accept Pine Hill's “cutlist” The list did not include nursing
(The Mercury News. December 29, 1983). From that point on, Ruff made no further
references to reducing the nursing department

The aftermath. Late in January, the state legislature reached an accord on tuition.
Ruff returned to the board with a revised budget plan, however, his new recommendation
still included the controversial layoffs. At that point a social crisis erupted. Meetings of
the board became the forum for faculty outrage as the faculty mood transformed from
anxious skepticism into open hostility. In a series of meetings, a stream of irate teachers
lashed out at the WSCH contract system which drew especially heavy criticism for the
way in which it was implemented. .Several members of the faculty, including the director
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of the about-to-be-terminated diesel tech program, came forward to publicly proclaim they
had been coerced into participating in Ruffs plan. Ruff denied the charges (The Mercury
News. January 25, February 1, 1984).
The officers of the academic senates made repeated appeals to the officials to avoid
layoffs at all costs, and maintain operations using the district's reserves-they wanted the
proceeds from the Milpoco sale to go for faculty salaries. The debate over that issue,
however, revealed a schism on the board. Trustees Wainwright and Bowers sided with
the faculty and rejected Ruffs layoff proposal. “I don't like to see the education process
impinged; I would hate to see it destroyed,” Bowers said (The Mercury News. February
9, 1984, p. 5B).
In May, the academic senates, using funds collected by a voluntary faculty fund
raising organization, hired an outside accountant to conduct an independent study of the
district budget The analyst found the district to be in sound financial condition (The
Metcurv News. May 23, 1984).

The SJCCD board agreed to review the analysts

findings, but in August, as enrollment took an upward swing, the trustees approved
Ruffs personnel reductions in a 3:2 vote (The Mercury News. August 22, 1984).

In

taking that action, the board acknowledged a need for greater communication in budget
planning. The following year, 1984-85, district reserves reached a low of nine percent.
During the spring semester, as crisis-social and economic-overtook the district,
the nursing department quietly focused on implementing its WSCH proposal. The going
was not all smooth. At mid-semester, the secretary of the department terminated her
employment. With admissions underway, her departure had an immediate disorganizing
effect on the program. Conner and Beckett appealed for a replacement, but Carr, Stoller,
and Ruff, all declined, citing the district's hiring freeze policy as their reason.
By the fall semester, 1984, however, it was clear that the unit could not continue
without secretarial assistance. Conner and Beckett took the controversial step of taking
the personnel issue to the board of trustees. There Conner distributed a fact sheet spelling
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out the cost and benefits of their request “Given the district's economic problems,” she
explained, “Dr. Ruff couldn't in good conscience approve my request I hope you'll find
it worthy of another consideration.” After a heated discussion in which several trustees
expressed their concern for the welfare of the department the board approved not the
half-time position requested, but a permanent full-time position.
Though successful, the action violated the SJCCD's hierarchical protocol. It drew
disapproval from several members of Pine Hill's middle management including Ravin
who expressed dismay. “I guess if the chancellor had indicated to me that there w asn't
money—I would not want to go beyond that point” Ravin said.
Beckett declined to discuss the strategy. “I prefer not to tell you how we got the
secretary—it required a somewhat devious means,” he said to the researcher. Conner,
however, talked freely about the action which she believed strengthened her position with
the chancellor. Indeed, she reported that Ruff thereafter made public references to her as
“one of those people who knows how to work the system.”

When asked what she

thought he meant, Connor said, “I think he meant that I know who to talk to, and—you
know—when to put on a little pressure.”
Overall, the members of the nursing faculty viewed their effort as highly
successful. Stoller agreed. Indeed, in an interview with the researcher, he restated one of
the themes often repeated by the internal coalition. “Nursing students are an integral part
of our college,” he said, “if we dropped that program, it would affect a host of others.”
Stoller stressed the department’s use of the formal advisory structure. “The decision was
mine, but the recommendation came through the college process, and that's important.”
Carr, however, added another perspective.

“Our objective was never to close the

program, but to encourage nursing through whatever device was legal to increase its
WSCH.”
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The case study at Fine Hill College illustrates how the mere threat of harsh
strategies by those in authority can lead to intense, self-protective behavior on the part of a
faculty. Professional idealism and shared governance were well-established aspects of
the decision culture in the SJCCD. However, the values of the administration were in
conflict with those of the faculty. Indeed, the faculty was willing to exhaust district
reserves to spare teaching jobs and instructional programs. Its idealism put it at odds with
district administrators who were trying to redirect district priorities and ground district
policy on economic realism.
Unlike some other colleges, the decision culture at Pine Hill supported policy
input from campus constituencies. Pine Hill executives, for example, involved campus
groups in retrenchment planning-an action experts recommend (Deutsch, 1983;
Gumport, 1993, May-June; Hannan and Freeman, 1988; Lewis and Logalbo, 1980; Me
Tighe, 1979; Powers, 1982). But when the financial situation deteriorated, they resorted
to coercion, albeit a subtle form, to elicit cooperation for the district's turnaround plan. In
doing so, they undermined one of their most important resources, faculty good will.
Biller (1980) advised against the use of tactical threats as a cutback strategy, pointing out
that coercion fosters conflict between potential winners and losers, which is what
happened at Pine Hill, where the social effect was extremely negative.
The nursing faculty was a prime target of the coercion strategy.

Absent the

stabilizing influence of a permanent director, the group was slow to respond to district
events. For months, its members underestimated the growing threat to their unit, but
responded to prompting by a concerned middle manager. The group was assisted by an
internal alliance of middle managers and science faculty who clearly recognized the threat
to nursing and wanted to prevent cutbacks in their own units. Here, the Pine Hill group
had an advantage over other nursing faculties in this study.

It benefited from an
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institutional structure which nurtured a sensitivity to the interdependence of college
subunits not found at other colleges. As a result, members of the nursing faculty did not
have to struggle for assistance; it was offered.
Several benefits flowed to nursing from its alliance. Nursing gained access, for
example, to a critical advisory committee which proved central to its policy success, and
also enjoyed the advocacy of campus leaders who wanted to see the program preserved.
Despite the pressure brought to bear by district and college administrators, the nursing
faculty made effective use of its resources with a complex strategy that included
complying with the executive demand while co-opting challenges to its status in the
college. The outcome was a successful resolution of the termination threat.
Throughout the crisis, the leadership of the center coordinator and new nursing
director was important The center coordinator recognized the need for a strong program
director, and picked one comfortable with the give and take of the play of power in the
institution. The new director, for her part successfully exerted control in her day-to-day
interchanges with her superiors.

A risk-taker, she recognized the importance of

supporting her opponents while challenging them, but was confident enough of her own
political skill to apply pressure in the interest of her department. In the end, the trustees
expressed support not only for the program, but for her leadership as well.
With the resolution of the state tuition issue, the economic necessity for district
layoffs and program closures faded, and with it, faculty support for cutbacks.

The

officials of the SJCCD continued to press for greater efficiency, but in their exhausted the
last vestiges of faculty good will.

In the end, some departments not as successful as

nursing in managing the challenges of the district's turnaround strategy lost jobs and
programs.
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Nursing Faculty Behavior in the Los Angeles Community College District

(Nos, .2, .22,28, 38)

The case of the Los Angeles Community College District (LACCD) illustrates
how a series of management errors and political miscalculations can compound the forces
of decline to push a huge public entity to the brink of bankruptcy. In a desperate search
for fiscal solutions, administrators turned their attention to nursing, where, ironically,
years of stable enrollment rendered the district's eight programs attractive as a target for
downsizing and termination.

Introduction

In early February of 1986, the board of trustees of the Los Angeles Community
College District (LACCD) announced a plan to close two nursing programs and layoff 20
full-time nursing instructors. Part of a general RIF and curriculum restructuring effort
requested by Chancellor Leland Kolford, this plan was billed not as a cost-cutting
measure, but as a means to rebuild district enrollment which had declined drastically over
a period of years. Coming at a time when the district had been forced to borrow money,
however, the move was widely regarded as a reaction to budget crisis.
To preserve nursing programs and jobs, nursing faculty members from each of
the eight programs organized an ad hoc coalition dedicated to preventing the district from
enacting its policy. They worked together with other organized groups in an all-out
grass-roots effort to bring local and state pressure to bear on the district In the end, they
managed to prevent instructor layoffs in nursing, but failed to stop the district from
implementing the designated nursing program closures.
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Background
The Los Angeles Community College District (LACCD), situated in the Los
Angeles Basin and San Fernando Valley, is a vast entity which spans some 882 square
miles and encompasses not only the city of Los Angeles, but a number of separately
incorporated cities and unincorporated areas of Los Angeles County as well. At the time
of this study, it had a resident population of over 4.3 million people.
The LACCD is not only vast, but diverse, due largely to the area's explosive
growth and post-World War II population trends. Thus, the communities making up the
LACCD differ in size and population density, in culture and commerce, in racial and
ethnic makeup, and the wealth of their inhabitants. In some cases, these differences are
extreme. For example, in the early 1980s the median income of the heavily minoritybased inner city population was $11,000, while that of the mostly-white suburban
communities was over $30,000 (Avila and Stevens, 1984).
The diversity of the LACCD is likewise apparent in the district's nine colleges,
each of which has a defined service area to meet the needs of local residents.

L.A.

Central, Midtown, Metro, and Industry Colleges, for example, serve the central city; L.A.
Channel College serves the port and peninsula area; L.A. Coast College serves western
Los Angeles, while L.A. Hills, Canyon, and River Colleges serve the San Fernando
Valley. These units, which at the time of this study varied in size from less than 5,000
students to over 20,000 students, all have unique identities derived from the changing
needs of their surrounding communities.
The LACCD is complex in its bureaucratic and political structure. Major policy
decisions, as in all districts, are made by the board of trustees according to the provisions
of district contracts and the California Education Code. Similar to other multi-college
districts, the LACCD has a centralized district administration. Located for many years in
the heart of downtown Los Angeles, its offices provide important services colleges such
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as data processing, budgeting, and personnel management to district colleges, and house
the chambers of the district's seven member board of trustees.
Although similar in many ways, the LACCD nevertheless differs from other
districts in two outstanding respects—size and power. The LACCD is by far the largest
community college district in California, its headcount equivalent to 10% of the total state
enrollment, and it is the biggest consumer of resources (Avila and Stevens, 1984).
Further, its boundaries encompass more than a fourth of California's state legislative
districts (Hoeber, 1983).

This gives the LACCD greater representation in the state

legislature than other districts enjoy, and greater authority over the state decisions that
determine community college policy. Indeed, it was not uncommon at the time of this
study for LACCD officials to pursue legislative solutions to local problems.
The LACCD's size is reflected in its staffing.

To accommodate its huge

enrollment--the headcount peaked at 137,000 in 1981-82-the district maintains a very
large teaching and ancillary staff. Indeed, at the time of this study, the faculty numbered
more than 3,400 certificated teachers, half of whom had fidl-time positions (Tyre, 1986).
The faculty is supervised by the chancellor and vice chancellors at the district level, and
by the nine college presidents, numerous vice presidents and the legions of middle
managers that comprise local college administration.
Although historically centralized, the administration of the LACCD became even
more centrally concentrated in the aftermath of tax limitation.

As funding declined,

district administrators focused on the replication of programs in the district as a cause of
inefficiency. Thus, in 1982, they expanded the functions of the district office to include
planning. The new system, which featured a central planning unit, gradually supplanted
local control. Administration at the college level thereafter took on the character of line
management as its planning authority was usurped.
The LACCD’s nursing programs exemplified the program proliferation that
occurred under local planning. Established and accredited as separate units over a period
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of thirty years, they numbered eight at the time of this study, and varied in their
curriculum organization and philosophy.

Under Kolford's restructuring plan, two

programs were slated for closure.

The 1985-86 crisis. In 1985-86, the LACCD, having exhausted its cash reserves,
found itself facing huge budget deficit projections and owing millions of dollars to the
state.

This unfortunate financial predicament, according to numerous interviewees,

derived from local mismanagement and the conditions created by state tuition policy. In
fact, there were additional factors, some held in common with other districts, others
peculiar to the LACCD's own history. Poor local planning, for example, compounded by
the unique state-local political dynamics surrounding LACCD finances, put a costly drain
on district resources that was unmatched in other districts.
The 1985-86 crisis had roots in the decade preceding Proposition 13—a time when
the LACCD pursued a policy of aggressive expansion. Between 1964, when the LACCD
separated from the Los Angeles Unified District, and 1978, when tax limitation was
approved, the LACCD added three new campuses, opened numerous satellite facilities
and outreach programs, and started a vast array of instructional programs, many designed
to appeal to student populations never before addressed by the district
Interviewees attributed this growth to the vision of Chancellor Lyle Kolford.
Kolford, who took charge in 1969, acquired a reputation as an empire builder not by
nurturing and refining old programs, but by promoting new enterprises to broaden the
scope of district operations. Under Kolford, new campuses were built but at the expense
of old facilities which went without standard amenities to help underwrite the new
development. Endorsed by the board of trustees, Kolford's priorities gave rise to a
pattern of expansion but always under conditions of austerity (Tyre, 1986).
That pattern carried over as the district prepared for Proposition 13.

In

anticipation, the LACCD drafted a series of budgets, a “business-as-usual” budget
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maintaining normal operating levels at all LACCD colleges, a “major disaster'’ budget
continuing operations at only a few colleges, and a “minor disaster" budget funding all
units at reduced service levels (LACCD, 1978).
The actual impact of Proposition 13, however, proved less severe than the worst
case anticipated. District income dropped $96 million, but a $60 million bail-out from the
state allowed the district to adopt its probable-case, reduced services plan (Koltai, 1978).
Across-the-board economies pared operations 15%, which helped to stave off an
immediate deficit (Koltai, 1978).
From the outset, LACCD officials recognized that basic changes would be
necessary. Not long after Proposition 13 passed, Kolford publicly addressed the need to
“regionalize” program planning (Koltai, 1978). After disaster was averted, however,
district officials resumed expansion, and in short order they acquired land for a new
campus at L.A. Hills, approved a new nursing program at L.A. Coast, and opened a
worldwide outreach college to serve military personnel. (The latter quickly failed at a
substantial loss to the district)
In short, the district returned to business-as-usual. That transition gave rise to a
mood of optimism expressed in the district's salary schedule. At a time when other
districts sought to impose salary freezes, the LACCD awarded substantial salary raises at
the behest of its AFL-CIO-affiliated employee unions. Faculty collective bargaining, the
advent of which preceded tax limitation by only five months, had a powerful influence on
district policy (Glass, 1989).

The first faculty contract, signed in February, 1978,

contained many costly provisions, among them parental leave, unlimited half-pay
sabbaticals, a workload-reducing FTE formula, and annual salary increments. It was the
latter that set the scene for crisis. Between 1979-80 and 1981-82, the board of trustees
increased faculty salaries 29%, and gave other employees equivalent raises to maintain
parity (Tyre, 1986).

Needless to say, those raises put an enormous strain on the

LACCD's fiscal balance (Tyre, 1986).
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Having returned to business-as-usual, LACCD officials did little to change district
management practices. Many of those practices served to amplify fiscal strain in the
LACCD, and were catalogued by the government auditors called in to assess district
operations after fiscal crisis ensued. Too numerous to detail here, examples of those
practices help to explain the 1985-86 crisis.
Audit findings showed that, among other problems, the LACCD had a weak
system of cost controls and a fragmented business services structure; it maintained an
irrational system of personnel deployment and a variable administrative structure both of
which caused wide disparities in costs, college-to-college; further, it relied on a
centralized budget planning system that used data irrelevant to post-Proposition 13 fiscal
realities. Additionally, auditors found that the district maintained no policy or procedure
manuals specific to its own fiscal operations, an oversight which perpetuated substantial
deviations from expenditure plans at the college level (Tyre, 1986).
The auditors further determined that the outlay for the district offices was
unjustified. That outlay, for prime real estate in the downtown L.A. area, amounted to $1
million in annual lease payments, and another $350,000 in annual subsidized employee
parking fees (Commission on California State Government Organization and Economy,
1986).
The most egregious practice, however, was the accounting system perpetuated by
the district which treated all nine colleges as a fiscal aggregate. That system, according to
the auditors, failed to track subunit revenues or expenditures, and thus created few
incentives for subunits to improve efficiency.

As a result, some colleges regularly

consumed more revenue than they produced, which made the district as a whole
vulnerable to cost-overruns (Tyre, 1986).
In sum, the LACCD handled decline in the same way it approached growth, by
stretching resources while at the same time increasing its overall obligations. Further, by
failing to face the implications of that pattern, district officials ignored actions that might
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have reduced the district's vulnerability to decline.
By 1981-82, the conditions for a pernicious spiral of decline were set. LACCD
enrollment reached its highest point just as the state, under AB 1369, levied a stringent
1% growth cap on district ADA That caused revenues to plummet 15%.

Officials

dipped into the district's cash reserves to cover the difference, but in the process, the
reserve fund was depleted 16% in a single year. That left the district with an ARP of 3%,
a margin putting it in a very tenuous fiscal position.
Foreseeing crisis, Kolford centralized planning and impaneled a task force to
design further cost-cutting.

Its task was to create a blueprint for regionalizing the

LACCD’s instructional programs.

Unfortunately, Kolford's action came too late.

Previous cutbacks had already taken a serious toll on instruction and services (Avila and
Stevens, 1984). The LACCD's enrollment dropped marginally in 1982-83 as students
began leaving the district in search of better conditions.
Turmoil over tuition, which erupted in 1983, finally caused a fiscal emergency.
The governor's revenue veto held up $12 million in district funds that were not reinstated
in time to help the district meet its 1983-84 obligations. Lacking cash—the district’s ARP
at that point was 0.02%—district officials were forced to cut course sections. As in other
districts, course-cutting resulted in an immediate drop in enrollment-12% for AY 198384 (Koltai, 1985)—the fiscal effect of which was to reduce the revenue for 1984-85,
when, again, the district was forced to cut course sections. Other factors-tuition fees,
and a poorly advertised calendar change moving up the fall, 1984 start date-added to the
impact of course reduction to drop the AY 1984-85 headcount by another 14%.
Despite the fiscal implications of those trends, district officials took no immediate
steps to reorganize. In fact, the board of trustees—fully informed of the district’s fiscal
situation-gave a 6% pay raise to all categories of personnel.

To meet their new

obligation, officials depleted their remaining cash reserves and more.

FY 1984-85

concluded with a general fund ending balance of -$2.8 million (Tyre, 1986). To avoid
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financial exigency, the LACCD was forced to secure emergency funding.
At that point the district turned to Los Angeles County which provided it with a $5
million advance secured by tax anticipation notes. The amount was sufficient to meet
LACCD liabilities and take care of district operating expenses through September, 1985
when the loan became due (Los Angeles Times. June 27, 1985). As a condition of the
loan, the district agreed to an independent audit of its management practices, later
conducted by the firm of Peat, Marwick, and Mitchell.
While the county loan solved the short-term problem, the solution added to the
overall fiscal instability of the district. Nevertheless, officials seemed intent on avoiding
organizational changes. Chancellor Kolford advised against further downsizing. In a
public statement, he recommended program improvements to rebuild district enrollment
(Koltai, 1985).
As the deadline for repaying the county loan loomed, officials also rejected other
available options such as divesting the district of unused real estate with an estimated
value of $14 million. Instead, they turned to the state legislature for an infusion of funds.
By then, however, press scrutiny had drawn public attention to the district's financial
problems, which put the district in a weak bargaining position. A series of incidents
followed that proved embarrassing to district officials:
- In response to the LACCD's appeal for funds, the State Senate Finance
Committee obligingly amended AB 539 (Leonard, R, Redlands), a bill to provide loans to
other districts then under its consideration, to include money for the LACCD. Special
provisions, however, written in by Sen.

Alan Robbins (D-Van Nuys), required the

LACCD, as a condition of the loan, to sell its surplus property and hold an election to fill
a vacancy on its board of trustees—an action the district for fiscal reasons wanted to avoid
(Los Angeles Times. June 27, 1985).
- Before signing AB 539, the governor deleted the $5 million earmarked for the
LACCD.

Deukmejian cited the LACCD’s “failure to exercise prudent fiscal
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management,” but went on to indicate that he would approve a loan in the future if it were
“accompanied by strong auditing provisions and a permanent incentive for improved
fiscal management.” The governor recommended that the district amend its residency
requirements to allow for a new “free-flow” policy under which LACCD residents would
be eligible to attend schools in other districts. (Los Angeles Times. July 10, 1985, Part n,
P- 1, 6).
- Consistent with its mission to promote efficiency in state government, the
California Commission on State Government Organization and Economy—also known as
the “Little Hoover” Commission-began a long-planned study of the fiscal accountability
of California's community colleges after announcing that the LACCD would be singled
out for special scrutiny (CCSGOE, 1986).
Behind those actions lay the competing and sometimes hidden political agendas of
officials with a vested interest in the policies and practices of the LACCD. Robbins, for
example, wanted to force the district to liquidate its real estate to raise money for facilities
for L.A. Hills College, a school in his legislative district His actions drew the opposition
of other state legislators in the L A area who wanted the loan to go through (Los Angeles
Times. June 27, 1985).
The governor, on the other hand, and members of the “Little Hoover”
Commission wanted the LACCD to become more fiscally accountable in the interest of
reducing the overall cost of education to state government For that reason, the governor
aimed to force the LACCD to adopt the idea of “free flow” as a way of instilling
competition and the motivation to enhance district efficiency (Los Angeles Times. July
10, 1985).
Chagrined by these actions but unwilling to back down, district officials decided
to fight back. The trustees, for example, vowed not to “knuckle under” to the governor’s
demand, and began a search for ways other than a state bailout to repay the county debt
(Los Angeles Times. July 11, 1985, Pt. II, p. 1). By fall, they had a plan calling for
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new economies and revenues to resolve the situation. The economies included canceling
the district's remaining maintenance contracts, renegotiating employee fringe benefits, and
laying off of dozens of clerical workers. New revenues were to come from the sale of a
small parcel of property, parking fee increases, an infusion of cash from the state lottery,
and a grant from the state for districts undergoing enrollment decline (Tyre, 1986).
Officials calculated these measures would yield enough money to repay the county loan
and wipe out an impending budget deficit.
Just weeks into the fall term, however, officials discovered their projections had
been overly optimistic. Early revisions projected a current-year deficit of $2.5 million
(Los Angeles Times. January 24, 1986; Tyre, 1986).

In October, however, before

LACCD officials had a chance to revise their course, the “Little Hoover’’ Commission
began a series of public hearings at the LACCD to air charges of district mismanagement
(CCSGOE, 1986). Shortly thereafter, the Los Angeles County Grand Jury announced
that it too would investigate the LACCD's management practices.
Overwhelmed by those developments, district officials succumbed to a siege
mentality that was clearly reflected in the comments of the district planning director, Nina
Conrad. “In the last five years we've lost 33% of our enrollment, we had a $5 million
deficit last year, we're being investigated by the Little Hoover Commission and an
accounting firm for the county, and now we're going to be investigated by the County
Grand Jury. So we have to cut back,” she commented to the researcher.
In November, LACCD officials finally began to lay the groundwork for a major
reorganization. The chancellor convened a planning group comprised of the members of
his planning department, the vice presidents of eight LACCD colleges, and Esther
Wendell, director of the L.A. Canyon nursing program. Its task was to provide a final
blueprint for district reorganization.
In December, with planning underway, district officials undertook a series of
visits to LACCD campuses, in which Conrad began preparing the faculties for a radical
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reorganization of instruction. District officials promoted the plan, which called for large
instructor layoffs in certain areas, as a strategy to shift the district's resources into new
areas. “We have to more closely align the faculty with student demand,” Trustee Coleson
told the press (Los Angeles Times. January 24, 1986, Part I, p. 3).
The plan. Specifically, the task force plan called for a districtwide RIF of 142
full-time teachers, with faculty cutbacks in physical education (40), the social sciences
(36), humanities (24), art (12), allied health (10), and nursing (20).

To achieve the

reduction, part-time teachers in those disciplines were also slated for dismissal, which in
nursing amounted to an additional 36 PTE. Nursing programs at L.A. Central and L.A.
Coast College were targeted for permanent closure, along with numerous allied health
programs in the district.

Task force operation. In approaching its job, the task force relied on historical
data amassed by Conrad over a period of several years, much of which dealt with subunit
enrollment, productivity patterns, and labor costs.

It examined the effects of various

cutback and termination options projected for particular campuses and the district as a
whole. To maximize economic productivity, the group decided to downsize the health
occupations and other curricular areas in order to expand business and computer science,
areas considered to have a higher growth potential.
According to Conrad, the heavy impact on the health occupations resulted from
the desire of task force to find a big savings without substantially disrupting the district's
curriculum.

“What fell were nursing and allied health,” she remarked.

The group

considered nursing’s cost per ADA and relative resource consumption. Conrad's data
placed the average cost at around $3000 per ADA—twice the district average~a figure that
reflected the structure of clinical teaching with its low student-teacher ratios. Enrollment
dynamics were also considered.

As district enrollment dwindled, the enrollment in

nursing had remained stable which increased nursing’s relative resource consumption to
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4.3% from 3.1% of the LACCD's total outlay for instruction. "With enrollment down in
the district, but not in nursing, the burden got too big," Conrad explained.
According to Conrad, the job of choosing which programs to close fell to the
district administrators after local college officials proved unable to make the decision.
“Nobody wants to volunteer their own program,” noted Conrad. Key factors included
comparative WSCH productivity, program quality as reflected by student performance
and graduation rates, and proximity to other service areas. L.A. Coast, the newest and
smallest program, and L.A. Central, the oldest and, according to Conrad, the least
economically productive program, were slated for closure.
The plan was trumpeted to campus administrators as a means to redistribute
instructional resources, eliminate overstaffing, and enhance revenue by redeploying
resources into areas likely to attract students. “It sounded like a good way to solve a lot
of the problems we had." commented Fred Barrow, Dean of Occupational Education at
L.A. River College.

The faculty reaction.

Although depicted as the product of a long planning

process, many of the faculty members interviewed for this study looked at the reform plan
as a stop-gap effort on the part of the district to accommodate political pressure.

In

general, members were cynical about the need for reform. A biology teacher at L.A.
Channel, for example, referred to the plan as “the district's public relations campaign.”
Numerous interviewees blamed the district's poor management practices.

A health

science administrator at L.A. Industry, for example, blamed district extravagance. “I'm a
company person, but I see the expensive offices sitting downtown.”

Others blamed

LACCD expansion. A chemistry teacher at L.A. Midtown College said, “Kolford needs a
big district.” Still others blamed planning mistakes such as the district's ill-fated calendar
change.
In general, the faculty was angry and hostile as was clearly demonstrated at the
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February 5th meeting of the board of trustees where an overflow crowd of faculty
assembled to denounce virtually every aspect of the proposal. Numerous faculty leaders
lambasted the layoffs as an attempt to destroy the district. In the audience, for example,
was Harvey Cox, AFT-Guild president, who charged the district with “panicking” over
the budget situation. Also in the audience was Raoul Teilhet, AFT state director, and a
prominent faculty organizer in California. Teilhet referred to the district’s plan as a
“declaration of war on the faculty,” (Los Angeles Times. February 6, 1986, Pl II, p. 1).
Despite the heated rhetoric, the trustees voted 6:1 to accept the chancellor's proposal.

Expansion of conflict. Embattled by the reaction, district officials went on to
make a series of precipitous decisions that not only heightened faculty anxiety over the
final scope of reform, but expanded the conflict to enfold the community. Two weeks
after the layoff vote, the board voted to fire the presidents of L. A. Metro and L.A. Coast
Colleges (Los Angeles Times. February 21, 1986), a decision which had explosive
results.

One of those fired, it turned out, was the highest ranking Asian-American

educator in California.

His removal angered L.A.'s Asian community and brought

charges of racism from a group called “Leadership Education for Asian Pacifies,” which
threatened to fight the decision (Los Angeles Times. February 21, 1986). Coincidentally,
rumors of district plans to close L.A. Metro, a largely black college, spread through the
district. These were followed by reports that black interest groups were also organizing
for a fight.
Squeezed by the pressure, the board of trustees took immediate steps to defuse the
situation, and at its next meeting announced the appointment of the Asian administrator as
assistant to the chancellor, duties unspecified (Los Angeles Times. March 6, 1986). At
the same meeting, Board President Marvin Rickman announced a “recision” of 60 layoff
notices. The action, reported incorrectly by the press as a “softening” of the layoff
policy, suggested a reduction of the final layoff total (Los Angeles lim es. March 6, 1986,
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Pt. n, p. 3). In fact, there had been no reduction, but an increase in the number of
notices sent. As officials accommodated sixty faculty members who chose to exercise
their bumping rights, they quietly issued another 75 layoff notices, producing a grand
total of 157 notices-or a net increase of 15. When, sometime after the meeting, leaders
of the AFT Guild caught on, they lambasted the “recision” as a ruse to manipulate public
sentiment.

Impact on faculty morale. By the time of the layoff announcement, 400 full-time
faculty positions vacated under the district's hiring freeze sat empty, work conditions after
years of service and maintenance reductions were drastically deteriorated, and faculty
morale was at an all time low. As one interviewee observed, “There were empty desks
everywhere!” Vacant positions meant obligatory work increases for the teachers
remaining. ‘T o function around here,” another member noted ironically, “you have to
have your own broom and dust pan!”
Reactions to these conditions were compounded by an insidious climate of
suspicion in the district, deriving from an unusual situation in the district administration.
In 1984, barely a year before the layoff announcement, the chancellor had appointed
Valerie Mulanney, chief negotiator for the AFT Teachers' Guild, to the position of district
Vice Chancellor of Personnel. As a primary author of the faculty contract and the guild's
first president, Mulanney had come to symbolize union power, and was generally
regarded as brilliant but ruthless. Her shift to district administration incited fears that she
would use her insider knowledge to the detriment of faculty. When the district announced
its layoff plan, many teachers decided to avoid drawing attention to themselves by leaving
the battle to others.

Faculty organization. The layoff announcement took a serious toll on the faculty.
Too demoralized to orchestrate a coordinated anti-coalition effort, teachers at several
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campuses responded by squabbling over how to react to the district's proposal.

For

weeks, debate in the academic senates centered around whether the faculty should stress
academic excellence or job security in its opposition to restructuring-a debate energized
by the practice of bumping.
The bumping process aggravated faculty tensions.

Because those exercising

bumping options usually lacked experience if not credentials for their new assignments,
they were widely regarded as underqualified. While some units received few teacher
transfers, others had many, and were often obliged to make space for the newcomers by
exchanging seasoned for unseasoned teachers. Their losses focused attention on the issue
of academic excellence.

For other groups, however, where the layoff notices were

numerous, job threats remained a larger problem than bumping.

In those groups—

physical education and social sciences faculties, for example-the focus was on the issue
of job security. Thus, the debate became mired in squabbles over the relative importance
of these two issues, with the result that faculties on several of the campuses were unable
to orchestrate a unified opposition. Rick Martinez, academic senate president at L.A.
Midtown College, explained: “Around here, because everything in this district is so
dammed big, most people only pay attention to their own shop!”
The failure of the faculty to unite gave rise to two ad hoc splinter groups.

One

was a districtwide coalition comprised mainly of faculty in the humanities and social
sciences which became known as the “Committee for Academic Excellence.” Its main
objective was to prevent layoffs in those disciplines. The committee coordinated with the
AFT Faculty Guild, and worked with members of the L.A. state legislative delegation to
put pressure on the district.

Another faculty group, called “Save Our Community

Colleges,” which was opposed to the AFT Guild's influence, used various tactics in a
fight to change the district's leadership.

Faculty theories. Theories about the layoff proposal were numerous, and indeed
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several have already been mentioned above. Large numbers of teachers, for example,
concluded that the layoffs were the end result of financial pressure caused by district
mismanagement, but some also saw the layoffs as a form of face saving for the board. A
sizable number, for example, believed that the trustees, all of whom had been elected with
AFT College Guild support, were embarrassed by the district's financial condition, and
therefore backed restructuring to show themselves capable of going against union
interests.

Others, noting the chancellor's close des to the Democrats in the state

legislature, and his important role as a leader of the CCC Urban District Association, saw
a connection to state politics. They theorized that the chancellor, who opposed tuition,
had engineered the layoffs to embarrass the governor. (Their theory spawned a faculty
joke pointing out the irony of the situation. Although the governor may have wanted
chancellor's head on a plate, the joke went, in the end it was the chancellor who served
the governor with 157 heads!)

Both theories underscored the political interests of

LACCD officials in the layoff policy, and served to focus the various faculty ad hoc
groups and coalitions on the importance of seeking state intervention to prevent
restructuring.

Tbs Political Behavior of Nursing Faculty

Numerous factors—unit structure, organization, and leadership—that are best
understood from an historical perspective shaped the responses of the LACCD nursing
faculties to district developments.
At the time of the layoff announcement, there were 110 nursing teachers
dispersed throughout the LACCD in eight independently accredited instructional units,
features of which are summarized in Table 32. Each unit maintained its own curriculum,
negotiated its own clinical contracts, and set its own schedule and policies.

Joint

meetings of the eight faculties, which operated independently of one another, were rare in
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the absence of a mandate from the district office to convene. As a result, faculty members
enjoyed few opportunities for interacting with one another other than those provided by
district governance activities in which few of them participated.
Thus, there was little faculty interaction and no central faculty organization at the
time of the crisis. Only the joint meetings of the nursing program directors provided a
nucleus for organization. In the LACCD, faculty members elected to the 100% releasedtime, non-management position of department chairperson served as program directors at
seven institutions. The exception was L.A. Industry College where the associate dean of
allied health acted as program director.

Working together under the auspices of the

district education office, the eight program directors met regularly to discuss policy, and
provided what little coordination there was between programs.

Table 32
Characteristics of the LACCD Nursing Programs
Program Features
Program

State
Accred

L.A.
1958
Central
L.A.
1968
Metro
L.A.
1970
Industry
L.A.
1957
Midtown
L.A.
1980
Coast
L.A.
1963
Channel
L.A.
I960
Canyon
L.A.
1969
River
Note. Year of state

College Features
FT
Faculty

Location

13,3^5

5 l4

Urban

20

3,298

227

Urban

140

9

8,653

491

Urban

generic

154

14

11,859

416

Urban

generic

79

5

8,548

261

Urban

generic

195

17

7,275

308

Suburban

generic

217

21

18,178

493

Suburban

generic

189

13

18,513

533

Suburban

Type
Program

Program
Enroll

generic

13$

FT
NSG
Faculty
16

generic

211

ladder

College
Enroll

accreditation, nursing enrollment and program type State-Approved

Schools of Nursing H .N ..

1986. 44th Edition, NLN, 1986.

College enrollment.

Location from The College Handbook. 1985-86. 23rd Edition, CEEB, 1985. Full-time
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faculty from Tyre, 1986.

Although the original task of the group was to make recommendations for
standardizing nursing education in the district, its focus changed in 1982 at the behest of
the chancellor, to program consolidation and ways

to “regionalize” nursing.

Unfortunately, the group, having no vertical hierarchy of authority, agreed on little.
Faculty observers attributed its inaction to the loss of unit autonomy and director status
that were certain to occur under a plan to consolidate, but Ruth Hartley, L.A. Industry
director, claimed the group faltered because district planners never made their expectations
clear. “We sent them ideas, but I guess we didn't give them what they wanted—we never
got any feedback!” In the course of their interaction, the directors grew to distrust one
another, and became divided in a number of factions, each of which had its own leader
and power agenda. These divisions carried over to the 1986 termination crisis.

The program directors' response to the termination crisis.

Kathy Ito, L.A.

Channel chairperson, claimed the chairpersons were under strong pressure to improve
program efficiency during the fall of 1985.

They received little official information,

however, on the cutbacks planned for nursing. As a result, most of the faculties remained
focused on regular department routines, despite rumors of impending layoffs and
program closures. In December, union leaders held an open meeting to discuss district
developments, at which Assemblyman Mike Roos (D-Los Angeles) was on-hand to
reassure the faculty. A few of the nursing chairpersons attended—Chairpersons Ito and
Wendell—along with a small group of faculty members.
The following January, weeks in advance of the chancellor’s proposal, the
nursing chairpersons were apprised of the district's plan. Most of the directors put off
informing their faculties, however, pending a formal public announcement. Word of the
district’s plan, leaked to members by Director Wendell, got out anyway.
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Wendell, faculty activist, believed that the chancellor wanted to use the nursing
terminations as a political lever to advance the district’s objectives at the state level. “He's
[Kolford] using us as a hammer against the legislators to get money released to the
district—he's done it before. Nursing is a very visible program!” she told the researcher.
Wendell favored a public challenge to the proposal, and an organized opposition. When it
became clear that the chairpersons as a group were not going to act, Wendell advised
members of the faculty to take action on their own behalf.

She recommended they

challenge the nursing decision by sending telegrams to the trustees to be delivered during
the board meeting. A large number of teachers followed through, and the arrival of a
flurry of telegrams interrupted the meeting.
Wendell's peers in the chairpersons' group were embarrassed by the incident
According to Hartley, Wendell was well-known for flamboyant tactics. Although at one
time influential with the chancellor, she fell into disfavor when she circulated her own
plan for regionalizing nursing that action that not only caused an uproar in the district, but
turned the other directors against Wendell. “Esther gives the impression she's speaking
for the directors when she isn't,” Hartley observed.
Wendell did not attend the February 5th board meeting, but her peers nevertheless
attributed the telegram incident to her. They believed she also instigated the appearance of
an assistant to State Senator Alan Robbins (D - Van Nuys) who addressed the board with
concerns about the impact of restructuring on the L.A. Canyon program—Wendell's
program.
The directors preferred a conservative approach and worried that Wendell’s
actions would alienate the administration. When they finally met to plan a response, they
agreed to a wait-and-see approach. Carol Campbell, L.A. River director and 1986 “chair
of chairs,” strongly backed a go-slow strategy. Campbell believed that people in the
community would come forward. She therefore took her time in convening a meeting.
“I'm not gonna jump right in. We'll wait until the dust settles a little, and see where we
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are.” she commented.

Implications of the termination policy for the nursing units. The restructuringwhich slated two RN programs for closure—nevertheless touched all eight nursing
programs. It called for a layoff of 20 full-time faculty members and all of nursing’s parttime instructors—a total reduction of 56 FTEs in all.

The teachers laid off were

determined, according to statute, by seniority on a districtwide basis.

Notices went to

seven members at L.A. Channel College; four each at L.A. Canyon and L.A. Industry;
two at L.A. River College; and one each at L.A. River, L.A. Midtown, and L.A. Coast
Colleges. Only L.A. Central, where all members of the faculty enjoyed seniority, had no
layoffs.

It, however, was one of the programs slated for closure.

District officials

announced no plans or schedule for the transition, leaving the eight faculties to speculate
when their positions would be eliminated.

Nursing faculty reactions.

The initial reactions to the proposal varied

considerably, both from member to member, and within faculty groups.
several sites were taken by surprise. “We have a strong program.

Teachers at

I guess we never

thought they would cut us!” said a member of the L.A. Channel faculty.

Others,

however, claimed to have anticipated the move. “It was pretty clear when they started
laying off classifieds [non faculty employees] last fall,” said another member of the L.A.
Channel faculty. Some members, were very emotional. “How can they do this! Our
program was one of the first in the country!” said an L.A. Central program member,
angry about the potential fate of her program. Others, however, were dispassionate. “I
don't think there's a real need for eight programs in this district!” said a member of the
L.A. Canyon program.
Finger-pointing was common. Some members, for example, blamed the union.
“The union got us down to 18 F i t ! What good did it do us?” said a member of the L.A.
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Central faculty.”

Others blamed the district

Many thought the administration was

sacrificing nursing to escape its political problems. Although recognizing nursing's cost
as a problem, few believed the district lacked money to pay for the programs. “They got
a windfall from the lottery last fall!” scoffed an L.A. Midtown member. Although word
of the rationale for the task force's closure recommendation filtered down, many members
doubted its claim that objective criteria had been used. “They made their decision first,
and then fed data into the computer to justify it,” said a member of the L.A. Central
faculty. Indeed, as Lucille Muro, L.A. Central director, pointed out in revelation , L.A.
Central surpassed other district programs in both WSCH and exam scores. Apparent
contradictions such as these led to speculation that political factors such as the racial
politics of service area constituencies had influenced the selection of programs for
termination.

Organization of the faculty. Footdragging by the directors had a significant impact
on members of the nursing faculties, most of whom were eager to take action. “This is
very threatening-we're all very concerned!” a member of the L.A. River faculty told the
researcher. After two weeks with no word from the group, confidence in the directors
completely eroded.
Directors Wendell and Ito, were the first to respond to faculty concerns. Wendell
was disgusted by the inaction of her peers. “They usually act after it's too late!” she said
to the interviewer. Ito, however, was worried about the impact o f a RIF on her program.
Her concern was that the terminations would dilute the expertise of her faculty which was
distinguished by its number of advanced degrees—more than any other program. She
consulted with Trustee Galvin, the lone dissenter in the termination vote, who advised her
to organize an anti-termination campaign.
Thus, Ito and Wendell agreed on the need to organize. Ito, whose program stood
to lose more than Wendell's, asked her staff to take the lead. Two teachers, Sally Tollis,
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a junior member who had received a layoff notice, and Nora Carson, a senior member
active in the academic senate and AFT Guild negotiating team, responded.
Tollis and Carson took charge of organizing a faculty action group. Less than
three weeks after the board vote, plans were underway for “The Coalition to Preserve
Quality Health Care in Nursing.”

On February 25th, 42 teachers representing six

programs convened for a kick-off assembly. The first meeting was held at L.A. Industry
College, the most centrally located of the eight institutions. A total of six raeetingsFebruary 25, March 6, March 20, April 1, April 15, and April 29, 1986-were held prior
to the May vote, and additional meetings followed during the summer and fall of 1986,
and spring of 1987.

Strategy and tactics. The First meeting provided members with opportunities to
get to know one another and discuss their mutual predicament The mood was one of
cautious optimism as Tollis and Carson worked to get the planning off the ground.
Wendell and Ito were there. Worried about their jobs, which they thought might be
jeopardized if they were seen to challenge the district, they acted only as consultants.
Melvin Baker, AFT Guild vice president, was also on hand. Baker had his own agenda.
He believed an anti-termination campaign by the nursing faculties would serve to raise the
level of public concern over restructuring, and thus benefit the union's campaign against
it. He also viewed his support for nursing as a way of building union membership.
“Nursing has over 100 teachers-that's a big part of our faculty body,” he commented to
the researcher.
Baker's presence at the meetings was controversial. Many of the teachers at the
meeting distrusted the union's goals and resented paying its closed-shop dues. “A lot of
people don't feel the union represents the teachers,” said a member of the L.A. Central
group. Tollis and Carson, on the other hand, while not exactly pro-union, believed that
the coalition needed union support. Unfortunately, they failed to convey their rationale to
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coalition members. Unaware of the reasons for Baker's presence, members could be
overheard questioning one another, “What’s he doing here?” Some also questioned Tollis
and Carson's motives for inviting him, which took a toll on group cohesion later down
the line.
Tollis and Carson ran the coalition in a business-like fashion, according to
standard rules of order, which in the early meetings included minutes, a budget report,
and progress assessments.

The latter were given by faculty members acting as

spokespersons for their respective faculties, and focused on work accomplished and
upcoming events.
From the beginning, planning was a collective function. Everyone who came to
the meetings participated in the coalition planning discussions. The decisions, however,
were nonbinding, and the faculties remained free to decide which of the ideas presented to
use in their own service areas-an arrangement that caused disparities program-to-program
in the tactics actually put in action.
From the start, members of the coalition seemed to have an implicit understanding
of the special-interest culture of the district They also seemed to understand the potential
benefits o f lobbying local politicians.

No explanation was given, or indeed seemed

necessary. As Tollis put i t “We've got to get some politicians to support us. Otherwise,
I don't know how far we'll go.” Lobbying became a major coalition strategy. By the
March 6th meeting, members were ready to plan a campaign. Baker instructed the group
on lobbying etiquette and provided a list of the legislators representing each service area
of the district

The coalition also decided on other tactical pressures that evening

including a series of demonstrations and rallies, an outreach to local hospital executives
and personnel, and a press conference to precede the board's final policy vote, but it was
clear that its primary strategy was lobbying.

Reaction from the chairpersons' group. To spread news of the coalition’s
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upcoming meetings and agenda, Tollis used an inter-campus courier to forward notices to
the eight program offices. The courier service, however, proved unreliable, and a few of
the directors apparendy never received their notices. When they were informed of the
coalition by members of their faculties, they questioned what was going on, and put
pressure on Campbell to convene a meeting of the chairpersons. A meeting was finally
held which Wendell and Ito did not attend. That fostered suspicion among the other
directors that Wendell might be using the coalition as a way to regain influence in the
district Thus, the directors decided to monitor the coalition, as they pursued their waitand-see approach. “We can't go out and do radical things in the community. If the
%

people over in personnel get angry, they might go higher on the [seniority] list,” said
Leslie Brookes, L.A. Midtown director, to the researcher, adding, “I've got young kidsI need my job!”
The directors’ decision put Muro the director from L.A. Central, and Susan
Woods, the director from L.A. Coast, both of whom worried about losing their
programs, in an awkward position. Muro and Woods wanted the directors group to come
up with a unified action plan, but recognized after the meeting that the idea was
unrealistic. Frustrated, they quietly turned to local legislators and community groups in
their own service areas for help.

Events prior to the May policy vote. Not long after the district announcement, the
Little Hoover Commission came out with a report on the LACCD (Los Angeles Times.
February 10, 1986).

Although failing to uncover “significant nonfeasance,” the

commission nevertheless called the district's lavish spending pattern “imprudent”
(CCSGOE, February, 1986, p. 40). The report amplified the pressure on the district to
press forward with restructuring.
Within days of the report, the board of trustees began a series of hearings on
restructuring. Faculty and student groups, predictably combative, held the first of a series
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o f anti-termination rallies on February 19th, the day the board voted to fire the two college
presidents.
The February 19th board meeting was eventful. Director Muro addressed the
board on behalf of the L.A. Central program, and presented the trustees with a sevenpage fact sheet challenging the district's WSCH data, in which she refuted in detail its
arguments for closing the L.A. Central program. According to observers, the reaction of
the trustees was one of interest but also confusion. The trustees were surprised to learn,
for example, that L.A. Central was accredited by the NLN-revealing gaps in the
information they had received. Observers concluded from the trustees' apparent interest
that the board was open to reconsidering its position.
As the ad-hoc group’s anti-termination campaign began, some members of the
chairpersons’s group worked quietly behind the scenes to advance another agenda. In the
final days of February, Directors Hartley and Brookes quietly conferred with Conrad, the
district planner, with whom both enjoyed close personal ties.
believed that a restructuring was inevitable.

Hartley and Brookes

“No matter what anybody does, those

programs are gone!” Brookes said to the researcher. They called on Conrad to contact the
Board of Registered Nursing (BRN) to begin planning for the transition. According to
Brookes, Conrad asked her to make the initial contact with the BRN, which she did. That
action initiated a series of negotiations between the BRN and the district

Neither

director, however, informed the leaders of the nursing coalition about the action.
By March 5th, the conflict in the district had escalated. Hundreds of studentsincluding nursing students-paraded outside of the district offices, chanting and carrying
placards. Inside of the board room, emotions also ran high.

An audience of faculty,

students, and numerous disgruntled Asian activists were on hand to protest district
actions. Many, holding tersely worded signs, muttered angry comments. The board's
agenda that day focused on faculty presentations, including several by members of the
L.A. Central nursing faculty and student body. Despite the tension in the room, the
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business concluded in an orderly fashion.

Observers were again impressed by the

receptivity of the trustees to faculty arguments. Kolford announced the formation of a
new committee which he organized to oversee the nursing program closures.
At the ad hoc group’s meeting the following evening. Baker advised members of
the nursing faculty to capitalize on the board's apparent openness. He recommended they
try to co-opt the economic argument by documenting nursing's general education WSCH
contributions. The proposal quickly died, however, when members reminded Baker that
past attempts by Wendell and others to use such arguments had always failed. Instead,
plans were laid for a series of student demonstrations highlighting, at Baker's suggestion,
nursing's identity as a separate, identifiable occupational group. The intention was to
capitalize on the sympathy Baker said the public had for nurses. Several nursing student
association leaders were in attendance. They agreed to coordinate the actions of their
groups with coalition plans.
With the lobbying campaign well underway, Wendell met on March 10th with
Assemblyman Patrick Nolan (R-Glendale), whose legislative district included her service
area. Nolan agreed to write a letter to the board expressing his concerns about the nursing
cutbacks, but was noncommittal about making a personal appearance. This was the first
in a series of unenthusiastic responses from politicians in the Los Angeles area to the
coalition's appeals.
The nursing transition committee met for the first time on March 11th. Wendell,
Hartley, and Brookes,

all recruited by the chancellor, attended as committee

representatives from nursing. Muro appeared before the committee to address the issue of
the L. A. Central transition. The issue was whether the district should adopt a one or twoyear phase-out plan. To buy time, Muro argued for a two-year phase-out plan. She
claimed that the district’s eight programs were too dissimilar to expedite a transition with a
massive inter-program student transfer. Hartley however, quickly undercut her argument
by insisting that L.A. Industry could easily accommodate L.A. Central’s students. The
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administrators were reassured, and the committee voted to accept the one-year phase-out
Muro left the meeting, irate.
For a number of reasons, the coalition's outreach to hospitals and other health
agencies failed to gain momentum in all service areas. From the start, the directors were
divided over whether to recruit hospital support, and some faculty members hesitated to
proceed without their own director's approval.

Nevertheless, a few faculties, L.A.

Channel and L.A. Canyon, for example, did make a concerted effort, and in mid-March
representatives from local health care agencies began to appear before the board. A nurse
recruiter from a large hospital in the L.A. Channel service area, for example, addressed
the board at its March 19th meeting with an offer of grant money to help save the
programs targeted for closure. An authority on hospital personnel needs,, she informed
the trustees that the nursing surplus in L.A. area had given way to a shortage, which
challenged the argument raised by a few trustees that local employment trends justified the
program closures.
At the same meeting, the trustees discussed the nursing transition, and voted to
allow the current nursing freshman finish on site. That amounted to a tentative approval
of a one-year phase-out plan-another step toward termination.
down new rules for public testimony at board hearings.

Later, the board laid

The aim was to curtail the

lengthy faculty speeches, but not necessarily to restrict the number of speakers, including
nursing speakers. (As Conrad observed, the level of public interest was higher for
nonnursing programs. “My desk is piled with over 300 letters, but so far only four letters
about nursing!” she told the researcher.)
Baker addressed the rule changes at the March 20th coalition meeting.
acknowledged that the board's mood had changed.
pressure,” he said.

He

“The trustees are feeling the

Director Hartley was also on hand at the March 20th meeting to

discuss the phase-out plan. She announced that the district would rehire most, if not all,
of those who received layoff notices for the period of the transition. In a thinly veiled bid
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to head of an open challenge to disrict policy, she encouraged the group to reconsider its
tactics since it was now clear that jobs would be saved. Members of Muro’s faculty were
also at the meeting. One informed the group that Muro was working with Assemblyman
Roos on a political strategy to deter restructuring that would save the L.A. Central
program. She went on to report that Muro had been reprimanded by the chancellor's
office for the pressure members of her faculty had allegedly put on students to participate
in media demonstrations.
On March 20th, a delegation of LACCD faculty members flew to Sacramento to
lobby members of the Assembly Education Committee. Teresa Hughes (D-Los Angeles),
the chairperson, agreed to hold a hearing on a bill before the committee to restrict the
LACCD's restructuring effort

Hughes’ action touched off a round of lobbying by

LACCD lobbyist, Patricia Hewitt.

A day later, Tollis and Ito appeared before the

Commission on the Status of Women to request its help to save the nursing programs.
Members of the commission agreed to write a letter to the LACCD board.
When the Board of Registered Nursing (BRN) met in Los Angeles, March 25th,
Muro was on the agenda to request the BRN's intervention on behalf of the L.A. Central
Program. A nine person panei, seven of which were Deukmejian appointees, the BRN
declined, claiming it lacked jurisdiction to interfere with the district’s decision. In an
interview for this study, however, member Tricia Hunter, R.N., cast the BRN's action in
a partisan light. “Most of us are real uncomfortable getting involved in the political issues
surrounding this district!” Hunter said. Hunter, a Republican, indicated that the BRN
was divided along party lines. “I don't think the district needs eight programs!” she said
(personal communication, March 31, 1986).
During the middle and lacer weeks of March, the nursing programs held their
annual community advisory committee meetings. Although several directors had agreed
to use these meetings as a forum to solicit support from local hospitals. Indeed, Campbell
and her supervising dean downplayed nursing's situation at the L.A. River meeting. Her

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

255
action alienated many of her faculty who had suspected for sometime that she had
administrative ambitions. Hartley and Brookes also deemphasized the crisis in their
advisors meetings, but managed to retain the loyalty of their staff members.
Late in March, Director Wendell was hospitalized with chest pains—another
setback for the coalition. Although diagnosed as a stress reaction, Wendell's condition
caused her to drop out of the coalition. She continued, however, to advise Tollis.
Meanwhile, Muro worked with Assemblyman Roos who desperately wanted to
save the L.A. Central program. Roos believed that to serve as an important jobs-training
program for the minority residents of his inner city district “There are a lot of immigrants
here,” Roos commented, “that nursing program is their ticket to the mainstream!”
(personal communication, November, 1986). Roos's idea was to erect legislative barriers
to the flow of funds to the district, a strategy Muro enthusiastically embraced. “Our best
chance is with the people in Sacramento—they hold the purse strings,” she explained to
the researcher.
Days later, Chancellor Kolford visited the L.A. Coast campus to confirm the
closure of its nursing program. His visit, which underscored the district's resolve to go
ahead with restructuring, ignited another round of student resistance. The Coast students
descended on the office of Assemblywoman Gwenn Moore (D-West Los Angeles) asking
about the status of AB 3586, a piece of legislation Moore was sponsoring which would
require the community college state board of governors to review local program
termination proposals. On learning that the bill had stalled in committee, the students
decided on another tactic-filing a lawsuit against the district.
By early April it was clear that the coalition's lobbying strategy was foundering.
The mood at the April 1st meeting was somber as numerous members rose to report that
politicians at all levels-city, county, and state-with a few notable exceptions had declined
or side-stepped their appeals often citing the limits of their authority and hesitation to
involve themselves in another public board's policies.

Tollis reported that even her
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efforts to have John Vasconcellos (D-San Jose), Assembly Ways and Means Chairman,
review nursing's WSCH data had failed. Sensing a morale problem, Ito urged members
not to give up, and advised that they direct their energy into an appeal to the BRN to
change its position.
With their options apparently narrowing, coalition members became concerned
about the group’s board hearing, scheduled for April 9th.
evening advising tactics for getting on the agenda.

Baker spent much of the

Constant side-talk, however,

interfered with coalition business. The district had offered incentives to the teachers that
week, and members could be heard discussing the pros and cons of the accepting the
offers. Coalition attendance was down to 27 faculty members.
Coincidentally, L.A. radio stations announced a local fund-raiser organized by the
“Committee for Academic Excellence” for Assemblyman Mike Roos. The committee, led
by Lester Mort, L.A. Central history professor, planned a $25-a-plate affair, and invited
the public's participation. The event was supported by the coalition. Numerous nursing
faculty members and a large group of nursing students attended.
On April 9th, the day of the coalition's board hearing, the activities began as
planned with a media demonstration in which a large group of uniformed nursing students
picketed outside of the district offices. Somehow miscued, the media crews arrived too
late to tape the event, thus failing to capture it for the local TV audience.
As the meeting opened, district officials acknowledged scores of letters from
legislators and public officials expressing concern about the restructuring and nursing
terminations. Only a few politicians, however, appeared in person to speak on behalf of
nursing. One, the mayor of the city of Hawthorne, addressed the board to underscore the
importance of the nursing program in his service area to his constituents. Other speakers
included a number of hospital executives who confirmed that although many local
hospitals suffered financial problems of their own, a local need for nurses still existed.
Numerous coalition members addressed the board. Their testimony highlighted

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

257
the anticipated consequences of the termination policy, including the problems envisioned
from student and faculty transfers, the loss of job education for women and minorities,
and the accreditation status of the district's remaining nursing programs jeopardized by
faculty exchanges. No one specifically addressed program economics or the loss of ADA
to the district. Some presentations took on impassioned and even angry tones. During a
particularly confrontational presentation, Board President Rickman rose abruptly and
retired to the board antechamber.

Frustrated by the day's events, coalition leaders

nevertheless vowed to press on.
Within days of the hearing, President Rickman took to the airwaves to bolster the
district's position. A practicing surgeon, he appeared on a number of radio and TV
shows, and, stressing his dual role as health professional and district official, provided
new arguments for the nursing terminations.

Changes in the nursing profession,

Rickman said, specifically a profession-wide debate over the entry credential—whether a
two or four year degree-had reduced the need for community college nursing programs.
On April 15th, the coalition met to plan its grand finale—a press conference at the
L.A. Press Club. It was clear that members were irate over Rickman's statements. As
the meeting opened, a number of those present expressed their frustration with Rickman,
whom they berated for “lacking respect for nurses.”
The group spent most of its time that afternoon discussing the press conference.
To assist in the planning, Baker had invited outside consultants.

Fox, AFT Guild

president, and Mort, head of the Committee for Academic Excellence, attended. Also on
hand was Jerry Fineberg, a political consultant hired by Mort's committee.
Tollis and Carson handed over the meeting to Fineberg.

Fineberg presented

himself with an insider’s bravado that appeared to offend coalition members. Few, for
example, responded to his invitation to share their problems. Finally, Tollis mentioned
that some of the politicians invited to the conference appeared to be wavering. Fineberg
made some rather involved recommendations for action, but his suggestions seemed only
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to puzzle people in the audience. Sensing the mood, Mort broke into the discussion to
laud the group's organization, which he said was better than that of other LACCD faculty
units. Mort also stressed that nursing, with its reservoir of community sympathy, had a
better chance than other groups of achieving a turnaround. The mood lifted, and the
group resumed planning.
In the final weeks, the coalition both gained and lost ground in its bids for
support. The students, who continued to rally, conducted a demonstration before the
April 21st administrative law hearings held. Faculty members who attended the hearings
complained that the lawyers assigned to the nursing teachers failed to bring out important
points in nursing's defense.

Days later, Trustee Galvin published an editorial

prominently displayed in the Los Angeles Times Sunday edition outlining his reasons for
opposing restructuring fLos Angeles Times. April 27, 1986).

Among the points he

highlighted were the negative consequences he foresaw from the nursing terminations.
On April 28th, Director Ito attended a meeting of the Greater Los Angeles Nursing
Services Administrators’ Association. Ito wanted to have institutions other than those in
the L.A. Channel and Canyon service areas involved in the coalition's effort. Members
of the association were unenthusiastic and declined to intervene, however, noting that
their numerous requests for information from Director Muro had gone unanswered.
Privately to Ito, several members expressed reservations about the quality of the L.A.
Central program.
On April 29th, at a meeting in San Diego, the BRN officially affirmed its support
for the one-year phase out plan. That action cleared the way for termination. Bowing to
pressure-much of it from the LACCD nursing coalition, the BRN agreed to make a
thorough assessment of the impact of the terminations on the remaining programs.
On May 2nd, a handful of politicians, numerous hospital professionals, faculty,
and scores of uniformed students assembled at the L.A. Press Club to address the local
media. Assemblymen Gerald Felando (R-Torrance) and Mike Roos (D-Los Angeles)
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appeared in person.

L.A. City Councilman, John Ferraro sent an assistant

The

politicians raised numerous questions about the impact of the nursing terminations on the
city and county. Their remarks were carried on local TV that evening.
On May 7th, the board of trustees met to vote on the layoff and termination
proposal-a meeting marred by numerous disruptions. One, a display by district students
in which the students presented the trustees with a bushel of lemons inked with pejorative
slogans, drew anger from Board President Rickman who asserted they had been
manipulated by the faculty. After some discussion, the trustees went into an executive
session which lasted several hours. Returning for the final vote, the trustees brought in a
scaled-back version of their original plan which called for a final total of 48 layoffs. The
new plan, however, while reinstating numerous allied health programs, included the 20
layoffs in nursing and two nursing program closures. The vote was 6:1 in favor of
restructuring, with Trustee Galvin again dissenting.

Events of the 1986 summer and fall. Members of the coalition did not disband,
but regrouped to continue their campaign. Disappointed by the outcome, they attributed
the board's decision not to district power, but to the divisions within nursing itself.
Interviewees noted, for example, that the ad hoc effort never succeeded in completely
uniting the eight faculties. Only the L.A. Channel group committed itself fully; members
of the other groups were less fully committed—particularly at L.A. Metro and Industry
where the nursing chairpersons opposed coalition strategy.
The leaders of the coalition nevertheless decided to press on. Baker, for example,
remained optimistic, and advised the group to redouble its efforts. For many members,
however, the outcome raised a question of efficacy. Was a reversal feasible? A number
of them wondered. Noting that various coalition outreach strategies had failed, and that
the nursing directors remained divided, many

members

factored the fatigue,

inconvenience, and the other natural forces of attrition wearing on them, into their
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answers about whether it made sense to continue. For a number of members, the answer
was no.

Some found the demands of meetings and the other coalition activities

impossible to sustain. “I live out in Calabasas,” said one member. Others found no
reason for continuing—the district quickly rehired most of the teachers laid off. Thus,
attendance at the meetings dropped off sharply, as those members drifted away. For
some, however, continuing did make sense. The primary issue carrying them forward,
however, no longer was jobs, but program preservation.
Ironically, as members reassessed their commitment, local interest in the nursing
terminations surged. In a new round of media attention, the local presc, for example, ran
a prominent article, and for the first time detailed the situation from the faculty and student
point o f view (Los Angeles Times. May 9, 1986).

Largely as a result of the belated

attention, the district found itself under pressure to reconsider.
Again, President Rickman, in a number of media interviews, reiterated the
rationale for the nursing program terminations, and stressed among other arguments the
local nursing surplus. This time, coalition leaders reacted by organizing their own public
relations effort.

A new coalition speakers' bureau dispatched a member to debate

Rickman on a local TV talk show. The effort was not an apparent success.
public speaker, Rickman dominated the discourse.

A skilled

On May 18th, George Green,

president of KABC, editorialized on behalf of saving the nursing programs, however,
and the coalition capitalized on its new support by sending a tape of Green's remarks to
Joshua Smith, state chancellor.
With pressure on the district mounting, the union filed several lawsuits on behalf
of the faculty, which Cox, AFT Guild president, discussed at the May 19th coalition
meeting. The union suits charged the district with violating faculty due process, and
enumerated a long-list of district affirmative action infractions. Cox promised to take the
problem of the nursing terminations, which he said raised a labor issue, to the County
Federation of Labor.
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Nine days later, on May 27th, the Los Angeles County Grand Jury issued a report
on the findings of its investigation of the LACCD.

The county report inventoried

numerous instances of district mismanagement. These the auditors pointedly attributed to
the district's decision culture. According to the report, the district had assumed that state
legislators would be unwilling to allow a huge public entity such as the LACCD to
descend into bankruptcy, and made little serious effort to alter its course (Tyre, 1986).
As the pressure on the district continued to grow, several local politicians
indicated a renewed interest in the district’s restructuring plan. In late-May, Mort, at the
behest of the union, flew to Sacramento to lobby members of the budget and education
committees, but had difficulty getting interviews. At about the same time, Assemblyman
Roos set his budget strategy in motion by inserting a section of budget control language
into the California Budget Act for 1986-87--AB 3217.

The provision asked for a

moratorium on reform, and stipulated that the district's continued eligibility for
stabilization funds should require the LACCD administration to submit a report to the state
chancellor documenting the impact of restructuring on student access-see Appendix S.
Roos submitted his provision to the Joint Budget Conference Committee. The
conference committee, which began deliberations on May 28th, consisted of four
Democrats and two Republicans, three of whom were part of the L.A. state legislative
delegation (Senator Seymour, R-Anaheim, Assemblymen Robbins, D-Van Nuys, and
Assemblywoman Waters, D-Watts).

According to Ross Clark, chief of staff to the

committee. Assemblywoman Waters, known to share Roos's concern for minority
education, introduced the provision into the final bill as a favor to Roos (personal
communication, April 23, 1988).
On May 29th, within days of Mort's failed trip, Tollis and Wendell flew to
Sacramento at the expense of the AFT Guild. Although they went to attend a BRN
meeting, their primary mission was to lobby legislators. As the Guild's leaders had
calculated, Tollis and Wendell succeeded where Mort failed, easily gaining access to

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

262
members of the budget conference committee whom they lobbied for the Roos measure.
AB 3217 passed out of the conference committee on June 9th with the Roos provision
inserted (File Analysis, AB 3217,1986, Vasconcellos).
Legislation was the main topic at the June 10th meeting of the coalition. Tollis
urged members to write to the governor on behalf of the Roos provision, and asked their
support for AB 3586 (Assemblywoman Moore, D-West Los Angeles), scheduled to be
heard within days.
Meanwhile, at the state level, LACCD lobbyist, Patricia Hewitt campaigned
vigorously to have the Roos provision struck from AB 3217. Lobbying officials in the
governor's finance office, Hewitt argued that the provision would interfere with local
control and limit the LACCD's ability to comply with the governor's explicit instructions
to reform (personal communication, April, 13,1988). The governor subsequently signed
AB 3217, but after striking the Roos provision. Acknowledging that district management
was a local responsibility, he noted that the LACCD faced severe fiscal problems
requiring difficult decisions (California Statutes of 1986, Ch. 186, p. 497).
On July 8th, less than two weeks later, the Assembly Education Committee killed
AB 3586. The action came after the committee received a letter from Chancellor Kolford
arguing against further intrusion on local control. “This is a case of arranging priorities
within existing resources. With respect to nursing, the district plan is to regionalize
nursing and not to eliminate the discipline.” (File Analysis, AB 3586, 1986, Moore)
Although the coalition succeeded in bringing pressure to bear on the district, the
reversals of the summer took a toll on its cohesion. At the July 23rd meeting, much of
the discussion seemed directed toward reenergizing the coalition's effort Baker and the
coalition leaders took on shrill tones as they attempted to shift the group's focus in a new
direction~to district “violations” in reassigning faculty for the transition.

They

inventoried numerous infractions. Tollis also announced that the governor had vetoed
$11 million in stabilization funds for the district claiming the veto as a sign of coalition
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success. People appeared doubtful. Baker closed by inviting members to participate in
locating candidates for the union to support in the 1987 trustee elections. Although the
discussion ended without a plan, Tollis and Carson personally took up Baker's challenge,
and weeks later took seats on the AFT Guild's political action committee.
As fall approached, the LACCD pushed back its fall semester start date and district
enrollment surged 11%. Without stabilization money, however, the district found itself
projecting another short-term cash flow problem.

Personnel Director Mullaney

announced that the district had rehired 33 laid off faculty, an action possible because, as
she noted, the LACCD had “...miscalculated its teaching needs under a new agreement
reached with the faculty union in June” (Los Angeles Times. September 12, 1986, Pt.
Ill, p. 4). Further, in what amounted to a complete reversal, the teachers who had been
transferred out of nursing were “loaned” back to their units.
At its November 3rd meeting, which was attended by less than ten people, the
coalition tried to draft a plan to prevent the program closures to present to the board of
trustees. Carson suggested that the group propose a plan to consolidate the programs at
L.A. Central and L.A. Industry Colleges. The members rejected the idea, however,
based on the high probability that Muro and the other chairpersons would oppose such a
plan.

Events in the spring of 1987. In the spring of 1987, nursing faculty members
found themselves again in the eye of a crisis. The LACCD faced another multi-million
dollar deficit, and district officials once again proposed faculty reductions as a means to
balance its budget. On February 25th the LACCD board voted to lay off 59 instructors,
including ten in nursing, for a saving of $1.7 million (Los Angeles Times. February 26,
1987).
The action came just weeks before the 1987 district primary elections. The AFT
Guild backed Josephine Chu, a Republican recommended by Tollis and Carson. Tollis
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and Carson used their influence with union leaders to get them to back a Republican
candidate, and argued that such a move would help the union recast its political image.
Their arguments succeeded, and Chu was drafted as the union's pick to replace incumbent
Democrat Martha Garcie-Packard, the only black on the LACCD board. In addition to
Chu, two other candidates, also backed by the union, joined the race to unseat the
incumbents, including Board President Rickman, who had supported restructuring.
Galvin was the only incumbent to retain union support
The nursing coalition, led by Tollis, waged a vigorous campaign on behalf the
union's candidates. Members of the L.A. Channel faculty assisted by several coalition
actives from the L.A. River and Canyon faculties, organized a phone bank, a
neighborhood walk, and a community forum to raise community awareness on the
impending fate of the nursing programs.
In the primary election, held on April 15th, Galvin was elected outright and
Rickman was defeated outright. Chu and another non-incumbent faced a run-off election.
The union claimed victory (Los Angeles Times. April 16, 1987).
Four days later, the LACCD board unanimously voted to rescind the faculty layoff
notices. In a prepared statement, Chancellor Kolford rejected the idea that the board was
influenced by the election results, indicating instead that the reversal was driven by state
politics. “The yearlong efforts of our district board and administration to reach out to all
sides in Sacramento are now bearing fruit,” he said (Los Angeles Times. April 23, 1987,
Pt. II, p. 3). Both non-incumbent candidates went on to win their run-off elections (Los
Angeles Times. June 4, 1987).

The aftermath. The nursing programs at L.A. Central and L.A. Coast Colleges
closed in June, 1987.

Newly elected Trustee Chu, assisted by Trustee Galvin, went

quickly to work to find money to reopen the nursing programs.

With Assemblyman

Roos, they pursued a variety of avenues, and succeeded with their overtures to the
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Regional Hospital Council, which, concerned about the local nursing shortage, offered to
underwrite faculty salaries for a program of reduced size at L.A. Central College.
At its October 7th meeting, however, the LACCD board in a 4:3 vote approved a
buyout package for the chancellor's contract Subsequent efforts to reopen L A . Central
nursing quickly faded as the district turned its attention to finding a new chancellor. As
the trustees labored, officials in the LACCD district office repeatedly increased the costestimates for reinstating the nursing program. After months of stalling by the district, the
Regional Hospital Council withdrew its offer.
By that time, the coalition had completely dissolved.

Having lost ground first

after the May policy vote, and again in the fall of 1986, the coalition revived only
temporarily to influence the outcome of 1987 trustee elections. Although that effort more
or less exhausted the group's political options, leader behavior was also a factor in its
demise.

“The people in charge started turning us off!” a member confided to the

researcher, “It was an ego trip for them, calling those political types by their first names!
People got tired of it.”

Discussion

The case of the LACCD shows the invidious effect of a decision culture that
assumes outside entities will rescue its organizational interests.
For years, the LACCD enjoyed political support for its expansionary policies.
That support eroded, however, when pressures in the California economy drew attention
to the expenses of the community college system, prompting scrutiny by state officials as
to how public money was being used. As a conspicuous entity in a large public system,
the LACCD became a point of focus for politicians, and as a result, suffered a loss of
legitimacy that, according to Whetten (1980), is often encountered by organizations
challenged with economic changes.
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A victim of its own history, the LACCD was unable to respond effectively to its
new economic and political conditions.

It staved off reorganization for as long as

possible, but in the process of avoiding change, committed itself to new fiscal obligations
it could not possibly m eet

Finally, on the verge of bankruptcy, district officials

requested a state bail-out, however subsequent events brought them face-to-face with
fiscal and political reality, and forced them to accept the extent to which their political
support had eroded. Only late in the game did they seek to restructure by cutting costly
programs such as nursing to shift resources where the student demand was the greatest—
an example under the Whetten paradigm of seeking a new ecological niche.
Faced with substantial layoffs and the termination of two programs, the faculties
of the district's eight nursing departments joined together to build an ad hoc organization
to prevent restructuring.

With union help, nursing’s ad hoc group pushed an anti

termination campaign of resistance and opposition that brought members into the shadow
governance network surrounding LACCD policy.

As defined by Tillary and

Wattenbarger (1985), the term shadow network refers to the connections between local
organizations and state government bodies which insiders and outsiders can use to
influence local institutional policy.
Working in cooperation with union leaders, the nursing faculty succeeded in
bringing substantial pressure to bear, but was frequently undercut by the actions of its
own formal leaders, some of whom worked at cross-purposes with the ad hoc group to
advance the district's termination proposal. Although jobs were preserved, the campaign
failed to prevent the program closures, in part because members of the local hospital
establishment failed to speak out strongly against the policy.

Absent an enthusiastic

resistance from hospital executives, the district was able to use the transitional nursing job
market to its own advantage. In the end, the coalition failed, however, not because of
politics or events at the local level, but because state politics—the politics of reform and
local control so shrewdly co-opted by district officials—were on the side of the district.
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Nursing Faculty Behavior at Delta College. (No. 13)

The situation at Delta college, one of two control sites in this study, illustrates
how deep across-the-board cutbacks can temporarily protect a campus from the political
and social disruptions often caused by harsher measures, but fail over all to prevent
faculty unrest. It also illustrates how, in the absence of harsh retrenchment, a nursing
faculty may ignore the activities of the general faculty which in this case culminated in a
job action and the censure of the chancellor over salary issues.

Introduction

Delta College experienced its most precipitous losses as a direct result of the
governor's 1983-84 revenue veto. One of three colleges in a district highly dependent on
state money. Delta sustained a 30% drop in revenue when district officials reduced its
operating fund blockgrant pending the restoration of state revenues to the district.
Despite this setback, the college maintained its full-time teaching staff and almost
all of its instructional programs, including a new career ladder program in nursing.
College subunits were obliged to cut their operating budgets, but the cuts, at roughly
10%, were proportional to the overall reduction in instructional outlay. Although barely
affecting units adequately funded, the new reductions nevertheless devastated units such
as the library where previous cutbacks had taken a serious toll.
Nursing, according to interviewees, remained remarkably unaffected by the
funding crisis. Used to making do, its members had low expectations for instructional
support, and accommodated easily to the new reductions by carrying over their previous
adaptations.

Few, in fact, voiced concern about the impact of cutbacks on the

instructional quality of the nursing program.
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Bagjcgrgmid
Delta College, a large suburban institution, is located in a sprawling community in
the vicinity of the state capitol and the farmlands of California's Central Valley region.
Although much of the economy is agriculturally based, Delta maintains a broad-based
curriculum typical of urban centers. Opened in 1955, the college moved to its present 153
acre location in 1958, and, in 1965, merged with Union City College to form the Big
Valley Community College District (BVCCD), The district, which eventually expanded
with a third campus and several outreach programs, is governed by a seven member
board of trustees.
For more than two decades, Delta College pursued a development program under
which it added more than a dozen buildings-including large complexes for instruction,
athletics, and student services. The program culminated in 1981 with the dedication of a
new bookstore. As its physical plant grew, the college expanded its curriculum with a
wide range of programs, many-including nursing-vocationally oriented.
Initiated in 1969 by a group of teachers transferred from Union City College, the
Delta nursing department became the second nursing department in the district Launched
on a shoestring, it operated for several years in the cramped, minimally-equipped quarters
of an old farmhouse on the outer edge of campus. Only later did it move to a small suite
in Delta's newly completed math/science complex--space it was obliged to share-and,
from there into a temporary building vacated by the bookstore. These early moves were
significant in that they helped to shape a perception shared by many department members
that Delta nursing enjoyed little more than stepchild status.

The transition to decline. Prior to 1983, The history of Big Valley governance
was one of unparalleled division and turmoil in which dissension on the board of trustees,
driven by personality clashes as much as policy differences, complicated the work of the
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board on all kinds of decisions. The fighting, which began when the district formed in
1965, continued for years, alienating a succession of chancellors, two of whom departed,
unable to deal with the rancor and discord (The Bee. April 1, 1979). In 1976, however,
the board hired Richard Grobstein as the district’s fourth CEO, and in a matter of months
he defused the feuding to achieve a period of relative calm.
During the respite, which was brief, the district underwent important changes in
management, governance, and finance. Grobstein, a self-described “district builder,”
completed the final phase of district expansion by building up the district staff to handle
the administrative work created by enrollment increases.
With the advent of faculty collective bargaining in 1977, three organizations—
CTA, CFT and FACCC—waged a vigorous campaign to represent the faculty. The CFT,
which enjoyed a reputation for being “pro-teacher,” narrowly won, but within months of
negotiating its first contract found itself confronted by the first of what became a series of
bitter decertification challenges (Glass, 1989).
In 1978, the BVCCD faced tax-limitation which, given its proximity to the state
capitol, drew district officials into a local political effort to counter criticisms of public
agencies made by the initiative's sponsors. In a particularly rash public relations move,
the BVCCD reduced its property tax rate prior to the vote.

Unfortunately, the ploy

backfired, when, after Proposition 13 locked in BVCCD revenues at a low level relative
to other districts (Rodda, 1986), the state set its the bail-out formula at a percentage of
prior-year base funding. Forecasts projected revenue losses of $12 million, a figure that
pushed the district, its reserves at a tenuous 9% level, into a state of organizational crisis
(The Bee. June 1, 1978; Gooder, 1984).
The board's immediate response was to declare a state of fiscal emergency.
Among other measures, Grobstein called for a massive layoff of classified workers, a
faculty workload increase, and a salary and benefit freeze for all employees.

Not

surprisingly, these measures drew heavy fire from the BVCCD's employee unions. The
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teachers' union, for example, under pressure to act strongly, declined to accept the
declaration, and later filed a lawsuit charging breech of contract (The Bee. June 27,
September 28, 1978).
Stunned by the reaction, the board temporarily backed off, and asked Grobstein to
reduce administrative personnel before other reductions were implemented (The Bee. June
8, June 22, 1978). The chancellor came back with a plan for a radical reorganization of
the district's administrative structure which called for abolishing numerous top executive
positions and returning numerous middle managers to the classroom.

The plan,

ultimately approved by the board in a 5:2 vote, precipitated a return to conflict that took on
racial overtones when Trustee Howard, the only African-American on the board,
criticized it for failing to meet the affirmative action requirement for advertising district
jobs to the public (The Bee. June 22, July 12, 1978). Howard followed with charges of
racial discrimination against the chancellor, and persisted in leveling additional racial
allegations to end the period of calm on the board (The Bee. October 7, 1985). The
trustees went on to resolve the crisis with help from a $6 million state bail-out, but not
before their old pattern reemerged to bring everything-district priorities, board rules, each
other’s behavior—under scrutiny. Discord grew and eventually culminated in a wellpublicized series of childish incidents amounting to a general breakdown of group civility
(The Bee. September 7, September 28, October 5, November 1, 1978; January 5,
February 27, April 4, 1979).
Ironically, tensions on the board worsened as the fiscal pressure dissipated. In
the aftermath, the trustees worked to tighten their grip over district policy and regain
power lost to the state through tax-limitation. In a series of decisions, they acted to limit
the authority o f the faculty and local administrators, and the opportunities for district
residents to influence board deliberations (The Bee. November 1, 1978; February 8,
1979). Later, they turned their attention to one another as they scrutinized each other's
activities for legal and ethical infractions (The Bee. June 14, 1979).
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As the situation on the board deteriorated, trustee civility and board stability
became the prime issues in the 1979 trustee elections (The Bee. October 22, 23, 24,
1979). Although the candidates raised other issues—program development, instructional
quality, student recruitment at Union City College-the challengers, who numbered 15 in
all and remained along with the media strongly focused on the civility issue, paid only
passing attention to district finances.

One challenger—Lester Wallace, a former

community college president—prevailed, as local residents returned three of the district's
more combative incumbents, including Howard, to office (The Bee. November 8, 1979).
Although the new board vowed after the election to seek stability, the dissension
continued and eventually engulfed the chancellor, leading to his departure. (The Bee.
November 8, 1979; January 17, 1980). Here the administrative experience of the newly
elected trustee played an important role. On learning that the trustees had never conducted
a formal evaluation of the chancellor, Trustee Wallace called for one as a matter of
procedure.

That action offended Grobstein, who was known for his sensitivity to

criticism. Forced by the board to wait outside as his performance was discussed in a
closed-door session, Grobstein responded with a public display of anger, and threatened
to resign.
The chancellor's public display fostered a realignment of the board. In the months
that followed, Wallace joined a long-time Grobstein critic and two other members to
successfully challenge the chancellor's tenure in a 4:3 vote (The Bee. November 26,
1980).

Believing his rights violated, Grobstein departed mid-year, and an acting

chancellor was named (The Bee. December 11, 1980).
Despite new reports of board incivility, the trustees moved quickly in a search for
a new chancellor, and in May, 1981 named Dr.

David Miller to replace Grobstein.

Miller, a seasoned administrator with a strong reputation in community college
administration, presented himself in a low-keyed manner that appealed to those who were
looking for a change from Grobstein's intense style. More importantly, Miller stressed as
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a first order of business his intention to restore civility to the board and decentralize
district authority while instituting governance sharing, positions that won him the support
of the faculty (The Bee. August 27,1981). District finances did not factor prominently in
the selection.
From the outset. Miller's efforts to impose order were impeded by Trustee
Howard who filed a lawsuit and formal complaints with two government agencies related
to alleged procedural violations in Miller's hiring. None of the actions succeeded (The
Bee. August 28. 1981).
Things changed in the fall of 1981 when fiscal trouble again loomed. Faced with
caps in growth funding, Miller acted decisively to assemble a task force of faculty and
administrators which he mandated to consult local businesses and community agencies on
funding priorities and sources (The Bee. October 29, 1981). The action helped to refocus
the press on policy issues and take attention off of the board itself. Nevertheless, board
stability was again an issue in the 1981 trustee elections. After a vigorous campaign, a
black attorney prevailed to become the second black on the board, effectively diminishing
Howard's power as the lone spokesman for racial issues (The Bee. November 4, 1981).
With that change, Miller was finally able to reestablish order. Much of his early
success related to the strong emphasis he placed on policy analysis which he expedited by
bringing in a researcher to generate data for framing district issues. As a faculty member
observed, “Miller knew just how to set everything up with his data-he worked on the
board members before they got to meetings.” Managing district problems proved more
difficult.

In the spring of 1982, as the district braced itself for growth caps and

defunding. Miller took a consultative approach, conferring with several district
constituencies. One of the measures recommended—fee increases—generated substantial
controversy, and failed for over six months to gain the necessary board approval (The
Bee. September 2, 1982).

During the impasse, district officials reviewed course

offerings in preparation for state defunding, the economic impact of which seemed likely
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to compound the district's growth funding losses--early forecasts pointed to a $3.2
million combined deficit (The Bee. April 29, 1982).
The controversy over fee increases stemmed in part from trustee frustrations that
had been building for some time which related to the board's role in budget decision
making. Several trustees complained about the proliferation of budget scenarios and
overly technical presentations made in budget deliberations (The Bee. April 29, 1982).
Sensing that these conditions eroded their power, the trustees' dug in their heels on the
fee increases, and declined to discuss Miller’s proposal. The action stalled a resolution on
the deficit.
To move the situation along, Miller changed strategies, and turned to the faculty
which had seen its expectations for empowerment dashed by the board's actions in the
wake of Proposition 13. Faculty discontent put the union, which, faced with threats of
decertification wanted to avoid a RIF, in a tenuous political position.

Miller took

advantage of that situation to negotiate a deal under which the district made a promise of
no full-time faculty layoffs in return for the union's agreement to table a scheduled 6%
salary increase (The Bee. July 13, 1982). Miller sold the arrangement directly to the
faculty, claiming it would “save faculty jobs.” The faculty acquiesced, and in June the
board approved the fee increases, and went on to adopt an austerity budget calling for a
massive reduction of course sections (The Bee. October 21, 1982).
Given their preoccupation with district finances, district officials made little
progress on Miller's promise of governance sharing during this period, and continued the
established pattern of faculty-administration relations which meant officers of the
academic senate were not included in district cabinet meetings, and were relegated to the
status of visitors at board meetings. District budget meetings continued as informational
forums—and controls were tight even on curriculum. “Miller would watch the ball go
back and forth and then bust the result!” a faculty observer noted. One new program did
gain approval-an LVN-to-RN career ladder program which was to be partially subsidized
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by local hospitals.
The situation at Delta College, where President Robert Benson involved the
faculty in college decision-making was somewhat better. As one observer put it, “Benson
tried to take what we [faculty] said into account.” The practical significance of those
efforts was questioned by several interviewees, however. As Dr.

Le Doh, dean of

science and allied health, pointed out, “What can the faculty do when the district says,
'Here's all the money we have!'“
Delta's system for setting spending priorities was to some extent collegial and
incorporated a college budget advisory committee with faculty representatives, a division
dean's council for middle-managers, and a series of “spokespersons’ groups” for
department managers, all of which assisted in ordering spending requests.

By most

accounts, the system was fair, although the nursing director claimed that subtle pressures
were applied to allied health administrators to use extramural resources which would free
general fund monies for other units.

The 1983 crisis. In July, 1983, the BVCCD faced another crisis, this time caused
by the governor's revenue veto anticipated to yield a $5 million deficit in a $59 million
budget. Miller appealed to burden-sharing as the cornerstone of his strategy. In August,
he announced that the district would make ends meet by cutting “a little bit every place,”
and followed with steps to reduce college blockgrants (The Bee. August 5, 1983, p. B3).
Somewhat later, he met with district constituencies, assuring them that the cuts would be
made “sensibly by the entire district community” (The Bee. October 6, 1983, p. A26).
An official of the California Community College Chief Executive Officers’
Association, Miller anticipated a quick resolution to the funding impasse. In his capacity
as a state leader, he spent substantial time at the state capitol personally lobbying
legislators. During the latter part of the summer, Miller repeatedly assured the BVCCD
board that a compromise was forthcoming, and based on his assurances, it finally passed
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an optimistic district budget, but one that included contingency proposals for large
reductions, if reductions proved necessary (The Bee. September 8, 1983).
Hopes for a resolution faded in October, however, as the district projected a
deficit of $6.3 million (The Bee. October 6, 1983). In a series of meetings, the trustees
deliberated on numerous proposals-closing outreach centers and athletic programs and
levying user fees for services—all of which brought loud outcries from the groups likely
affected (The Bee. October 20, 1993) The discussions continued through the trustee
elections.
The elections of 1983 focused on numerous issues—how to minimize the impact
of tuition, district priorities in the face of state funding changes, and the meaning of the
new harmony in board deliberations. A challenger charged the board with acting as a
rubber stamp for the chancellor’s policies, rejecting the incumbent’s claims that the board
had finally consolidated as a team. Trustee Howard, who had been a constant source of
friction, finally lost his seat to a challenger who had the support of the teachers' union and
numerous state lawmakers—the venerable community college educator and former state
senator, A1 Rodda. Rodda promised to use his knowledge to help the BVCCD respond
“critically and constructively” to its difficult fiscal situation (The Bee. October 25, 1983,
p. B 3).
After the election, the search for budget reductions became an all-consuming
focus. As hope continued to fade, district officials considered various options including a
plan to radically reduce student counseling, however, the threat of staff layoffs brought an
outcry from the district's faculties. Led by Nell Daniels, associate director of the Delta
nursing faculty, the Delta academic senate ratified a formal resolution opposing the
layoffs. Senate leaders offered to aid the district in a search for other alternatives.
In December, the board canceled the outreach programs, and approved a
contingency plan for cutbacks of $4.4 million that included possible academic program
terminations, none of which would affect nursing (The Bee. December 8, 1983).
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January, with no compromise in sight. Miller asked the board to declare a state of
emergency (The Bee. January 5, 1984). At the last minute, the board received notice of
the state compromise, and the crisis was averted (The Bee. January 19, 1984).

The aftermath. The Delta academic senate worked throughout the fall to prevent
professional staff layoffs, but as the situation worsened, members grew restive over other
changes such as forced split workdays.

In October, the BVCFT organized a faculty

march on the state capitol—and by February, with the tuition compromise in place, the
faculty was looking forward to an end to the salary freeze. Two semesters went by,
however, before the situation improved.
In early 1985, the board voted to raise administrator salaries, an action that had an
immediate negative impact on faculty morale, but which became an explosive issue later
when, in faculty contract negotiations, district officials offered the faculty only an
inflation adjustment

The negotiations, predictably, stalled.

Facing bankruptcy and

plagued by declining membership, the teacher's federation used the opportunity to call its
first job action. Tim Birklin, BVCFT president, asked later whether salaries were the
main issue, said, “That's what we said. When you're trying to build and organization,
you do what's necessary to save it.”

The teachers' federation, joined the district's

academic senates in organizing an informational picket and a boycott of all advisory
committees-hundreds of faculty participated, none from Delta nursing.

The climax,

however, came when, in late 1985, the BVCFT asked the faculties to submit a vote of noconfidence on the chancellor.

A vote was taken, and the result, which was never

announced, seemed certain to go against Miller. At the last minute, officials offered a
compromise, the insertion of a “trombone clause” calling for salary increases in
proportion to the future growth of district revenue into the faculty contract. They also
agreed to a contract-mandated shared-govemance committee at the district level.
Throughout the fiscal ups and downs, district reserves (ARP) rippled between
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five and ten percent of expenditures, and hovered around seven.

With conservative

management and deep across-the-board cutbacks, officials succeeded in avoiding financial
exigency, but years of service reductions and deferred maintenance took a very apparent
toll—campus libraries went understaffed and their collections became outdated, and cuts in
course sections brought district enrollment growth to a halt.

As Tom Lowell, Delta

admissions officer put it, “The facilities and equipment went to hell, our library resources
went totally down the tubes, and salaries eroded terribly, but we muddled through-this is
a conservative district—we've always minded our nickels.”

The Political Behavior of the Nursing Faculty

During these years, Delta nursing incurred only those cutbacks common to all
Delta programs. In 1983, the college conducted a comprehensive program review and
cost analysis in which nursing ranked second to bottom in WSCH per FTE. Despite that
poor showing. Delta officials made no proposal to terminate the department. Although
rumors of plans for consolidating occupational programs circulated, counseling was the
only unit actually proposed for downsizing. “In this district, programs that generate ADA
are like the husband who brings home the paycheck. Counseling doesn't—it's like the
housewife,” explained Lowell.
Thus, nursing retained a secure position in the Delta curriculum. As Ron Long,
dean of instruction, put it, “I think everyone recognized that nursing was a program that
was needed, and, just as important, that the hospitals were helping out.”

Lowell

amplified. “It was a program with prestige-the administration thought nursing did a lot
to raise the credibility of the college in the community,” he said.
Unthreatened by selective cutbacks, members of the nursing faculty adapted
primarily by accommodating to the fiscal pressures on their unit. Space was the primary
issue in 1982 and had been since 1979 when the department began planning its career-
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ladder program. In the intervening years, the members passed by good opportunities to
expand on site, primarily because they had become convinced that competing for space
against more powerful units would be a waste of time and energy. Luckily, the faculty
solved its problem with the unsolicited help of a trustee who had a personal interest in
nursing, and who, in 1980, took it upon herself to request new quarters for the
department In 1982, the nursing department moved into a newly remodeled temporary
building, but when the facility proved less than optimal, its members reacted by blaming
the administration. “Nursing has always been given second-hand--we get angry,” said
Tom Babcock, a nursing fundamentals teacher.
The issue of department facilities, in fact, reflected deep differences within the
group over how the department should solve its problems. Although most of the faculty
was unenthusiastic about engaging other units in a competition for space, Associate
Director Daniels had wanted the group to stand its ground. She alone dissented when the
group voted instead to move to the temporary building.

After that decision, she

terminated her tenure as associate nursing director, and for reasons described below, took
a position as a counselor in the Delta counseling department
Donna Potter, nursing program director, as the others, voted for the move. She
blamed the administration, which she viewed as overly influenced by nursing's WSCH
status, for the department's problems. “Math wanted our suite—those people get what
they want. Nursing has no leverage--we feel like poor step-children,” she said to the
researcher.
Many nursing staff members agreed. “Nursing is at the bottom of the list in terms
of clout,” said Lucille Horton, another nursing fundamentals teacher.

Babcock

concurred. “If you're not a money maker like P.E., you just sort of take what's left,” he
said. People outside the department contradicted that view, however. As evidence, they
pointed to a unique clause in the faculty contract exempting allied health programs from
district WSCH targets, which, in their view, gave nursing a privileged status, if not
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power.
When crisis overtook the district in 1983-84, the nursing budget, like most
instructional budgets, was trimmed ten percent

Don Long, the dean of instruction,

worked with the division deans to refine the amounts in some cases, and for fairness,
varied the cuts marginally so that some units lost slightly more and some slightly less than
ten percent. According to Long, nursing's cut was a straight ten percent-no less because
nursing had access to the resources of the hospitals.

Long denied that nursing's

extramural alternatives weighed heavily in the decision, but admitted they were a factor.
“We didn’t assume the hospitals were going to pick it up [the funding losses], but we
hoped they would,” he said.
The overall impact of the ten percent reduction proved hard to pin down, in part
because members’ opinions, derived from the vantage point of their position and role,
differed markedly.

From her managerial perspective, Potter saw the effects as

inconsequential. “We don’t have that big a budget, so ten percent doesn't mean that much
to us--it was business as usual,” she said.
Other people in the department painted a different picture. According to some of
the teachers, supplies and equipment suffered considerably.

Babcock, for example,

described the situation in the laboratory as critical. “It was embarrassing some of the stuff
we had to use for the students.”

Conservation was a major coping tactic.

Having

adjusted both to double-digit inflation and Proposition 13, Horton, the lead teacher in
nursing fundamentals recognized the value of stockpiling. “I'm retired military. I saw
the situation coming, and I over-ordered on everything.”
Indeed, Horton's colleagues credited her efforts with preserving the quality of
nursing's campus instructional program. “Lucille knew how to manage—she kept us
going,” said a teacher in the second year. Despite Horton's stockpiling and the district's
lab fee increases, recycling became a constant and necessary practice, and students were
often obliged to share disposable items. “We really had to make do and reuse until things
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finally fell apart,” Horton complained. “The lab fee goes into the college fund, and
doesn't come back to us,” Director Potter explained.
The faculty managed for a while to maintain its aging laboratory equipment and
other paraphernalia with a small annual allotment from the district's VEA monies. In
1984-85, however, a new Delta management team changed the funding policy, and
abruptly withdrew nursing’s VEA funds. At that point, nursing decided to give up its
NLN membership and redirect the money into its laboratory supply fund. Members also
accelerated their practice of soliciting supply donations from numerous sources, but never
resorte*1 to outright fundraising, as some Delta faculties did, or to asking the hospitals for
additional funds. “We really couldn't ask the hospitals for more help—they were having
problems of their own,” said Potter.
With no money for equipment, and the college's meager repair fund under central
control, the faculty found itself obliged to work with broken laboratory mannequins.
“We didn't have the money to fix them,” Potter explained. Further, they had to cut the
hours of the campus laboratory assistant for which the faculty gamely compensated by
taking students to the clinical facilities for simulation practice. ‘W hat saved us was the
clinical area,” said Horton. “It's not like being down at autobody where the students have
nowhere else to go!” explained Nell Daniels.
Despite such inconveniences, few of the department's teachers complained.
Those teaching the more advanced courses, for example, did not have to depend on the
campus laboratory, and found the situation decidedly less distressing than their colleagues
in nursing fundamentals. As Mary Ruiz, a second-year teacher put it, “The 10% cutback
didn’t have any meaning in my course.” Members adapted by reducing their expectations
for instructional support, which was particularly evident in the way they reacted to the
lack of funding for audio-visual teaching aids.

“AVs are so expensive.” said Betty

Edwards, “and our students don't really have time for them anyway.”
A major frustration for everyone, however, was the loss of faculty positions that
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occurred incrementally over the period. Nursing lost a total of three full-time positions,
including the position vacated by Daniels. To avoid compensatory enrollment reductions,
the department employed long-term substitutes. That practice, however, increased staff
turnover and reduced teaching continuity. The full-timers, moreover, resented having to
orient new substitutes each semester.
Throughout the years of decline, members regarded their inconveniences as a
temporary problem, and the situation of the district as deriving from state politics. “The
feedback we got was that the reason for the funding crisis was the governor's refusal to
do much for the community colleges,” said Potter. No one believed, at least in the early
years, that the department would face anything more than material austerity. “We were
producing their nurses,” said Ruiz, “We felt good that our program was needed.” The
challenge, as members saw it, was to make do for as long as possible, and wait the
situation out.
Expecting the situation to pass, members ignored the efforts and activities of their
faculty peers on the Delta campus and in the district at large. Few, for example, took part
in the faculty's march on the capitol or participated in the district's letter lobby campaigns,
or its boardroom debates over district priorities, which one nursing member described as
“a lot of hullabaloo that went nowhere.” They relied on Daniels, moreover, to represent
nursing on college governance bodies. “This faculty has a tendency to take care of the
students and go home,” explained Babcock. Ruiz agreed, “Our priorities just seem to lie
elsewhere.”
Daniels' left the unit in 1983, however, and at that point, the faculty lost its
campus spokesperson. Her absence created a vacuum in department leadership. Although
Potter continued to perform her executive duties, she did not attempt to take on the
political functions usually assumed by Daniels. “Donna doesn’t come from a political
base,” observed Dick Balducci, associate dean of behavior and social sciences, “She
prefers to work through the hierarchy.”
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In the spring of 1985, nursing's situation changed in a subtle but significant way.
Student applications began to drop as did graduate job placements. Further, there were
rumors of a nursing consolidation that worried some members who became anxious about
the implication for their jobs.

“We worried for a while about whether we would

eventually be closing,” said Ruiz. Later asked about what she and her colleagues did to
resolve their worries, she replied, “We kind of played it by ear—it [consolidation] didn't
happen.”
Faculty tension again increased when Delta administrators, under pressure from
district officials, began to question nursing's WSCH exemption. In 1985, the district
instituted a “formula hour” policy under which faculty members exempted from WSCH
targets were obliged to log their campus and clinical laboratory hours much as a worker
would punch a time clock. The purpose was to encourage compliance with laboratory
FTE requirements, but the faculty looked at the system as a form of harassment.
Undercurrents of dissatisfaction began to surface at that point as members took to
questioning among themselves Director Potter’s leadership.”

There's a lot of

undercurrent-a power struggle against Donna,” said Babcock, “I'm the type of person
who will support the boss, but sometimes I wish she'd push harder.”

Potter gave

indications that she was aware of her staffs dissatisfaction. Never directly addressing
their concerns, she countered the undercurrents by blaming the administration for the
department's problems. “Nursing has no leverage,” she said repeatedly. She also tried to
redirect the group's attention, and seized on an opportunity provided by an event in the
nursing profession-the anniversary of the American Nurses' Association's entry-topractice 1985 Resolution.

Ignoring what was happening locally, she focused the

faculty's attention on the entry issue and the future professional status of two-year
graduate in nursing, underscoring the issue, according to several on her staff, as the
premier contemporary problem of the nursing profession.

“Donna pushed it,” said

Babcock, “She says its about our future in associate degree nursing.”
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Early in 1985, Potter pressed her faculty into action by asking Vera Edwards, a
second-year instructor, to ask the Delta academic senate for a resolution of support for the
institution of AD nursing. That led to an awkward, and for the nursing unit, imagetarnishing situation. Unfamiliar with senate protocol, Edwards, made a stumbling request
that left her general faculty peers confused about the nature of the issue and her purpose in
coming to the senate for assistance. Daniels finally stepped in, but only after she came
forward did the body agree to act.

As Daniels observed, “It was like they [senate

members] wanted to know, Where've you [Edwards, nursing] been before this?'“
The incident, which coincided in time with the BVCFT job action, underscored
the nursing faculty's detachment from the college as an organization. It also embarrassed
Daniels who for years had worked to build an image of connectedness for the unit. “If
you don’t take part and let them [general faculty peers] know you’re there, they're not
going to support you when you need them,” Daniels lamented.
Delta's economic problems eased somewhat with an influx of money from the
state lottery. Daniels, by then in the counseling department, continued in her activist role
which had begun in 1969, shortly after the inauguration of the program. Daniels at that
time recognized a reluctance on the part of the general faculty to embrace new low-WSCH
programs. “W e were thrust upon them,” she recalled, “so I joined the senate to smooth
the way for nursing.” Daniels used her activities to educate the general faculty about
nursing. “For years I worked to correct a fallacy on this campus that nursing is Delta's
most expensive program,” she said. Along the way, Daniels-who eventually rose to
become president of the district senate-helped to secure the WSCH exemption for allied
health, but paid a price for her activism, by failing to gain the program directorship, a
position her tenure as associate director should have guaranteed. “I had been associate
director for over 10 years, and I knew all the ins and outs of the job,” she observed.
Daniels believed it was her activism that cost her the promotion. “The dean told me I
would never get the job while he was on campus because I was too assertive for him,”
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she related to the researcher.
After being passed over, Daniels did not curtail her activities, but renewed her
effort and went on to pursue higher levels of governance leadership. According to several
observers, Daniels showed a level of commitment unusual not only for nursing, but for
general faculty members as well. Daniels' personal loss unfortunately left her embittered.
“Nursing faculties are notoriously passive. That's not the way I define my professional
role, so I am the one that has come out from nursing and done all of these things, but the
others have been passive--they always hide behind the fact that they’re different,” she
observed.

She left nursing frustrated by Potter's refusal to deal with the realities of

campus politics. “There was no threat to the program as Donna saw it~you know
'Nursing was needed and therefore the administration would not do away with iL'“ she
said, referring to Potter's outlook as one of “arrogance.”
Potter, who was approaching retirement, continued to nurture her faculty's
frustration over the power disparity members collectively perceived between nursing and
the other college subunits. Potter was uncomfortable with Daniels activist tendencies,
and, clearly rejected Daniels' model, referring her somewhat disparagingly as “a person
who is involved in everything.” Others in the department also rejected Daniels' model.
As Edwards noted, “Nell cares a lot more about the college operation than the rest of us
do.” Horton underscored Edwards' sentiment. “Nell is very political-the rest of us in
nursing don't give two hoots for politics.”

Discussion

The case study of Delta College illustrates how, even under conditions of
institutional crisis, the absence of a perceived threat at the subunit level may serve to
support a faculty's prior mode of adaptation. In the case of Delta nursing, that meant that
faculty members passively accepted executive decisions about the place of their
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department in the institution.
A striking feature of district governance in this case was the pattern of incivility on
the board of trustees, which for several years complicated the district's efforts to deal with
decline and the shift of power to the state.

Fortunately, the community tired of the

situation, and voted for a change. Electoral turnover led eventually to executive turnover
and the leadership needed to stabilize the board and district as they faced a series of
challenges and fiscal crisis. The new chancellor, who preferred an across-the-board
approach to retrenchment, handled the district's fiscal crises with appeals for burdensharing, a tactic supported by the retrenchment literature. In 1982, he took advantage of
the faculty union's weak position to negotiate a salary freeze that staved off a budget
deficit, and he used the same appeal again in 1983 when the revenue veto threatened to
push the district into financial exigency. The district weathered both situations, but its
close calls took a toll on its willingness to compromise. The consensus for burdensharing gave way when district officials ignored the faculty's sacrifice yet gave the
administrators a salary raise. Cued by its besieged and self-interested union, the faculty
engaged in a job action, an unprecedented event that although avoidable, in the end
restored harmony by producing a sensible compromise.
Members of Delta nursing faculty did not take part in the job action, and in general
did not involve themselves in the governance activities of the college or district. Their
pattern can be understood as a reflection of their common viewpoint on nursing's place in
the institution. Miller et al. (1981) differentiated group identification, the process of self
location within a stratum of a society or an organization, from group consciousness which
is the process of identifying with group ideology as a way of establishing social position.
Members of the Delta nursing faculty, in an example of the former, shared a common a
perception of nursing's position in the college, which they believed was one of low
power. Based on that perception, they curtailed their participation in college decision
making, but when they failed to gain the benefits of participation, however, explained
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their losses as a function of nursing's corporate powerlessness, which became a selffulfilling pattern.
Another factor was low motivation. Members of the Delta nursing faculty did not
see their situation has a crisis, and were not bothered by the job insecurity found at some
of the other case sites.

Greenhalgh and Rosenblatt (1988) studied job insecurity in

groups, and noted that insecurity aroused perceptual defenses which blunt a group's
experience of threat.

They further found that those defenses are fostered by threat

situations lacking clear, unambiguous indicators. Although job threat clearly existed at
Delta, members of Delta nursing, including the director, did not experience that threat as a
serious one, arguably because some indicators, the chancellor's no-layoff promise, and
nursing's WSCH exemption, for example, contradicted others such as the rumors of
program consolidation, in the faculty's threat-severity equation.

Given the apparent

ambiguity of their situation, members had little cause to change their pattern.

Nursing Faculty Behavior_at Desert Flat College, (No, 35)

The situation at Desert Flat College, the second control site, illustrates how an
institution facing serious revenue losses can continue to expand its instructional programs
by using part-time personnel, while balancing its budget with deep across-the-board
economies in all areas. It also shows how the conditions created by an excessive parttime faculty buildup can politicize faculty groups such as nursing even in the absence of a
selective termination threat to their units.

Introduction

As the only college in a small but growing district, Desert Flat College fared better
than many institutions in this study. Although Proposition 13 rolled back its revenues

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

287
causing sizable short-term losses, the district had accumulated a multi-million dollar
building fund which made it possible to continue expanding instruction while managing
decline with across-the-board budget reductions.

College officials acted decisively,

setting a stringent personnel policy which featured part-time staff increases and a high
faculty FTE, and stemmed the growth of faculty salaries.
The nursing department, which experienced the full brunt of the part-time buildup
and heavy workload formula, was the unit most affected by these policies. Not only was
its FTE high, at 24 hours, but its ratio of students to full-time faculty-unmatched by the
other nursing programs in this study—see Appendix J—was extremely high.
The impetus for the part-time buildup in nursing was a district policy to expand
enrollment in programs attractive to students, one of which was nursing. Thus, between
1979 and 1984, the college more than tripled the number of students in the nursing
department—see Appendix L-but did so on a shoestring. Indeed, officials dramatically
enlarged the program without enlarging the full-time nursing faculty. Although part-time
teachers were hired to cover the increased in clinical workload, the full-time teaching
staff, which numbered six for a student body that grew to more than 200 students, was
obliged to absorb all other increases, including the added classroom teaching and student
evaluation.
The result was a morale-busting accumulation of demands that exhausted the fulltimers as they attempted to juggle their own clinical teaching responsibilities with their oncampus workload. As time passed, the full-timers began to chafe under the weight of the
heavy expectations placed on them by the college. “We were losing all of our creativity,”
recalled Sara Black, a second year teacher.
Eventually, they sought relief in the form of an FTE work-hour reduction, but
their requests were turned down by the administration. Frustration finally prompted them
to turn to Desert Flat's CTA-affiliated faculty council for help. The council took up their
cause, but failed to make headway on workload or faculty salaries, both of which were
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issues of concern to the general faculty. Finally, it seized on the 1987 trustee elections as
a vehicle for change. Its effort resulted in the unseating of two incumbents on the board
of trustees, and the new majority finally gave the nursing faculty a measure of the
workload relief it sought.

Background

Desert Rat College is a rural institution situated on the western edge of Mojave
Desert in the high-desert country east of the San Bernardino Mountains of Southern
California. Its 280 acre campus is physically one of the largest in the state system, and
the district it serves, established in 1960, is likewise large, spanning more than 2200
square miles. The town in which the college resides, which is known for its libertarian
political culture, is a hub for regional commerce but also serves as a bedroom community
for the urban industrial areas to the west (Homor, 1989).
Long a peaceful retreat for retirees, the district’s younger population surged in the
1970s to create new demands on public services, including education. That prompted
district officials to expand the college's facilities. Thus, in 1979, the college opened a
new vocational complex, in 1981 a performing arts center, and, in 1983 a new structure
to house allied health—which by then was an important feature of the Desert Rat
curriculum.

Transition to decline. Prior to tax limitation, Desert R at was a quiet, peaceful
institution with a tranquil atmosphere that reflected the unhurried, relaxed ways of its rural
setting. Unique among the sample colleges, Desert R at stood out for its informality. For
years, in fact, the college operated with a loosely organized social network that substituted
for the advisory bodies found at other colleges, and seemed to nurture a relaxed
environment in which the teachers enjoyed an unusual level of freedom. According to
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several interviewees, members of the faculty prized the individual discretion they
exercised in academic matters. So strong was the value placed on autonomy that the
academic senate failed to attract faculty interest, and depended year after year on a small
group of activists to keep it going. In 1977, however, the activists turned their attention
to collective bargaining, and combined the senate with Desert Flat's new CTA-affiliated
faculty council.
As in other districts, fiscal conditions declined after Proposition 13.

Officials

managed the revenue losses--31% in 1978-79-by cutting course sections which resulted
in a 26% drop in headcount (California Community Colleges, 1980). Within a year,
however, the college resumed growing and restored its building program.

“We had

losses, but we still managed to bring in a new building every three years funded enurely
by the district!” boasted Charles Larsen, Desert Flat's planning director.
Enrollment peaked in 1981-82. Although defunding and the revenue veto also
took a toll on district resources, they did not overwhelm district operadons. “We took a
little beadng with the hit list, but we just hunkered down to weather the storm,” observed
Larson, whose nonchalance belied Desert Flat's 49% cumuladve losses.
Members of the faculty also weathered the transition with apparent ease. Many of
them in fact seemed to regard the college building fund as a source of reserve monies. As
Ed Lewin, a biology teacher, observed, “Even when Prop 13 came along and the general
fund got dght--we all knew that with the building fund, we were in basically good
financial shape.” That idea seemed to buffer the threat of declining revenue, and as a
result, the events at the state level did not touch life at Desert Flat.

According to Janet

Wirt, the head librarian, “We focused on local issues—people here don't care much about
what goes on in Sacramento.” Thus, the climate of crisis that existed at other campuses
was did not develop at Desert Hat.
Subde changes in atmosphere did occur, however. As Jeff Walker from biology
recalled, “District officials did a good job until '81 when they decided they were really
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going to save money. They'd go to meetings up north and pretty soon they were difficult
to talk to.” Walker's reference was to members of the upper administration, and to
changes in administrative policy. In 1981, Ben Goodfellow, Desert Flat CEO, and James
Lynch, the budget manager, established new cost-controls, capping supply budgets,
monitoring purchase requests, and filling positions with part-time personnel.

Their

personnel policy in the span of a few years increased the proportion of part-timers at
Desert Hat from 44% to 56% of the teaching staff (Community Colleges, 1980,
September; 1984, May).
At first, faculty morale did not suffer, but a series of coincidental changes
followed that eventually took a serious toll. In 1983, Goodfellow retired, and Lynch
quite his job, departing the college.

Thereafter, the institution underwent a period

turbulent executive tumover-indeed, three presidents and four vice presidents between
1983 and 1986. “We had basic organization problems—it was chaotic for a while,” Lewin
noted. The situation was brought on, not by the fiscal situation, but by personality
clashes in the executive cabinet which had a disorganizing effect on the college.

To

correct the problem, the board of trustees first tried to micro-manage the institution's
business, and when that failed, acted to reform the cabinet The turnover finally ended in
the fall of 1986 when a new CEO succeeded in restoring the harmony.
Before order resumed, however, the new administrators instituted changes that
transformed the way business was done at the college. First, they formalized decision
making, reviving the college’s advisory committee system, and then they tightened the
budgeting process by initiating a program of long-range fiscal planning. For the first
time, the college required all instructional units to submit written budgets, an action that
put new demands on middle managers and faculty. As Jean Riley, allied health dean,
noted, “I never had to do a budget when Ben was here-I had to learn from scratch!”
The changes were largely unwelcome. Members of the faculty resented the new
system, which many viewed as an encroachment on their traditional autonomy.
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“Everybody here was going to committee meetings, and doing all these things they had
never done for years!” Riley observed.
It was during those y ears-1983- 1986—that faculty morale dropped, and faculty
frustration first emerged. In 1984, the CTA faculty council undertook a salary review
which showed Desert Flat salaries seriously eroded. That prompted the faculty council to
press for increases.

In a series of negotiations, however, officials of the district

steadfastly declined to consider its demands. Finally, in the fall of 1987, after several
semesters with no contract, the council asserted itself with an electoral strategy to unseat
incumbent trustees. Its officers met with civic leaders and local business people to gain
their support, and organized door-to-door neighborhood walks, and a faculty picket of the
college which was unprecedented in Desert Flat's history. The effort was successful.
The incumbents were defeated, and within weeks a new majority acceded to a large pay
increase and one-hour reduction in faculty workload.

The Political Responses of Nursing Faculty

The expansion of nursing and allied health came at a time when the demand for
program graduates was regional and strong.

According to numerous interviewees,

Norma Werner, former division dean, convinced Desert Flat officials to expand the
curriculum to meet the demand. Thus, the college began a buildup in nursing, and two
years before Proposition 13, added programs in respiratory therapy and emergency
medical services. As Larson, district planning director, noted, “Norma was a real gogetter—she was very expansion-minded.” Nursing proved to be a big student attraction,
which resulted in its remarkable growth. Indeed, at the time of this study, the program
was prominently featured in a booster pamphlet published by the regional chamber of
commerce, and remained Desert Flat's vocational centerpiece.
By the time of this study, nursing's growth had stopped. The rapid expansion
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begun in the late 1970s slowed dramatically in 1984 when conditions in the health service
job market changed. At that time, Werner departed Desert Flat, leaving her legacy to
others, and shortly after her departure, the growth of the allied health programs also
stopped. “Norma built up our programs, but after she left, we mostly just maintained
them,” said Jean Riley, who assumed Werner's position, and the problems of maintaining
an overgrown division.
It was Riley who recognized that conditions no longer supported expansion.
Nursing's waiting list was shrinking, and she saw that it had become a struggle to keep
its class seats filled. With college finances uncertain, Riley initiated an LVN-to-RN career
ladder program as a means to reduce the pressure on her department That innovation
served the local hospitals, but also helped to minimize the affects of student attrition in her
division.
As a study participant Riley was less than candid about the conditions in her
department She minimized, for example, the impact of revenue decline on her division.
“The administration gave me everything I wanted-they knew I wouldn't ask for the
moon!” she said to the researcher. In fact she gave the impression that conditions were
adequate, if not ideal, and failed to mention the years of roll over budgets and double-digit
inflation that had left the department with supply and personnel shortages. “We didn't
have any cuts in nursing,” she assured the researcher.
Impact of expansion on the faculty. A year after the initial inquiry to Riley, the
researcher finally contacted members of the nursing faculty. At that time, an entirely
different picture emerged—one of understaffing, serious supply shortages, and a faculty
demoralized by extreme productivity pressure.

Indeed, the first member interviewed

questioned why the researcher had chosen the Desert Flat program as a control site.
“We've had all kinds of cuts here. Some of us who teach full-time feel that our loads are
very, very heavy-I just thought you should know that,” reported Sara Black.
From the faculty's point of view, the situation was grim. In addition to the on-
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campus work increases, members reported an upward creep in their clinical teaching ratio,
which by then exceeded 1:14, the highest in this study's sample. Further, a lack of
ancillary personnel forced them to do their own secretarial and laboratory management
tasks such as typing, Xeroxing, supply inventories—activities, that took time away from
teaching.
In addition, the administration was unrelenting in the pressure they applied for
workload increases. “We were told again and again that we had to increase, increase,
increase! Our department is only slightly under the college average, but the administrators
still hold WSCH over our heads!” said Susan Ehlers, a first-year faculty member.
“We've had to turn to our part-timers for the energy we need.” “They just kept inching us
closer and closer to their definition of a full load~we knew that they were taking
advantage of us,” Sally Green, another first-year member, observed.
Material austerity was another problem. Years of double-digit inflation seriously
reduced the unit’s buying power, and its roll-over budget had to be spread thinner and
thinner. At first nursing's capital purchases ceased, but eventually supplies were hard to
come by.

That forced the faculty to stockpile supplies, and use their inventories

sparingly. “We reused, reused, and reused!” noted Black.
Nursing faculty actions. Difficult work conditions, and the growing perception
that they were being exploited by the administration seriously demoralized several
members of the group. A few individuals indeed grew quite bitter. “The administration
never gave us credit for all the meetings the state forces us to attend.

That violates

policies in the faculty handbook!” Green observed.
Overwork became a constant theme in faculty meetings. As conditions worsened,
members regularly implored Riley to press the administration for workload relief. “Over
and over we asked her to explain our needs to the administration,” recalled Ehlers. These
exhortations never produced results, however. Riley repeatedly returned to her division
with excuses for the pressure or with explanations as to why the workload reductions
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members asked for were not possible.
In fact, Riley identified with the administration.

“I’m management!” she

volunteered to the researcher numerous times. Indeed, as a division dean, she was a
member of the upper administration, and as such one of the highest ranking nursing
administrators in the sample. Riley's position put her in an awkward situation. She
knew the demands of her faculty would put her in conflict with her executive peers if she
pushed them, so she refrained from making requests she knew they would not support.
“We have an FTE of 24 hours with our clinical lab,” she said, “I think it should be
lowered, but that's expensive to do!

I have to side with the administration,” she

explained to the researcher.
Riley used her personality to deal with the situation. A veteran of several years at
Desert Flat, Riley enjoyed the professional respect of her peers, and the goodwill of
people in and outside of her division.

Even her faculty acknowledged her for the

determination she showed in keeping the program going.

Nearing retirement, Riley

shrewdly used her personal influence to deflect the conflicting pressures put on her in her
role as division dean. Instead of pushing for a workload reduction, she appealed to her
teachers to cooperate with the administration's goals. If her teachers complained, she
would respond with emotional displays. “Our director takes things in faculty meetings
personally,” noted Black. “Sometimes she'll start crying, and we have to say, Jean, this
isn't about you!” In administrative meetings, on the other hand, Riley deflected challenges
from her peers by drawing attention to the long hours her staff put in, and by boasting
about how hard her teachers worked.
Riley's strategy was to comply with the administration, but she was not alone in
her preference for going along to get along. Indeed Diane Glen, the associate nursing
program director, defended Riley on the workload issue.

Unlike the other nursing

members for whom fairness and workload equity were major concerns, the concern Glen
articulated was for job security.

“I have young children, so I guess weekends.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

295
Christmas, and summers are important to me. I guess I look at the alternative, which is to
go back to work in the hospital for $ 10 an hour,” she reported to the researcher. Several
of the interviewees, however, suspected that she had administrative ambitions and hoped
to get Riley’s job.
The situation in nursing climaxed in 1987. After years of waiting for workload
relief. Black and the other full-timers concluded that they needed to try a new strategy.
As she noted, “In many ways, Jean's a good boss, but there's been no help in relieving
the pressure on us!” Green, her colleague, was more succinct. “Jean's on the fence,” she
said. Thus, they turned to the faculty council. “We finally realized that things needed to
go to our CTA,” said Green.
The transition was awkward at first. The nursing faculty had in fact never been
involved in the campus social network. “The people in nursing kept to themselves and
didn't get involved in much!” reflected Lewin from biology. Indeed, most of its members
had not bothered to join the CTA. That made it awkward to reach out and join the union
in a time of need. Dick Lowell, faculty council president, however, understood what was
happening, and took matters in hand. He invited individual teachers to become involved.
“We worked on the nurses to come on over!” he said.
Some members, fearing that Riley would not understand, hesitated at first. Riley
had often referred to the faculty council leaders as “rabble rousers,” and Black, Green,
and Ehlers worried that by going to the union, they would heighten tensions in the
department To some extent they were correct.

The tension did increase, but was

partially defused by avoiding the workload in faculty meetings. As Green noted, it had
become a “ticklish” issue. Riley, however, to their surprise, articulated support for their
decision. “It's the only way they’re ever going to get what they want,” she explained to
the researcher.
The faculty council officers, for their part, welcomed the nurses.
considered the participation of the nursing faculty a boost for the union.

Lowell,

“Before the
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nurses came over and joined us, Riley could get away with claiming that things were fine
with her nurses! After her teachers broke and came with us—allied health is a good chunk
of our faculty-the administration could finally see this problem was universal!” he
observed. Lowell believed that Riley’s boasting made it easier for district officials to
dismiss the union's demands for workload relief. As he observed, “I love Jean, but she
talks up her nurses-you know, 'My nurses do this, my nurses do that!’- a s if there
wouldn't be any of these troubles if the rest of us would just work as hard as they did.”
In October, 1987, the union implemented its electoral strategy with a get-out-thevote campaign. Members of the nursing faculty worked side-by-side with their general
faculty peers to picket the college and go on door-to-door walks where they influenced
district voters to support the union's candidates. “We went all over town and basically
told people how to vote,” laughed Green. With the election of new board members,
nursing got a one-hour FTE reduction, but also another important benefit. By the end of
the campaign, the nursing teachers had became full participants in the social and political
organization of the campus. As Lowell put it, “The election brought the nurses into our
group—they're no longer looked at as a separate entity.”
No doubt Riley's tactics benefited her department, especially in the turbulent years
of administrative turnover at Desert Rat. By talking about the her faculty’s long hours
and hard work, she kept the spotlight on nursing as a cost-efficient operation, and that
message got across to the cabinet executives. As Larsen, the vice president for planning,
emphasized to the researcher, “Our nursing unit at Desert Rat is net expensive!”

Discussion

Removed from the political and economic turbulence at the state level, Desert Rat
College did not descend into economic crisis, but in fact expanded in certain areas while
managing decline with deep across-the-board economies and stringent personnel policies
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that had a particularly harsh impact on the nursing department.
Those policies eventually cost officials the good will of the faculty, which
eventually fell back on the electoral process to achieve its goals. In that strategy, the
Desert Flat faculty was not unique, as the preceding cases confirm.

Ernst (1985)

observed that faculties increasingly employed adversarial strategies as collective
bargaining spread, and the economic conditions of community colleges deteriorated.
The most difficult aspect of decline for the nursing faculty was the part-time staff
buildup. The full-timers objected to it because they believed it put the burden of growth
on them. Such a perspective is not unusual. Jackson (1988), for example, noted that
full-time teachers often feel over-burdened by the increased work created in a system that
relies on part-time staff. Further, the frustration they experienced is also not uncommon.
Hartleb and Vilter (1986) in fact pointed out that while the use of part-time personnel
produces a short-term gain in efficiency, it does so at a cost to faculty good-will and long
term productivity.
Frustrated by perceived overwork, the full-timers in the nursing department
complained to their director who in turn cast her lot with the administration. According to
Staw el al. (1981) a clash of perspectives not uncommon between faculties and their
overseers. In this case, the full-timers were concerned about instructional excellence and
their own welfare, while the director was concerned about program continuity and the
fiscal solvency of the college. To achieve their goal, the full-timers joined the union in its
campaign to change budget policy at Desert Flat. As Bahrawy (1992), adroitly pointed
out, governance participation is never more important than in times of decline.

Summary of Findings from the Selected Sites

This chapter focused in depth on six community colleges, diverse in size,
structure, and location, during a unique period of California history, 1982-1987, when
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the community colleges were struggling with the economic and political consequences of
Proposition 13. The purpose of these studies was to illuminate the fiscal and social
conditions that prompted administrators at some institutions to propose nursing programs
for termination, and to describe the behavior of nursing faculties in response to local
retrenchment policies.
The years of this study, 1982-1987, were years of unprecedented economic
volatility in the community college system. Policy changes at the state level threatened the
financial and social stability of colleges throughout the system. The six selected sites
were no exception. Indeed, funding changes initiated by Proposition 13, and accelerated
by later events, caused major problems at all six selected sites. As Table 33 illustrates,
each institution underwent years of financial decline during which officials were under
immense pressure to redirect their institutions.
Notably, all six districts had unique financial and organizational circumstances that
affected their ability to withstand decline. District-to-district differences in local revenue,
costs, expendable assets, and reserves shaped their post-tax limitation conditions,
determined the size of their losses, and to a large extent, their capacity to withstand
decline. For example. Pine Hill College resided in a multicollege district with a 54% ARP
in 1978. It avoided major restructuring until 1983 when the district, then with reserves of
22%, undertook a controversial, and some said coercive, WSCH contract program.

In

contrast. Delta College resided in a district with only 9% reserves in 1978, but managed
decline throughout the period with across-the-board economies. Thus, it is difficult to
generalize on the links between the fiscal conditions and administrative strategies, except
to say that some of the districts acted more conservatively than others.
Although all six districts anticipated decline and initiated economies to offset their
losses, the timing and pace of financial adaptation varied, as did the financial and social
conditions under which they made their changes. Nonselective cutbacks were common,
but as revenues continued to fall, some institutions showed a shift in values and opted for
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a selective strategy. Thus, officials at Arroyo, Palomino, Pine Hill, and Los Angeles all
made plans to restructure whereas officials at Delta and Desert Rat avoided selective
cutbacks, even in times of fiscal crises. Thus, institutional values and the priorities of

Table 33
Summary of Selected Sites
Selected Sites
Desert
Flat
Small
Large
Rural
SingleCol

Arroyo

Palomino

Pine Hill

Los Angeles

Delta

College Size
Nsg Program Size
Location
District Type

Small
Small
Suburban
Single-Col

Large
Large
Urban
Single-Col

Moderate
Moderate
Suburban
Multi-Col

Very Large
Varied
Urban/Suburb
Multi-Col

Large
Small
Suburban
Multi-Col

Revenue 1978-84
Total Change
Prop 13
Growth caps
Defund/Veto

(28%)
(24%)
1%
(5%)

(25%)
(14%)
(6%)
(5%)

(49%)
(19%)
(17%)
(13%)

(43%)
(17%)
(22%)
(4%)

(22%)
(13%)
(7%)
(2%)

(49%)
(31%)
(11%)
(7%)

Spending 1978-84
Total Change
Propl3
Growth caps
Defund/veto

(40%)
(29%)
(4%)
(7%)

(28%)
(17%)
(2%)
(9%)

(49%)
(15%)
(19%)
(15%)

(37%)
(14%)
0%
(23%)

(33%)
(21%)
(8%)
(4%)

(22%)
(23%)
6%
(5%)

21%
15%
12%

12%
11%
8%

54%
22%
9%

24%
(1%)
(1%)

9%
7%
5%

36%
12%
12%

Crisis year(s)

1981-2

1982-3

1983-4

1985-6. 86-7

1983-4

1986-7

Retrenchment
Strategy

Proposed
Prog.term.

Enacted
Prog.term.

Suggested
Prog.term.

Enacted
Prog.term.

Nonselective

Non
selective

Program
term/
Public
consensus

Costcutting/
Union
salary
concessions

Program
efficiency

Program term/
Cost-cutting/
State policy
change

Cost-cutting/
Org.unity

Growth
support

Nursing Response

Anti-term.
coalition

Anti-term.
coalition/
Electoral
action

Anti-term.
coalition

Anti-term.
coalition/
Electoral
action

Accommodatio
n

Electoral
action

Policy Outcome

Complete
reversal

Partial
reversal

No term
proposed

Partial reversal

Status quo

Work
condition
improve
ment

Reserves
1978 ARP
Pre-crisis ARP
Lowest ARP

Goal
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decision makers shaped the manner in which the selected sites reacted to economic events.
At three of the sites-Arroyo, Palomino, and Pine H ill-a dramatic change in
values, away from educational idealism and toward economic efficiency, was evident
Officials anticipated decline well before the institution's reserve levels had dissipated to
emergency levels.

Although their precise objectives were different in each case, all

elected to change the priorities that guided their institution’s spending decisions. Thus, at
Arroyo College, the board of trustees wanted to pull back from their comprehensive
curriculum; at Palomino, the aim was to keep the faculty union in check as the institution
adjusted to lower revenue; and at Pine Hill, officials wanted to stem the drain of rapid
enrollment growth on district reserves.
In each of these cases, officials reacted by hiring new executives to redirect the
institution's priorities. In search efforts that excluded faculty and other internal groups,
they sought individuals with skills tailored to the task. In each case, they hired new
managers who lacked broad experience but had the narrow management skills needed to
advance the financial priorities of the organization. These individuals expedited change
by tightening control at the top of the organization, usually with planning arrangements in
which the faculty and other groups were relegated to token roles. These arrangements
allowed the officials to dominate decision-making, but, ironically, weakened their ability
to resolve fiscal crisis when they occurred. Thus, as crises arose, administrators in each
case found it necessary to use harsh, coercive measures to achieve their financial
objectives, in an overall approach Mason (1985) referred to as an abuse of excessive
rationalism.
Although the pattern in the Los Angeles district was different in some ways, it
was similar in others. Having adopted the rhetoric of reorganization, the officials in Los
Angeles where more interested in preserving the status quo and thus perpetuated gross
inefficiencies which rendered the district as a whole vulnerable to decline. Forced by
intense political pressure to abandon their long-established pattern of district expansion.
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the officials finally opted to restructure, but with procedures as high-handed as those of
the other districts, they, too, promulgated policies that invited resistance from their
constituencies.
Eventually, all four districts faced huge deficits, and proposed to resolve them
with targeted cutbacks to nursing and other areas. In each case, the selection of nursing
was justified on the basis of the high cost of nursing programs, but appeared to have
political as well economic objectives. Indeed, public persuasion appeared to be part of the
agenda in each case. At Arroyo, for example, the nursing proposal was part of an effort
to move public opinion in favor of canceling an athletic program; at Palomino, it was part
of a plan to force the union to accept a salary or workload concession. At Pine Hill, the
objective was to gain public acceptance for continued institutional cutbacks, and at Los
Angeles, to enlist government support for increased district allocations.
In contrast, the officials at Delta and Desert R at showed a firm commitment to
nonselective measures. They too fostered a top-down policy approach, but did display
the dramatic shift in values evident at the other sites.

In both institutions, the officials

made strenuous efforts to balance economic with educational priorities. For example, the
board of trustees in Delta’s district, while struggling with its own internal problems, hired
a new CEO with broad administrative experience to run the district.

Although he

maintained tight economic control, he tempered his approach with a demonstrated concern
for the human resources of the institution. By engaging the faculty in a humane cutback
policy based on shared sacrifice, he fostered conditions that preserved the financial and
social integrity of the institution for several years.
Likewise, at Desert Rat, the executives managed with deep across-the-board
cutbacks and selective growth to build revenue.

Despite the unpopularity of the

institution's part-time instructor policy, the faculty as a whole remained cooperative until a
series of new administrators invoked procedural changes encroaching on the teachers'
traditional autonomy. Thereafter, the faculty union pressed for demands that resulted in a
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negotiation impasse, and ultimately an electoral campaign to unseat incumbent trustees.
At Delta and Desert Flat, the executives demonstrated a sensitivity to value of
nursing as a student attraction. Indeed, at Desert Rat, the nursing program became the
centerpiece of a strategy to build resources by expanding popular programs.

The

administrators in both cases clearly viewed nursing as an organizational asset rather than
an economic liability. Committed to nonselective cutbacks, they did not display a need to
deal with perceived or real economic crisis by using high-cost programs as pawns in an
effort to manipulate public opinion.
The question posed in this study was whether or not community college nursing
faculties would act to influence the policies responsible for their circumstances. The case
data showed that faculties five of the six nursing faculties studies did challenge those
policies that threatened the survival of their programs, their jobs, or the standards they
perceived essential to their job performance.
Thus, the nursing faculties at Arroyo, Palomino, Pine Hill, and in the Los
Angeles district all organized anti-termination campaigns to prevent enactment of district
termination recommendations, and succeeded in achieving a partial or complete reversal of
the policy proposal.
In each case, they operated on theories about their circumstances.

Although

recognizing that program cost made nursing a conspicuous target, they also suspected
other reasons for the district's proposal. Thus, members theorized that gender bias,
political expedience, or a tendency on the part of administrators to devalue nursing as an
academic pursuit, were the actual basis of nursing termination proposals. Litde evidence
supported these claims, however, which are probably best understood as the judgmental
outlook of groups whose survival is threatened.
More interesting, however, was the effort at Desert Rat, where the nursing faculty
was not threatened by termination, but nevertheless challenged the across-the-board
policies of its district Members of the Desert Rat nursing faculty believed that a district
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policy to expand the nursing department by employing part-time instructors unfairly
exploited their full-time status, and threatened the quality of their program. They pushed
for change by joining with members of the faculty union in an electoral effort to unseat
incumbent trustees which eventually resulted in a workload reduction.
At Delta College, where the nursing faculty also felt exploited, but, in the absence
of crisis, resisted governance participation, members, following the model of their
program director, coped by accommodating decline.
Chapter VI, which follows, will summarize the findings of the research, present
conclusions, and discuss the implications of this study for future research.
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CHAPTER VI

THE POLITICAL BEHAVIOR OF CALIFORNIA COMMUNITY COLLEGE
NURSING FACULTIES IN RESPONSE TO BUDGET CUTBACKS, 1982-1987:
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, IMPLICATIONS

Introduction

This chapter presents a summary of the methods and findings of the statewide and
selected site studies, accompanied by the conclusions to be drawn, and discusses the
implications of the findings for nursing education and future research.
This study is exploratory and descriptive in nature. Using a two-phase qualitative
design, it looked broadly at the political behavior of nursing faculties in response to
resource decline in California community colleges. In phase one it examined 38 programs
statewide to identify the impact of resource decline on nursing programs and describe the
responses of nursing faculties to their cutback circumstances. In phase two, it focused on
six selected sites for a more detailed view of the circumstances and events surrounding
resource decline, as well as the perspectives, attitudes, theories, and actions of nursing
faculty members as they reacted to local administrative strategies and their impact on
nursing programs.
Both phases incorporated numerous methodologies.

Phase one employed

surveys, interviews, and document review as principal research tools, while phase two

304
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employed these methods and newspaper accounts, and, in the case of one large, multi
college district, limited participant observation.
The data from the statewide and selected site studies were analyzed in light of the
conceptual framework outlined in Chapter I.

To reiterate, the conceptual framework

combined a model of cutback management and a model of crisis perception in
organizations with authoritative ideas on the activation of political behavior. It stipulated
that as organizations confront severe resource decline, strategies used by officials to deal
with fiscal stress often invite dramatic changes in institutional governance.

Those

changes, characterized by competition, crisis, and social conflict, often serve to activate
political behavior.

Summary of Findings from the Statewide Study

Resource Decline

Thirty-three community college districts diverse in size, structure, and location,
constituted the sample in this study. As the findings of the document review show, all of
the districts reported a decline in their real dollar income during the period of this study.
Indeed, seventeen districts suffered severe cumulative losses as defined by Sibolski's
(1984) revenue criterion. However, the average losses for the period of defunding and
the revenue veto, at 6.24%, were far less than the precipitous 17.45% decline incurred
immediately after Proposition 13. Those losses, however, were devastating nonetheless,
coming as they did at a time when many districts had already spent down their reserves.
The fiscal indicators employed in this study showed 1982-84 to be the most fiscally
stressful years. Although the financial situation began to improve after 1984, conditions
in a some districts continued to worsen.
To address decline, all of the districts in this study cut spending, at least
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temporarily. Indeed, expenditure reductions were the primary means available to local
officials seeking to balance their budgets after Proposition 13 shifted funding authority
shifted to the state. As the data show, the size and pattern of retrenchment varied from
district-to-districL Some districts acted in a highly conservative fashion, acting early to
cut spending more than the amount required to balance revenue losses; others balanced
their losses on a year-by-year basis, while some tried to preserve the status quo by relying
heavily on reserve funds to cover budget deficits. Indeed, reserve consumption was a
common finding. A majority of districts (N = 22) enjoyed reserve levels of 15-20% or
more in 1978, but chose to reduce them substantially during the years of this study.
Despite that trend, only ten districts reached a state of severe decline as defined by the
reserve criterion set in this study—which, to reiterate was two or more consecutive years
of reserve levels (ARPs) five percent (5%) or lower. Unlike the revenue indicators which
define fiscal stress, reserves more precisely set the parameters of financial exigency, the
state in which authorities agree restructuring is justified.

Administrative. Strategy

As the findings showed, most institutions avoided severe decline as defined by the
reserve criterion. In most cases, spending reductions were critical to restoring their fiscal
balance. The administrators in many districts made across-the-board economies in which
they reduced plant maintenance and noninstructional student services, froze hiring, cut
funds for faculty travel and sabbaticals, reduced capital outlay, and even reduced
spending for instructional materials and supplies. In some cases, the administrators also
undertook selective program termination and faculty layoffs.
Nursing programs, as an expensive aspect of the occupational curriculum, were
not excluded from these strategies. Indeed, none of the programs in this study (N = 38)
escaped the impact of resource decline, and, in fact, all of the programs experienced the
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effects of one or more nonselective economies. Seventy-eight percent (78%) received
reduced funds for instructional materials, 88% for supplies, and 91% for capital outlay;
29% reported support staff reductions, and 58% experienced faculty reduction by
attrition.

Some programs, moreover, were singled out for selective retrenchment.

Indeed, twelve nursing programs (#1, 2, 5, 6, 10, 22, 27, 28, 34, 38, 39, and 40) were
targeted for termination or downsizing. Only half (6) of these, however, resided in
districts where the criterion of financial exigency was met. In fact, the reserve levels
reported by their parent districts ranged from 15% to -3, with several reporting double
digit ARPs. This suggests that impending financial exigency is only one explanation for
administrative strategies that target nursing programs.

The Political Behavior of Nursing Faculties

The data showed that nursing faculties responded to local cutback policies with
political behavior that varied in character and complexity according to the retrenchment
circumstances in which they found themselves. Two distinct patterns, accommodation
and contention, were apparent.
Accommodation, a pattern comprised of resource conservation and substitution,
fund-raising, and curriculum adjustment tactics, was used by nursing faculties to stretch
declining resources as they attempted to comply with or incrementally adjust to budget
reductions. Accommodation predominated under circumstances in which administrators
made cutbacks according to an across-the-board strategy that applied reductions more or
less evenly to all instructional units.
Accommodation proved attractive to nursing faculties for a number of reasons,
among them that most nursing faculty members perceived resource decline as unavoidable
and temporary, and derived from conditions external to the institution. Because members
regarded across-the-board strategies as fair, they were eager to support the retrenchment
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goals of their institutions. The availability of alternative resources or substitutes for items
reduced by budget cutbacks was another factor. Alternative resources and substitutes
reduced the needs-resources gap, and thus mitigated crisis perception. Nursing faculties
enjoyed a relationship to the community other groups did not have.

Unlike other

faculties, nursing faculties could prevail on hospitals and other agencies for materials and
supplies or use the hospital as an alternative laboratory when campus supplies became
scarce. Such alternatives relieved the pressure on nursing groups and prevented crises
that otherwise may have developed.
Finally, many nursing faculties were often isolated by the location, schedule, and
the patterns of their teaching routines which involve long, off-campus clinical
laboratories. They thus had a tendency to become detached the from the college-asorganization. Because of the inconveniences created by their work situation, most groups
did not participate fully in college governance activities or the changes in campus politics,
in particular the subunit funding competition that developed on many campuses during the
period of this study. Their detachment, too, helped to mitigate crisis perception.
Finally, nursing faculties sought solutions to their budget problems that allowed
them to preserve their functional routines and thus protect their primary value, clinical
teaching. Thus, the tactics of accommodation, which required no new behavior, proved
attractive.
Contention, a pattern of resisting and opposing district policy, predominated
under conditions in which institutional officials targeted nursing programs for selective
termination. It was also evident in few instances in which faculties sought relief from
drastic conditions caused by across-the-board cutbacks.
Faculties shifted to a pattern of contention when they recognized that termination
as imminent absent an effort to change district policy. Unlike across-the-board cutbacks
generally perceived as fair, nursing faculties regarded termination proposals as a crisis of
individual and group welfare as well as an injustice to themselves, their students, and the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

309
community.
The tactics of contention required new behavior of nursing faculties, and transition
was not easy in many cases. Nursing faculties were often surprised, and sometimes
shocked, by termination proposals. Unprepared for their new circumstances, groups
encountered problems as they tried to shift into a contention mode. Most lacked political
resources including such basic assets such as internal group cohesion, political
organization and leadership. Further, members often disagreed over decisions to oppose
district policy. Such decisions put faculties in an adversarial position with respect to their
administrative superiors, and thus were fought with conflict.
Typically, nursing faculties went through stages of adaptation. The first stage,
immobilization, was a period of variable duration in which members were unable to
engage in effective planning activities.

The second phase, interpretation, was an

intermediate phase in which members attempted to regroup, and sought explanations for
the district's proposal. In the final phase, organization, members resolved their shock,
overcame barriers to action, and moved on to orchestrate a political plan.
When organized, most groups mounted anti-termination campaigns to counter
district termination proposals. Pursuing various tactics for a policy reversal, they formed
coalitions, activated their community base, supported legislative and regulatory initiatives,
gave direct testimony to boards of trustees, instigated media demonstrations, and
participated in district electoral politics. In almost all cases, they gained a complete or
partial reversal of the termination policy, and, in addition, intangible benefits such as
group morale improvement and perceived group status gains.
The data from the statewide study showed that faculties also participated in a
limited number of activities intended to influence state funding policies. These usually
consisted of letter lobbies organized by district officials or by the nursing faculties
themselves.

The nursing faculties in this study did not, however, pursue broadly

organized professional or educational coalitions to strategically alter the state policies
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driving up the relative cost of nursing programs.

Summary of Findings from the Selected Site Studies

The selected site studies explored conditions at six sites chosen for their size,
location, structure, and the nature of their retrenchment decisions regarding nursing
programs. At Arroyo, Palomino, Pine Hill, and Los Angeles, officials adopted a policy
of selective retrenchment in which they targeted nursing programs for reductions. At
Delta and Desert Flat, officials relied on across-the-board strategies to deal with decline.

Site Summaries

Arrovo College (#39)

Arroyo College, a small, conservative, but financially overextended institution,
struggled to maintain its fiscal equilibrium in the late 1970s and early 1980s as pressure
from a newly-organized faculty collective bargaining unit mounted within the
organization.

As conditions deteriorated, the historical grip of Arroyo's executive

hegemony weakened. In an unprecedented move, the board of trustees sought a new
CEO to redirect the organization, and hired an outside executive search firm to conduct the
search. However unintentionally, they excluded the faculty from the decision process,
and by their action raised faculty suspicions about the likelihood of an imminent shift in
district priorities. When information spread to the faculty that person hired as chief
executive had no community college administrative experience, and in fact enjoyed a
reputation as a program terminator, the conditions for a social crisis were set.
Within months, the new CEO proved himself unsuited in demeanor and style to
deal with a disgruntled faculty. His open displays of temperament alienated the teaching
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staff as did the measures he instituted to prepare for decline such as hiring an outside firm
to conduct an instructional program review—a move which again excluded the faculty
from the decision process.
In 1981, the district faced its first serious projected budget deficit-a shortfall of
10% of the institution's annual budget Officials attributed the deficit to the state's caps
on enrollment growth funding. True to his reputation, however, Arroyo's new CEO
proposed professional staff layoffs, and a series of student service and athletic program
reductions. The plan, however, contained unexplained deviations from the program
review findings. Indeed, some of its elements conflicted with the mandates of a statefunded service program.

Nevertheless, with help from Arroyo's controversial budget

manager, the new CEO succeeded in railroading the plan through the board of trustees
virtually unopposed by any of the district's constituencies. Indeed, the faculty, having
succumbed to rampant job insecurity, remained mobilized. When opposition from the
community also failed to develop, the proposal was easily passed.
Some months after the decision, however, resistance began to mount. The local
newspaper and the classified employees' union independently conducted audits of the
district's finances. Their findings highlighted gross inconsistencies in Arroyo's budget
planning, which the paper published just weeks before the 1981 district trustee elections.
Under a front-page banner headline, the paper singled out Arroyo's executives and board
of trustees for sharp criticism, and as a result of its scrutiny, two long-term incumbents
were unseated. The election resulted in a new, more independent majority on Arroyo's
board of trustees.
In 1982, another deficit loomed which Arroyo's CEO again proposed to solve by
narrowing the mission of the college.

This time the plan featured a measure long

anticipated by the faculty-the termination of Arroyo's intercollegiate football program.
The new board majority, skeptical of the economic necessity for any additional cutbacks,
refused to consider the proposal but asked the CEO to draft a list of cutback options. He
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complied with a list of academic programs for cancellation that included nursing which he
defended in the press in statements stressing the high cost and low enrollment of the
nursing programs. The list was viewed by many observers as a political tactic to shift
public opinion in favor of eliminating football.
Members of the nursing faculty were shocked by the CEO's proposal. Despite his
previous attempts to reduce the nursing department, they had not anticipated the move.
The nursing program director was also surprised. She perceived the CEO’s tactic as
“pitting” nursing against football, and was angered by the comparison, and by the
administration's apparent opportunism. A veteran of local civic organizations, however,
the nursing program director was not intimidated, and indeed, ignored the risk opposing
district policy might have posed to her own position.

Working independently, she

organized nursing's community base for an anti-termination coalition. Her tactics were to
refute the administration's cost claims by gathering data on nursing's indirect ADA
contributions, and to build an alliance of prominent hospital officials and civic leaders to
support the department.
At the same time, members of the nursing department sought to find support
within the general faculty. In view of the climate of intimidation that prevailed in the
institution, their appeals were largely ignored. The members then turned to organizing
nursing's alumni and networking with people in local health care agencies. Not all of the
members participated in these efforts. Indeed, one faculty member supported the goals of
the administration.
Although the appeals to the general faculty failed, the department did gain the
enthusiastic backing of the regional health care establishment, the local business
community, and the press. Community residents showed up in unprecedented numbers
for the board hearing on nursing. Given a choice between academic or athletic program
closures, the community withdrew its support from football, and the nursing faculty,
armed with data-based arguments for rejecting the nursing proposal, prevailed.
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Palomino College (#1)

Palomino College, an old, established urban institution, anticipated the negative
impact of Proposition 13 on district revenues, and acted to curtail the emerging strength of
its faculty union before the measure was passed. As a key tactic, the Palomino board of
trustees hired a new CEO, who lacking executive experience, nevertheless had a strong
reputation for being tough on the union in contract negotiations.
The new CEO arrived in the summer of 1978, and shortly after his arrival,
proceeded to overhaul Palomino's administrative structure with a series of changes in an
effort to consolidate control at the top of the organization. The most notable change was
the creation of four new executive vice presidencies filled outsiders in an action at odds
with Palomino hiring tradition.

The reorganization not only alienated the middle

managers displaced by the change, but further raised the suspicions of union leaders and
members of the faculty who believed that the changes were made in the interest of
advancing a hidden agenda which was to bust the union.
At first, the new cabinet plotted a conservative course. In fact, for three years it
managed to stave off fiscal crisis with an ambitious program of capital outlay,
maintenance, and personnel cutbacks and operational spending freezes. However, the
end-of-year surpluses often resulted from these economies which created the impression
of an administration overreacting to fiscal circumstances.
Part of Palomino's economic strategy was to put downward pressure on faculty
salaries. Thus, in contract negotiations, the CEO and his cabinet took a hardline stance on
faculty demands.

Over time, this resulted in an unusually acrimonious bargaining

process, and eventually degenerated into adversarial warfare. The result was a state of
chronic social conflict in the college.

Concerned about the long-term effects on the

institution, the board of trustees, in a futile effort to restore harmony, finally acquiesced to
a series of faculty salary raises the district could ill-afford. That action, coming shortly
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before the state defunded much of Palomino's avocational curriculum, seriously
embarrassed Palomino's finances. By the summer of 1982, the college faced a $5 million
deficit, and appeared headed for serious fiscal trouble. Confronted with that likelihood,
the board opted for a turnover in the chief executive position, but was forced temporarily
to accept an interim-manager arrangement.
During the 1982 fall semester, it became clear to district officials that efforts to
gain a salary concession from the faculty would be unsuccessful.

Palomino's vice

president for instruction, newly recruited from Arroyo College, arranged for an
instructional program review, to be conducted as Arroyo's by an outside consultancy
firm. He also assembled a committee comprised mainly of administrators to plan for a
massive retrenchment The committee focused its attention on nursing which, unlike
other units, had a large, all full-time faculty. A survey of local hospitals showed the
demand for vocational nurses declining. Thus, under the vice president’s supervision,
the committee came up with a plan to close the department's venerable LVN program, and
reduce its teaching staff by fifty percent

The plan, which also called for widely-

distributed general faculty layoffs, was ultimately approved by a reluctant board of
trustees at the urging of an interim CEO who shared the committee's cutback preferences.
Predictably, the layoff proposal outraged union officials and members of the
general faculty who regarded it as a coercive measure aimed at forcing the union into a
salary concession.

Little coordinated faculty action preceded the board's decision,

however, as self-interested department heads advocated for their separate agendas in a
series of special board meetings held for that purpose.

Press coverage focused public

attention on the conflict, highlighting the nursing proposal in lengthy articles devoted to
the administration's cost argument as disputed by the nursing faculty's claims of gender
bias.
The proposal to cut nursing caught members of the nursing faculty, many of
whom were overly confident of their department's standing in the college, by complete
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surprise. Although rumors of a nursing cutback had circulated for months, members had
failed to anticipate the proposal. In fact the group was internally divided and preoccupied
with unrelated problems, and thus had ignored the indicators of impending layoffs.
Shocked at first by the announcement, they were initially unable to plan or organize
themselves for action. Instead, they spent time speculating on the possible reasons for the
board’s action. Members doubted the motives of district trustees, the executive cabinet,
and even their own unit manager, whom some regarded as a weak leader. They thus
rejected the reasons offered by the administration, instead embracing the theory of gender
bias and political exploitation by the administration to explain their situation.
The shock eventually lifted, however, and members of department temporarily
overcame their own lack of cohesion to begin planning a defense. Indeed, they rallied
sufficiently to organize a media demonstration and a show of community support, both of
which were scheduled to coincide with the board hearing on the nursing policy. Their
efforts, the result of a tentative and loose internal organization in which ten of the
department's thirty members actively participated, resulted in an unprecedented public
turnout, which, ironically, conveyed an image of skilled political organization.
In the board hearing on nursing, members of the department stressed the
reputation and quality of the nursing program, and, ignoring the administration's
economic argument, shared their theory of administrative gender bias as the real reason
for the nursing proposal. Although the suggestion that angered several trustees, the
media demonstration and community turnout, which were unduplicated by other campus
groups, impressed the trustees and to some extent canceled whatever negative effect the
nursing.

Weeks later, the board bowed to public opinion and a threat of electoral

opposition from the faculty union, and voted to reduce the number of layoffs in the
college and the nursing department, but declined to rescind the LVN program closure.
Although members of the nursing faculty were initially buoyed by the reduction of
layoffs in nursing, they quickly refocused on their losses which were greater than those
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of other units.

Some members blamed the program director.

During the following

summer, a highly successful fund-raising effort mounted by the director saved the LVN
program and the jobs of several teachers. Although the local press gave credit to the
director, some members of the department held fast to their view, and reverted to a
demoralized state.
Months later, public confusion persisted over the status of the department This,
along with a drop in the local demand for nurses, took a toll on the nursing program's
enrollment At that point the administration, under a new CEO who balanced a concern
for economy with preserving Palomino's human resources, decided to dismiss the rehired
teachers. The action further offended those members of the department who were still
unable to address the reasons for their department's decline. Again, they blamed the
program director, but later, refocused on the instructional vice president after a
coincidental and bizarre turn of events reopened speculation about institutionalized gender
bias as the reason for nursing's losses.

Ironically, the nursing faculty succumbed to

chronic conflict just as conditions in the college began to improve.

Pine Hill College f#101

Pine Hill College, a mid-sized, structurally innovative institution in a central
coastal multi-college district, conducted business-as-usual until 1980 when the board of
trustees installed a new administration to redirect the district's economic policy, by then
under siege from state-implemented growth funding caps.

The new CEO, formerly

district budget manager, put in place a three-year, phased-in program of cost-controls and
an unusual plan for enhancing instructional productivity.
Under pressure from the district office to make cuts, Pine Hill's president, a man
known for the value he placed on constituency participation, convened an internal
program review committee with broad college representation. Its task was to review
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instructional programs for their efficiency and vitality~a test the RN nursing program
withstood poorly. As a result of the committee’s findings, and on the recommendations
of college and district executives, the board of trustees voted in the spring of 1983 to cut
two full-time positions from Pine Hill's nursing department
In the fall of 1983, as the district struggled to resolve the economic crisis ignited
by the governor’s revenue veto, Pine Hill's president again resisted the chancellor's
invitation to drop nursing, and urgendy implemented a district-recommended efficiency
program. All units, including nursing, were asked to commit voluntarily to new, higher
WCSH targets. After some local administrators hinted that program termination awaited
the noncompliant, many members of the Pine Hill faculty came to perceive the WSCH
program as coercive. Throughout this period, the CEO put pressure on “low WSCH”
programs such as nursing and engineering by singling them out in his press statements as
possible targets for program termination.
Accustomed to unwavering administrative support, the nursing faculty was illprepared for this turn of events. Its long-time, administratively powerful director had
taken leave because of a terminal illness, leaving the unit in the hands of an interim
substitute with little interest in district politics. The lapse in vigilance had short-term
consequences-the department lost two positions, and the administration threatened it with
termination if it failed to comply with a new WSCH target
The lapse also alerted people outside of the department to the need for a strong
nursing director. Acting on a personal commitment to the nursing department and its ill
director, a Pine Hill middle manager, assigned to impanel a search committee, handpicked several influential members of the Pine Hill science faculty who shared his
concerns about finding a strong candidate. The committee reviewed several applications
and recommended a member of the nursing faculty experienced in the arena of state
politics. The recommendation was approved, and under pressure, the new director began
to working with key people inside and outside of the department to mount an anti-
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termination campaign from within the organization.
Nursing's strategy was multifaceted. It addressed not only the department's new
WSCH target, but also the advisory process through which the department’s restructuring
plans would have to pass. The anti-termination effort required members of the nursing
faculty to coordinate their actions with other faculty groups, and adapt, however
temporarily, to the economic values and institutional politics driving district policy.
The change was not easy.

Members of the department believed that the

administration was failing to consider their reputation for excellence.

However, their

efforts argue against the WSCH proposal by focusing on program quality were frustrated,
which prompted them to change strategy.

Using data-based arguments, an internal

coalition of middle managers and teachers from science and nursing managed to stave off
strong competitive pressure from other units by emphasizing the economic unity of the
college. The coalition worked through various college committees and advisory bodies,
using ADA data to counter the arguments repeatedly made by the managers of other
departments who promoted the idea that terminating nursing would solve the district's
economic problems. It did so at a time when the board was divided on the direction to
take, and the local job market for nurses was in a temporary slide. In the final analysis,
nursing not only avoided the termination policies applied to other units but succeeded in
gaining a full-time replacement for a vacant secretarial position, a notable gain given that
district officials, besieged by months of financial and social turmoil, had yet to lift their
hiring freeze.

Los Angeles Community College District (#2,22,28.38)

The transition to decline in the Los Angeles Community College District, a huge,
powerful, urban multi-college district, was complicated by enormous pressure from
special-interest groups to maintain a long-term commitment to district expansion, and
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equally strong pressure from the governor and various political bodies for the
organization to hold itself fiscally accountable.
As the LACCD approached tax limitation, the rhetoric of its officials emphasized
economy over programs, but belied the district’s real priority, which was to preserve its
expansionary status quo. That paradox perpetuated a pattern of costly plant growth and
program proliferation at a time when money for basic operations was dwindling. Early
efforts to streamline district operations resulted in centralized planning but little structural
change.

Extravagances and inefficiencies went unaddressed, employees were given

salary raises and benefit increases, while across-the-board economies eroded the capacity
of instructional units to function.
For years, the district limped along by spending down its reserves. In the early
1980s, however, changes in state growth-funding policy resulted in deficits necessitating
a series of course section cutbacks. Those cutbacks in turn unleashed a vicious spiral of
enrollment and income contraction, which given the district's failure to make prudent
organizational changes, pushed it-the only selected study site to exhaust its reservesover the brink, into a state of financial exigency and fiscal crisis.
Fiscally embarrassed, district officials asked the county administration, and then
the state legislature for funds, but in the process drew the scrutiny of state executives and
oversight bodies. After a statutory provision approving funds for the LACCD was denied
by the governor, district officials decided to solve their own problems by going it alone.
Unfortunately, they drafted a plan based on unrealistic fiscal assumptions, and, finally,
faced with forecasts of huge, imminent deficits, were forced to make structural changes.
Officials of the district rapidly assembled a plan calling for wholesale faculty
layoffs and academic program terminations. Nursing, a costly division, outstanding for
its large size and stable enrollment, was noted by the district planner to consume an
increasing proportion of the district's shrinking resources, and thus drew the attention of
the LACCD's administrator-dominated planning committee as an attractive target for
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termination.
Billed as a “restructuring,” the district’s turnaround proposal focused on
eliminating jobs in some departments while adding them in others. The argument invited
faculty opposition.

Indeed, the LACCD denied that financial exigency was the major

reason for its action, which brought challenges from the faculty about the need for
change. Long cynical about conditions in the district, the faculty resisted the action, and
for three months, confrontation and conflict characterized district policy making as the
district and its constituencies sparred in a battle that spilled over into the arena of state
politics.
Under pressure from the teachers and community groups, district officials
defended their proposal in a series of board meetings followed closely by the press and in
the media where they strenuously promoted their decision to reduce health care and
nursing. After months of angry testimony, lawsuit filings, and attempts by all sides to
marshall the support of state legislators, the district finally approved a fraction of its
original plan, and by the start of the 1986 fall semester, under threat of law suits, all but
reversed its teacher layoff policy.
A year later, conditions were no better. Facing another large deficit, the board of
trustees approved another proposal for massive layoffs. At that point, the faculty union
shifted to an electoral strategy, campaigning against several of the board incumbents it at
one time had helped to elect.

As the votes were tallied, the trustees who favored

restructuring lost their races to union-backed challengers.
The layoff plan was immediately dropped, although the chancellor declined to
acknowledge the elections results as factor in the decision. Months later, a new board
majority made sweeping changes in LACCD's executive administration, replacing not
only the district's long-time, politically powerful CEO, but also the cabinet personnel
director, a former president of the faculty union who had written the faculty contract, and
whose appointment as personnel director therefore inspired great fear in the faculty ranks.
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Throughout 1986 and much of 1987, a dedicated group of nursing faculty
volunteers representing the district's eight nursing programs responded to the district's
proposal to drop two nursing programs and reduce the nursing faculty districtwide by
twenty members. The group's initial task was to overcome the problems created by the
absence of a district-level organization of nursing faculties and cohesion among the eight
program directors, some of whom appeared more interested in protecting their own
positions and protecting the independent standing of their programs than in working to
oppose the termination policy.
To orchestrate a policy reversal, a districtwide ad hoc nursing faculty group
formed. It coordinated allied itself with faculty union leaders who recognized a political
opportunity in the nursing terminations. The nursing coalition's tactics included lobbying
elected officials in municipal, county, and state government, and making appeals to the
LACCD governing board, the state board regulating nursing education, a state
commission on women’s issues, an organization of hospital nurse executives, and
numerous hospital officials. Coordinating with other faculty and student groups, the ad
hoc group also supported legislative efforts to erect fiscal and administrative barriers to
district restructuring, and assisted the union's electoral campaign with strategic and
supportive actions of its own.

In all of these activities, the nursing group enjoyed

advantages over other faculty groups involved in the effort. Because of the importance of
health care and nursing service as a public policy issue, nursing gained attention from the
media more easily than other faculties and more readily gained access to politicians able to
influence the debate.
At all points, however, the ad hoc group was hindered by deep differences within
the nursing faculty. These involved conflicts in management philosophy and style, in
motivation and preferences for political strategy which alienated unit managers from one
another, divided unit managers from their faculties, and at points came between the
faculty members themselves. These conflicts impeded organization, led to pockets of
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inaction, as well as actions by some—notably program directors who were competing for
position and power-that canceled out the actions of others. By the end of the effort,
these conflicts had taken a serious toll on the organization which began with a
participation of nearly half of the faculty and ended with only a few active members.
Nevertheless, the group succeeded in bringing substantial pressure to bear on
district officials by its widespread appeals.

Aided by the terms for the transition

negotiated with the state regulatory board, it succeeded in reversing the nursing layoffs,
but failed to prevent the nursing program closures. On that question the district prevailed,
using a theme of local control to block legislation intended to regulate its reform efforts,
and by co-opting the governor's reform agenda to advance its own goals.

In the end,

district officials won by stalling action on an offer of subsidies that would have reinstated
one of the canceled nursing programs. The offer was solicited by the newly elected
trustees with help from a local politician from the local Hospital Council. After months of
waiting, the agency finally withdrew its offer, and the issue of the nursing program
closures died.

Delta College (#131

Delta College, a large institution, in a fiscally conservative multicollege district
located in the region of the state capitol, was chosen for study because its nursing
programs were not targeted for harsh selective cutbacks.
At Delta College, the transition to decline was complicated not by program
overcommitment or special interest pressures, but by a clash of personalities and policy
perspectives at the level of the district governing board. Those clashes enveloped the
board in a culture of conflict for much of its history prior to this study, and contributed to
a fateful decision that left the district highly dependent on state funds after tax limitation.
Numerous incidents resulting in a serious breakdown of civility on the board were amply
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covered by the local press. These eventually attracted enough voter attention to influence
an electoral turnover on the board.
The new board majority, seeking to redirect the organization away from the
district-building policies o f the past, acted to change the executive administration of the
institution. It hired a new CEO with long experience and a strong, statewide reputation in
community college administration. Under the new CEO conditions stabilized, and the
district gradually returned to a state of harmony and order.

Calm persisted until the

governor's revenue veto led the institution, which had long operated on a narrow reserve
margin, to forecast financial exigency.
Despite the early chaos, the trustees and district administration budgeted
conservatively and overcame numerous pressures to embrace a philosophy of
retrenchment that stressed across-the-board economies and the preservation of
instructional programs. When the state instituted defunding, causing a local crisis, the
new chancellor made a concerted effort to preserve faculty jobs by taking advantage of the
vulnerability of the faculty union. Appealing directly to the faculty, he offered a no-layoff
policy in return for a salary concession. The faculty accepted, and the policy remained in
place until the governor's revenue veto brought layoffs temporarily back into
consideration.
After a series of close fiscal calls, the district unfortunately failed to reward the
faculty's sacrifices. As the threat of fiscal crisis ebbed, the board of trustees approved
salary increases for members of the administration, but declined to give raises to the
faculty.

At that point conflict erupted.

The teachers' union, pressed by falling

membership and its own financial problems, seized the opportunity to orchestrate a job
action, and took a vote of no-confidence on the chancellor. In the end, those actions
produced a compromise on salaries and structural changes giving the faculty a new formal
voice in district decision making.
At no point did the district’s actions threaten Delta nursing. Rumors of program
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consolidation circulated during the months of crisis associated with the revenue veto, but
no such action was taken. Several factors operated in nursing's favor.

Interviewees

pointed to the department's grant subsidies, and the career ladder program underwritten
by local hospitals, its contractual arrangements with other community agencies, and its
importance as a community asset They also stressed the administration’s overall support
for instructional programs. Thus, as a small, externally subsidized program in a large
district, the Delta nursing program, which by all accounts was run on a shoestring, was
neither a highly conspicuous budget target nor a cost burden on the institution.
Under the supervision of a bureaucratically-oriented director, members of the
Delta nursing faculty accommodated to institutional budget cuts with a program of
conservation and cost-shifting. For example, they took students to the hospital for their
skills orientation rather than use the department's sparsely outfitted campus laboratory.
Although chronically dissatisfied with the amenities allotted their department, members of
the department nevertheless distanced themselves from district governance activities.
They preferred to weather austerity, not by fighting for larger allocations, but by reducing
their expectations for instructional support When institutional fiscal crises arose, they
discounted the likelihood of job losses in nursing on the basis of a unique clause in the
faculty contract exempting nursing from district WSCH requirements, and carried over
their usual mode of adaptation.
Not all nursing members were so confident, however.

An associate program

director served for years as nursing's only liaison to college and district governance
bodies. She recognized the potential for political challenges from within the organization,
but left the department in 1984, pardy out of frustration with her colleagues' passivity.

Desert Flat College f#35)

With a multi-million dollar building fund to stave off decline, Desert Rat
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weathered its funding losses with notable ease. Indeed, the college managed to expand its
facilities, adding buildings at a time when other institutions were reeling from defunding
and the revenue veto. Its strategy for dealing with fiscal uncertainty was to promote and
expand programs that proved attractive to students, one of which was nursing. To make
ends meet, however, the district perpetuated a high faculty workload formula, froze
faculty salaries, and hired part-time instructors to cover the expanding workload, all of
which took a toll on faculty morale.
In 1983, a series of executive turnovers began which caused chaotic conditions in
the college and eventually resulted in new policies and a more formalized decision system
that encroached on the traditional teacher autonomy at Desert Flat.

Frustrated by

procedural changes and the compensation issue, leaders of the faculty union made
repeated demands for workload and salary compromises, which over a period of years the
administration and board of trustees declined to oblige in a series o f contract negotiations.
Finally, in the fall of 1987, after three semesters without a contract, union leaders seized
on the district trustee elections to effect change.
Nursing's rapid expansion-more than a tripling of enrollment in a few years time-gave the department a position of importance at Desert Hat. Indeed, it was prominently
featured in a community booster pamphlet published by the local chamber of commerce.
But expansion caused considerable work increases for the full-time faculty, which did not
grow as students were added. Fatigued from perceived overwork, members for years
sought relief from the district's high FTE formula and incremental work increases that
were taking a serious toll on their morale. After appeals were repeatedly ignored, they
went to the faculty union for help.
The union president, in fact, had encouraged the nurses to join the union effort,
and welcomed their involvement. Indeed, he saw the nursing faculty's participation as a
way to back up the union's demands to workload relief and eliminate a barrier to union
progress subtly imposed by the nursing program director who had a habit of bragging to
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her administrative peers about the long hours of her faculty, a habit the union president
perceived to undermine his efforts to gain executive attention for the workload issue.
In the fall of 1987, four of the six full-time teachers in nursing worked with
members of the general faculty in the union's effort to unseat two pro-administration
board incumbents.

Their effort succeeded.

After years of waiting, the new board

majority approved a new faculty contract that included salary increases and, finally, the
workload reduction sought by the nursing faculty.

Cross-site Analysis

The preceding case summaries depict the responses of nursing faculties to
retrenchment, and illustrate how some programs came to be targeted for harsh selective
measures, while others avoided program termination. The lessons of those stories are
important to summarize.

How did nursing programs come to be targeted?

What

generalizations can be made?
Common to the districts selectively downsizing their nursing programs was that
after Proposition 13 all of their boards of trustees made decisions about the future
direction of their institutions.

In three cases-Arroyo, Palomino, and Pine Hill-the

trustees determined at an early point to change course in order to curtail conditions that
might otherwise complicate their adaptation to the new economic environment, and hired
new managers with skills and management philosophies tailored to the institution's
objectives.
The pattern in the Los Angeles district, where officials sought to preserve and
expand their institution's scope of operations, was somewhat different

Adopting the

rhetoric of reorganization, they rewarded special interests and perpetuated management
practices that made the district vulnerable to decline. Forced by intense outside political
pressure, the officials finally opted to restructure.
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In all four of these institutions, the officials held a vision of the institution not
shared by their constituencies, and used procedures to develop retrenchment policy that
invited resistance from groups within the organization. All four eventually faced huge
deficits which their administrators proposed to resolve with cutbacks to nursing and other
selected areas. In each case, the termination decisions appeared to have a political as well
as an economic rationale. Public persuasion, for example, appeared to be part of the
agenda.
The conditions at Delta and Desert Flat were similar in some respects~all, for
example, experienced significant decline-but different in others. The troubled board of
trustees of the Delta district, while struggling with its own internal problems, hired a CEO
with broad experience to run the district. He balanced a concern for the economy of the
institution with a value of its human resources.

By budgeting conservatively, and

engaging the faculty in a humane cutback policy based on shared sacrifice, he fostered
conditions that preserved the financial and social welfare of the institution for several
years. Only later, after the period of economic crisis finally passed, and the district failed
with reward the faculty’s cooperation with salary raises, did the faculty organize to resist
district policy.
At Desert Flat, an ample building fund eased uncertainty.

Its top executives

managed with deep across-the-board cutbacks and a policy of selective growth made
possible by heavy use of part-time teachers. Despite the unpopularity of that policy, the
faculty remained cooperative. Conflict did not erupt until new administrators invoked
procedural changes that encroached on the autonomy of the teachers.

Thereafter the

faculty union pressed for salary increases and workload relief that eventually resulted in a
campaign to unseat incumbent trustees.
At both Delta and Desert Flat, the executives demonstrated an ongoing
commitment to preserving the instruction program, and to a value of nursing as a student
attraction. Absent the economic desperation evident among the administrators at the other
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sites, neither district moved to selectively downsize their nursing departments.
The nursing faculties in all six cases responded with clear patterns of political
behavior. At Arroyo, Palomino, Pine Hill, and Los Angeles they waged anti-termination
campaigns to prevent the enactment of termination proposals. At Desert Rat, the nursing
faculty joined a union effort to unseat incumbent trustees in the interest of gaining a
workload reduction, and at Delta, where in the absence of crisis members resisted
governance participation, the faculty accommodated to decline.

Summary of Findings on the Objectives

The primary objectives of this study were to determine:
1. How and to what extent nursing faculty members acted on behalf of their own
interests to influence policies proposed in the campus and state legislative arenas as a
response to community college fiscal decline, 1982-87.
2. What factors influenced the pattern of political behavior exhibited by nursing
faculty members.
3.

What impact nursing faculty response patterns had on policy decisions

pertaining to nursing programs.
The secondary objectives were to determine:
4. How and to what extent the patterns of political behavior of nursing faculty
compared to those of nonnursing faculty in the same community college subject to the
same budget cuts.
5.

How and to what extent the patterns of political behavior varied between

community college nursing faculties.
The main focus of this study was the political behavior of community college
nursing faculty in response to budget cuts and institutional retrenchment. The question
asked was whether or not nursing instructors operating under reduced allotments would
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act to secure policies more in their own professional interest.
Levine et al. (1981) theorized that institutional retrenchment—how organizations
cut back, whether across-the-board or selectively-depends on the relative strength of the
groups exercising power over organization policy. They also identified a relationship
between resource change and the outcome of the policy debate. Severe decline, according
to their model, prompts administrators to attempt selective cutbacks, but also exposes the
weaknesses of formal authority, rendering it vulnerable to challenges from interest group
coalitions. A final review of the data in light of the research objectives is helpful to
summarize the behavior of nursing faculties, how they acted, and how well they fared in
their efforts to exercise power over organizational policy.

Objective I; Nursing faculties response to fiscal decline. Revenue decline and
retrenchment were common to the institutions in this study’s sample.

All of the

institutions made across-the-board spending reductions which at some point challenged
their nursing faculties to adapt to reduced budgets. Nonselective retrenchment policies cut
or froze nursing allocations, resulting in losses which were amplified by the double-digit
inflation of the period.
The most common nursing faculty response under these circumstances was to
accommodate decline by complying with or incrementally adjusting to the reductions.
The faculties engaged in a program of conservation, resource substitution, fundraising,
and curriculum adjustment the objective of which was to make scarce resources go
farther, and thus preserve the status quo, but also to minimize the threat of future, deeper
cutbacks, and as one director put it, to “get administration off of our backs.”
Accommodation tactics fit easily into the functional routines of nursing
departments. Indeed, they required no interruption of routine by time-consuming new
activities such as those of on-campus governance participation, and created few new
inconveniences for busy faculty members who often perceived themselves to be
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overworked. Thus, accommodation allowed nursing faculties to preserve their traditional
focus and central value-clinical teaching—while dealing with the challenge of reduced
allotments to the quality of their efforts. Absent a threat to program survival, few groups
engaged in activities to change policy at the local level, and few participated in the political
activities of the organizations seeking change at the state government level.
This pattern changed, however, when the survival of nursing programs was put in
jeopardy by official or informal threats of termination. With few exceptions, the only
groups to go beyond the tactics of accommodation were those forced to deal with
involuntary faculty reduction and program termination proposals.

Termination

represented a threat to professional identity and job security of nursing faculty members,
even among those whose jobs were not threatened by layoff. Thus, threatened with
termination, nursing faculties typically adopted the tactics of contention, forming
coalitions with various other groups inside and outside of the organization to wage anti
termination campaigns.

Although those campaigns varied in scope of action and

participation, they, too, were directed toward preserving the status quo—that is, toward
keeping nursing programs intact and unchanged.

Objective ! ;f a c to r s influencing the political behavior of nursing faculties.
Members' perspectives on the funding situation, the goals and needs of the institution,
and their outlook on the fairness of the retrenchment policy, the ready availability of
alternative resources and substitutes, and the desire of groups to their functional routines,
were all important in influencing the political behavior exhibited by nursing faculties.
How these factors shaped the patterns of nursing faculties can be understood by
examining those patterns in light of crisis, conflict, leadership, and faculty values.
Layoff and termination proposals presented a profound threat to the professional
identity of nursing faculties. Not only were jobs at stake, but also the satisfaction that
members derived from their professional mission and other values such as continued
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association with each other, the department, and in some cases, the institution.
Termination proposals, which raised the specter of the endangerment o f program
survival, threatened those values, causing members to perceive a significant discrepancy
between the existing and desired circumstances. Thus, termination caused a crisis as
members came to perceive their individual and collective welfare in jeopardy from the
direction of district policy.
Across-the-board retrenchment, on the other hand, and the material austerity and
personnel attrition that from it overwhelmed very few faculties.

Nursing faculties in

general did not regard supply shortages or a loss of positions by attrition as an
insurmountable blow to faculty or department welfare. Indeed, they had ready access to
alternative resources and substitutes that allowed them to compensate for those losses and
narrow the needs-resources gap. Thus, reduced allocations, even when severe, generally
was not a cause for crisis.
Absent a crisis, most groups were reluctant to engage in behavior that would
engage them in conflict with other groups. Indeed, the structure of faculty routines and
unique mode of organization of nursing departments provided disincentives to do so, and
substitutes and alternative resources made the avoidance of conflict possible. Rather than
engage in governance participation most faculties adapted by using the tactics of
accommodation and/or by reducing their expectations for instructional support
Only in a few cases when program survival and faculty jobs were not at stake
were other responses evident. Those cases occurred in situations (#6,9, 21, 23, and 35,
for example) where faculty leaders had a vision of how the nursing department could
benefit from governance participation even during decline, and were able to persuade their
colleagues of the importance of engaging in the activities of the institution. This happened
in very few programs, however. Far more common were the cases in which program
directors and their faculties pursued measures that allowed them to avoid the
inconvenience of governance participation.
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Finally, the dedication to minimal change and preserving the status quo found at
the district level also typified the efforts of nursing program directors in their state
organizations. Again, the efforts of the directors' dealt more with educating their peers
members’ in measures for coping with decline than with changing retrenchment policy at
the local or state level.

Objectives 3: The impact of faculty responses on policy decisions.

Most of the

nursing faculties not selectively targeted for layoffs and termination accommodated to
across-the-board budget reductions.
nonselective policies.

Indeed, only a few faculties worked to change

According to Levine et al. (1981), administrators often meet

declining resources with nonselective cutback strategies to avoid triggering the
antagonism of groups inside and outside of the organization and weaken the involvement
of interest groups in the policy process.

It is not surprising, therefore, that nursing

faculties would opt to accommodate to decline challenge since that is the political purpose
of across-the-board strategies.
By accommodating, nursing faculties clearly avoided conflict, but at some cost to
their instructional standards. On the other hand, the few groups that risked conflict to
compete for benefits did not gain additional resources in every case or improve the
conditions of their departments. Some (#6, 9, 23, 35) were successful, while others
(#21, for example) were not
On the other hand, most of the nursing faculties targeted for selective cutbacks
challenged district proposals that otherwise might have resulted in program reduction and
an involuntary loss of faculty jobs.

Indeed, all but a few mounted anti-termination

campaigns, and succeeded in completely or partially reversing their circumstances, and
sometimes in gaining other tangible and intangible benefits (improved faculty morale,
program standing).
Nursing faculties brought pressure to bear by a variety of means. They appealed
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to public figures, local agencies, and government entities in a position to influence district
decisions, and in some cases worked jointly with them to identify and implement strategy;
they worked to gain organizational positions from which to influence policy; they
coordinated with unions,

students,

alumni

and

others

to

orchestrate

media

demonstrations, with local health service professionals to coordinate community
challenges, and with other faculty groups to thwart policy opponents inside the
organization; they collected data for rational anti-termination arguments, testified on their
own behalf before boards of trustees, mounted letter lobbies in support of legislative and
regulatory intervention; and, when all else failed, they participated in and, in some cases,
helped to coordinate local electoral efforts aimed at ousting incumbents and installing new
trustees who favored their policy objectives.
The scope of actions varied from group to group, as did the number of members
participating in the effort, which in most groups was less than full faculty participation.
Overall, nursing faculties engaged in a wide range of anti-termination activities, and
showed strength in their efforts to exercise power over district policy.

Indeed, their

actions confirmed the relationship between resource change and policy outcome described
by Levine et al. (1981), who proposed that severe resource weakens the ability of formal
authorities to resist challenges from the interest groups they serve-even, it would seem,
from groups ordinarily inactive in organizational decision-making.

Objective 4: Comparison of political behavior of nursing and nonnursing faculties.
Despite the severe financial conditions of many community college during the period of
this study, the data revealed a tendency on the part of nursing faculties to focus on their
teaching routines to the exclusion of other activities, including governance.

Indeed,

because of their unique relationship to the community, nursing faculties were able to
accommodate to decline. The data also showed a related tendency on the part of nursing
faculties to discount the likelihood of institutional policies selectively target nursing

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

334
programs.
These tendencies, according to the survey and interview data, were not
characteristic of nonnursing faculties.

The data gathered about nonnursing groups

showed they were more involved than nursing faculties in college and district governance
activities and more regularly participated in the advisory bodies and informal networks
where organizational policy was discussed, perhaps because they did not have the ready
access to alternative resources and substitutes that nursing faculties had.

Because

nonnursing groups involved themselves in governance, it can be argued that they were in
a better position than nursing faculties to compete in the arena of.organizational politics,
and thereby improve their allocations from college or district sources.
Thus, it can also be argued that nonnursing groups were better prepared for
dealing with termination crises when they arose. As the data showed, however, that
nonnursing faculties often had difficulty putting their subunit self-interests aside, which
hampered them in organizing internal anti-termination coalitions.

At the same time,

nonnursing faculties lacked the advantages of nursing faculties in putting together external
coalitions, advantages such as strong economic connections to community agencies, a
mission clearly connected to public policy concerns, or a well-defined vocational identity
to which the public easily related. Lacking those advantages, nonnursing groups, it can
be argued, had more difficulty than nonnursing groups putting together alliances that
made strong anti-termination campaigns possible.

Indeed, as the data showed,

nonnursing faculties were usually no more effective and sometimes less effective than
nursing faculties in responding to program termination proposals.

Although their

programs were usually less costly, and therefore less conspicuous than nursing as a
solution to budget deficits, nonnursing faculties did not enjoy the unique structural
relationship to the community typical of nursing and thus did not share the source of
power exercised that shaped the behavior of nursing faculties.
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Objective 5: Variations of political behavior between nursing faculties. The date
showed a remarkable similarity from program to program in the political behavior of
nursing faculties.

Most shared the goal of keeping their programs intact under the

difficult conditions imposed by revenue decline. As indicated above, the faculties in this
study pursued that goal with one of two distinct patterns of political behavioraccommodation and contention. Depending on their retrenchment circumstances, faculties
either accommodated to across-the-board policies or employed the tactics of contention to
prevent the enactment of a termination proposal targeted to nursing.

Over 90% of the

faculties in this study adapted with a pattern of accommodation to nonselective cutbacks,
which all groups (N = 38) faced. See Tables 23 and 24. Although fewer groups (N =
12) were targeted for selective retrenchment, all but one (N = 11) mounted antitermination campaigns incorporating the tactics of resistance and opposition typical of a
pattern of contention.
Working to prevent change from across-the-board reductions, accommodating
faculties accepted the challenge of reduced allocations, and responded with a pattern of
rational behavior compatible with their role as decision implementers. Encouraged by
their program directors, they directed their attention to identifying practical solutions that
promised to minimize their needs-resources gap.
Their actions centered on conserving resources, locating alternative resources, and
making co-optive program adjustments. Such actions were compatible with the primary
objective of their members which was to preserve the functional routines of the
department, but allowed faculties to limit change while softening the impact of reduced
resources, and yet avoid the inconveniences of participating in policy development
Thus, they maintained their concentration on the clinical teaching routines from which
their professional identity derived.
Faculties also accommodated to reduce the chance of a targeted threat in the future.
As Director #10 put it, the aim was “to get administration off of our backs.”
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accommodated to avoid conflict with institutional officials and their peers in other
subunits.

By accommodating, however, they did not always avoid conflict among

themselves. Thus, the shortages created by nonselective cutbacks were felt most acutely
by members whose courses had higher requirements for supplies, equipment, and
personnel. Thus, the burden of accommodation, which fell disproportionately on some
teachers, caused conflict within some faculties.
A few of the faculties in this study diverged from the pattern of accommodating to
nonselective retrenchment. To alter the allocation decisions of local administrators, they
resisted or opposed nonselective cutbacks, or co-opted administrators into increasing their
allocations. In each case where this occurred, the faculties were encouraged by their
nursing program directors who appreciated the political nature of allocation decisions and
sought to influence their members to become active players in the internal politics of the
organization.
Twelve nursing programs became the object of termination proposals.

In each

case, their faculties were desperate to prevent losses. Thus, in crisis they embraced a new
model. In all but one instance, targeted faculties abandoned accommodation for the tactics
o f contention in order to exercise control over the policy decisions. Lacking political
experience, information, organization, and leadership, they changed their behavior under
difficult conditions, but overcame the barriers to mount anti-termination campaigns.
In place of the practical problem solving, faculties substituted direct challenges to
district policy. Indeed, they formed coalitions and acted as interest groups in the open
forum of district policy making.

The alliances they organized usually involved

community groups. Faculties thus prevailed upon their community base, groups external
to the college with an interest in maintaining local nursing education programs, most
commonly hospital executives. Such alliances were sensitive to changes in the local
demand for program graduates, however. Thus, as hospitals began to suffer economic
decline, nursing faculties had more difficulty enlisting the support of their executives.
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Further, the nature of the termination proposal and the political complexity of the
institution were important determinants of the scope of political action employed in
nursing anti-termination campaigns. Informal threats (policies suggested but not put to an
official vote) gave nursing faculties latitude to use internal decision structures in their
effort to redirect retrenchment policy, and to combine the tactics of accommodation and
contention. Official proposals, on the other hand, pushed faculties directly into the public
forum of policy decision making. Further, the relationship of the institution to higher
levels of government, such as in the state-local shadow governance network that existed
in the case of the Los Angeles district, made it necessary for nursing faculties to reach out
beyond the immediate community to state government authorities and bodies in waging
their campaigns.
Internal social factors, such as the motivation and tactical preferences of faculty
members, also shaped anti-termination campaigns. In some groups, for example, there
were members who rejected public challenges as a solution to department problems, and
preferred to alter policy by influencing officials in the course of regular faculty routines
and role relationships. Their preferences revealed a disparity of motivation between those
members whose personal stake in the status quo was secure, and those whose personal
stake was in jeopardy. Members in the former group, which included some program
directors, feared the consequences of a failed power strategy, while members the latter
feared the consequences of a failed consensus strategy.

Not only were motivational

differences a cause of social conflict, they served to undermine the capacity of faculties to
organize in a time of crisis.
Faculties also differed in the arguments they offered to advance their anti
termination efforts. Some faculties took a rational approach, directly challenging program
cost, the rational argument most often used by college administrators to justify their
proposals, as a basis for program termination. Other faculties countered with emotional
appeals stressing the quality and reputation of their programs, while a few offered
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arguments based on faculty speculations about the underlying political basis of
termination policies. The differences in the way faculties groups approached their own
defense derived from internal dynamics of the group, and the perspectives and theories of
those members who emerged to lead their efforts. In most cases, the internal organization
of anti-termination campaigns was loose, and members were not unanimous in their
perspectives on whether or not to challenge district policy.
Finally, the focus of this study was the political behavior of nursing faculties. It
is therefore important to consider whether or not, or in what sense, accommodation and
contention constituted forms of political behavior.
Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary characterizes political action as action
concerned with making policy as distinct from the executing policy. Jeffries and Rost
(1996) characterize politics as an interactive process wherein individuals and groups
attempt to affect the allocation of limited organizational resources to favor their own or the
public's interest. By those definitions, the pattern of contention, which involved faculties
in forming coalitions to prevent termination policies from being enacted, was clearly in the
category o f political behavior.
The case for accommodation is less clear. However, one might be argue that by
complying and/or making incremental or pro forma, co-optive changes, that faculties took
the initiative away from their administrators, and in that way, dissipated program cost as
an issue, thus reducing the likelihood of additional future demands.

Thus,

accommodation behavior was clearly political to the extent that it had a political effect,
which in the case of faculties in this study was to co-opt the administration's argument.

Conclusions

The following conclusions can be drawn from the findings on institutional
retrenchment and nursing faculty behavior.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

339
Conclusions on Institutional Policy

Conclusion 1: Organizational history and values created circumstances that helped
or hindered an institution's adaptation to decline. As the data showed, economic events at
the state level—tax limitation, growth caps, defunding, and the revenue veto—led to
widespread revenue decline at the institutional level.

Revenue decline, however,

coincided with another major event in the community college system—the advent of
faculty collective bargaining, which became an important factor in local policies for
dealing with decline. Further, an institution’s financial conditions prior to tax limitation
helped to determine its vulnerability to fiscal crisis after tax limitation. Prior low tax rates,
reflected in low reserve accumulation, left some districts dependent on state funds. Such
conditions made it more difficult for some institutions to weather subsequent funding
changes.
Institutional values-as reflected in the priority districts gave to service,
community, public trust, or economic efficiency-also played a role in creating the
financial conditions that institutions faced after tax limitation.

Many institutions, for

example, had trouble sustaining the cost of rapid growth or the comprehensive curricula
they instituted prior to Proposition 13.
Conclusion 2: Some institutions realigned their values in anticipation of an
economic crisis, while others did not Value realignments were evident in many districts,
as officials reacted to financial pressure by redirecting their institutions the in the interest
of achieving greater economic efficiency. Officials seeking to redirect their institutions
sometimes sought new administrative personnel, and used executive turnover as a means
of realigning district values. The administrators recruited to facilitate a redirection brought
their preferences for managing decline with them.

Often, although not always, the

philosophies of the new executives stressed economy and narrowing the mission of the
institution over other values.
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Conclusion 3; Few administrators in this study showed leadership in their
approach to retrenchment policy development. Rost (1991, 1992) defined leadership as
an influence relationship among leaders and followers who intend real changes (in
people's attitudes, behavior, or assumptions) that reflect their mutual purposes.

He

further described the process as noncoercive in nature, and not to be equated with the
hierarchical forms of decision making in which managers exercise their contractual
authority and issue directives from the top of the communication ladder to decision
implementers at the bottom of the organization.
In light o f Rost's definition, few of the administrators in this study engaged in
leadership as they developed their cutback recommendations. Indeed, as the selected site
studies showed, most failed to engage the institution's internal constituencies in a
meaningful exchange, and thus invited the conflict evident at all six sites, conflict which
might have been lessened under a more collaborative approach to retrenchment policy
development
Conclusion 4: The tolerance of institutional officials for economic uncertainty and
risk varied considerably. As the data showed, economic crisis generally coincided with
forecasts of large, looming budget deficits, not with the immediate financial position of
institutions. Termination proposals were often proposed as a solution to perceived fiscal
crisis. The financial point, however, at which administrators proposed to restructure and
narrow the scope of district operations varied considerably.
Some executives, for example, appeared to value economic efficiency over other
values, and proposed faculty layoffs and program terminations well before the
institution's losses had reached the point of financial exigency. Others appeared to place a
high value educational idealism and put off restructuring until an impending economic
catastrophe forced it. The fiscal point at which administrators proposed restructuring
reflected the value the institution put on economic efficiency.
Conclusion 5: In times of economic uncertainty, nursing program terminations
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had appeal to efficiency-conscious managers in search of solutions to looming deficits.
Nursing programs, which were often sizable and expensive operations, made appealing
administrative targets, as executives sought solutions to budget deficits. Indeed, their
large faculties, small enrollments, and high budgets made them conspicuous, and
provided efficiency-conscious administrators with compelling rational arguments for
program termination.

Nursing terminations comprised an easy way to reduce fiscal

stress, and were easily justified as officials idealistic concerns for program quality and
community gave way to pragmatic concerns about cost-burden—the proportion of district
resources consumed by a nursing program.
Conclusion 6; Although cost-cutting was a common objective, administrators also
had other objectives for proposing nursing program terminations. In every district where
nursing programs were proposed for termination, the cost of nursing education was cited
by planners as the main justification for termination. However, other objectives, often
political, were also evident.

Public persuasion was one.

Administrators also used

nursing termination proposals to advance their objectives for overall institutional costcutting, fund-raising, or eliminating programs other than nursing.
Conclusion 7: Program termination invited strong reaction from institutional
constituencies.

Confirming the propositions of Levine et al. (1981), program

terminations proposals invited intense conflict and confrontation with an institution's
internal and external constituencies. Termination proposals pitted faculty and student
groups against administrators and boards o f trustees on the one hand, and community
educational interests against district economic interests on the other. The economic and
social consequences of that conflict were substantial.
Conclusion 8: The conflict aroused bv harsh retrenchment policies caused several
institutions to realign their values.

Harsh retrenchment policies resulted in electoral

changes on to the boards of trustees at all six selected sites. Those changes caused a
realignment of institutional values away from economic efficiency and toward educational
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idealism, and a greater concern for community and the restoration of social harmony.

Conclusions on Nursing Faculty Behavior

CanclHsiBDA Absent a serious threat to. facultyjobs-Qr-progaffi-syryiYak nursing
faculties accommodated to decline with managerial solutions to the problems imposed bv
budget cutbacks. The results showed that most faculties accommodated to across-theboard cutbacks, but resisted and opposed selective termination, generally regarded as a
crisis situation. One political benefit of accommodating was that it required little new
behavior and faculties could remain focused on their teaching routines.
Accommodation, as Levine et al. (1981) suggested, was a natural political
consequence of across-the-board retrenchment strategies, yet in part, as this study
showed, reflected a deep motivation on the part of nursing faculties to protect their central
value, clinical teaching. Thus, in very few instances did nursing faculties deal with
decline by attempting to alter budget policy since such a strategy required a level of
governance participation to which few faculties were willing to commit, absent a crisis.
Conclusion 10; Nursing faculties faced with a threat to Job security and the
survival of their programs abandoned accommodation for contention. Faced with the
high probability of program termination, nursing faculties altered their behavioral pattern,
and organized anti-termination campaigns. Although most of the faculties in this study
did not foresee targeted nursing program reductions, when termination crises occurred,
they sought out resources, including political information and leadership, and formed
alliances to stave off policy enactment
Conclusion 11: Nursing's community base was a key factor in the political
hehavior of the faculties . Because of the availability of resources in the community to
nursing programs, nursing faculties were able to accommodate to across-the-board
retrenchment and avoid the conflict and inconvenience inherent in governance
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participation. Further, the close relationship that nursing faculties enjoyed with hospitals
and other local health agencies provided them with resources not enjoyed by other faculty
groups, including power resources important to the success of anti-termination
campaigns.
Conclusion 12: Nursing faculty members differed in their preferences forantitermination tactics, and those differences complicated faculty efforts to organize effective
anti-termination campaigns.

Individual self-interest in relation to job security and

professional identity conflicted with the interests of the anti-termination effort in some
cases, which caused variations in the scope of participation among members of the
faculties in this study.
Conclusion 13: When nursing campaign outcomes fell short of a total policy
reversal, the final decision was usually dominated bv factors outside of faculty control.
Anti-termination efforts failed in situations where the economic and political trends were
too strong to overcome. Decline in the local demand for program graduates, for example,
kept some groups from obtaining a policy reversal, as did the politics of fiscal
accountability which some administrators co-opted to the advantage of their retrenchment
proposals.
Conclusion 14: The nursing faculties in this study engaged in political behavior.
The nursing faculties in this study acted in their own interests with clear patterns of
political behavior. All groups complied with, incrementally adjusted to, or co-opted
across-the-board policies in order to fend off future cutbacks and seize the initiative from
local administrators who argued that nursing programs were expensive. A few groups
also resisted or opposed such policies to improve their allocations. Likewise, the faculties
targeted for termination mounted and-termination campaigns in which they used power
strategies to stave off the enactment of targeted policies as they applied to nursing.
Further, most faculties engaged in letter lobbying to alter policy at the state level,
but few seized other political options at the state level, such as working to establish broad
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coalitions of educators and health service professionals to change the state policies driving
up the cost of nursing education.
Conclusion 15: Nursing programs proved difficult to terminate. Community anti
termination coalitions were easy to assemble during periods when the nursing job market
was healthy and program graduates were in high demand. Thus, nursing anti-termination
campaigns attracted media attention which helped to arouse vocal public opposition and
made it difficult for college administrators to terminate nursing programs.

Implications for Future Research

This study focused on a unique period in the history of the California Community
Colleges and associate degree nursing education in California.

Not only were the

community colleges under economic siege between 1982 to 1987, but associate degree
nursing programs were challenged by a temporary downturn in many of the local nursing
job markets in California, resulting in conditions that made nursing program downsizing
and termination administratively justifiable.
Both situations subsequently improved, but with recent trends in the state
economy, fluctuations in revenue again plague the community colleges (Adams, 1994;
Huggett, 1994). As important, the economic impact of managed care in the California
health care marketplace has profoundly affected the number and structure of jobs in
California hospitals (Kreiner, 1995). Thus, the trends that put associate degree nursing
programs at risk during the period of this study are again evident
Indeed, economics continue to dominant the politics of California's community
colleges. Despite Proposition 98, a voter initiative which guaranteed 40 percent of state
tax monies for public education, California has not kept up with the economic needs of its
community college system (Piland, 1995). The reasons are by now familiar; a five-year
recession (1990-1995) which substantially reduced tax revenues, and the limitation of
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funds for new community college students under state imposed growth caps. Thus, it
would seem that the economic conditions that favored retrenchment in the years of this
study, 1982-87, again ex ist
Moreover, the environment of health care has changed dramatically since this
study was conducted.

Managed care, a capitated, prospective payment system for

containing health care costs, has rapidly evolved in recent years to become the new
regional and national model of health care finance. By injecting market competition into
health care finance, managed care has already had a huge effect on the resources of
California's hospitals, and thus on provider jobs.

Indeed, at one California hospital

alone, more than 1500 of a total 4300 employees have been laid off since 1991 (New
York Times. January 29, 1995).
Such conditions repeated throughout the state make it clear that the same forces
that placed nursing programs at risk between 1982 to 87, are again relevant to today's
environment, and will continue to shape the conditions of associate degree nursing
programs in the state for the foreseeable future. That said, it is appropriate to again ask
the questions asked in this study:
(1)

How severely have the community colleges been affected by the recent

economic trends? What actions have they taken to meet their resource needs?
(2)

How are community college officials currently approaching their fiscal

challenges, with a paternalistic, top-down paradigm as seen in the findings of this study,
or with some other model of organizational decision making?
(3)

How are nursing programs faring, and what factors are administrators

considering as they allocate funds to nursing programs?

What changes are nursing

educators making to their programs in light of changes in the environment of education
and health care?
(4) What is the current role of nursing faculties in the local and state policy
process? Have they increased their participation in college and state budget governance?
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In a search for answers to these questions, it would be wise to consider the
limitations of this study.

First and foremost, the broad scope, although justified in

exploratory research, made an in-depth analysis of many important aspects impossible to
do.

Future studies should therefore focus on narrow aspects of the questions posed

above, which indeed might provide a direction for several studies rather than one.
Secondly, the methods used in this study were cumbersome. Although telephone
interviews are superior to surveys when the objective is contextual data, the fact is they
are not superior when the objective is factual information. Well-constructed surveys are
appropriate for obtaining much of the factual information needed to answer the questions
suggested above, and would limit the time and expense of collecting the information.
Thirdly, the design of this study was limited by its retrospective orientation.
Indeed, some institutions were studied two or more years after their respective
retrenchment crises, which made it difficult in some cases to locate those individuals who
had important roles in local policy development A future design should study evolving
situations. Further, a future design should focus on a broader range of retrenchment
situations to identify cases with the potential to yield data on nuances in the patterns of
nursing faculty political behavior.

The Implications for Nursing Education and the Community Colleges

The findings of this study have important implications for nursing education and
the community colleges now and in the future.
Proposition 13 caused a political and economic sea change in the environment of
the California community colleges. People at all levels of the system were forced to deal
with new conditions which often included material austerity, budget deficits, student
enrollment decline, and severe conflict between groups as the flow of resources
dwindled. Faced with rapid and threatening change, it is no surprise that they would
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assume a reactive posture and dedicate themselves to preserving the status quo. Indeed,
as Harris (1995) noted, sameness is a comfort zone.
Clearly, the nursing faculties dealt reactively with their cutback circumstances.
Thrust into unfamiliar conditions, they sought to minimize change rather than embrace it.
Indeed, they paid little attention to one of the most important factors driving the politics of
nursing education—the cost of nursing programs. Current trends, however, suggest that
associate degree nursing faculties in California and the nation will soon face new demands
that will force them to examine not only program cost, but also structure, content,
methods, and settings, in short, the entire paradigm of nursing education.
Those demands will derive not only from changes in the economic environment of
the community colleges, but from rapid changes in health care and medical technology
will. With its emphasis on cost-efficiency, managed care, for example, is transforming
not only the economics of health care, but health care itself. Providers who once worked
independently on parallel professional tracks are now working collaboratively to provide
cost-efficient care. At the same time, current technology and the emerging emphasis on
prevention are making it possible to shift health care out of hospital settings and into the
community and home. Hospital stays are becoming shorter and shorter, and more and
more services are being transferred to ambulatory care centers or home settings.
These trends, which have already caused major changes in nursing, promise to
carry over into the twenty-first century and the new millennium. Indeed, nurses in the
managed care system are assuming central figures as case managers and as planners of
critical pathways and other systems to ensure economic efficiency in health service. In
ever greater numbers, moreover, nurses moving into the community or rendering nursing
care in the home.
Given these changes, futuristic nursing educators are beginning to recognize the
need for a new model of nursing education, a model that emphasizes the content and skills
needed by nurses working in this new system. Lindeman (1996), for example, called for
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a new paradigm that emphasizes clinical simulations and care management skills; that
provides exposure diverse groups and populations of patients in a variety of settings, as
well as opportunities to work with communities; and, finally, a paradigm that stresses
independent student learning. Her ideas require a new direction for the clinical education
of nurses, particularly at the associate degree level, where nursing programs have long
stressed hospital instruction, the care of individual patients, a focus on needs rather than
resources, and close instructor supervision. Thus, community college nursing faculties
will be challenged by such ideas to establish new ways of educating tomorrow's nurses.
In summary, associate degree nursing education is at a crossroads where change
is unavoidable and where its resources are again uncertain. Nursing faculties have an
opportunity to address these trends by establishing a new model of nursing education,
one more appropriate to trends in the health care and education environments.
Information technology will almost certainly become an essential feature of a more
economical model of nursing education. The use of computer simulation promises to
broaden range of experiences to which nursing students have access but without requiring
intensive (and costly) instructor supervision. Faculties will therefore require resources to
expand their hardware and software inventories, but will need to prepare for changes in
their teaching role as the familiar tasks of classroom lecturing and clinical student
supervision give way to program development and learning experience coordination. As
the model for student education changes, faculdes will have to renegotiate not only the
instructor's role, but also the economic formula under which their activities and programs
are funded.
The demands confronting nursing faculties are presenting themselves at a time
when California's community colleges are pondering their own future. To a large extent,
the issues facing the community colleges are those of nursing education: how to enhance
student learning opportunities and modernize operations in an environment where
resources are shrinking.

Piland (1995), for example, calls for a new educational
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paradigm in which the community colleges embrace the central role of information
technology in the coming century.
Another issue is the role of the community colleges in economic development and
addressing the needs of those facing career displacement (Dozier and Zwolak, 1996).
Corporate reorganization and downsizing, documented by the New York Times as the
most wrenching trend o f the 1990s, is forecast to continue into the new millennium,
creating a demand for worker retraining (New York Times. March 3-9, 1996).
Presumably, hospital and health service reorganization will put pressure on the
community colleges (and thus nursing programs) as workers displaced by downsizing
seek new skills.
How these challenges will be resolved remains to be seen.

Clearly, nursing

faculties can no longer afford to react to change in health care and the educational
environment, but must seize the initiative by proactively addressing the trends now
apparent. To meet the demands, they will need to dispense with their old model and
identify a new, more economical paradigm. This process will require new resources and
it will take place in an organizational context.

Thus, nursing faculties will have to

redefine the way they relate to other groups in the college organization, as they redefine
themselves and their operation.

No longer can nursing faculties afford to exclude

themselves from budget governance, as was evident in this study, and as Bahrawy (1992)
found among nursing faculties in four-year institutions. Governance participation will be
essential as nursing faculties seek to secure resources in an environment where resources
are uncertain, will require nursing faculties to engage with college administrators, health
service executives, government officials, other disciplines, and one another as they work
to define a new, more economical paradigm for delivering preservice education to nurses.
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Appendix A
Cover Letter for Nursing Program Directors' Survey

December 3, 1984
Ms.
, Assistant Dean
Associate Degree Nursing Program
Ohlone College
Street Address
City, State, Zip.
Dear Ms.

:

The enclosed survey is the first phase of a doctoral dissertation on the political
behavior of nurses. In this project the subjects of focus are nursing faculty members in
California community colleges, and the issue to which political responses are related is the
1982-84 budget retrenchment crisis in the California community college system.
In recent years nurses have come to appreciate what other health care groups have
known for some time: that the route to achieving professional goals involves political
strategy and engagement in the political arena. Yet a canvas of a small group of
community college nursing education administrators reveals mixed impressions about the
political assertion of nursing faculty during the recent budget crisis. Given their
leadership role in conveying professional values to future nursing practitioners, the
responses of this faculty group are extremely important to understand. Conducting a
statewide study is a step toward achieving that understanding.
Thus, your completing this survey is very important. The survey form includes
eleven brief, easy-to-answer questions. A stamped, self-addressed envelope is enclosed
for returning the form. To be included in the data analysis, forms should be received by
December 21, 1984. Let me thank you in advance for sharing your observations on this
important matter.
Yours truly,

Karen J. Berger, R.N., Ed.D (C)
Doctoral Candidate in Educational
Leadership
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NURSING PROGRAM DIRECTORS SURVEY
Directions: If you wish, use the space on the back of this form to respond.
Name_______________________________
T id e________________________________
School ______________________________
1. What is your current enrollment?
What is the size of your facility?
2. Did your faculty make efforts to influence budget policy affecting your department
during the 1982-84 budget retrenchment crisis in the California Community Colleges?
Yes

No

3. How many of your faculty (total) participated in attempts to influence budget policy?
4. What form did these attempts take? Please check
Yes

No

Number of
Faculty Participating

Participating on campus committees
Lobbying campus faculty leaders
Lobbying campus administrators
Lobbying school board members
Giving testimony to the school board
Enlisting students involvement
Enlisting teachers' union officials
Enlisting professional organization officials
Enlisting the media
Lobbying state legislators
Getters, phone calls, postcards, etc.)
Giving testimony to state legislative committees
Lobbying the Governor
Other

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

371
5.

Describe the patter of your faculty's efforts to influence the impact of budget
retrenchment on your program (active vs. passive, etc.):

6.

How do you explain this pattern?

7.

Did other faculty groups on your campus (nonnursing faculty groups) make efforts
to influence budget policy, and, if so, how did the pattern of the nursing faculty's
efforts compare?

8.

What impact did state budget cuts to post-secondary education have on your
curriculum (enrollment, number of courses/program offered, number of faculty
positions, facilities and equipment, etc.)?

9.

Which other administrator on your campus would have insights on these questions?
N am e__________________ Title________________________

10. Would you and your faculty be willing to participate in a further study of these
issues?
11.

Do you have a politics and policy making component in your nursing curriculum?
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Appendix B
Cover Letter for Instructional Deans' Survey

April 8, 1985
Dr.
, Dean Vocational Education
Palomar College
Street Address
City, State, Zip.
Dear Dr.

:

The enclosed survey is the second phase of a doctoral dissertation on the political
behavior of nurses. This study deals specifically with the political responses of nursing
faculty members to the 1982-84 budget retrenchment crisis in the California community
college system. It looks at attempts by nursing faculty members to influence budget
decision affecting the nursing curriculum.
Data from the initial phase of the study indicate that, contrary to the common belief
that “nurses are not very political,” many nursing program directors and faculty were very
active indeed. The data also indicates that the factors determining their political behavior
are complex.
At this point I am gathering further data to identify the actual impact of budget cuts
on campus and nursing programs, and to determine the relative influence of the nursing
faculty's efforts on budget cut decision. I am also interested in how their efforts
compared with those of nonnursing faculty.
Your completing this survey is thus very important to the outcome of the study.
Sixty seven percent of all California community college nursing program directors
responded in the initial phase. You are being contacted to amplify the data they provided.
The survey form includes seven short-answer questions and requests referral to politically
active nonnursing faculty members who might provide comparative information on the
issues o f this study.
Let me thank you in advance for sharing your observations and for returning this
survey as soon as possible.
Yours truly,

Karen J. Berger, R.N., Ed.D (C)
Doctoral Candidate
University of San Diego
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INSTRUCTIONAL DEANS SURVEY

Nam e_______________________________
T id e________________________________
School______________________________
1.

What impact did the budget retrenchment have on your campus? (Number of
courses, programs offered; early retirements, replacement of those resigning,
positions cut; equipment purchase and maintenance; student body size?)

2.

What was the specific impact on your nursing department?
How did this compare to other departments?

3.

What were the organizational mechanisms on your campus for making decisions on
implementing budget cuts? Who participated in making allocation decision?

4.

Did the nursing department influence the allocation decisions? What impact did their
efforts have on the budget decisions affecting nursing?
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5.

How did the nursing faculty's efforts compare with those of other faculty groups in
terms of assertiveness, organization, percentage of department members involved?

Who led the nurses efforts?

6.

How active are your nursing department members (compared to other faculty
groups) generally in campus politics?

7. Could you refer some nonnursing faculty on your campus who were involved in the
politics of budget allocation decisions during the crisis and might have some insights on
the issues of this study (teachers union officials, budget committee members, faculty
senate leaders, etc.)?
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Appendix C
Faculty Invitation Transmittal Letter

October 4,1985
Ms.
, Department Chairperson
Associate Degree Nursing Program
Los Angeles Pierce College
Street Address
City, State, Zip.
Dear Ms.

:

Enclosed is a cover sheet about my dissertation research for your faculty to look
over, and a sign-up sheet for those who are willing to be interviewed. I would really like
to have 100% participation by those who were on campus between 1982 and 1984, if
possible.
As you recall from the survey you were kind enough to return, the study looks at
the political responses of nursing faculty during the California community college budget
crisis, 1982-84. I am now entering the case study phase, looking for comparisons
between faculty groups-10 faculties have been invited to participate.
I will be conducting brief telephone interviews with participating faculty. These
will be scheduled at the convenience of each respondent I would like to complete the
interviews by mid-semester. Interviews will be focused on the campus budget situation,
the impact on the nursing department and most importantly, on nursing faculty
responses.
I would greatly appreciate anything you can do to encourage cooperation. Thanks
so much for your cooperation.
Yours truly.

Karen J. Berger, R.N., Ed.D (C)
Doctoral Candidate
University of San Diego
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Appendix D

Telephone Interview Schedule Sheet

School______________________________
Department___________________________ Extension______

Name

Office Extension

Home Phone

Preferred Time
D av/H our

* If preferred, interview calls can be directed to home phone number, however, this is for
your convenience only.
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Appendix E
Notice of Follow-up Call

April 8, 1985
Ms.
, Director, Health Sciences
Ventura College
Street Address
City, State, Zip.
Dear Ms.

:

The response to the survey you returned on the political behavior of California
community college nursing faculty in the 1982-1984 budget retrenchment crisis in post
secondary education was indeed gratifying. Two-thirds of the nursing program directors
contacted replied. Preliminary analysis of the data indicates that there was considerable
variability in faculty responses and that determining factors are complex.
To clarify and amplify survey data, I will be contacting the program directors who
participated in the study. In brief telephone interviews during the month of April, I will
be focusing on the same questions covered in the survey in an effort to fill in missing but
necessary details.
Your initial response helped to provide potentially important data on the political
behavior of nurses. I look forward to speaking with you to gain further insight on the
important issues in this study.
Yours truly,

Karen J. Berger, R.N., Ed.D (C)
Doctoral Candidate
University of San Diego
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Appendix F
Values for Constant Dollar Computation
Fiscal Year

CACPI

Deflator

1973-74

44.8

1.000

1974-75

49.9

1.114

1975-76

53.9

1.203

1976-77

57.3

1.279

1977-78

61.7

1.377

1978-79

67.4

1.504

1979-80

77.5

1.730

1980-81

86.4

1.929

1981-82

95.7

2.136

1982-83

97.9

2.185

1983-84

101.4

2.263

1984-85

106.4

2.375

1985-86

110.7

2.471

1986-87

114.3

2.551

1987-88

119.1

2.658

Source for CACPI: California Commission on State Finance
Note. Deflators are computed by dividing each year’s CACPI by the 1973-74 CACPI. Constant dollars
are then calculated by dividing each year’s current dollar figure by that year’s deflator.
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Appendix G
Revenue Indexes Rank Ordered by Year 1973-1988
Dist 73-74 Dist
I
LOQ 17
2
1.00 20
1.00 29
3
4
1.00 9
1.00 40
5
6
1.00 19
7
1.00 36
8
1.00 16
m 32
9
10
1.00 2
1.00 10
11
1.00 8
12
1.00 3
15
16
1.00 31
17
1.00 37
18
1.00 21
19
1.00 11
20
1.00 35
1.00 15
21
1.00 18
23
24
1.00 M
1.00 4
27
1.00 24
29
1.00 7
30
1.00 39
31
1X0 6
32
1.00 33
33
1.00 30
34
1.00 27
35
1.00 23
36
1.00 12
37
1
1.00
39
40 LOO 5

74-75
221
133
124
123
1.18
1.16
1.14
1.13
IS :
1.11
1.10
1.09
1.08
1.07
1.07
1.06
106
1.06
1.06
1.06
1.05
1.04
1.04
1.04
1.(8
1.02
1.02
1.01
1.01
0.98
0.97
0.94
087

Dist 75-76 Dist 76-77 Dist 77-78 Dist 78-79 Dist
165 9
9
189 5
9
150 9
m
40
182 9
132 5
1.52 5
1.59 40
16
1.71 40
132 8
1.52 40
1.57 5
1.48 35
124 40
1.41 34
5
1.® 19
124 35
35
1.43 8
139 8
1.53 8
122 16
1.32 35
36
137 19
1.51 35
1.50 34
128 36
34
134 34
1.19 34
2
1.40
36
129 36
1.19 32
1.19 19
8
1.18 19
236 n
126 26
128 11
128 16
1.16 36
32
135 16
1.15 11
127 32
1.12 39
19
133 32
1.15 11
124
21
1.12
21
132
30
27
39
1.13
18
1.12 32
130 21
1.19 7
1.13 21
4
1.10 21
1.12 18
130 7
1.19 39
Z7
1.12 27
1.17 27
129 18
1.09 18
18
11
1.17
30
1.11 3
1.07 27
123
1.16 2
105 7
120 39
110 2
37
1.18 2
1.(8 37
1.10 7
1.15 17
3
10
1.01 2
1.17 20
1.15 37
1.09 37
1.08 17
4
1.16
30
17
1.15
0.99 24
1.14 20
1.08 30
0.97 17
3
1.15 4
1.08 15
0.96 4
1.15 3
15
1.13 24
7
0.96 20
1.07 4
1.13 24
1.13 30
1.12 37
1.07 33
0.95 31
31
1.13 10
24
1.10
0.94 3
1.07
1.09 3
29
33
1.06 20
109 33
I® 3
33
0.94 3
24
1.06 3
1.07 15
1.09 3
0.93 33
1.06
1.06
10
1.06
31
39
29
0.93 6
20
0.88 29
1.05 10
1.05 31
1.05 31
1.04 15
0.88 15
17
1.02 1
1.03 6
6
0.97 29
1.00 29
1.02 1
0.87 12
1
1.01 6
0.97 1
1.00 6
0.83 1
12
091 12
(195 12
<179 »
090 12

7980
2£5
1.65
1.58
1.42
1.41
133
128
124
119
1.17
1.15
1.10
1.10
1.07
1.05
1.05
1(8
1.01
1.00
1.00
1.00
0.99
0.98
0.97
0.97
m
0.91
058
057
050
0.80
0.79
078

Dist 8081
216
9
1.79
5
40
1.65
8
1.51
16
134
134
19
36
127
127
34
122
35
1.16
11
1.14
39
21
1.12
1.12
32
4
1.10
18
1.08
30
1.06
104
27
24
1.04
1.04
17
1.01
20
1.01
7
1.01
37
0.99
3
29
0.99
0.96
33
096
31
0.96
2
3
0.93
6
0.93
10
053
1
052
0.78
15
076
12

Note: Top and bottom lines = range; middle line = median; mid-lines = interquartile range.
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Revenue Indexes Rank Ordered by Year 1973-1988
Dist 81-82 Dist

9
5
40
8
36
16
19
35
U
34
32
39
21
18
29
27
17
4
24
20
37
7
23
31
3
30
33
2
6
1
10
15
12

W 9
1.66
1.53
1.48
127
1.26
122
121
1.17
1.16
1.09
1.07
1.03
1.®
1.01
0.99
095
0.97
0.97
0.95
0.95
0.93
0.92
0.91
0.89
056
0.85
0.81
0.80
0.77
0.76
0.72
0id9

5
40
8
16
35
U
36
34
19
32
39
18
21
4
37
29
24
27
20
7
23
17
3
31
30'
2
33
1
6
15
10
12

82-83
200
1.61
1.42
1.40
120
1.17
1.14
1.14
1.12
1.10
1.04
1.®
1.01
1.00
0.96
0.98
095
0.95
0.94
0.92
0.91
059
059
057
057
050
050
0.77
0.74
0.74
0.71
0.70
067

Dist ©54 Dist 8455 Dist 8556 Dist 8687 Dist
257 9
218 9' 249 9
207 9
9
1.68 5
1.72 5
5
1.59 5
1.55 5
8
138 8
1.53 11
1.51 8
135 40
40
40
8
40
40
1.48
136
130
1.49
1.46 8
1.42 11
11
134 11
1.19 11
1.41 36
16
1.16 36
134 36
121 36
1.14 35
137 35
125 35
1.15 35
35
122 34
1.11 16
36
L31 21
1.13 39
1.10 18
116 34
121 39
125 34
34
1.08 21
120 21
123 39
19
1.09 18
1.02 34
123 18
1.09 16
1.19 16
39
122 16
21
1.19 18
0.99 39
1.05 21
18
1.04 17
1.12 17
0.99 19
1.15 17
1.10 20
1.12 20
1.® 19
17
0.99 17
1.10 7
0.98 37
1.00 29
1.07 19
32
24
0.96 32
1.07
24
27
32
1.09
0.99
106 7
1.07 19
37
097 37
093 29
20
1.07 27
0.97 20
1.05 29
0.95 27
24
0.96 7
1.05 37
0.94 20
1.05 32
1.04 27
1.04 23
4
0.95 27
0.93 24
1.02 32
0.94 24
1.04 37
7
0.91 7
1.02 29
0.90 3
1.02 73
0.91 4
29
0.90 23
0.98 4
057 4
0.99 4
3
055 31
059 3
0.95 3
0.95 3
31
0.85 23
059 31
0.93 31
0.91 31
23
0.78 33
052 33
m 33 090 33
33
2
051 1
0.81 1
0.77 6
0.75 l
0.78 30
0.78 12
0.76 30
0.74 6
30
0.76 12
6
0.74 2
0.77 30
0.73 2
0.76 6
1
0.72 1
0.74 30
0.75 2
0.68
0.68
12
2
12
0.73 15
0.75
15
0.66
0.68
0.67 6
12
0.64 15
15
15
0.® 10
10
m 10 066 10
063 10

8758
280
1.76
1.59
1.55
1.55
1.52
1.42
138

m
133
133
130
125
1.18
1.15
1.14
132
1.11
1.09
1.08
1.07
1.07
1.02
0.98
0.94
091
055
053
0.79
0.74
0.70
0.68
067

Note: Top and bottom lines = range; middle line = median; mid-lines = interquartile range.
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Appendix H
Expenditure Indexes Rank Ordered by Year 1973-1988
Dist 73-74 Dist
1
1.00 10
2
1.00 40
1.00 19
3
4
1.00 36
1.00 27
5
6
1.00 5
1.00 32
7
8
1.00 3
1.00 8
9
10
1.00 21
1.00 15
11
1.00 7
12
1.00 24
15
16
1.00 35
1.00 39
17
18
1.00 20
1.00 31
19
1.00 16
20
21
1.00 17
1.00 9
23
1.00 23
24
1.00
2
27
1.00 34
29
1.00 29
30
1.00 11
31
1.00
32
30
1.00 4
33
1.00 18
34
1.00 33
35
1.00 12
36
1.00 37
37
1.00 1
39
1.00 6
40

74-75
1.67
127
125
121
121
1.17
1.15
1.14
1.13
1.12
1.12
1.12
1.09
1.09
1.08
1.08
1.08
1.08
1.07
1.07
1.06
1.05
1.04
1.04
1.(8
L01
1.01
1.01
1.00
0.99
0.98
0.97
0.97

Dist 75-76 Dist 76-77 Dist 77-78 Dist 78-79 Dist
216 5
«
148 40
1.58 5
2.15 5
1.90 40
1.46
40
40
1.91
5
5
1.53
1.58 19
36
1.40 19
1.50 19
1.47 19
138 36
1.48 36
1.47 8
1.41 8
9
1.46 36
136 31
1.46 21
136 36
19
11
16
1.32 16
27
27
129
138
1.45
138 27
1.45 31
1.29 U
127 21
15
138 31
1.44 27
21
127 9
129 35
137 8
W 11 129 31
125 20
31
1.44
7
11
37
125
34
123 21
135
1.42 7
1.22 27
32
125 37
134 9
1.42 32
122 2
124 16
37
133 35
1.41 20
121 7
124 39
132 16
3
121
20
124 32
7
139 37
37
131
120 20
122 8
139 10
35
131 39
120 34
122 2
137 17
130 20
39
120 9
16
121 35
129 10
135 9
120 34
128 32
134 35
2
1.19 32
1.18 17
120 7
134 21
127 34
17
1.18 39
132 2
120 17
127 2
23
126 17
130 4
1.11 30
8
1.19 23
1.10 4
124 3
127 39
1.18 3
34
124 18
1.07 24
24
1.18 18
123 24
120 4
121 24
1.06 18
11
1.17 30
1.06 3
10
1.19 75
1.19 3
1.15 24
18
L04
30
4
1.17
119 75
1.15
75
1.16 33
0.98 29
18
1.14 29
1.15 29
1.12 33
4
1.11 10
0.97 6
1.13 6
1.10 33
1.07 29
1.11 6
29
0.95 10
1.06 30
1.04 30
0.94 33
1.07 6
33
1.00 15
0.86 15
6
1.03 15
1.05 1
1.00 15
0.86 12
1
0.99 1
0.99 1
088 12
036 12
0.90 12
12
079 1

7980 Dist 8081
226
200 5
40
1.76
m
1.68
1.55 19
1.59
l.« 8
132 36
139
127 16
138
126 9
130
130
125 31
127
125 34
124 11
127
122 17
127
121 27
125
122
121 21
121
121 2
120
1.19 20
1.18
1.19 7
1.16
1.19 37
1.18 32
1.16
1.16
1.17 35
1.14 4
1.13
1.11 39
1.13
1.08 30
1.12
1.10
1.04 29
1.(0 18
1.09
1.01 24
1.05
1.00 3
1.02
1.02
1.00 23
1.02
0.97 6
1.01
0.97 10
0.96 33
0.95
087
0.92 15
002 1
080
080 12
0.74

Note: Top and bottom lines = range; middle line = median; mid-lines = interquartile range.
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Expenditure Indexes Rank Ordered by Year 1973-1988
Dist 81-82 Dist
217 5
5
1.78 4)
40
8
1.60 8
19
1.49 36
36
1.47 16
16
135 19
17
133 31
128 29
34
31
127 31
126 11
9
126 35
11
1.25 37
35
20
123 27
37
123 9
121 20
27
1.20 17
32
L18 23
2
1.16 32
23
24
1.08 2
4
1.07 4
1.06 24
39
7
1.06 18
30
1.05 7
21
1.05 21
1.05 39
29
18
L05 33
1.01 10
10
0.98 3
33
0.98 30
3
6
0.85 6
0.84 1
1
0.© 15
15
0.68 12
12

82-®
1-99
1.74
1.58
1.48
1.45
139
131
125
124
124
123
123
1.17
1.17
1.14
1.13
1.11
1.10
1.10
1.08
1.07
1.06
1.05
1.04
1.01
1.00
0.99
0.97
0.86
0.82
081
080
0.67

Dist 8384 Dist 8485 Dist 8586 Dist 8687 Dist
2.00 5
2.12 5
222 5
112 5
5
40
1.60 8
1.76 8
1.69 8
1.53 8
8
40
1.64
36
36
36
1.69
1.51
1.53
1.42 40
1.64 9
36
1.59 U
1.51 36
19
135 9
IS 11 1.53 11 1.59 9
134 11
1.40 9
1.58 40
11
1.52 40
16
1.44
35
133 19
31
133
1.51 35
1.40 21
16
132 19
138 21
131 35
136 34
127 U
129 16
139 34
9
122 31
128 34
129 16
139 20
31
120
127
128
17
1.35 16
31
35
35
20
1.16 37
128 20
125 17
1.35 17
128 19
1.14 20
127 37
17
123 20
1.12 27
127 37
27
127 19
1.19 21
126 39
1.12 34
126 27
37
1.19 37
1.10 21
1.18 39
1.25 27
1.19 29
29
1.16 27
32
1.18 39
107 29
125 18
1.06 32
1.18 31
21
125 23
1.13 32
1.18 32
122 7
24
1.05 18
1.09 29
1.08 18
120 31
1.04 39
1.16 24
23
1.01 7
18
1.07 23
1.16 18
1.19 24
1.18 29
1.00 23
1.06 7
7
1.15 23
1.16 32
1.05 24
39
0.99 24
1.13 7
1.12 4
4
4
1.02
4
4
1.07
0.99
1.01 3
0.98 2
1.01 33
1.05 33
33
1.01 33
1.00 3
2
1.01 3
0.95 33
0.96 2
0.90 2
0.94 3
0.91 2
3
086 6
081 10
10
084 1
0.87 1
0.81 10
0.86 30
6
0.78 1
083 10
0.78 6
1
081 30
0.75 1
0.85 10
0.76 30
30
0.77 12
0.73 30
0.79 6
0.70
0.70 15
0.74 15
0.72 12
15
15
0.61 12
0.66 12
0.72 15
12
0.69 6

8788
213

m
1.78
1.76
1.69
1.67
1.54
1.54
L50
1.48
1.46
138
135
133
132
129
128
127
127
126
125
123
121
1.14
1.07
L06
0.93
089
088
086
0.77
0.74
068

Note: Top and bottom lines = range; middle line = median; mid-lines = interquartile range.
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Appendix I
ARPs Rank Ordered by Year, 1973-1988
Dist 73-74 Dist 74-75 Dist 75-76 Dist 76-77 Dist 77-78 Dist 78-79 Dist 79#) Dist 8081
10
LOO 36
0.64 36
0.60 10
052 »
045
070 10
054 30
051 10
0.44
0.50 35
036 32
0.57 10
034 23
031 36
9
0.59 36
0.73 15
037
0.42 37
0.40 17
0.67 9
029 33
15
031 34
033 36
0.53 37
026
034
0.64 37
030 32
36
031 15
029 37
0.51 15
039 15
23
028 17
026 34
0.48 4
036 8
030
11
029 37
0.51 4
030 17
0.46 2
028 36
030 35
027 2
025 37
0.47 39
029
39
035 39
026
0.44
027
2
027
12
2
025
025
35
0.43 31
39
033
33
31
021
026 34
022 40
4
024 33
0.41 2
038 31
027 2
029 4
026 $
020 17
020
036 17
026 34
022 37
027 34
0.37 10
23
0.18 2
026 17
17
024 39
021 12
036 17
0.19
023 29
035 34
0.18
021 23
022 5
0.17 1
022 23
32
034 11
025 32
033 11
8
024
021
0.16
0.17
021
021
36
32
0.32 23
032
35
31
23
15
021 30
0.16 5
0.16
021 4
030 9
34
032 34
023 40
0.19 39
0.16 20
0.16
2
0.30 35
021 5
021 24
0.21 39
029 35
0.19 30
020 40
0.16 31
0.30 21
020 12
021 33
0.15
5
0.19 8
025 21
024
020
021
0.18
24
0.15
0.15 39
0.19 15
31
31
3
0.29 3
3
024 32
020 24
020 7
014 24
0.14
Z7
0.17 21
0J7 1
027 32
0.16 20
0.14 21
024 24
020 1
0.18 5
0.12
21
0.17 19
0.25 30
0.12
024 23
0.17 8
0.17 7
0.13 4
0.15 16
37
0.25 19
0.19 35
024 12
0.16 19
0.16 20
0.12 29
0.11
12
0.24 24
0.17 16
0.15 24
0.14 32
0.11 18
0.11
0.16 40
30
021 19
0.17 33
0.13 1
0.23 23
0.11 30
0.10
24
021 27
0.16 20
0.17 11
0.13 5
0.13 27
023 7
0.11 8
0.10
1
020 18
0.16 3
0.16 16
0.13 9
0.13 11
023 8
0.10 15
0.10
020 1
0.16 7
0.12 18
022 27
0.15 18
0.13 31
19
0.10 27
0.12 6
40
0.18 40
0.12 11
022 12
0.13 1
0.09
0.15 20
0.11 40
0.12 21
0.10 3
0.18 16
0.15 9
0.13 21
009
7
0.22 18
0.10 12
0.11 29
0.12 8
20
0.18 6
0.14 21
0.09
0.13 11
0.19 40
0.10
0.10
16
30
0.12
0.11
7
11
16
0.17
0.09
0.19
0.13 19
29
29
0.08
0.12 6
0.12 3
0.11 3
0.16 33
0.09 16
0.09 6
0.15 7
33
0.12 6
16
0.14 29
0.12 18
0.11 12
0.09 9
0.05
0.15 1
0.09 4
0.10 9
0.08 27
0.11 33
0.12 29
0.07 3
18
0.11 5
0.09 7
0.05
0.08
0.07 4
0.04
8
0.08 6
0.10 20
0.07 9
0.07 27
0.05 27
19
0.00
0.00 30
0.01 30
006 18
0.01 6
6
0.08 5
0.04 29
aos 19
Note: Top and bottom lines = range; middle line = median; mid-lines = interquartile range.
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ARPs Rank Ordered by Year, 1973-1988
Dist 81-82 Dist 82-83 Dist 8384 Dist 8485 Dist 8586 Dist 8687 Dist 8788
020 36
020 36
021 V
026
030 10
022 35
0.15 36
33
0.14 17
020 17
028 33
10
0.19 39
0.17 36
0.19 37
025
0.16 35
0.14 1
0.16 35
0.16 35
021
027 35
0.17 10
29
0.18
0.16 1
0.15 37
0.17 20
0.15 1
0.13 4
023 23
34
0.14 11
021 37
0.11 37
0.15 1
0.15 16
0.15
0.15 17
35
0.14
4
0.14
11
0.14
0.14 39
0.11 39
36
0.19 34
34
0.13
0.10 34
0.14 34
0.14 3
0.12 39
0.13 34
0.13
0.19 32
23
0.10 35
0.12
0.18 20
0.12 23
0.12 18
37
0.13 20
0.13 5
0.10
0tl2
16
012
0J2
4)
0.12
0.12
30
0.15 39
25
23
23
0.10 21
0.12 17
0.12
0.12 8
0.11 39
0.12 5
0.15 5
5
0.12
0.11 10
0.11 18
0.12 15
0.12 36
0.09 11
0.13 21
31
0.11 30
0.08 29
0.11 1
0.10 4
0.11
8
0.12 8
0.11 7
0.10
0.10
0.11
0.11
4
0© 33
37
0.10 34
0.12 31
33
39
0.10 24
0.10 10
0.10
21
0.12 9
0© 20
0.09 10
0.09 18
0.10 8
0.10
0.11 17
0© 10
1
0.09 12
0.09 20
0.09 2
0.10 12
0.10
0.11 36
24
0.07 23
0.09 2
0.09 32
0.09 33
0J0
0.10 11
0.07 18
32
009 29
009 11
009 20
009 9
0.10 4
0.10
20
0.07 24
0© 21
0.09 21
0.09 4)
0.09 9
0.10 18
18
0.07 32
0© 15
0.09 18
0.09 7
0.09
0.09 4
0.08 40
0.08 19
0© 12
0© 40
0.09
12
0.09 33
0.09 1
0.08 33
0.08 21
0© 37
0© 8
0© 24
0.09
4
0.09 24
0© 21
0©
0.07 24
0.07 19
0© 9
0© 30
11
0.09 40
0©
16
0.07 3
0.07 9
0© 16
0.07 19
0.07 24
0.09 12
0.08 29
0©
0.07 31
0.07 5
0© 40
0© 9
0.07 12
3
0.06 29
0.08 3
0.04 3
0.07 27
0© 32
0.07
27
0.07 32
006 7
0© 7
a© 31
005 5
17
0.07 27
ao7
005 7
0.04 32
0.06 16
0.04 2
0.04 2
0© 3
0© 29
0.07
19
0.04 40
0.04 16
0.04 29
0© 19
0©
0.04 19
7
0.05 19
0.© 16
0.04 31
0.04 12
0© 3
0©
0© 5
2
0.03 7
0.02 11
0© 15
0.04 8
0© 6
6
0.02 2
0© 31
0©
0.00 15
0.01 27
0.02 27
0.04 31
0.02 6
0.04 27
0.04
9
0.00 6
0.00 6
0© 15
0.01 15
0© 27
0.04
0.02 30
15
■
0.01
6
-0©
-006
-0.11
■0©
6
8
2
a©
30
30
30
-0.09
Note: Top and bottom lines = range; middle line = median; mid-lines = interquartile range.
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Appendix J
The Relative Efficiency of Nursing Programs

Program

FT Nursing Faculty

Student Enrollment

Ratio

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

28
21
15
16
18
7
12
13
7

213
261
140
238
210
118
140
144
108

0.13
0.07
0.11
0.07
0.09
0.06
0.09
0.09
0.06

10
11*
12
13
14
15
16
17
18

9
6
7
6
11
6
13
7
6

142
43
85
100
104
89
115
79
90

0.06
0.14
0.08
0.06
0.11
0.07
0.11
0.09
0.07

19
20
21
22
23
24
27
28
29

5
6
8
19
10
9
12
14
12

130
92
153
200
156
124
180
204
162

0.04
0.07
0.05
0.09
0.06
0.07
0.07
0.07
0.07

30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40

8
8
15
14
15
6
7
7
13
2
12

90
110
214
240
150
200
96
75
178
32
123

0.09
0.07
0.07
0.06
0.10
0.03
0.07
0.09
0.07
0.06
0.10

Note. Data from 1985 study survey. District 11 enrollment for 1984-85 was atypically low; enrollments
for the previous and following years numbered 90+ students.
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Appendix K
The Relative Cost-burden of Nursing Programs, 1982-83
Program

Nursing
Enrollment

College
Enrollment

Ratio

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

248
363
148
310
214
168
148
68
124

21,800
22,600
16,000
30,500
24,800
9,800
13,300
25,200
20,100

1.1
1.6
0.9
1.0
0.9
1.7
l .l
0.3
0.6

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18

172
102
61
98
117
103
95
75
104

9.500
7,500
6,800
14,600
9,900
7,400
15,300
12,900
10,000

1.8
1.3
0.9
0.7
1.2
1.4
0.6
0.6
1.0

19
20
21
22
23
24
27
28
29

64
92
132
159
163
157
286
146
184

10,600
6,000
26,600
12,700
14,200
21,500
13,500
20,000
27,200

0.6
1.5
0.5
1.3
1.1
0.7
2.1
0.7
0.7

1.8
30
135
7,000
6,500
1.6
31
105
32
124
14,800
0.8
221
33
31,100
0.7
34
118
1.6
7,500
35
180
5,100
3.5
114
36
23,900
0.5
37
77
9,000
0.9
38
179
23,000
0.8
39
31
4,200
0.7
40
181
17,500
1.0
Note. Nursing enrollment data from State Approved Schools of Nursing. R.N.. 1983. 41st Edition, NLN,
1983; college enrollment data from 1982-83 Occupational Programs in California Community Colleges.
Leo A. Mayer, 1982.
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The Relative Cost-burden of Nursing Programs, 1984-85
Program

Nursing
Enrollment

College
Enrollment

Ratio

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

213
250
123
338
216
111
133
68
113

22,000
16,200
14,900
23,400
22,400
7,200
15,100
22,300
19,000

0.9
1.5
0.8
1.4
1.0
1.5
0.9
0.3
0.6

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18

132
44
58
96
109
92
113
81
96

7,600
7,800
6,200
19,700
10,400
18,200
15,000
10,300
19,200

1.4
0.6
0.9
0.5
1.1
0.5
0.8
0.8
0.5

19
20
21
22
23
24
27
28
29

150
90
182
157
144
112
158
241
140

11,400
5,600
26,500
7,700
11,100
22,400
11,400
11,709
20,700

1.3
1.6
0.7
2.0
1.3
0.5
1.4
2.1
0.7

90
30
3,500
2.6
31
117
2.2
5,300
204
32
12,900
1.6
230
33
27,000
0.9
34
120
6,700
1.8
210
35
4,800
4.3
36
18,400
93
0.5
37
93
9,000
1.0
178
38
17,400
1.0
39
32
3,500
0.9
110
40
15,400
0.7
Note. Nursing enrollment data from State Approved Schools of Nursing. R.N.. 1985. 44th Edition,
NLN, 1985; college enrollment data from 1984-85 Occupational Programs in California Community
Colleges. Leo A. Mayer, 1984.
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The Relative Cost-burden of Nursing Programs, 1987-88
Program

Nursing
Enrollment

College
Enrollment

Ratio

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

150
144
94
219
148
111
133
142
106

20,100
16,400
14,900
21,200
18,700
8,200
15,100
22,000
18,100

0.7
0.9
0.6
1.0
0.8
1.4
0.9
0.6
0.6

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18

134
90
60
136
118
88
54
81
99

7,600
7,700
7,000
19,200
9,800
7,500
12,000
12,400
23,500

1.8
1.2
0.9
0.7
1.2
1.1
0.5
0.7
0.4

19
20
21
22
23
24
27
28
29

103
81
121
170
120
112
163
165
167

9,300
6,600
29,600
13,900
15,000
28,600
12,400
12,000
23,500

l.l
1.2
0.4
1.2
0.8
0.4
1.3
1.4
0.7

30
79
4,300
1.8
2.1
31
118
5,700
32
189
1.5
12,700
179
27,000
0.7
33
34
120
6,800
1.8
214
3.5
35
6,100
87
0.4
36
22,400
0.7
37
57
8,000
17,900
1.0
38
175
39
28
3,800
0.7
107
0.7
40
15,800
Note. Nursing enrollment data from State Approved Schools of Nursing. R.N.. 1988.46st Edition, NLN,
1988; college enrollment data from 1987-88 Occupational Programs in California Community Colleges.
Leo A. Mayer, 1987.
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Appendix L
Nursing Enrollment Trends Among Participating Programs, 1973-1088
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Note. Data Source: National League for Nursing (1974-1988). State-Approved Schools of Nursing. R.N.
(32nd-46th ed.). New York: National League for Nursing Division of Research.
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Nursing Program Enrollments, 1973-74 through 1987-88
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Nursing Program Enrollments, 1973-74 through 1987-88
Years

73-74 74-73 75-7<5 70-77 77-7s 78-75 75-85 80-81'81-82 82-83 8T-8r84-8T85^S 80-8717-88

Program
18

82

84

1.00

1.02

15
i6

74
0.90

82

102

97

78

1.00

124

1.18

095

85“ 43 TT~ 43
1.00 1.18 1.15 1.18
51 i t
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1.00 1.00 1.04 1.00
117 151 lo8 lib
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52
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1.00

1.87

74

84

1.45

1.65

52
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Note. 1st line = nursing enrollment (data from NLN, state approved schools of nursing, 1974-1988); 2nd
line = index; original data source was incomplete. Bold figures represent numbers inserted to prevent the
gross distortion of the indexes that would have occurred if zeros bad been used.
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Nursing Enrollment Indexes Rank Ordered bv Y ear. 1973-1983
Dist
1
2
22
28
38
3
13
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
23
24
27
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
39
40

73-74 Dist
1.0C 30
1.00 5
1.00 19
1.00 36
1.00 4
1.00 2
1.00 23
1.00 38
1.00 13
1.0C 9
1.00 3
1.00 33
1.00 18
1.00 14
1.00 34
1.00 27
1.00 31
1.00 28
1.00 8
1.0C 10
1.00 12
1.00 17
1.00 20
1.00 35
1.00 39
1.00 7
1.00 6
1.00 32
1.00 1
t.oc 16
1.00 22
1.00 37
1.00 15
1.00 11
1.00 24
1.00 40
1.00 21
1.0C 29

74-75 1Dist
n * 12
1.21 27
1.18 30
1.14 4
1.13 36
1.11 38
1.11 23
1.10 8
1.07 3
l.Ot 33
1.04 19
1.03 2
1.02 24
1.02 9
1.02 40
1.01 18
1.01 20
1.00 15
1.00 34
1.0C 14
1.00 28
1.00 13
1.00 6
1.00 10
1.00 11
0.99 16
0.99 17
0.98 35
0.97 39
7
0.9;
0.95 22
0.95 32
0.95 5
0.94 21
0.92 31
0.92 29
0.86 37
0.7t
1

75-76 1Dist
ZOC 12
1.29 8
1.25 35
1.24 23
1.24 4
1.18 30
1.17 27
1.17 38
1.17 36
1.15 3
1.15 19
1.12 10
1.11 40
1.08 16
1.08 33
1.05 11
1.04 6
1.04 2
1.02 9
l.Ot 7
1.00 14
1.00 32
1.00 24
1.00 28
1.00 15
1.00 17
1.00 20
1.00 34
1.00 39
0.99 13
0.99 22
0.99 37
0.98 1
0.92 21
0.92 29
0.91 18
0.90 5
0.9C 31

76-77 Dist
2.15 12
1.90 35
1.66 8
1.33 5
1.30 23
120 27
1.22 40
1.20 38
1.19 4
l.tf 19
1.18 34
1.12 30
1.10 2
1.10 36
1.10 9
1.10 3
1.09 13
1.09 16
1.08 6
1.05 33
1.03 11
1.02 7
1.01 17
1.00 20
1.00 22
1.00 28
1.00 15
1.00 18
1.00 24
0.95 39
0.98 10
0.% 29
0.94 21
0.94 37
0.92 14
0.90 32
0.89 31
0.8€
1

77-78 1Dist
Z1C 12
ZOO 35
1.97 27
122 8
1.38 23
1.35 40
1.22 16
1.22 28
1.21 34
I.2C 4
1.20 18
1.20 33
1.19 19
1.19 38
1.15 36
1.13 30
1.12 2
1.10 11
1.09 13
l.OS 9
1.07 6
1.05 24
1.03 10
1.02 3
1.00 5
1.00 7
1.00 20
1.00 39
1.00 22
1.0C 17
0.99 29
0.98 15
0.95 1
0.94 31
0.93 21
0.89 32
0.82 37
0.8C 14

78-79 Dist
22C 35
Z20 12
1.69 27
1.60 5
121 8
1.36 23
1.33 33
1.33 16
1.31 34
I.3C 40
1.24 4
1.21 20
1.20 36
1.19 9
1.18 11
1.18 19
1.17 24
1.14 38
1.13 30
1.12 18
1.11 28
1.11 6
1.08 3
1.08 10
1.07 2
1.04 15
1.04 13
1.00 7
0.96 39
0.96 17
0.92 22
0.89 29
0.87 37
0.86 21
0.85 I
0.83 32
0.83 31
0.81 14

79-80 1Dist
Z4:- 16
225 12
2.00 35
1.79 27
1.60 5
129 34
127 8
1.47 19
1.35 23
t.3; 11
1.28 20
1.27 40
127 13
1.26 33
1.26 4
1.20 3
1.19 38
1.19 36
1.19 6
1.11 24
1.16 15
1.15 10
1.10 30
1.07 9
1.07 28
1.05 2
1.01 7
1.01 39
1.00 32
03< 17
0.97 1
0.95 18
0.93 22
0.91 31
0.89 29
0.88 21
0.85 37
0.7< 14

80-81
4.13
Z90
Z86
ZOO
1.87
1.75
1.60
1.60
129
1.53
1.45
1.41
1.40
1.35
1.31
1.29
1.25
1.24
1.23
1.16
1.16
1.14
1.13
1.09
1.07
1.04
1.02
1.00
0.99

039
0.98
0.95
0.92
0.91
0.91
0.90
0.86
0.79

Note: Top and bottom lines = range; middle line = median; mid-lines = interquartile range.
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Nursing Enrollment Indexes Rank Ordered by Y ear, 1973-1988
Dist
16
35
12
8
27
5
34
33
19
20
4
23
13
40
24
7
11
2
38
6
3
36
10
9
30
21
18
28
15
32
1
17
29
39
31
37
22
14

81-82 Dist
4.57 35
4.37 16
3.00 12
2.77 27
2.35 8
2.06 5
1.85 34
1.70 20
1.65 6
1.65 40
1.63 4
1.59 33
1.56 2
1.56 7
1.44 13
1.40 24
1.36 11
1.35 36
132 30
1.31 3
1.29 23
1.29 18
1.23 38
1.22 10
1.18 9
1.14 19
1.10 21
1.09 15
1.06 28
1.01 17
0.99 29
0.99 31
0.98 22
0.97 1
0.91 39
0.86 37
0.83 32
0.74 14

82-83 IDist
5.1* 35
3.17 16
3.05 12
2.92 8
237 5
2.00 34
1.82 20
1.80 33
1.76 27
1.61 II
157 7
157 36
1.47 6
1.45 4
1.44 23
1.43 18
1.42 13
1.36 21
132 40
1.21 38
1.27 3
1.27 30
1.26 2
1.17 22
1.17 9
1.16 31
1.13 19
1.12 24
1.07 15
0.9: 10
0.97 32
0.95 17
0.94 28
0.92 29
0.89 1
0.86 39
0.73 37
0.7' 14

83-84 1Dist
5.2C 35
3.17 16
2.95 12
127 19
1.87 8
1.85 5
1.80 34
1.60 20
158 28
151 4
1.47 33
1.33 27
1.28 21
1.26 13
1.26 7
1.26 38
1.25 32
1.21 18
1.19 6
1.16 23
1.15 36
1.13 37
1.09 3
1.08 9
1.08 31
1.06 17
1.05 40
1.02 24
0.98 2
0.95 22
0.94 39
0.94 10
0.93 15
0.93 30
0.93 1
0.91 29
0.86 14
0.63 11

84-85 Dist
6.0C 35
3.77 12
2.90 8
2.73 5
2.27 16
2.02 20
1.85 27
1.76 33
1.76 11
1.72 38
1.63 7
1.61 13
156 19
1.41 18
1.30 4
1.25 6
1.21 22
1.17 3
1.16 32
1.12 28
1.11 23
1.11 31
1.07 36
1.07 40
1.06 17
1.05 9
1.02 24
1.02 21
1.01 10
0.92 34
0.91 29
0.90 ->
0.89 39
0.88 37
0.79 15
0.74 30
0.68
1
0.61 14

85-86 1Dist
5.4C 35
3.00 8
2.30 16
1.97 12
1.83 34
1.73 5
1.57 27
1.42 20
1.33 7
152 11
1.30 38
1.29 33
1.24 6
1.20 13
1.17 28
1.16 4
1.15 32
1.15 40
1.13 18
1.12 31
1.11 9
1.10 24
1.07 19
1.06 17
1.05 10
1.04 36
1.02 23
0.98 22
0.92 21
051 37
0.88 29
0.88 15
0.86 3
0.83 30
0.83 39
0.81 2
0.72 14
0.6S
1

86-87 Dist
5.71 35
3.60 8
3.13 12
3.00 13
1.85 19
1.81 34
1.63 16
151 27
1.40 20
105 5
1.23 7
1.18 33
1.16 11
1.12 38
1.09 18
1.08 28
1.07 6
1.06 32
1.05 4
1.04 31
1.02 17
1.02 36
1.00 21
0.99 24
0.98 22
0.98 9
0.95 40
0.94 23
0.93 10
0.85 29
0.88 15
0.82 3
0.78 39
0.77 30
0.74 14
0.73 37
0.70 2
0.62 I

87-88
6.11
4.73
3.00
2.00
1.87
1.85
1.80
1.66
159
1.38
1.30
1.27
1.25
1.23
1.21
1.20
1.16
1.12
1.11
1.07
1.05
1.04
1.03
1.02
1.01
1.00
0.99
0.94
0.91
0.88
0.85
0.82
0.80
0.77
0.74
0.68
058
055

Note: Top and bottom lines = range; middle line = median; mid-lines = interquartile range.
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Appendix M
Nursing Faculty Perspectives on the Probability of Selective Retrenchment
“We thought they [administration] had hidden money, and that the faculty wouldn’t be
touched.” (Faculty member, #1).
“The administrators on this campus consider nursing students one of their elitist
products!” (Director #2).
“I’ve been here since 1960. Things wax and wane but we always survive!” (Director
#3).
“We have the best graduation rate of any program on campus. Administration commends
us for that!” (Director #4).
“Administration wouldn't dare to mess with us—our advisory committee has some very
important people on it!” (Director #4).
“People on the program review committee felt nursing was a needed service to the city
and that it served the city well-even if it was Low WSCH.” (Faculty member,
#4).
“Administration would be cutting their own throat to close nursing!” (Director #5).
“We're the only R.N. program in this area.” (Director #6).
“Nursing is central to the mission of the college.” (Director #6).
“This program is administration's crown jewel.” (Director #7).
“This department fares well because of the reputation of our program.” (Director #7)
“Our director is embarrassed about our contact hours. She worries that to outsiders it
looks like we're eating gravy, and she wants us to look like really hard workers.”
(Faculty member, #7).
“Nursing is hard to cut because that means cuts to other departments!” (Director #9).
“We don't have a vitality problem in nursing like some programs on this campus have.”
(Director #10).
“Nursing attracts students to this campus—administration would be foolish to cut us.”
(Director #10).
“We felt certain they wouldn't close the program because we have contracts in the
community.” (Director #10).
“We're really low W SCH-we really look bad on paper!” (Faculty member, #10).
“If you cut nursing, it hurts everybody!” (Director #12).
“We felt pretty safe. We produce their [the community's] nurses!” (Faculty member,
#13).
“People in our faculty don't see what happened on a statewide level as as much of a threat
as they should.” (Faculty member, #14).
“When the college is accredited, one of the things the officials point to is the quality of
certain programs. Included on their short list is nursing—so we're in a nice
position.” (Director #15).
“Nursing has a waiting list We're one of the only programs to fill our classes—that helps
the sciences.” (Director #16).
“Administration knows how valuable nursing is-w e documented the ADA we bring in!”
(Director #17).
“We're the only nursing program around here, and this community needs our graduates.”
(Director #18).
“This is a rural area, and we're the only nursing program here.” (Director #19).
“This is a small town, so we have a close relationship to the community—community
support is one of the ways we prove our worth.” (Director #20).
“We have always been subject to question by people in the administration because nursing
is expensive-we are always under the gun.” (Faculty member, #20).
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“This is the only program in a two-district area, so it's needed.” (Director #21).
“We didn't think £ur program would be closed-this college built an expensive facility for
nursing. We heard warnings from one of the chairpersons, but people don’t think
it will ever happen.” (Faculty member, #22).
“Our students graduate, transfer, and go on to get jobs-all the things that the review
committee looks at (Director #23).
“I don't think we were really too concemed-we consolidated our lecture sections to get
our WSCH up, but that only lasted a year or so.” (Faculty member, #27).
“I don't think we worried about the program closing. There was such a need for nurses
that we felt the Hospital Council and the hospitals in the area would never allow
the district to cancel nursing.” (Faculty member, #27).
“They've [administrators] been talking about regionalization for years, but it didn't seem
like we had to start on it The idea was to have a plan.” (Director #28).
“It seems like every time we come back from summer vacation there are rumors of March
15 letters~I let it go like water off a duck's back.” (Faculty member, #28).
“The noises were there, but they'd cried wolf before.” (Faculty member, #28).
“We're kind of prestigious to administration—they count us as one of their professional
programs.” (Director #29).
“Administration doesn't bother us. As long as our students do well on state boards—
that's a feather in the their cap!” (Director #29).
“We’re OK as long as we keep getting students in the program—lately our applications
have been dropping.” (Director #29).
“Our program provides more than job skills, it gives a lot of minority women a
profession!” (Director #30).
“A lot of students are at this campus taking prerequisites because they intend to go into
nursing.” (Director #30).
“We didn't feel terribly threatened—we always have plenty of students, and almost all of
our courses are required for graduation.” (Director #32).
“We’re the biggest program in this college-we bring in a lot of students!” (Director #32).
“The community wants our nurses. I guess we weren’t really thinking anything would
happen.” (Director #32).
“I believe the nursing faculty here did not feel they would be touched.” (Division Dean,
#32).
“Nursing is a showcase program on this campus.” (Director #33).
“All you have to do is a little figuring to see how much nursing generates versus its
expenses, and you can see that if the program weren't on campus it would hurt the
support courses!” (Director #33).
“The administration knows and appreciates that our student attrition is extremely low.”
(Director #35).
“Our students support physiology, history, and English so we don't pay attention when
administrators talk about how expensive we are!” (Director #36).
“We get lots of recognition. It's almost like a baby sucking its thumb-the board knows
the value of instruction and administration looks on nursing as something really
great!” (Director #36).
“This program has strong community support.” (Director #37).
“The hospitals that asked for this program in the first place—they need us!” (Director
#39).
“We've been a Cinderella program! We’re well-known in the community.” (Director
#39).
“Our dean said publicly that we were expensive, but also that we were the most
successful program on campus-success in terms of graduation, retention, and
employment. So he expressed his support-there were no indicators ihjs [layoffs]
was going to happen.” (Faculty member, #40).
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Appendix N
Nursing Faculty Governance Participation
“We've always had a rep to faculty senate, but we aren't really involved—our faculty is
off campus much of the time.” (Director #1).
“A few of our faculty have been on committees, but only on minor committees, and they
haven't ever been in leadership roles,” (Director #1).
“Getting involved on campus is a problem in nursing. We ca tt be on committees if we
want to be.” (Faculty member, #1).
“We're not on committees—it’s no excuse really, but we don't have a lot of time being in
clinical.” (Faculty member, #1).
“Some of our faculty isolate themselves and it's their fault they're not on committees.”
(Faculty member, #1).
“We have twenty contact hours and two of our days are in the hospital, so its more
difficult for us to get to meetings.” (Faculty member, #1).
“The committee meetings are all on Tuesday when we're in clinical!” (Director #2).
“People believe that the only reason for them to be active in [campus] committees is if
they want to move into administration.” (Director #2).
“The nurses generally don't get very involved [in college activities]. Their problem is that
they are not on campus enough.” (Biology faculty member, #2).
“Sometimes we don't have energy left after hours of clinical.” (Faculty member, #3).
“The nursing faculty is not involved on campus-this somewhat reflects the fact that
they're off campus so much.” (Dean of instruction, #3).
“I don't think our faculty is aware of how it [campus involvement] can benefit the
program—they're not sophisticated in that respect.” (Director #4).
“Some of our faculty work two jobs, and a few have young children to take care of—that
decreases their participation on campus.” (Director #5).
“Our faculty has never been active in campus governance-we're too busy!” (Director #6).
“We can be on committees, but it's harder for us!” (Faculty Member, #6).
“The nursing faculty here are not active in college governance.” (Dean of Instruction, #6).
“The only time I can get them [nursing faculty] to go to advisory committee meetings is
when we have an accreditation visit coming up!” (Director #7).
“We would have reps at faculty senate except the meetings conflict with our clinical
schedules.” (Director #7).
“Most of us feel we put in so many hours what with classes and labs and going to the
hospital, that we feel we've paid our dues.” (Faculty member, #7).
“Only one or two of us have ever been interested in what's going on on campus.”
(Faculty member, #7)
“The nursing faculty here doesn't want to be bothered with college matters. They just
want to be left alone to do their own thing.” (Division dean, #7).
“We have someone in faculty senate, but we're only on campus three days a week, and
our attendance isn’t always good.” (Director #8).
“Our eight-hour labs make it almost impossible for us to get to advisory meetings.”
(Director #9).
“Our faculty is very upset with administration because they refuse to lower our hours, so
they say 'The hell with it’ when it comes to being involved in the college.”
(Director #9).
“We let other people fight the battle.” (Faculty member, #9).
“Most of my faculty just won’t go to meetings. I'm always after them.” (Director #10).
“More than half our faculty is complacent when it comes to participating in campus
committees.” (Associate Director, #10).
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“The nursing faculty here seems to prefer their own company.” (Division dean, #10).
“Our faculty are on committees, the college requires it, but so does the department.”
(Director #12).
“We have one member who's in everything—she's on all the committees—that's her
thing.” (Director #13).
“A lot of us live out in the country. We tend to take care of the students, and go home.”
(Faculty member, #13).
“Our director asks for volunteers, but no one raises their hand.” (Faculty member, #13).
‘T he nursing faculty here doesn’t work with the rest of the campus. They have the
excuse that they have all this clinical they have to do.” (Former Associate Director,
#13).
“Nursing has always had someone on faculty senate, but they haven't been on a lot of
committees. They're off campus a fair amount, so we don't see them much.”
(Counselor, #13).
“One nurse is involved in the college, but the rest don’t seem interested.” (Dean of
Instruction, #13).
“Our faculty won't get involved on campus because of being so busy on the job.”
(Director #14).
“Most of our faculty have their own interests—one is writing a book, another is doing a
curriculum project One is a new teacher—she's overwhelmed with the job right
now. Those kinds of things keep our group from being involved on campus.”
(Director #15).
“It's a college policy that we are all involved in campus committees.” (Director #18).
“We always have reps on the decision making bodies-its an expectation of the college.”
(Director #19).
“Our faculty are overwhelmed with direct teaching concerns—they trust me to do the
politicking!” (Director #20).
“Our faculty hasn't been involved on campus until recently.” (Director #23).
“Nursing is the most overworked department and that probably never will change, I've
resigned myself to that!” (Director #23).
“When the issue is important, we get there [senate, advisory bodies]. (Director #24).
‘There's not time to do everything. My faculty chooses to concentrate on teaching.”
(Director #27).
“Our people have difficulty getting to campus committees-they meet at a bad time for us.”
(Director #27).
“It's just with the long lab hours, I chose to spend my time with the teaching aspect rather
than with the college.” (Faculty member, #27).
“I've never been assigned to a committee that I've been able to get to.” (Faculty member,
#27).
“I belong to the curriculum funding committee, but I've never been able to go.” (Faculty
member, #27).
“We get about 20% participation.” (faculty member, #27).
“The nursing faculty here is not active in campus politics.” (Vice President, #27).
‘T h e nurses aren't involved in campus meetings simply because of the load they carry.”
(Photography faculty member. Faculty senate president, #28).
“We do have an advisory council, but our faculty don't go-they're in the hospital.”
(Director #29).
“Working an 18 hour week plus a three hour class-you’re putting in a lot more time than
anybody else on campus.” (Director #29).
‘W e don't have any reps in faculty senate because of time—we do have someone in the
union.” (Director #30).
‘W e aren't in the faculty senate. In fact, we are really overworked—because again
nursing is unique as far as having to teach clinical and theory, and we have to stay
in the hospital long after the students are gone.” (Faculty member, #30).
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“Faculty members in other departments don't expect us to come [to meetings]-they say,
'Oh, you're in the hospital all the time.'" (Faculty member, #30).
“We've always had a representative on faculty senate, but I don't think it has ever been
taken quite seriously.” (Director #32).
“We really haven't felt the need to be involved, we feel very secure in our program.”
(Director #32).
“Our faculty makes an effort to be involved-its not easy with our schedules,” (Director
#34).
“A few of our faculty are involved on campus, but clinical assignments make it difficult.”
(Director #35).
“We're tired. When you add up the teaching time and obligations to students for faculty
hours and all our faculty meetings-it's a very high number.” (Faculty member,
#35).
“A lot of times our meetings are on days when the nurses are in clinical, and it’s just not
possible [for them to come].” (Librarian, #35).
“The nurses used to keep to themselves, but they found out that to get what they want,
they have to go out and get involved.” (Biology faculty member, #35).
“We just go to clinical and classroom and work our 80 hour week to get the job done!”
(Director #36).
“Like many nursing faculties, this group tends not to be particularly active
organizationally!” (Director #37).
“Because of hospital teaching schedules, it's difficult for our faculty to get to campus
committee meetings.” (Director #38).
“Only the nursing director is involved in our advisory committees. The rest of the faculty
is in the hospital.” (Dean of Occupational Education, #38).
‘Traditionally in nursing--we have weird hours, longer hours, and we're off campus, and
that leads to a feeling of complacency.” (Director #39)
“Our faculty has never been involved in campus governance—there isn't enough energy.”
(Director #40).
“People [nursing faculty] felt they were so busy with clinical and department meetings
that they weren't that interested in the college, and that's pretty much the way they
feel now.” (Director #40).
“They've [nursing faculty] become involved since the cuts. I kept saying to them—it's
real easy to cut from somebody you don't know and don't see what they're trying
to do.” (Director #40).
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Appendix O
The Professional Interests, Identification, and Isolation
of Nursing Faculty Members

Interests

“The nursing faculty has set high standards for teaching, but beyond that they don't see
an active role for themselves.” (Director #4).
“This faculty's main concern is for clinical teaching.” (Director #7).
“It hasn't been worth it to me to get upset about anything-I just concentrate on trying to
become a better teacher.” (Faculty member, #7).
“For a long time we have just retreated back and concentrated on doing a good job of
producing professional nurses.” (Faculty member, #9).
“The faculty here is a lot more interested in nursing issues than the college budget.”
(Director #13).
“Most of us don’t give two hoots for [college] politics.” (Faculty member, #13).
“Most of our faculty have their own interests--one is writing a book, another is doing a
curriculum project One is a new teacher—she's overwhelmed with the job right
not. Those kinds of things keep our group from being involved on campus.”
(Director #15).
“This faculty's primary interest is the clinical preparation of students.” (Director #20).
“Our faculty are most intensely concerned with their classes and clinical teaching roles.
(Director #21).
“A group of faculty from our campus requested a special meeting with the Chancellor to
talk about funding, but no one from nursing went!” (Director #21).
“There's not time to do everything. My faculty chooses to concentrate on teaching.”
(Director #27).
“This group [nursing] is almost totally focused on clinical teaching. Our members really
aren't interested in college issues.”(Director #30).
“We just go clinical and do our classes. No one ever really looks into how other people
get things done.” (Director #36).
Identification
“Our thrust over the last five years has been to become more like other departments, but
we always end up looking at ourselves and seeing that we're different. (Director
# 1).
“We work harder than other faculty—there's a lot of anger deep down!” (Faculty
Member, #1).
“We tend to say to ourselves that our content is different, that our students are different,
and that we have different needs [than other units]. (Director #2).
“Nursing faculty are neither fish nor fowl. We always have to deal with two
bureaucracies, and we don’t really know where we fit!” (Director #2).
“We set ourselves apart. It's almost as though we want to be in the college and we don't
want to be in the college.” (Director #2).
“Nursing faculty never really belong to the hospital staff and they don't belong to the
college faculty-it’s a mindset.” (Director #2).
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“Being nurses, we are used to making do with very little—we know how to improvise.”
(Director #3).
“Nurses have been improvising for a thousand years-that's why we don't get as upset [at
budget cuts] as the people over in psych, for example.” (Director #5).
‘T h is faculty is not really politically oriented.” (Director #7).
“Our faculty identify with their clinical teaching duties.” (Director #13).
“The first loyalty of the nursing faculty here is to nursing. I mean, they even put on a
separate graduation.” (Former Associate Director #13).
“In general, one of the things about nursing faculty in our district is that they have been
non-joiners. They're not in the union or the senate.” (Associate Director #22).
“Most of our faculty associate themselves more with the teaching aspect of the job than
with the global college operation!” (Director #27).
“The faculty in this department identify less with the campus as a whole and more with
nursing concerns.” (Director #32).
“I think most of our faculty are not political in their own personal lives.” (Director #32).
“W e’re tired. When you add up all the teaching time and obligations to students and
department meetings-it's a lot!” (Faculty member #35).
“Like many nursing faculties, this group tends not to be particularly active
organizationally!” (Director #37).
“Our faculty members consider themselves nurses first and educators second.” (Director
#37).

isolation
“W e’re really isolated, not only because we're off campus so much, but our building is
set off from the rest of the college.” (Faculty Member, #1).
“Some of our faculty isolate themselves and it’s their fault they're not on committees.”
(Faculty member, #1).
“We're accused of being very ivory tower!” (Faculty Member, #1).
“The nurses always seem to be in the hospital—their not on campus much which causes
some people to feel they're kind of elitist!” (Vocational Education Dean, #1)
“The nursing faculty is not involved on campus—this somewhat reflects the fact that they
are off campus so much!” (Dean of Instruction, #3).
“The nursing faculty isn't very much involved in the college as a whole,” (Director #4).
“We're really isolated from what's going on in the college. (Faculty Member, #7).
“Sometimes I feel like a bastard relative of the college faculty. People I've seen for 20
years I still don’t feel like I know!” (Faculty Member, #7).
“We have very little interaction with other faculty. We don't even see them at lunch
because that's when our department meetings are! (Faculty Member, #9).
“Some of the science faculty tried in the past to organize social functions, but nursing
didn’t support i t ” (Faculty Member, #9).
“The nursing faculty here seems to prefer their own company!” (Division Dean, #10).
“The nursing faculty here has always isolated themselves—they’ve never gone out and
intermingled and tried to put across what they're doing.” (Former Associate
Director, #13)
“We tend to be isolated from the rest of the campus.” (Faculty member, #13).
“The nurses aren’t on campus much, so we don't see much of them. Their classes are
housed over on a comer of the campus.” (Admissions director, #13).
“The nursing faculty on this campus isn't active in campus affairs. They claim their
clinical assignments don't allow them enough time.” (Dean of Instruction, #14).
“The faculty are off campus a lot, and so I guess you can say they aren't very visible,”
(Director #15).
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“We are off campus so much that we really feel cut off from the campus!” (Faculty
Member, #15).
“Only one of our faculty is involved in the college-there just isn’t time.” (Director #17).
“Our faculty is isolated. Some of it is kind of self-induced—I mean they just sort of stay
in this little area [department suite].” (Director #27).
“Our director brings us information, but we don't get to involved down on campus.
We're in the hospital,” (Faculty Member, #27).
“I’m not sure, just as an instructor, where all that money [college budget] is going—some
of my colleagues are more involved in the global college operation than I am.”
(Faculty member, #27).
“We just stay in our own little area. Other faculty think we are isolated and elitist—I've
heard th at” (Director, #29).
“Faculty from other departments don’t expect us to come [to meetings]—they say, 'Oh
you're in the hospital all the time!” (Faculty Member, #30).
“We are the biggest department on campus and we are the least involved in the
organization. Many times decisions were made and we’re the last to know!”
(Director #32).
“The majority of time we are off campus, and we are also isolated physically from the rest
of the campus.” (Director #32).
“We don't really get to know our faculty peers— our campus is designed on a house
system and there's no faculty dining area—there are people teaching here twenty
years you don’t really know.” (Faculty Member, #32).
“Only one nursing faculty member out of eighteen seems to have any interest outside the
department!” (Division Dean, #32).
“Our nursing faculty is very good, but they do keep to themselves!” (College planning
director, #35).
“There is a feeling-kind of an undertow, you know-that the nurses are so cliquish!”
(Automotive mechanics faculty member, #35).
“The nurses, you know, they're over there on the comer of the campus.” (Biology faculty
member, #35).
“The nursing department chair is the only one from the department on committees-the
rest are in the hospital.” (Vocational Education Dean, #38).
“We're in the hospital so much that we’re really ignorant as far as college politics is
concerned.” (Faculty Member, #40).
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Appendix P
Nursing Faculty Attitudes and Perspectives on Budget Governance
“I keep a copy of our budget here in the office, but nobody comes in to look at it.”
(Director #1).
“This nursing faculty is not really budget-oriented.” (Director #2).
“I was probably the only one aware of the budget because that's my bag—this group
[nursing faculty] knows it's an interest of mine!” (Director #2).
“The budget here is strictly an administrative process. Our faculty feels powerless-they
have no role in deciding how the funding is divvied up!” (Director #3).
“I don't see the [college] budget because I'm not the department head right now.”
(Associate director, #4).
“There seems to be varying degrees of how much they care. Some pay attention, but
others don't care about it[budget] as long as they don’t suffer.” (Director #5).
“My faculty doesn’t want to be involved [in the budget]. They say, you take careof
that.” (Director #7).
“People at the department level aren't really involved in budget planning!” (Director #7).
“It hasn't been worth it to me to get upset about anything-the budget is so out of my
hands. I just concentrate on trying to become a better teacher.” (Faculty member,
#7).
“Most people on this campus don't have any idea about how the budget is constructed!”
(Faculty member, #7).
“We're [nursing faculty] ignorant about the budget process.” (Director #8).
“The budget is pretty much dictated by the administration.” (Director #9).
“Our faculty doesn't feel they have any influence over the [college] budget atall!
(Director #9).
“This faculty [nursing] isn't interested in the budget—not even the nursing budget! I bring
it to meetings and they don't even look at it!” (Director #10).
“As long as there's enough money left to get what they want for their own classes, they
don't seem to care!” (Director #13).
“There are faculty on the district budget committee, but they have no role in the
decisions.” (Director #13).
“The faculty here doesn’t know what's going on with the budget—I seriously doubt if the
deans really know or have any clout!” (Director #13).
“The faculty here is a lot more interested in nursing issues than the college budget.”
(Director #13).
“The budget is kind of a ponderous process with no definitive protocol-its one of those
gray areas you're never quite sure of!” (Director #14).
“The budget is something that seems very far removed from
our daily
routines.”(Director #21).
“The outcome [of budget committee deliberations] seems a foregone conclusion and our
faculty doesn't want to be a rubber stamp.” (Director #21).
“The nursing faculty is just too busy with clinical labs to worry about the budget.”
(Director #21).
“The faculty isn't involved in college budget construction.” (Director 22).
“The faculty here has absolutely no control over the [college] budget-those decisions fall
strickly to the administrators.” (Director #23).
‘There’s a mystique about the budget that is prevalent with my faculty as with other
faculties on this campus. I think they feel there is little or nothing they can do to
influence the process!” (Director #24).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

403
“The college budget is public information, but this group doesn’t see it-they don't even
look at the nursing budget. They want me to take care of them.” (Director #24).
“We saw the rest of the campus in the same situation, and it didn't seem like there was
anything we could do about it anyway!” (Director#27).
‘W e have our wish-list, but as far as the allocation of money—it's just kind of an
administrative thing-at least it has been here.” (Faculty member, #27).
“They [nursing faculty members] don't even look at cm budget!” (Director #29).
“They [nursing faculty] don't seem to care about the budget-as long as they get their
paycheck!” (Director #29).
“I don't think our faculty is very interested in budget governance—they don’t see it as a
real priority.” (Director #31).
“Our faculty identifies budget concerns as belonging to the director and the division
chair!” (Director #32).
“They [nursing faculty] verbalized their frustrations [about the budget] to me, and
expected me to implement change.” (Director #32).
“I scheduled budget priority meetings, but nobody came.” (Director #33).
“Unpredictable funding drives everybody nuts. We [nursing faculty] don't like it, but its
not something we feel we have any choice over.” (Director #33).
“I used to send out memos to everyone asking for their budget input and requests, but
they would go largely unanswered!” (Director #36).
“It has never been clear what influence, if any, the budget committee has on this campus.”
(Director #37).
“The faculty crucified me [for the cutbacks]. They thought I should have been able to do
something.” (Director #40)
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Appendix Q
Surprise, Shock, Anger, Guilt, Fear, and Demoralization
as Responses to Termination Proposals
“I never thought jv£ would be cut. I mean, I was trying to help other schools where they
were having RIFs, but I didn’t think jvg would be hit.” (Director #1).
“I couldn't get our people to focus on the situation. I finally called in a consultant to help
us organize ourselves.” (Director #1)
“It's like this whole thing was happening, and the newspapers had been talking about it,
but again we didn't think it was going to touch us at all!” (Faculty member#1).
“We knew the college was having a deficit, but I don’t think anybody thought it would
impact our faculty.” (Faculty member, #1).
“Out of the blue, we got word that half our department would be getting pink slips.”
(Faculty member, #1).
“We were nationally and internationally known for our innovations. We couldn't believe
they were going to cut us.” (Faculty member, #1).
“Some of us wonder whether the director was informed. She says she wasn't.” (Faculty
member, #1).
“All the decision were made behind the scenes—there was never any discussion with us
before this happened.” (Faculty member, #1).
“We were in shock-at first. We couldn't even talk about d in our faculty meetings.”
(Faculty member, #1).
“Nothing like this ever happened to us before.” (Faculty member, #1).
“W e were stunned by what happened.” (Faculty member, #1).
“We were so frightened as a group.” (Faculty member, #!).
“What can you do? They can just zap the program and you're lost.” (Faculty member,
# 1).
“Everybody was depressed. The morale was terrible-nobody wanted to teach.” (Faculty
member, #1).
“We were depressed. We had no power and we didn't get support from the rest of the
campus.” (Faculty member, #1).
“When you're told so many times that they no longer need, it affects your self-esteem.”
(Faculty member, #1).
“The decision was completely irrational and unfair.” (Faculty member, #1).
“The faculty didn't know where to put their anger, so they put some of it on our director.”
(Faculty member, #1).
“We were angry. Why is this happening to us? Why is nursing taking a bigger cut than
anybody else?” (Faculty member, #1).
“There were divisions in the group. It was like, “You're OK, I'm not OK.'“ (Faculty
member, #1).
“I didn’t get a pink slip, but I couldn't sit by and do nothing when some of my friends
might lose their jobs.” (Faculty member, #1).
“We had no idea this was coming.” (Faculty member, #2).
“I think people are really concerned about their jobs.” (Faculty member, #2).
“I felt threatened—there were people in the district who might lose their jobs who had
more tenure than I did.” (Faculty member, #2).
“Our director warned us this would happen, but I think everybody was sort of
complacent.” (Faculty member, #2).
“Our director tried to warn us, but I think most people think it won't happen.” (Faculty
member, #2).
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“We tried going to the academic senate, but they didn't seem to care about what was
happening to us.” (Faculty member, #2).
“What could we do? We were really down-depressed as a matter of fact.” (Director #6).
“I think people knew at some point we might be cut-but it was still a shock.” (Director
#6).
“We were shocked. The administration had always been so supportive.” (Associate
director, #10).
“All of us feared for our jobs. After the president came to talk to us that day, we thought
they might actually terminate our program.” (Faculty member, #10).
“Our director told us, 'I don't know anything more than you do.'“ (Faculty member,
# 22).
“They'd been talking about a cutback for years, but nothing ever happened.” (Faculty
member #22).
“We felt our program was very viable and not at risk. We have a beautiful facility, and
with all the money involved, we didn't think they’d chose to cut us.” (Faculty
member, #22).
“It never occurred to us that our program would be affected. We were the one nursing
program in the district with our own building—I guess we thought we were safe.”
(Faculty member, #22).
“We didn't think it would ever happen. We thought that in a service oriented program
like ours, the community would back us.” (Faculty member, #22).
“We [nursing] got shafted, there’s no two ways about it—we were just dumped on. At
the start, people were really angry and hostile—now, I guess we've kind of
accepted it [the layoffs].” (Faculty member, #22).
“We knew they had plans to regionalize, but in the future. It was never something that
had any imminency-I never anticipated them closing schools.” (Faculty member,
#22).
“I didn't know until a couple of days before we got our letters. I’m not naive, but my
god, I was shocked. I really was.” (Faculty member, #22).
“I never really thought we had much of a chance-I mean all this activity seemed to be
futile to me.” (Faculty member, #22).
“I don't see any support anywhere.” (Faculty member, #22).
“I didn't think there would be layoffs in our department—maybe at one of the other
programs.” (Faculty member, #22).
“People are scared for their jobs—it doesn't seem like there will be a reversal.” (Faculty
member, #22).
“My job isn't at risk-I've got lots of seniority. Some of my colleagues got slips. I feel
so bad for them -that's why I'm going to the meetings.” (Faculty member, #22).
“I guess I feel sort of insecure-saddened, and pretty angry!!” (Faculty member, #28).
“It's all political. You have groups speaking out and some action will be done to appease
them, but if the decision is carried out, those active people can be penalized in
other ways.” (Faculty member, #28).
“I think we thought there might be cuts in the future, but I don't think anybody expected
them now.” (Faculty member, #28).
“Everybody is in the hospital dealing with the students and there are so many distractions
that your're fighting to keep your head above water, let alone saying, 'What's
going to happen now.'“ (Faculty member, #28).
“We weren't involved in the planning—just reacting after the fact.” (Faculty member,
#28).
“Even if they rescind everything, so much damage has been done to morale that it will
take years to recover.” (Faculty member, #28).
“I'm not worried about my jo b -I can work anywhere. I'm concerned about this
program—it's they only school that serves the Hispanic community. I'm
Hispanic-it means a lot to me.” (Faculty member, #28).
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“They [administration] kept pushing us and pushing us to increase, increase, increase.
We have just bad it.” (Faculty member, #35).
“All our energy is gone. They have us doing all these classes and going to all these
meetings that we don't even get paid for—that's against the faculty handbook.”
(Faculty member, #35).
“All the creativity is coming from the parttimers.” (Faculty member, #35).
“We found out about it [termination proposal] in the paper-they [administration] didn't
tell us anything. (Director #38).
“I didn't get a slip yet, but I'm the next down on the list. I'll be the next to go if they cut
some more.” (Faculty member, #38).
“Our morale was low to start with. This [layoffs] just totally zeros it out.” (Faculty
member, #38).
“I don't think anybody
saw this coming. I mean, we had started to envision
regionalization aspart of our future, but not the closing down of a school.”
(Faculty member, #38).
“There wasn't any way to anticipate what happened [termination proposal]. I think our
director probably knew but didn’t tell us. It's almost like we have met the enemy
and they were us!” (Faculty member, #38).
“There were rumors of March 15 letters, but I never thought it would hit the nursing
department We have a waiting list!” (Faculty member, #38).
“This is very threatening. We are all very concerned.” (Faculty member, #38).
“Everyone was very, very shocked!'” (Faculty member, #38).
“Everyone is concerned about their job which is their livelihood, you know.” (Faculty
member, #38).
“Nothing happened at first Then we realized that we had to go out and fight for
ourselves. There was a power struggle going on among the chairs. Some of
them don't like the coalition-our director was afraid that we might make the board
angry.” (Faculty member, #38).
“The administration is going to do what the administration is going to do.” (Faculty
member, #38).
“I was angry. They equated jis with football!” (Director #39).
“I think no matter what we do, the administration is going to dictate what's going to be
done.” (Faculty member, #38).
“My concern is for the students—what are they going to do?” (Faculty member, #38).
“We knew the college was having problems, but we never thought it would lead to
anything serious for our department.” (Faculty member, #39).
“There were no signs that layoffs were coming. I was invited down to the dean's office
and he said your're going to lose three faculty—I'll never forget it.” (Director
#40).
“I think it was ten days before I could get our people rallied. It took a while for them to
believe that this was going to happen.” (Director #40).
“We were thinking how could they do that. I mean we were in a community college and
we were meeting a community need!” (Faculty member, #40).
“It's real scary. You get a registered letter saying they may lay you off, and your are
entitled to a hearing and to an attorney to represent you. It's a very unsettling
thing to go through.” (Faculty member, #40).
“We were in such shock. And it's all you can do just to handle the students.” (Faculty
member, #40).
“We were immobilized at first. We couldn't do anything.” (Faculty member, #40).
“There was a lot of anger-it was awful.” (Faculty member, #40).
“We were too demoralized to do much-our response was to redistribute the work so we
wouldn't have to change our curriculum. (Faculty member, #40).
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“We were frozen with immobility. Unless somebody comes at you with an ax, I don't
think that when people are theoredcally threatened they do as much to protect
themselves as when they are really threatened.” (Faculty member, #40).
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Appendix R
Causal Theories and Members' Search for Explanations
“There were two people on the board who had taken positions and said things that made
us think they were against women. “ (Director #1).
“There was a big question in our minds about the need for layoffs. The president at the
time was not trustworthy, and we were all suspicious!” (Faculty member, #1).
“We didn't know the details of the budget-we thought they had hidden money
somewhere.” (Faculty member, #1).
“They look for the most expensive department and its always nursing, and if they feel
they have to cut, then let's cut nursing.” (Faculty member, #1).
“We heard the college was having trouble financially, but we were suspicious that
finances were not the real cause.” (Faculty member, #1).
“We felt the cuts had something to do with our being women.” (Faculty member, #1).
‘W e knew the administrators were anti-women. I mean, they had made a lot of
statements.” (Faculty member, #1).
“I think they put the screws to the nursing department because they were hoping the
hospitals would come up with some money.” (Faculty member, #1).
“Our vice president for instruction didn't like nursing—he had been at another college
where he also cut nursing.” (Faculty member, #1).
“What happened from my perspective is that the layoffs focused on female faculty-it was
a very sexist thing.” (Faculty member, #1).
“Some of us feel that it was because we were women that we were getting it.” (Faculty
member, #1).
“We knew the cuts were coming from Sacramento, but we still looked at it as, who is this
that is promoting this?” (Faculty member, #1).
“The budget may have been a factor, but there was 112 move to layoff people in
administration.” (Faculty member, #1).
“I don't think it's a woman's issue, I mean I don't get uptight about female stuff. I'm not
sure what's going o n -I think there are just a few people who really know what's
going on.” (Faculty member, #2).
“When they start cutting, they cut the most expensive programs, and they classify nursing
as expensive.” (Faculty member, #2).
“I'll tell you frankly, the administration here will do anything I tell them to do with regard
to nursing, anything.” (Director #4).
“The administration leaves nursing alone. We have a very large program and a very
active, powerful community advisory committee.” (Director #4).
“Nursing has no power. Sometimes we feel like poor little stepchildren.” (Director #13).
“Nursing here is at the bottom in terms of clout” (Faculty member, #13).
“There are those who feel the RN program takes too much money and would rather see
our budget to to them.” (Director #15).
‘W e are always under the gun from administration that nursing is expensive.” (Faculty
member, #20).
“Administration is always on our backs about being the most expensive program in the
district.” (Faculty member, #21).
“The president of the college does not support nursing because of the expense involved.”
(Faculty member, #22).
“They said they were looking at the high cost of the programs, but I think it was just a
bunch of stuff to justify their plan!” (Faculty member, #22).
“The VP of district personnel doesn't like nursing-she closed down the health service at
VocTech.” (Faculty member, #22).
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“The district needs to show Sacramento they're doing something.” (Faculty member,
# 22 ).
“I don't think its money—they even told us it wasn't. I think one of the reasons they pick
on nursing is because it's a majority female role.” (Faculty member, #28).
“I believe in my heart that it's politics—there is some sort of union-busting being done by
the district” (Faculty member #28).
“I heard that Deukmejian is after the chancellor because the district is poorly managed.”
(Faculty member, #28).
“I don't think it has anything to do with money-my understanding is that the district got a
windfall from the lottery.” (Faculty member, #28).
“I think it's political—the program they're closing is integrated, largely Asian—lots of
Filipinos. There's another program with worse problems, but it's black.”
(Faculty member, #28).
“It's a sexist attitude. They think we're not going to react, that we’ll be subservient.”
(Faculty member, #28).
“I think our president knew I would fight back and hoped I would generate some financial
support from the community.” (Director #34).
“We didn't want to believe it [that the program was targeted] because we were a female
department, but we wondered.” (Director #34).
“I think someone is trying to make clout for themselves-the higher ups in
administration.” (Faculty member, #38).
I don't know whether it is political—I do think the district is in financial straits. A lot of
people are alluding to mismanagement-I don't know, I really
haven't studied i t ” (Faculty member, #38).
“It's [terminations] budgetary to a point, but it's political too.” (Faculty member, #38).
“It all depends on who has the power, and nursing certainly doesn’t.” (Faculty member,
#38).
“The administration here is very opportunistic. I think they thought I'd roll over and play
dead, but I picked up the gauntlet” (Director #39).
“Our president was a hatchet man. That's what the board hired him for.” (Director #39).
“Yes, the community colleges were hurting, but this college started cutting back early. It
didn't seem like it was a budget problem.” (Faculty member, #39).
‘There was a tone—'If you're a good girl, OK, if not, no.” (Director #40).
“The president at the time didn't respect nurses. He had a coconut head on his desk—you
know, with a face painted on it-it was wearing a nurses cap. We asked him to
put it away, but he refused.” (Faculty member, #40).
“We really felt it wa a man-woman issue as well as everything else.” (Faculty member,
#40).
“We felt our president didn't mind offending some of the women up on the hill as much
as the men down on campus.” (Faculty member, #40).
“Our director didn’t have a good relationship with the dean. He got mad when we
changed divisions. That's what started it.” (Faculty member, #40).
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The Legislature finds and declares that there shall be a
moratorium
on
the
implementation
of
the
Los
Angeles
Community College District reform plan.
Further that, no
funds shall be allocated to the Los Angeles Community
College
District
for
declining
enrollment
unless
the
district submits a report to the Chancellor's Office on its
district reform plan and the following requirements are
satisfied:
(1)

That the study include,
but not be limited to, an
impact
assessment
on student
access,
student
enrollment,
faculty
displacement,
reassignment,
terminations, and management.

(2)

The study describe in detail the plan for lay-offs,
reassignment,
discontinued
programs
in
divisions,
departments, and student
services offices,
and other
management actions.

(3)

The study be submitted to the Chancellor's Office for
their review to determine whether the proposed plan
will cause a decline in student access.

(4)

If
be
be
to

the Chancellor's Office determines that there will
a decline in student access, the district will not
eligible for any declining enrollment funds pursuant
this item.

The Chancellor's Office shall certify to the Director of
Finance
whether
declining
enrollment
funds
should
be
allocated
to
the
Los
Angeles
District.
Immediately
following certification, the Department of Finance shall
notify
the
J t . Legislative
Budget
Committee
of
the
Chancellor's
Office
recommendation.
If
the
Director
determines that funds should be provided to the Los Angeles
District, the Director shall do so subject to approval of
the J t . Legislative Budget Committee within 30 days of
notification
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Appendix S (con’d)

Ch. 186 1

497

STATUTES OF 1986

**18. The amount appropriated in schedule (ex) shall be available for staff develop*
ment in community colleges. The Chancellor's Office shall allocate these funds
to districts on the basis of ADA and subject to the approval of the Department
of Finance. In addition, funding for staff development shall be contingent upon
review and approval by the Joint Legislative Budget Committee pursuant to
Section 28.00.”
...
! am eliminating the 92,143,000 legislative augmentation for the Disabled Student
Program. TTiese funds were requested to serve additional disabled students in the
community colleges. While I am supportive of this program, I believe it Is critical that
the Chancellor's Office provide better information on the number of.students needing
services and the cast of providing servici's. Until such infarmuliou is provided, wr
cannot determine the need for additional funding and cannot, therefore, justify this
augmentation._______________
I am deleting Provision ib, which woula prohibit me Lot Angcics Community
OaHeg" District from implementing reforms and recotving aid for declining enroll*
menta until the district submits a report demonstrating that Its reforms will not cause
a decline In student access.
"19. The Legislature flnds and declares that there shall be a moratorium on the
Implementation of the Los Angeles Community College District reform plan.
Further, that no funds shall be allocated to the Los Angeles Community Col
lege District for declining enrollment unless the district submits a report to the
Chancellor's Office on its district reform plan, Including, but not limited to, an
impact assessment on student access, student enrollment, faculty displace*
ment, reassignment, terminations, and management and a description, in de
tail, of the plan for layoffs, reassignment, discontinued programs in divisions,
departments, and student services offices, and other management actions.
This study shall be submitted to the Chancellor’s Office for its review to
determine whether the proposed plan will cause a decline in student access
If the Chancellor’s Office determines that there will be a decline in student
access, the district will not lie eligible for any declining enrollment fund
pursuant to this item.
The Chancellor's Office shall certify to the Director of Finance and the Joint
Legislative lludgct Committee whether declining enrollment funds should In*
allocated to the Los Angeles Community College District.”
Management of community college districts is a local responsibility. The Los Ange
les Community College District is facing a severe financial crisis and must make some
difficult decisions. If the Legislature believes that there should be additional oversight
of local community college governing boards, then it should address its concerns
through supurate legislation, rather thun through the Budget Act.
As a result of my actions, the total Ccncrul Fund locul assistance budget for com
munity colleges for 1986-87, including this Item and Item 6870-111-001, will be $84.3
million higher than for the current yc.:tr, which is a 7.1 percent increase.
Item 6870-101-782—For local assistance, Board of Governors of California Communi
ty Colleges. I revise Provision I of this item.
I am revising Provision 1, as follows:
"1. The amount appropriated in this item is available on a one-time basis for the
purpose of providing community college districts with funds 13 replace instruc
tional equipment. The Chancellor shall allocate these funcs to the districts
provided that any allocation would be subject to a 25 percent local match. The
Ghinccillor Ahull mIaUMi tnlAfM fef llie wttvAf o f the wwilththg fotiuiroHwut
fr* hfr f her jwlgwienh * * * * * * provide m>l«hh»g ftmih
wMhtmt financial hardnhipi The Chancellor thaU ew w ilt with the Popartntcnt

t
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Community college districts huvc historically ullocotod u portion of their apportionmo, * funding for instructional equipment und it is appropriate that the d is t r ic t s
maintain this effort. With maintenance of district efforts, the additional State funding
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